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FIRST STEPS

TOWARDS

SOCIAL SCIENCE.

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STRONG AND FREE

OR

FIRST STEPS TOWARDS SOCIAL SCIENCE.

BY THE AUTHOR OF
'MY LIFE, AND WHAT SHALL I DO WITH IT?'
'RECORDS OF THE MINISTRY OF THE REV. E. T. MARCH PHILLIPPS,'
'THE BATTLE OF THE TWO PHILOSOPHIES.'

27394

'The final cause of all science and all philosophy is the enrichment of human life; the quickening of its powers; the enlarging of its capacities; the making it in some respect or other nobler, mightier, fairer than before.'

DR. MAGBE.

LONDON:
LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO.
1869.

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TO THE

REV. S. H. MACAULAY, M.A.

RECTOR OF HODNET,

BY WHOSE ADVICE THIS WORK WAS FIRST UNDERTAKEN,

AND WITHOUT WHOSE FRIENDLY ENCOURAGEMENT

IT WOULD NEVER HAVE BEEN COMPLETED,

IT IS NOW GRATEFULLY INSCRIBED

BY THE AUTHOR.

TO MY

THOUGHTFUL FELLOW-COUNTRYWOMEN.

THE over-generous reception given by you some years ago to my first little essay, whilst it has encouraged me to write again, has made it doubly incumbent on me not to offer any but the best considered work I can give. The book for which I now ask your attention, and which has pleasantly and painsfully occupied me for the best part of the last six years, is the natural sequel of that former one; and though it is very far from what I had hoped it might become, yet the time is passing, and social changes now are rapid, nor do I imagine that any further revision on my part would much amend it. Again I write for women only; and again I have endeavoured, if it may be, to afford some help and throw some light on a subject which at this time much engages their thoughts and hearts. In my first essay, speaking of the different ways of social usefulness open to educated women, it seemed unnecessary to go into any matters more profound than the practical occupations of their outer lives. The questions which now occupy the attention of the most thoughtful women in this country, concern the just position of women in the nation; and can be adequately understood only by

examining the constitution and the relations, the causes and conditions of society itself. But whilst, on the one hand, no fragmentary study of one portion of society arbitrarily isolated from the rest, can lead us to any just conclusions: on the other, Social Science is a region too vast, and at present too little explored, to be dealt with as a whole. In this difficulty I have only tried to trace out one footpath out of the many that might be taken through it; and that not because I thought it to be the main road, but because it seemed to me one of the least intricate, and one of those best marked by the pioneers of our Science. I must however warn my younger readers, that the subject is of that nature, that all right paths through it must needs lead up hill; and the ablest pathfinder can only clear and mark out the steps that must be taken; he cannot spare us the labour of mounting them.

I have taken two specific questions: how can men become strong; and how can men become free; both of equal importance to the well-being of society, and so closely allied together as to be virtually one; and I have endeavoured to discover the conditions necessary for their realisation, first in the case of individual persons, and then in the case of a nation. I have followed the guidance of writers of acknowledged authority in these matters; as the number of quotations of itself will show, this book is a compilation from these, not an original work: much that could not be marked as direct quotation, is adapted to its place from their writings; and there are some passages which have I fear in the course of repeated transcription slipped away from their intended references, and which I cannot now retrace. My highest ambition has been to act as a faithful collator, and sometimes as an interpreter of those great men's labours: in whatever I have added of my own, my aim has been to suggest thought,

not to teach opinions. This will explain why questions are frequently raised, which are not answered; many of which in truth I know not how to answer. The form (itself a borrowed one) of discussion, has enabled me to state various opinions, and to bring forward objections that have been raised against the principles stated, more briefly and perhaps with less formality. The discussers—I could not attempt to delineate characters — are intended for impersonal representative shadows of classes of women common amongst us, from the girl of the period as many of us find, and finding love her; to the accomplished advocate of women's rights; and to the English matron, as it seems to me she is, and as I hope she ever will be.

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WHY WE WISHED TO CONSULT SOCIAL SCIENCE.

THIS was how our conferences began. All the hot June day, Mrs. Melcombe, Miss St. John and I had sat under the lime trees which crown the bank above Holme Manor, enjoying the perfection of that true summer weather and—on the part of my two companions—that well-earned summer idleness. We sat each with an open book which was little read; each with the pretence of work, which only Mrs. Melcombe did; sometimes playing with the two baby children, Minnie and Boy, who with shouts of laughter never tired of rolling down the mossy bank before us, and stumbling up again hand in hand: sometimes listening dreamily to the summer sounds from the fields below us, and to the summer murmur from the leafy domes above us; and sometimes talking together of that which mostly troubled Mrs. Melcombe last year—her sister Sara's strong desire to find some distinct object for which to employ herself, other than that of marriage in general to nobody in particular, as that heart-whole young person was used mockingly to describe the end for which her sister-in-law had mentally destined her.

It was a pretty spot: the lower branches of the limes, sweeping down to the ground with their peculiarly graceful curves, and lying far along the soft turf, formed an impenetrable wall of shade on every side but one, the south-west, where they had been propped up or bent aside to open a way into this natural tent, and a view from it of the far-off horizon with its dim sea-line and deep blue hills; of the richly wooded plain, with its silvery river and many spire and tower-crowned city, that stretched itself out far and wide

below us, basking and shimmering all day in the blaze of sunshine, now softened by the light veil of mist that was beginning to steal up from its streams and out of its woods: immediately on the right we looked down on the twisted chimneys and grey gables of the old manor house, buried in trees or covered with creepers as all the rest of it is; and on the left lay a small and formal garden of crimson, blue, gold and white. At this hour when the springing up of the light breeze from the sea generally aroused us to a greater state of animation; a still more refreshing mental breeze usually reached us with the return of our host Dr. Melcombe from his daily work in the University, in which he is a professor. But this evening it was a flood-tide of excitement that reached us: for a Social Science branch association of the most advanced and spirited character was just concluding its annual session, by what Sara called "a grand women's field-day:" and she had insisted on her brother's taking her to attend the discussions. She had set off with high expectations of finding entire satisfaction and edification: she came home, as we mostly do return from such gatherings, thoroughly interested, somewhat perplexed, and much dispirited. She poured out a brilliant and rapid summary of all she had heard: the details of women's degradation in fashionable society; in the middle classes; in manufacturing towns; in village fields; in England and in India: of the schemes for their self-support and independence; for their legal and social emancipation; for their higher education; for raising them to their proper position in society; for organizing their strength in religious and benevolent works; and of the social millenium which is to follow. And then, when she had ended, and the storm of our questions had somewhat abated, she turned to her brother and said almost fiercely; "What is the good of all this talking,—you said all this last year, and the year before that; and you will say it next year, and next, and next after that. Why don't you do it, or else get out of the way and let us do it—do something at least,—for all that sickening misery you talk of." The

Professor raising himself from the mossy bank with an air of sleepy astonishment, replied; "I never said it any year, and I am going to do something. That heap of papers will take me half the night to correct for my class to-morrow: surely a man may have time for one cup of coffee? But you are very welcome to do them without coffee if you particularly wish it: only to be sure half of them are Greek;—or ought to be," he added doubtfully.

"Yes," said Sara: "that's just what Mrs. Charlton said this morning: you men have meanly kept all the education to yourselves, and so you have all the educated work of the world to do: and your brains are worn out with too much work, whilst women's dwindle away for want of any. Why don't you give us some of your education?"

Dr. Melcombe. The only education worth having is self-education and we can't give you that. Besides now you are so very much grown up, I should say work is the only real education for you.

Sara. What work? will you let me choose it and go to it?

Dr. Melcombe. Let you! My dear child aren't you of age now, how on earth could I prevent you?

Sara. Just as if being of age has anything to do with it. Of course you prevent me, you and Emily too, by not wishing me to go.

Her brother began to speak more seriously. "I'm sorry I can't oblige you then; but as for wishing you to go away, and bind yourself by vows, at your age and with so little experience, to spend your life in a sisterhood I altogether dislike—why I simply cannot wish it: I don't know how to wish it.

Sara. If I married to-morrow you would not think me too young to bind myself by vows for life.

Dr. Melcombe. No, that's true; not if I knew and trusted the man you married, and had got your settlements ready. I know how married people live and what they do. I don't know how sisterhoods live nor what sisters generally become.

Sara. But I do not want to go into a sisterhood, if I could get work to do without.

Dr. Melcombe. I am very glad of that: but have you thought really what it is you want to do?

Sara. I don't know how to set about it; but what I want is to be of some use to women: if this college were open, I should like to go there for three years, and then try to get a tutorship in it, that I might help those young governesses, who can't pay for instruction; or in the middle class schools. Or there are the hospitals—one could learn to nurse there, and then help to teach other women who would earn their living by nursing well. Anything in the shape of a profession —a settled work one was bound to do, would be better worth living for.

Dr. Melcombe. Than what?

Sara. Than living luxuriously and uselessly at home, as I am doing now, and marrying at last just to make another easy home:—living on for ever in the same round of comfort and play, with all this misery and struggle going on round one, and quietly letting it grow.

Dr. Melcombe. Well if you seriously wish, on reflection, to try some such work, we must see about it. It's decidedly a lower class of work—lower in its importance to the nation— than a married woman's work, a Christian woman's I mean. But it may suit you better; if you prefer it so much I suppose it will, though I should not have thought it. But I do hope you are not going to choose it from such an utterly rotten notion as that of its being the nobler, or more useful life of the two: such an opinion would show to my thinking not only ignorance of the first rudiments of social science, but that you hold an entirely false theory. Nothing but disappointment can come of acting on false grounds.

Sara. I wish your classes were in the Red Sea, Tom, and then you'd be of some use to one.

Dr. Melcombe. If there is a thing I admire in your genuine philanthropical woman, it is her malevolence. What use do you want now—a ride?

Sara. It's you that want the ride, you know that very well: what I want is that you should tell us what social

science really has to say about women's position and all that. Does it say that we ought to keep ourselves slightly silly, very ignorant, and altogether dependent, for the general consolation of society? and why are these clever people wrong who want to raise us to the level of men?

Dr. Melcombe. As long as they don't insist on your coming down to our level, I don't see they are wrong in trying to raise yours. Why do you think they are?

Sara. I don't know. They want women to be better educated: they want them to be able to maintain themselves by intelligent work, as little hindered as men are. They want them to be free to enter any profession they choose to try: to make their charitable efforts more systematic and rational; to give them more power in society and to get for them as much protection and justice as men give themselves. And I should like to know why they are wrong?

Dr. Melcombe. Quite right I should say; where do you see the wrong?

Sara. I don't see it, but it rings wrong somehow. Then you come in and say, for all this we are wrong through our false notions of social science, and not considering the whole of society. So now it is your duty to show us the whole, and say what social science teaches as to the way in which these things can be set right.

Dr. Melcombe. A nice sort of question to throw at a man's head. Am I Mephistopheles to show you all the kingdoms of the earth and hand them over to you to reform their fashions?

Sara. Oh that's just what I want to know—about these fashions of society.

Dr. Melcombe. I can tell you all about them, and they are the ugliest ever invented: you'll see them in the new Punch: I got them all up whilst that pretty little woman in a blue feather was exhorting you to use your higher reason instead of your lower. You've got to put your hair high up in a fuzz, and four beetles on the top of that, and a feather,—

Mrs. Melcombe. You had better get ready for your ride, Sara, you will get no more sense out of him till he has had it.

Dr. Melcombe. No no, I will be good—only you ought not to let her throw snails at me. You mean how much of our present social state is artificial and how it can be changed, don't you?

Sara laid down her fourth snail shell. "First of all I should like to be sure that it can be changed, and that it ought to be. How did society get into such a jumble and such extremes as it is in now? was it by the necessity of the case or by men's blunders? And ought we to submit to its present condition and all the habits of life we have grown into, as if they had a divine origin as Emily seems to think; or ought we to rebel against them and break through them because Mephistopheles created them as you say."

Dr. Melcombe. No I don't go as far as that. But I wish you would give us an example what manners and customs you mean?

Sara. Well there is this frightful inequality of money, which they say grows worse the richer the country gets; is it owing to bad laws or men's selfishness—or does it come from natural laws which we cannot alter without mischief. Or this utter idleness of some women, and the slavery of others, are either things God has appointed for some good end, or ought we to try to get rid of both? And then the whole position of women—our political nonentity—our weakness and dependence—our inferior education—our personal subjection; does it come from our own nature, and is it really a good thing for everybody, or is it what can be altered? Is it true that women would be wiser and stronger than they are now, if they were educated as well as men are?

Dr. Melcombe. Was it the discussions to-day that put all that into your head?

Sara. Agatha said that if we have any real social science, it ought to tell us how society got into its present condition, and how it can get out of it. She says if it cannot explain that, she will not believe these little schemes for altering bits of it are scientific at all.

Dr. Melcombe. You want to know how society came to be

constituted in every particular as it is: and whether being so constituted, it can designedly and intelligently modify itself, and command its succeeding condition. Your friend seems to expect that social science shall be completed before it is well begun. Well those questions are beyond me. If you want to find footing in the smaller question, as to the place which educated women like yourself ought to fill in the nation, let us go into it together. When these examinations are over we will get up these papers you have heard, and try what we can make out of them.

Sara overwhelmed Mrs. Melcombe with thanks and praises, assuring her she was the dearest old thing, and vowing she would never teaze her again by wanting to go into a convent. "But Tom if you can really spare the time, you shall not spend it on those papers: you must give us lectures of your own: Mrs. Charlton and Miss St. John shall come to confute you on opposite sides: Agatha will be at home then ready to construe you all to me if you get too sublime for my little wits; and so we shall have it all out."

Dr. Melcombe. No that won't do, they won't want to be bored with it.

Sara. Yes they will: at any rate Mrs. Charlton will want to argue with you; and I know Agatha will be secretly enchanted to hear her handsomely put down.

Dr. Melcombe. Then she will not be gratified: I had much sooner put down your Agatha. Mrs. Charlton is really a very clever woman, and enthusiastic too, which is a rare merit.

Mrs. Melcombe. Something more than clever, she has so much earnestness and so much grace. But I don't think it will do, Sara; those two will never manage to agree together.

Sara. I know they won't: that's just the merit of the plan. The Herr Professor will have to answer both; and you and Aunt Mary shall be the umpires.

"I am afraid," said Mrs. Melcombe turning to me, "we two quiet people will be suffocated with words."

However Sara's plan—as usual I fancy—prevailed, with all but myself. I entirely declined the office of umpire, for which I found myself wholly unfitted. To appease her, I offered instead to be the reporter of the discussions, and was graciously accepted. When they were over, Mrs. Melcombe lent me her husband's notes, thus enabling me to prepare a fuller and more correct account than my memory would have supplied: these notes indeed occupy the main portion of the following pages, which we now submit to the consideration of all those of our thoughtful fellow-countrywomen, who take an equal interest with ourselves in the matters herein discussed.

It was not till a month later, about the middle of July, that Sara summoned us to hear the first of the lectures Dr. Melcombe had promised to prepare. From that time our meetings took place pretty regularly twice a week; and as the weather continued fine we generally held them under the lime-tree grove where they were first planned. The audience consisted of Mrs. Melcombe; whom I may best describe as Dr. Melcombe's wife, Minnie and the Boy's mother, the mistress of Holme Manor, and our hostess; and so complete in each relation, as fully to merit the title of "the gracious lady," which Sara has bestowed upon her: Sara herself, Dr. Melcombe's half sister, who has been living with them since her father's death three years ago. Till then she had grown up in our Cornish village, its chief pride and pet; and it was for the sake of being with her again, I had been induced to accept Mrs. Melcombe's invitation and to spend my summer holidays at their northern home: Agatha Tryanon my cousin, who lives in the village near, and more than shares my admiration tho' not my love for Sara: Miss St. John, the mother of an English sisterhood, who had come to Holme Manor for change and rest after a severe illness brought on by too much work and too great austerity: and Mrs. Charlton, one of the most accomplished and eloquent leaders of the present movement for the legal and social emancipation of women. She is certainly a dis-

tinguished looking woman, tall and graceful, exquisitely dressed, and with a voice so musical and soft that all she says appears becoming. She is also enthusiastic, earnest, and so thoroughly persuaded of the soundness of the newest phases of opinion, and of the superiority of the most modern ideas of progress, that I fancy it has never once occurred to her to question their infallibility. Agatha is a contrast to her in every way, but especially in this, that she so greatly prefers old thoughts to new ones; and the first thing that occurs to her, when any modern idea or advanced opinion forces itself on her attention, is to try and question it away again.

July, 1860.

STRONG AND FREE.

LECTURE I.

OF SOCIAL SCIENCE.

"But I my friend have not leisure for such matters: for I have not yet complied with the precept of the oracle; I am not yet able to know myself. And it seems to me a ridiculous thing, whilst I am in this ignorance, to busy myself with matters that lie at a distance from me. Therefore accepting the popular opinion about those things, I enquire about myself, whether I happen to be a beast with more folds and more furious than Typhon; or whether I am a gentler and more simple animal, naturally partaking of a certain divine and modest condition."—*Phædrus.*

1. Dr. Melcombe began by saying, that the first duty of every lecturer is to state clearly what the subject is which he proposes to discuss, to say what it includes, and to point out its limits. But then generally the lecturer has the advantage of choosing his own subject; or at least of knowing what it is. "I," he said, "have neither; my subject has been set me, and I cannot satisfy myself either as to what it includes, or what it excludes. It seems to me that it embraces the science of man and of all that concerns mankind; most of the physical sciences, all the moral sciences; and the whole of the Divine Science. It appears to embrace as parts of itself, and essential to the working out of its own problems, several sciences which have at present no existence for us, and one that has not even a name, whilst two of its most important branches lie beyond the limits of human knowledge. It has however a name; it is called Social Science. What I have been required to do, is to state some of its results in answer to two distinct sets of questions; the one referring to the natural or true

relations, and to the present position of women in the body politic; the other to the constitution of human society itself. The first is I think something of this sort.

2. The theory is, that in civilized society as it is constituted amongst ourselves,

i. Women have not sufficient opportunity given them for the full growth of their natural abilities.

ii. That they are not left free to use to the best advantage, such power as they do attain to.

iii. That being thus arbitrarily kept in a state of childish dependence and helplessness, they are dwarfed both in body and in mind.

iv. And lastly that the result is not only much loss of happiness to themselves, but that their position in relation to men is artificially depressed much below that which nature intended; that they are not only treated as being, but are actually made to be, much more of burdens than of helps; and thus the bonds of society are weakened and its whole tone demoralized. It is alleged, that if such entire legal subordination of women and of their interests to men and their's, if such unequal dependence were necessary in the dark ages for their personal protection, and as being the only way in which women's influence could be brought to bear in the humanizing an uncivilized race; yet that such dependence and helplessness of one half of the human race involves a great loss to the whole, and is unnecessary when law has become paramount over brute force; and that its legal perpetuation now is purely evil, at once creating the weakness it was intended to remedy in women, and the selfishness it was designed to utilize in men, whilst under our altered circumstances, it altogether fails to draw out in them any generous or chivalrous feeling. Have I stated your case correctly?

Mrs. Charlton assented, and added that the injustice is notorious, and that as long as men alone make our laws it will continue.

Mrs. Melcombe warmly denied: It is much happier for women to be dependent on their own husbands, and it is not society but God's will, and her own nature, that has made woman so.

Agatha. If nature has made her so, most likely nature

will keep her so, without any arbitrary legal privations for women, and arbitrary legal rights for men.

Mrs. Melcombe. Good laws must enforce natural distinctions.

Mrs. Charlton. One of our greatest legal authorities has declared in the House of Lords, that English law is so utterly unjust to women it would be idle to attempt to do them justice in a single case.*

Mrs. Melcombe. Well one cannot expect the world to be set right at once: when men once become convinced of the injustice of a law, they always begin to talk about how it is to be mended. We had much better trust them in patience, than meddle with what we do not understand.

Mrs. Charlton. Judging from experience one would say women had better trust to Providence to defeat these laws, than to men who have been able to make them in their own interest, to change them in ours.

Agatha. Providence helps those who help themselves.

Professor. Well if we could assume the truth of this statement, the problem before us would be, how this state of things can best be remedied: what education must women receive, and what changes must be made in their legal status, and in the existing relations which our social habits and public opinion have established between men and women. Even this we could not tell without enquiring more accurately into the extent and the nature of the evils complained of, as well as into the causes from which they have arisen.

3. But you are not agreed as to the evils themselves; whether they are evils at all; and if so, whether they are artificial, or necessary. And thus there comes in another set of questions, driving us much further back. What if the present constitution of Society has sprung, in this and in all its essential relations, not out of men's blunders, but out of the action of the laws of human nature and the circumstances of human life; or from express Divine appointment? What if it cannot be materially changed, or if it would be wrong to attempt to change it? What if in trying to change it, we do but fly from inconveniences we know, to far greater evils we

* In Mrs. Norton's trial.

know not of? In short, unless we know how our present social state has become, in all main particulars, what it is; we cannot tell what means will effect any real improvement in it, or even what changes will be for the better. These then are the questions which social science has to answer; and these things it ought to tell us. Nor can we get to any certain conclusions on the special questions you have raised, until it has told us. For how can the true remedy be found for one or two evils which form parts of a complicated state of things, the causes of which are mostly undetermined, and wherein the effects of any change or new cause are at present incalculable?

4. But these questions it has not yet answered: nor do I know of any notable attempt to reduce what is known about them to a really scientific order: in truth, though much has been done in the various branches of this science, the sum of its facts is not yet ripe for scientific investigation and generalization. Instead therefore of telling you what science has determined on the matters about which you are enquiring, I propose to-day to survey very briefly what a complete social science would be; what is the method it prescribes, and what its present condition is. If the only result be to show you how very little is as yet determined, how much a scientific determination is needed, and how very difficult this political science is, you will perhaps be inclined to admit that men's selfishness is not the only cause of the evils of which you complain. Perhaps I shall best illustrate the present condition of this science, by asking you to accompany me in the failure of my own attempt to answer the questions first set me. I had, as I have said, to find how certain evils affecting the present social condition of women amongst ourselves have arisen, and how they can be removed.

First of all I had to classify the facts complained of: they resolved themselves into these three: that women amongst ourselves are neither as powerful, as free, or as closely united with men in thought and action, as their own welfare and the good of the commonwealth require they should be.

The next step was to ascertain the causes of this state of things. Now in attempting to discover the causes of any given phenomenon, the first thing to be done is to ascertain

as completely as you can all the instances in which that phenomenon is present; to notice in what other respects these instances agree; to find, if possible, instances of its occurrence which have no other circumstance in common but this of its presence. To ascertain why women amongst ourselves are less powerful, free, and united than they should be, I had to ask whether the same deficiencies exist amongst other classes of people and at other times than ours: whether there are or have been other important classes of mankind equally hindered in making the most of themselves, equally falling short of being what they might become: whether any of them fall short in the same particulars in a markedly less, or markedly greater degree; and under what circumstances these variations in the phenomena take place. I found that the evils complained of as especially affecting women amongst ourselves, are so universal, that they appear to affect the whole mass of mankind at every time, and in all varieties of circumstance. It even seems that although individuals amongst those classes which receive the highest education, and are of the most cultivated races, do occasionally make the most of themselves; yet this only makes more apparent —I do not say more real—how very far on the whole men fall short in these most essential particulars, of what they might and ought to be. I could not but admit for example that this shortcoming is as far more apparent amongst professing Christians than amongst Mahomedans, as it is more disastrous: or in the bulk of our University graduates than in an equal number of national school boys. And several other facts of this kind I noted; until it seemed clear to me, that however much circumstances may aggravate or diminish the apparent effect, yet the permanent cause of the evil must be one that is common to all men, and must therefore be sought for either in human nature itself, or in some condition or circumstance that is coextensive with humanity. And thence I concluded there can be no effectual remedy, unless one can be found that shall on the one hypothesis, amend this fault of our nature; on the other, remove that universal condition or circumstance of its present existence.

When I turned to the specific disadvantages imposed by society on women, I got nearly the same result. On trying

to class these they arranged themselves mainly under three heads: the physical difficulty, of getting a sufficient livelihood; the moral difficulty, of resisting temptation; the intellectual difficulty, of framing definite laws to regulate an indefinite and complex mass of relations, acting under circumstances which it is impossible to foresee, and which have little in common but this, that no two cases ever occur exactly alike. These evils again, are such as the great mass of the human race labour under; and therefore, though the precise forms in which they oppress ourselves may be determined by the circumstances of our nation and the character of our institutions; their true causes, and therefore their effectual remedies, must be sought for in a far wider field than our own. At least this appears certain, that these three classes of evils do not in our country affect women in any special manner. There are large and distinct classes of our population who suffer under the first more than the majority of women do. The difficulty of resisting temptation acts on men to the full as much as on women. The difficulty of wise legislation acts in every direction.

5. Now there are two ways of dealing with these universal evils. We may consider them in themselves and in connection with their causes, and that is the scientific way: but I know of no science, except that of Christian theology, which has attempted so to treat them. Or we may consider their partial and accidental manifestations, in connection with the local and partial causes of the forms they assume in our own country; and this is the empirical way. It is in this way that social reformers and legislators have for the most part attacked our social evils; it is for the accidental manifestation rather than for the essential evil they have sought to find a cure. And herein they have done a very necessary work: for the great burden of our unwieldy material civilization, which has so far outrun our mental cultivation as to become its master, is continually pressing unequally and therefore unjustly on one or another portion of its victims, making it necessary to find some immediate remedy for these special cases as they arise and if possible to ease the burden where it presses unduly.* But this being

* The Factory Act, Sanitary laws against overcrowding; and the Poor Laws, are instances.—*Note by the Professor.*

done in hot haste and without science, by men who look at the immediate suffering without considering its true causes and its ultimate results, (which would in many cases be its true remedy); and who do not foresee the collateral and abiding results which their remedy will produce over and above that immediate effect which they intend; they have too often relieved the hardships endured by one set of people by means which have inflicted equal hardships on a more numerous class; or which have ultimately involved those they tried to relieve, in still greater evils of another kind. And I believe you will generally find, that these collateral and indirect effects of any social change are both more abiding and of wider extent than are its direct results.

And as the view thus taken of the evils to be conquered is very superficial, so the estimate made of their causes is far too narrow. Philanthropical writers are specially prone to err in this, that they discover one or perhaps two of the more obvious causes for the specific evil they are attacking; and then assume that the evil will cease if this cause be removed. Thus the absence of public-houses will make men sober: good drainage and pure air and water will make all wise and moral; and criminals must be protected from themselves, not punished; for had their brains been healthy and their digestions good they would not have committed a crime. Others again having selected as their enemy the great want of liberty under which women suffer,—as though slavery were not the misery of mankind;—assume that the legal restraints imposed upon them by the State, and the moral restraints imposed on them by public opinion, are its only causes.

6. Thus overlooking the real magnitude and number of the causes; the possible effects of the remedies proposed are exaggerated beyond all measure. The favourite panacea now is the diffusion of knowledge and of a better understanding of the laws of health: and if human nature contained nothing more than pure intellect existing side by side but not in union with an animal body, these remedies might be all-sufficient; at any rate they would be all that could be applied. When Mr. Austin asserts, that if the multitude were embued with the leading principles of ethical or of social science, they

would be docile to the voice of reason;* when he urges that if they were adequately instructed in the true principles of population, they would see and adopt the remedy which that law suggests;† when he tells us that nothing but the diffusion of knowledge through the mass of the people will go to the root of the evil of the frequency of crimes against property;‡ he appears to assume that the bulk of mankind are essentially different from that comparatively small sample of men who have already received such instruction, more thoroughly and under far more favourable circumstances for its practice, than even he ever hoped the masses could enjoy. One cannot wonder at the sigh with which Mrs. Austin concludes her revision of this lecture;—"the experience of the thirty years which have elapsed, does not seem to justify the Author's sanguine expectations of the effects of the spread of education amongst the people." She accounts for this failure by the great difference between the kind of instruction actually given, and that which he contemplated. But a crucial instance lay before him, in the conduct of the most thoroughly instructed portion of the community, and with their conduct he was even more dissatisfied than he was with that of the uninstructed. The gigantic crimes against property which have since he wrote so much disgraced our country; the frauds of our railway companies, banks and on the Stock Exchange, have been committed by that very portion of the community who best understand the principles of property. So also of the laws of health: were these more widely understood, it is reasonable to expect the general health of the population would be improved: and the statistics of the last fifty years are said to bear out this expectation. But has it made men more moral, more self-governed? Is it true, as a matter of fact, that a high state of health is favourable to moral self-restraint? Or are those classes who best understand the laws of health, and can best foresee the consequences of transgressing them,—are these in any marked degree superior, in their abstinence from self-indulgence, to their less informed contemporaries? If not, it is clear that something stronger than ignorance leads men to folly; and that something more than the diffusion of sound

* Austin's *Jurisprudence*, vol. i. lecture 3, p. 59.
† Ibid. p. 61. ‡ Ibid. pp. 62-65.

instruction is needed, to make us docile to the voice of reason.

Not less are we in danger of exaggerating the power of education as a cause of the progress of society: but as we shall have to go into this subject at some length, now I will merely suggest one or two cautions. In estimating the effects of any given degree of education there are two facts to be considered: the first is the efficiency of the education given; and this may be increased indefinitely, with the increasing knowledge we may hope to acquire of human nature, of the mind and its laws. The second is the capacity for being educated which the educatee possesses; and this capacity is a personal, an individual thing, which cannot be accumulated by the united efforts of many as knowledge may, and which does not appear to increase as mankind grows older. It seems to me then that we have no warrant from past experience or from psychology, for believing that any possible improvement in the art of education, will bring us to a time when great and wise men will be either more powerful or more numerous than they have been in times past. And this is a point of prime importance, in determining the rate of progress which mankind may be expected to make; and in judging of the amount of progress actually effected in the increasingly rapid whirl of our social or political changes. Perhaps we have better reason for expecting that with an improved and extended education men will on the whole have more capacity for discerning, and more humility for learning, from the great men who may arise amongst them, than they have formerly shown; and if so, the work of these great men will be accomplished more quickly, though not probably more thoroughly, than it has been. But it will very much depend on this, whether education can be at once improved and extended fast enough to hold her own against that rapidly increasing dead weight of society, which is ever striving,—and now with a fearfully growing momentum,—to grind all minds and thoughts and feelings and desires, all that shows a trace of human life, down to the level of an average uniformity.

Another very prevalent exaggeration amongst our profession of social science now-a-days, is that of attributing to the State, or to society in its vague action as "public opinion"

a far greater positive power than it really possesses.* In truth, whilst on the one hand the power of individual persons over society is far greater, than would be willingly admitted by the mass who constitute it, and who would fain atone for their individual insignificance by their collective bigness; on the other hand, the power apparently wielded by society over its individual members is far greater than that which it really exerts. It is itself the subject, and often the unconscious agent of many laws, which it did not create, which it cannot alter, and of which it is for the most part, still ignorant. Even its most consciously voluntary action, its legislation, seldom expresses its real mind, but is the result of that compromise between will and can—between the right, the expediency and the difficulty of the case, to which nations no less than individuals are continually compelled to sacrifice their desires. Of negative and obstructive power society has a good deal; of active and impelling power it has little directly, and what is indirect is not practically under its own management. Above all no State, no legislation, no force of public opinion can make one human being strong or free. Those moral evils which arise from our being human, and therefore subject to temptation, to weakness, to ignorance; to want of thought, to dislike of effort, to various passions; these each one must in the long run conquer for, and by himself. Legislation and philanthropy may put us in some respects in a better position for resisting them; but they can neither save us from being tempted, prevent our yielding, nor—happily for us—avert the punishment.

But I am falling into the very error I am condemning—that of asserting general facts without laying a sufficient basis of specific facts for their support. Remember I am not railing against knowledge: What I want to show you is, how very little social good we can do, how much harm we are sure to do, without it; how vitally important a scientific determination of such social problems as these is, how far we are from having obtained it; and what a very little way any empirical determination of them will carry us.

7. In summing up the present state of social science, two things strike us at once. The first is that the political and

* See Sir G. C. Lewis, *On Authority in Matters of Opinion*, pp. 314, 315.

social facts already ascertained are very insufficient in number, and much too partial in character, to justify any general conclusion except in the way of hypothesis: indeed at present little or no attempt has been made to classify them. The second is this: that the phenomena of society have been considered too much apart from the phenomena and the science of human nature. Indeed the presence of one philosopher amongst our social physicians, is still a startling phenomenon, and has something, I know not what, of ludicrous to many, who yet profess to understand politics very well. As though a physician should pretend to be a master of the medical art, who understood the drugs he employed, but knew not the parts or the constitution of the human body. For as the body politic is but the whole number of individual human beings who constitute it, one would think it obvious they cannot wisely prescribe for the whole, who are ignorant of all. If "all the phenomena of society are phenomena of human nature, and are generated by the action of circumstances upon masses of human beings;"* then we can never have a science of society which does not begin with, and include the science of human nature. The natural results of such an omission are apparent in the whole course of our political action. When a social evil has to be met, no search has been thought necessary after causes that may lie behind the immediate and obvious ones: no clear distinction has been laid down between evils which are remedial, and those which cannot be remedied by legislation: and the accidents of civilisation, which at most only aggravate, and more frequently only manifest the fault of human nature, are constantly treated as though they were the sole causes of that fault itself.

8. And though in the present state of social science these errors may be unavoidable, I cannot see that this makes them less momentous. The consequence is that our state physicians are mostly empirics, "who without regard either of cause in the disease or of the nature and constitution of the patient; go boldly to work with those remedies whereof they had experience in other cases, fall it out as it will."† Thus our legislation is at the best little more than guesswork,

* Mill's *System of Logic*, 5th edition, vol. ii. book 6. ch. 6, 7.

† Holland's *Explanation of Obscure Words*.

a series of attempts to escape from evils much felt but little understood, by remedies the effect of which no one pretends to foresee: and too often it is merely a somewhat cowardly attempt to escape censure by the appearance of doing something, as seemingly, though in the vaguest way, preferable to doing nothing.

From empiricism comes failure: from hopes unreasonably excited come the inevitable reaction of disappointment: from changes begun without light and carried on without sweetness come confusion and bitterness. From all arises a profound hopelessness as to society and social affairs, which tends to make our most thoughtful and most cultivated men fall back from the service of the commonwealth to that of the few elect; from the task of raising the nation to that of perfecting the individual. Despairing of their own commonwealth, and of the human race they are ready to cry

> "Is there confusion in the little isle?
> Let what is broken so remain.
> The Gods are hard to reconcile,
> 'Tis hard to settle order once again.
> There *is* confusion worse than death,
> Trouble on trouble, pain on pain.
> Let us alone. What pleasure can we have
> To war with evil? Is there any peace
> In ever climbing up the climbing wave?
> . . . . . Why should we toil alone—
> We only toil who are the first of things,
> And make perpetual moan
> Still from one sorrow to another thrown;
> Nor steep our brows in slumber's holy balm
> Nor hearken what the inner spirit sings,
> 'There is no joy but calm.'"

9. Let us go on to our next enquiry, What a complete social science would be. I am afraid I must trouble you here with two or three dry definitions.

i. Science is the knowledge of facts in their causes. The knowledge of any complete set or class of phenomena, so arranged as to exhibit their constant relations of connection, of interdependence, and of succession, constitutes the science of that class of facts. These permanent relations we call their laws. You will remember that science does not pretend to tell us why one specific fact always follows, when another specific fact has occurred; it merely tells us that this invari-

able connection of sequence has been ascertained by experience; and thence it infers that it will take place, under like circumstances in the future. This is the use of science, that from the experience of the past, it enables us to foresee the future.*

ii. "Society" is the name we give to a number of individual persons, regarded as uniting to constitute one community of people. "Men in a state of society are still men: their actions and passions are obedient to the laws of individual human nature. They are not converted when brought together into a different substance; they have no properties but those derived from and resolvable into the laws of individual human nature."† The phenomena of Society are those which result from a multitude of human beings living and acting together, and are of three kinds; i. the phenomena of human nature individually; ii. the phenomena which result from men's union; and iii. the phenomena which result from their external circumstances.

iii. "A State of Society is the simultaneous state of all the greater social facts or phenomena. Such are the degrees of knowledge and of intellectual and moral culture existing in the community, and in each class; the state of industry, of wealth and its distribution: the division into classes and the relations of these classes to each other: their common religious beliefs, their arts, form of government and their more important laws."

iv. "Social Science," or as it has been I think better named "the Science of Society,"‡ is therefore the knowledge of these phenomena, in their causes. Its work is to ascertain the relations and the actions of collective bodies of men, and the principal phenomena of their social life, in their causes. It has to ascertain "the great facts which constitute the state of society at any given time, and to discover the laws which govern the coexistence and succession of these facts." "Such laws if ascertained could not enable us to predict history, because the circumstances amongst which they act are innumerable and constantly changing; but they would be most valuable for guidance: Science of society would have attained a high degree of perfection, if it

* See *Encyl. Brit.*, article "Science."

† Mill's *System of Logic*, book 6. ch. 6, 7. ‡ Ibid. ch. 10, p. 501.

enabled us, in any condition of social affairs, to ascertain by what causes it had, in every particular, been made what it was; to what changes, if any, it is tending; what effects each feature of its existing state is likely to produce in the future; by what means those effects may be accelerated, modified, or prevented, or a different class of effect super-induced."*

10. This would resolve the question, whether Society has any power designedly and intelligently to direct its own progress or to control the succession of its own states. A further question has however to be resolved, *i. e.* If society has such power, what is the end at which it should aim. But this last question we must reserve; it belongs not to social science, but to one which some philosophers tell us is the still undiscovered, the crowning science of all: they name it Teleology, or the science of ends.† As the other sciences with their resultant arts have each their own special object, and are busied with discovering and employing the proper means for attaining that object: so this science would they say, if it existed, have for its object the discovery of the true Good; and would employ itself in classifying all those special ends of other sciences, and in determining their comparative worth as means of attaining some portion of the true and universal Good. But this is not the object of social or political science: social science even were it complete could only pretend to tell us how any given condition of society could be produced, modified or changed; not which of all possible coexisting conditions would be the best in itself and in its results. Though it does not appear to be of much use for us to know how society can be moved, until we have discovered to what end and whither it ought to tend;—though social science would be of little service for man's happiness without a true Teleology; yet Teleology would in this direction be wholly impractical without a true science of society.

11. These considerations will suffice to determine the position and the method of your science. As to the first, such a science must be founded on the great facts of human nature,

* Mill's *System of Logic*, book 6. ch. 6, 7.

† Austin's *Jurisprudence*, vol. i. *note*, p. 269. "Ethical Teleology—an analysis of happiness and of the means towards it: and therefore of the ends to be directly pursued as the means of its attainment." See also Grote's *Plato*, vol. i. ch. 16, p. 479.

accurately ascertained, rightly classed and truly generalized. It must be deduced from the laws of human nature, and cannot commence as a science until these have been discovered.* It may indeed be more properly considered as a branch of that great science than as an independent science itself:—A most important branch it is true, but as subordinate to the parent tree in the value of its results as it is subsequent to it in the order of discovery. For the condition of any community is nothing but the condition of the individual men and women that compose it: their intelligence or folly, their strength or weakness, their freedom or slavery, their goodness or wickedness, determine its character: its prosperity has no reality but in their happiness. And further consider, that individual men and women do not exist because of Society; but the community exists solely because of the individual men and women who constitute it. So also all existing Societies are but passing modes of human life, not that life itself: and as the body is more than raiment; and the spirit of man more than the body in which for a time it dwells, so the individual life of each human being is more than the social or national life in which it is for a time immersed, and more important than all those social institutions by which its circumstances are for the present shaped. And therefore Aristotle spoke of the "science of social life" as a department of moral philosophy. But it must include a good deal more than this.

Its first task as we have seen is to ascertain the great facts that constitute the state of society: and these appear to divide themselves into two classes. 1st, the relations and actions of collective masses of men; which must be learned from history: and 2nd, the causes of those relations and actions; which must be sought for in the primary laws of human nature, and in the circumstances of human life.

The first difficulty that meets us here is this, that it is quite impossible to obtain an exhaustive list of all the circum-

* "The whole of the qualities of human nature influence the phenomena of society, and there is not one which influences them in a small degree. There is not one, the removal or any great alteration of which would not materially affect the aspect of society, and change more or less the sequences of social phenomena." —Mill's *System of Logic*, vol. ii. p. 479.

stances that are present at any given time in a given community: and therefore we can never be sure we know all the circumstances that may have combined to produce in that community the particular result we may be enquiring about. It is seldom that we can even ascertain the exact share, which any one of the circumstances known to have been present has had, in bringing about that result: for no one cause ever acts by itself, or under exactly the same circumstances; nor can we exclude circumstances at will. Induction therefore is impossible. The most complete collection of facts within our reach can only be obtained from those few communities with whose social state in every important particular we are acquainted; and from these only through that short period of time which their authentic history embraces.

No general principle drawn from such facts can be relied on as applicable to any other community, nor even to that community itself at another time or under other circumstances. Such a generalization can at the most give us only an empirical law, or rather an approximation to an empirical law which will be wholly unreliable for our future guidance unless sufficient reason can be shown for it in the known laws of human nature. But if this can be done,—if these results of historical observation can be explained by, and be shown to coincide with the results deduced from the laws of human nature,—their verification is as complete as the case admits of its being. Even now it will only enable us to foretell the tendencies, not the actual results, of those measures or events in which the circumstances whose effects we have ascertained are present: for we neither know all the circumstances present, nor can we in any case provide against the unforeseen entrance of new, counteracting, or modifying circumstances. Certainty being thus out of the question, nearly every important political change is a move in the twilight of probability.

12. Questions of this kind dealing with human beings, human communities, and human circumstances, are unquestionably the most complicated and intricate. In entering on them we come face to face with both the spiritual and the material kosmos, and are called upon to calculate the combined results of their wholly incommensurable forces; and to solve

the mystery of their conjunction in its most complicated form, —in the resulting condition of large communities. Every important social or political event is the result of many single causes, and of many long chains or series of causes that extend back to unhistoric times. And each such event becomes in its turn the fruitful source of a thousand social changes: as its causes were innumerable so its effects may prove to us incalculable. "Everything," Mr. Mill says again, "which takes place in any part of the operations of society, influences every other part: and the mutual action and reaction of the coexisting elements of society is such, that whatever affects any one of the more important of them, will by that alone affect the rest indirectly if not directly." * "Hence, in social phenomena, composition of causes is the universal law." †

On account of the want of certainty attending its conclusions, some writers have ridiculed the notion of seeking practical guidance from social science at all. In the strict but somewhat pedantic definition of true science, which limits it to absolute demonstration (and consequently to pure metaphysics and to mathematics), there can be no science of society. But the knowledge that will not suffice for prediction "may be most valuable for guidance;" and few reasonable men will be prepared to assert, that because we cannot have mathematical certainty, we ought not to endeavour to obtain moral probability: or that questions so momentous to mankind should be abandoned to the haphazard decisions of ignorance or of party impulse, because the union of scientific deduction, with the most careful and extended empirical observation of which the case admits, is insufficient to determine them with certainty.

13. Having ascertained the great facts which constitute the state of society, the second task of social science is to notice the condition in which these facts are found coexisting together in political communities. And here the first glimpse of order in our tangled mass of facts is met with, in the discovery that great as is the variety of possible social states, it is still a limited, not an endless variety that is possible. For as the condition of a community in respect of each of

* Mill's *System of Logic*, vol. ii. book vi. p. 467, &c.

† Ibid. p. 461; see vol. i. book iii. p. 492, &c.

these principal facts constitutes, when taken together, its entire condition at any given time, and determines its succeeding state; so we find that the state of the community in any one of these particulars influences its state in respect of the rest, and is in its turn modified by all. Hence there results that natural proportion and correlation among all these elements which we call its civilisation. There are certain states of each which are wholly incongruous and cannot exist together: there are certain states of each which have the strongest tendency to coexist, and which confirm and increase each other by their coexistence. All conceivable variations of character and states of being are not possible even to individual men; and when we come to estimate the aggregate state and character of a large community, these possible variations rapidly diminish both in number and in importance. The force of individuality is so great, that we can hardly guess what will be the conduct of a man we do not know under any given set of circumstances. The power of known motives acting according to the laws of human nature, may enable us to reckon with tolerable confidence on the general conduct of a mass of unknown individuals, when combined in a community whose principal circumstances are known to us.* Now this correlation, or the congruity which actually exists between the chief facts that determine the condition of a political community, being ascertained by a sufficiently extended observation of the states of various communities at different epochs, we should be able to discover the laws (or uniformities of sequence) which determine their coexistence. But in endeavouring to ascertain these we must remember, that whilst natural—or what social philosophers call organic—conditions will produce natural results which may be foreseen, yet artificial social conditions always tend to produce results different from those which were foreseen and intended; so that no true conclusion can be drawn from the actually coexisting state of these circumstances in any community, unless its civilisation be the natural outcome, the genuine growth of its independent social life and political organisation. But it is very possible, and has indeed continually happened, that some of these states have been artificially created and im-

* Mill's *System of Logic*, vol. ii. book vi. pp. 426, 427.

posed on a nation. And in such cases; when for example a code of laws, of education, and of manners, borrowed from a highly civilised people, is imposed by an absolute monarch upon another race in a very different stage of growth, as was done in Russia by Peter the Great; or when the wealth of a nation is suddenly increased by accident, not through the growth of its intelligence and industry, but in a degree very disproportionate to either, as happened in Spain after the discovery of the Americas; or when the religious faith of an educated Christian race is imposed in its highly developed and philosophical form on a half barbarous people, instead of allowing its primary truths to take root in the minds of the new disciples, and suffering it to grow up and manifest itself in the ruder form which their national character and actual degree of civilisation would give to it. In all such cases the natural law of correlation being forcibly suspended, the natural law of the succession of social states will be found to produce very different results from those which in a normal state might be anticipated.

14. With this proviso, we may say that the whole state of society existing in any nation at any one time is a principal part of the cause of that condition that will succeed it, and is itself mainly the effect of the state that preceded it. It is not, I think, as some have said, the whole cause: the advent of a great man, foreign interference, and physical convulsions may, and continually do, intervene to modify or wholly revolutionize this natural succession. But generally the summary of those leading facts which determine the state of a community, is also a summary of the principal causes of its becoming what it is tending to become.

The next object of social science will be to ascertain the laws which regulate the succession of these social states. For this purpose we must ascertain from history what that succession has actually been in the case of each one of them. We must so classify these facts as to show by what causes they have, in every particular, been made what they are; and we must verify our conclusions by showing that the particular effect we assign to each cause, is one which would follow from it under the same circumstances in accordance with some established law of human nature. Now therefore

these great facts which together constitute the social state we are examining, must be handed over for investigation to those special sciences which undertake to discover the sequences that respectively prevail in each class.* These special sciences I have arranged somewhat roughly in two tables, which may serve to suggest to you some of those relations which subsist between them, but which are in fact too numerous and complicated to be exhibited in a single chart. These distinct sciences have to tell us what the effect of their own facts would be, if acting freely and in isolation from the rest. This being known, social science, gathering up these special laws, will have to determine what will be the effect of the united action of all, when present in such proportions and under such conditions as the laws of their correlation determine to be possible; remembering however that the effect of social causes acting in combination is by no means always the same, either in degree or in kind, as the sum of the effects of the same causes acting one by one.

§ 15. Table I.

SCIENCE OF HUMAN NATURE.

Subject.—The phenomena of the thoughts, feelings, actions, and circumstances of man.

Problem.—To ascertain the laws which determine his history.

Method.—Inductive.

I. *Subordinate Enquiries into Man's Nature.*

1. Psychology.

Subject.—The phenomena of consciousness.

Problem.—To determine the laws of the human mind, or the uniformities of the coexistence and succession of our mental states.

2. Physiology (Human).

Subject.—The organism, properties, and actions of the living human body.

Problem.—To determine the uniformities of coexistence and succession of our bodily states.

* "To judge how men will act under the variety of desires and aversions which are concurrently operating upon them, we must know how they would act under the exclusive influence of each one in particular."—*System of Logic*, vol. i. book vi. p. 490. The descriptions of the several sciences here given are chiefly taken from the same work.

3. Ethology, or Science of Character.

Subject.—The possible combinations and variations of the qualities, or states of human beings, with the circumstances under which they occur.

Problem.—To determine the laws of the formation of individual character.

Resultant Art.—Education.

II. *The phenomena which constitute the condition or principal circumstances of man belong to these sciences:*—

1. Ethics, or Science of Man's Relations to Men.

Subject.—The relations and state of man as a moral agent.

Problem.—To determine the nature and extent of his moral obligations, and the principle on which they are founded.

2. Physics, or Science of Man's Relations to the Material World.

Subject.—The phenomena and laws of the material kosmos, in which man lives.

Problem.—To determine the conditions of his physical life, and the possibilities of his actions.

3. Theology. Man's Relations to God.

Subject.—The revelation and the dealings of God with man.

Problem.—To determine the nature and extent of man's relation to God, and the methods and results of realising it.

III. *Teleology. Science of the End or True Good of Men.*

Subject.—Human happiness and the various means of obtaining it.

Problem.—To determine the proper destiny of man, and the final object of all human effort.

Resultant Art.—"The art of life in its three departments of morality, expediency, and beauty."

§ 16. Table II.

SOCIAL OR POLITICAL SCIENCE.

Subject.—The phenomena which characterise and the relations which exist between states of society.

Problem.—To find the laws according to which any given state of society produces the state which succeeds it.

Method.—Deductive.

Subordinate Enquiries: Class A: The Conditions and Causes Common to all Communities or Political Societies.

SCIENCE OF HUMAN NATURE.—TABLE I.

JURISPRUDENCE, OR SCIENCE OF POSITIVE POLITICS.

Subject.—The conditions necessary to constitute a political society.

Problem.—To determine the relations

i. of a Sovereign government to its subjects.

ii. of subjects to their Sovereign government.

iii. of subjects to the community or to any considerable and definite portion of the community.

SCIENCE OF HISTORY.

Subject.—The changes of states which have taken place in political communities, and the circumstances in which these changes occurred.

Problem.—To determine the empirical laws, or the actual uniformities of coexistence and succession, of social states.

POLITICAL ECONOMY.

Subject.—Those phenomena of the social state which take place in consequence of the pursuit and consumption of wealth.

Problem.—To determine the laws which govern its increase and diminution.

SOCIAL PHYSICS.

Subject.—Those phenomena of the social state which are produced by the physical constitutions of the various human races and the geography of the territory inhabited by them.

Problem.—To determine the laws which govern the industrial employments and physical condition of nations.

POLITICAL ETHOLOGY.

Subject.—The possible combinations and variations of national character, and the circumstances amongst which these are found.

Problem.—To discover the laws which determine the formation of national character, opinions, feelings, and habits.

Class B.—The principal phenomena which characterise, and the facts which determine, the coexisting state of any individual community at a given time are mainly these:—

Its physical state: as its climate, territory, race, numbers, and stage of material civilisation.

Its intellectual state: religious beliefs, knowledge, and degree of intellectual cultivation.

Its moral convictions, and the habits and forms of domestic or family life prevailing in it.

Its past history: the political changes it has undergone, and especially the character and power of the great men who have moulded it.

The divisions and relations of the greater classes of the community to each other.

The form of its government and its actual conduct or legislation.

Its relations to other communities, and its comparative strength.

SCIENCE OF LEGISLATION, OR SPECULATIVE POLITICS.*

Subject.—The circumstances or states of society which determine the stability of political communities, and those which determine their changes.

Problem.—From the general laws deducible from these, and applied to the existing social condition of the individual community, to determine the means of securing its political prosperity.

Resultant Art.—Applied politics, or maxims of practice.

17. Now though all these facts taken together are the causes which have determined the past history of any nation, and which still constitute its condition and regulate its changes; and though all their effects are also reacting causes, yet they are by no means all equally important. The same condition, though it may be equally present, may not be equally potent amongst different races, nor even in the same nation at different times; and in all cases the proportion these conditions bear to each other is of more consequence than their absolute amount. Yet we may expect that those causes which are on the whole most powerful in forming the character and determining the action of individual men, will on the whole also act with the most power on society. And if the conclusions drawn from any national history on this point should coincide with the results of observations of its individual members, and can be explained by reference to the known laws of human nature, then a table of the causes which control and impel the course of that nation might be made out with almost scientific accuracy, arranged in the order of their importance.

It has been said that political causation resolves itself into human agency; and this agency is determined partly by men's circumstances and habits, partly by their intelligence and will: and whilst the effects, or at any rate the tendencies, of the two former causes may be foreseen, the two latter are "mysterious powers, the direction of which under new cir-

* "Speculative Politics, enquire respecting the operation and consequences of political actions and constitutions."—Sir G. C. Lewis, *Methods of Reasoning and Observation in Politics*, vol. i.

cumstances it is impossible for man to calculate."* For without including that element of free will or a self-originating cause, which would put their action beyond the reach of science, and the presence of which is still disputed; without this, not only are they living forces, and certainly as such as yet unmastered by science, but they are ever acting under changing circumstances, with a changing direction and a variable power. As no individual life ever repeats itself, so no existing social state in civilised and living communities ever repeats itself, or is ever at a standstill. It may sometimes be advancing or decaying with extreme slowness, but it is always changing; and they whose intelligence and resolution, or whose want of intelligence and resolution, cause its changes, are themselves changing with it. Then notwithstanding the law of correlation, all those great facts which constitute the existing social state do not always change harmoniously together: they do so, so far as the community is one and actuated by one motive; they fail to do so, so far as its union is imperfect and its motives various, and consequently they are apt to change unequally and incongruously in the different divisions and great classes that compose the nation. Every portion of the community, we may say every great social event, is instinct with life; all are acting and changing, but not all in the same direction nor with the same momentum. Luxury is turning one portion into selfish animals, and cultivating another to the utmost; destitution is changing another class into barbarians. Great wealth is making wits waver; insufficient means are sharpening intelligence. Intellect is quadrupling material prosperity; and material prosperity diverts men from the cultivation of intellect to the pursuit of wealth. Now if the watchmen of the community do not see the new direction it is taking, or cannot calculate the force of the changes; and if its pilots fail so to re-adjust the helm that they shall still continue to direct its course to the same port, then the nation is falling off from its true course, and is drifting, without intelligence, to dangers it does not foresee, and against which it cannot guard. Change is the universal condition of life.

There are two motive forces acting on the intelligence and will of every community. One is the result of the instinct

* Liddon's *Bampton Lectures*, Lecture III.

of self-preservation, or of the desire of being: the other of the instinct of progress, or the desire of existing well. The one tends to maintain the existing condition; and the stability of every community depends on its efficient action. The other impels the community to change, and the progress of every community depends on the vigour and intelligence it employs in its satisfaction. The misdirection of the first generally takes the form of forgetting that life cannot be maintained except by renewal and adaptation; that of the second, of mistaking change for progress. Our social science professors are exceedingly apt to make one of these two mistakes, and our newspaper press follows suit; on either side with the same practical result—that of persuading the bulk of the community to substitute party for science, and to believe that foresight in political matters is as unnecessary as it is difficult. For if all change is bad, it can be resisted without intelligence; and if it is all good, it will not need guidance. And certainly as movement is inevitable, it is far pleasanter and easier to embrace this latter opinion and to take for granted that whatever is becoming or going to be, is right. But science takes nothing for granted; and no moral, therefore no social evil is inevitable to the patriot who believes in God and has no faith at all in the Devil. Here it is we see the immense importance of a true science of society that could tell us "to what changes society is tending; what effect each of its multiform features is likely to produce in the future; and by what means these effects may be intelligently controlled." For as a main cause of social phenomena is human intelligence and will, could such information be obtained by the bulk of any community, this would of itself to a considerable extent govern those effects.

18. As in order to exist well it is before all things necessary to exist, the conditions of stability take precedence of the conditions of progress. We might as well look for growth in a dying man, as for social progress in a community that is tending to fall to pieces. For this reason Mr. Mill tells us that "to ascertain the laws of social progress, the laws of social status must be included." These conditions of stability he considers to be threefold, and he finds them—1st. In the strength of the principle and of the habit of obedience to the Government which prevails in the community; and

this will depend on their subjection to a system of education or restraining discipline beginning with infancy and continued through life.

2ndly. In the prevalence of the feeling of loyalty or allegiance; a deeply rooted conviction in the community generally, that there is in the constitution of the State something settled and permanent, that is not to be called in question.

3rdly. A strong and active principle of cohesion amongst the members of the community.*

It is therefore mainly in the moral life and convictions of the community we are to seek for the causes of its stability, or for the signs of its approaching dissolution.

The social element, which is pre-eminently the moving one, is, Mr. Mill goes on to tell us, "the state of men's speculative faculties, including their beliefs. . . . We are justified in believing that the order of human progression will mainly depend on the order of progression in their intellectual convictions." †

Here again we must recollect that men's intellectual convictions on all subjects are not of equal social importance. It is their knowledge in the natural sciences that principally determines the wealth of the community, and that gives the measure of its material comforts. It is the state of their literature that mainly determines their æsthetic condition; and these two elements taken together make up their apparent civilization. But when have these ever determined the history of any nation? or when have they by themselves secured the strength of its union, its true prosperity, or the growth and vigour of its national life? The most marked advance in these two particulars has never secured the increased patriotism of any nation, or interfered to check its disintegration. In truth, nearly every era of marked progress in such civilization appears hitherto to have been followed by an equally marked period of social and political corruption. It is those intellectual convictions which are most important

* *System of Logic*, vol. ii. book vi. pp. 512–516.

† Ibid. vol. ii. book vi. p. 520. "I am of this opinion, not because I regard their moral and economical condition as less powerful or less variable agencies; but because these are in a great degree the consequences of their intellectual condition, and in all cases are limited by it."—P. 529.

in determining the character and the principles of our conduct as individuals, which are also the most influential in determining the real life of nations and the nature of their progress. It is the convictions they have attained and the faith they hold as to God and His relation to themselves; as to the nature of the human soul and the *summum bonum*, which determine the nature and supply the force of their national progress. In a word, as their philosophy is, so will their progress be. Neither its deficiency in natural science nor the poverty of its literature has ever yet availed to prevent a nation's rising in strength, in freedom, and in energetic life, if its faith was clear and strong. Depend upon it, "whatever nation has given up philosophy, is in a state of intellectual insolvency: though science has filled its granaries; though its territories are netted with railways; though its mills and foundries should be the busiest in the world; the mark of the beast is upon it, and it is going the way of all brutality." *

Nor would this surprise us did we duly reflect on the fact that all political action is the action of men, and mainly on men. Therefore to be successful it must be an action in harmony with the laws of human nature, and not, as it too often has been, an artificial arrangement for breaking through these and overriding their consequences. If the agents hold false opinions of human nature their action may be powerful, but it must be injurious, for "to resist these forces of human nature, is to turn them against ourselves." † Take, by way of example, the institution of property, which is said by lawyers to be the creature of positive human laws; and hence many are ready to argue that what the State has created, it can also destroy. That the sovereign Government in any nation has the physical power to take away the property of any number of its individual subjects, if the bulk of the people consent to obey it in doing so, is certainly true. But if the institution of property be not the creature of positive human law, but a result of the laws of human nature, then neither the sovereign lord, nor the whole mass of the nation, can destroy it. For then in some form or other it will spring up again; or if absolutely repressed in

* Prof. Masson's *Recent British Philosophy.*

† Sir G. C. Lewis.

all possible forms by vigilant physical force, the moral laws of human nature, being fairly forced into conflict with the stupid laws of human self-sufficiency, will rend them to pieces as surely as the law of gravity will rend the building that disobeys it.

There is yet a higher law, against which governments and people alike rebel in vain. There is a moral purpose ruling in the kingdoms of men and of nature, of which all the laws of nature and all the righteous and successful laws of men, are but the subordinate and orderly means of accomplishment; of which all disorderly rebellion and self-will, whether on the part of lawless kings or arbitrary peoples, will serve only to manifest the Omnipotence.

"Woe to the Assyrian, the rod of mine anger, though the staff in their hand is mine indignation. I will send him against an hypocritical nation, and against the people of my wrath will I give him a charge to take the spoil and to take the prey; howbeit he meaneth not so, neither doth his heart think so; but it is in his heart to destroy nations not a few."* Through reason and conscience only can men receive the light, by which they may be enabled to conform both their ends and their means to this moral purpose. And therefore it is that "all government and law rest on nothing else than reason and conscience in their ultimate resort; and can have no permanence except so far as they accord with the moral order of the world." †

We may hope that this fact of the paramount political importance of men's religious and moral convictions, and of their knowledge of human nature, in one word of their philosophy, is becoming more visible to us, seeing that we find thinkers from the most widely distant standing points are agreeing to proclaim it. This was the great fact which Coleridge, working down from the abstract principles of pure metaphysics, reached and laboured to teach.‡ Coming from the practical teaching of political life, Sir Cornewall Lewis arrived at the same conclusion.§ Coming from the philosophy of positive law, Austin taught this truth.‖ And

* Isaiah x. 5–7. † Bunsen's *God in History*, vol. i. book i. § 5.
‡ *The Friend*, Essay ii. p. 6, Bell and Daldy.
§ *Methods of Reasoning and Observation in Politics*, vol. i. c. xxiii., xxvi.
‖ *Jurisprudence*, lecture 6, p. 296.

more popular writers are teaching it. It has always been one of the merits of the *Saturday Review*, that it has seen and proclaimed, that "the politics, poetry, and literature of the age are but the manifestations of its actual philosophical doctrines;—that it is philosophy which in the long run governs the direction and the forces of a community;—that it is but natural that the dominant body of doctrine about the nature of truth; the possibilities of the human mind; the grounds of belief; the sanctions of morals and its standards; should impress itself markedly and irresistibly on habits of thinking which are in fact mere derivations from it."*

19. What is it then which governs the philosophical convictions and the belief of a community? If it be true that a change in the state of men's intellectual convictions has preceded every considerable change in the social state, and has thus divided their history into distinct epochs; it is equally true that such a change of convictions has ever been preceded by the advent of some great man or of a few great men; who have gathered up the truths already possessed by their people; have freed what was true in the old formulas from the superstitions and materialism that had incrusted it; have re-embodied it in a higher form, adding to it that further truth the want of which was falsifying and making it powerless; and have succeeded in impressing this new revelation on their age or nation. I will go on in Bunsen's own words: "All the life of history springs from the conscious self-determination of individuals; and all that is truly creative, conservative, propulsive in the life of the individual flows from the image of God within him: . . . so far as he does not resist being made the organ of the Divine thought, he becomes a spiritual power for the whole community, for which he feels, thinks, acts, writes, and creates. . . . The thought of the individual is assimilated and becomes common property; this heritage of ideas works on and on, through the action of a number of individual minds who are bound together by its power, and stamps its mould on the individual of a succeeding generation, as truly as it received its own impress from one great Personality." Thus is created the atmosphere of traditions and convictions in which we find ourselves from childhood upwards. All interruptions of this

* *Saturday Review*, April 11, 1868.

natural order are due either to the degeneracy of the community, "to which the thinker opposes the unconquerable freedom of a moral will, or to the error of the leading minds of the age, who from lack of resignation turn their energies to the destruction of existing institutions. . . . But the divine energy in man, ever afresh, asserts its claims, goaded by the disintegrating forces of evil and impelled by love to suffering fellow-men. Thus sooner or later some creative person appears on the scene, who renews the unspiritual and corrupt community in thought and will, and inaugurates a new unfolding of the spirit in human history. But his path leads him for the most part to a martyr's death and ends with the subversion of states. . . . Personality is the lever of the world's history: the whole history of the world is inexplicable without it; with it, clear and intelligible."*

20. If we now ask what is the one central fact, the lever of the whole of modern history, without which it were wholly inexplicable; which has in truth so entirely moulded it, that it is scarcely an exaggeration to say it has created it? Is it not the life and the word of Christ? Is it not rather Christ Himself; "that august Personality which is to our European world, in point of creative influence, what no other has been or can be? Is it not a simple matter of fact, that at this moment the progress of the human race is entirely identified with the spread of the influence of the nations of Christendom? What Bhuddist, or Mahomedan, or Pagan nation is believed by others, or believes itself to be able to affect for good the future destinies of the human race?" †

And this mention of the world's hope brings us to another train of thoughts, leading straight to the same conclusion. For hope is an essential condition of human effort, and therefore of all human progress. There is no law of human nature more sure than this, that men will not actively use the present, unless they are sustained by the prospect of the future: and if we truly live only as we energise, we certainly only energise when we hope. It is so in moral action: if we are not pressing forward towards a higher and purer standard of morality than we have yet attained, our morality

* Bunsen's *God in History*, vol. i. book i. § 8. See also *System of Logic*, vol. ii. book vi. c. xi.

† Liddon's *Bampton Lectures*, Lecture I.

is dwindling and fading away. It is so in mental action: it is not the knowledges we have gained, but those we hope to discover that rouses the intellect to exertion. It is so in all human industry: it is never the wealth we have, but that which we hope to secure, that makes us toil. And it cannot be otherwise in the life of a community. It is the presence of hope in the nation that impels it to progress. Search through history, and you will find that no nation has ever permanently achieved great deeds, which has not been animated by a strong hope. "There is one element of national life with which no nation can dispense. It must have a future before it—a future which can rebuke its despondency and can direct its enthusiasm;—a future for which it will prepare itself, which it will aspire to create or to control. Unless it would barter away the vigorous nerve of true patriotism, a nation cannot fall back altogether on the centuries which have flattered its ambition or developed its material being. Something it must propose to itself as an object to be accomplished in the coming time—something which is yet beyond it: self-complacent a nation cannot be, unless it would perish. It is this law which makes the anticipation of a better future, of such vital importance for the common life of a people." *

Now where can such a hope be found for individual men or for nations? The arts give us pleasure, they raise and widen our enjoyment, just so far as they express that hope which they cannot create. The physical sciences are so far from giving hope to man, that they are, by themselves, wholly inhuman: the highest change they bid us await is the change of death, quickening in lower forms of life. Intellect the most profound and the most acute cannot furnish us with any certain ground for hope. Separated from truths which to be known at all must be supernaturally revealed, human thought tends to produce a melancholy the more profound the more powerful and the more unselfish it is. And if none of these can satisfy the demand of one human being, for some end to hope for in which he could rest, and for some reasonable ground for hoping he may reach it; how can they give us any rallying point for the hopes of mankind? Look again at the testimony of history: what

* Liddon's *Bampton Lectures*, Lecture II.

has kindled hope anew amongst the nations, since it died in ancient Greece, in Palestine, and in imperial Rome?

Is it not the life and work of Christ? Separated from Christ the whole history of humanity is an inexplicable, a mournful riddle; it is the history of a moral chaos, without any moral purpose, without any intelligible end. The science of humanity, the science of society, which would exclude Christ and Christ's work, Christ's revelation and Christ's kingdom; must rank with that science of astronomy that should attempt to explain the motions of the planets whilst denying the presence—the existence of the sun. Wilfully separated from the truths of God's revelation to us of His own purposes, the science of humanity could tell us nothing of ourselves which it is really important for us to know; nothing of whence we came, why we are here, what we ought to do here, whither we are going. Separated from the Man Christ Jesus—the Doer of the Father's will, the Revealer of the Father's Word, the Incarnate Son of God, the suffering dying rising and victorious Head of men; mankind is but a meaningless, aimless, hopeless procession, from darkness, through suffering, into darkness again. Science knows no more: men calling themselves scientific run hither and thither, assuring us that ages ago men grew slowly out of polypes: not assuring us that ages hence they shall not return to polypes again. Men calling themselves politicians tell us that we are moving towards a millennium when all men shall stand on one dead level; that the reign of great men and great ideas is passed, that the reign of mediocrity is beginning; that society will henceforth be everything and the individuals that compose it, nothing. What motive for effort, what hope lies hidden in these doctrines? If we have grown out of polypes without an effort, can we not go on growing without one? or can we not become polypes without exertion? If it is inevitable that we must all grow in thought word and deed alike; if we, individual and living persons, are henceforth to be swamped by society and to have no existence but a fractional one, why should we labour to rise? If dust is all that each man has to look forward to for himself, can we not at least return to dust without wisdom and without goodness and without strength? And what can it possibly

signify to our dust, whether a succeeding generation turns to dust without having heard of us?

Philosophers bid us not look at our sun: they say that its light is arrogant and false: they tell us that the historical spirit, and the higher criticism, and modern thought have quite put out our sun. Have they any reliable teleology to teach us; any hope to offer us that could satisfy one truly human want? Till they have let us be content with that of which God has assured us; and confidently trusting our future to Him, whose Word alone can safely guide us through the mazes of the present, let us labour to enter that rest of which He has said, "Eye hath not seen; nor ear heard; neither hath it entered into the heart of man to conceive; the things which God hath prepared for them that love Him."

LECTURE II.

OF POWER: ITS MODES AND CONDITIONS.

> More than he can, can do no man,
> Though much he tug and strain.—*The Iliad*, PROF. BLACKIE.

1. *Dr. Melcombe.* I THINK you agreed to my summing up the advantages you desire to obtain for women under these three heads: greater power; more liberty; and a greater equality of social position. Let me change the words and say, greater strength, freedom and union; and it seems to me that in these three words we have at once expressed the real want and the true perfection of mankind: that all men's miseries have arisen from the absence of these, and that all their hopes depend on their obtaining them. And—not to lose ourselves in generalizations—that for each one of ourselves, for each individual man and woman, the measure of our life, our happiness, our worth to ourselves, to our nation, to the human race and the universal church—all depends on the degree in which we have individually attained, and are actually enjoying and exercising these three blessings; which Christ has redeemed for all men, and into the possession of which His Gospel is calling us to enter.

Looking at the end which you have in view, we are bound to confess then, that it is the highest that can be set before us: and the enquiry, by what means you can hope to approach its attainment, is the most important which can engage your attention. It involves the whole battle against evil in which as Christians we are engaged; and it directly meets evil in those special forms in which in our day it manifests itself most triumphantly; *i.e.*, in individual feebleness, in social bondage and in sectarianism, bitter class spirit, or disunion.

2. But it is, as I tried to point out last week, impossible to deal justly with a subject so general, in a form so arbitrarily limited. The whole so-called "woman question" has it seems to me been vitiated by one enormous exaggeration and by its naturally exaggerated reaction: I mean that of the difference between men and women. I am quite sure you must get rid of this before you can come to any sound practical conclusion on the subject. I do not mean that this exaggeration began with, or is at all confined to the advocates of women's claims: it probably began with the one-sided legislation on the relations between men and women, which we have inherited from the times of barbarism. And vulgarly and amongst vulgar men, women are constantly spoken of, under the title of *The* ladies, as though instead of being the half of mankind they were an agreeable, pretty and partly useful appendage to the race of men. But if a stranger to our world were to judge of us from the way in which your writers often speak, he would conclude that men and women constitute two distinct species, naturally at war with each other; of which one must give up some of the possessions it has unjustly monopolized, in order that the other may secure its fair share: and much eloquence has been spent on the advantages of an alliance. Where there is but one species, neither war nor alliance are possible, and to give up any possessions of a part, is to impoverish the whole.

It is especially necessary to come to some right understanding as to the intellectual difference between men and women, before you enter on the consideration of women's strength and the training that is to educe it. One of your writers—I think it is Miss Cobbe—in pleading that the same education should be given to women as to men, urges that this will not make them too much alike, because there is an essential and eternal difference between the intellects of men and women, designed by the Creator for the purpose of supplementing and completing each other, and therefore indestructible. Now if there were any such essential difference, it surely would be more probable that the same education could not be the best for both. So Plato argued when he would have women educated like men; he says unless persons' natures are the same, they ought not to have the same employments; but that the same natures must have

the same education and offices. And he concluded men and women must have the same because there is no function in the state peculiar to women or to men as such, for that natural talents are indiscriminately diffused through both; and though the woman is weaker than the man, yet that many women are in many respects superior to many men.* Without agreeing altogether as to his premise, his reasoning is surely just. You may however have noticed, that it is in general those who are most positive that nature designed men and women for wholly different functions, who are the least inclined to leave it to nature to make them different; who evidently feel she never will keep the difference sufficiently broad and deep, without the aid of laws and social customs framed for the express purpose of widening it. Against such Miss Cobbe's argument holds good.

3. But I cannot think the alleged distinction is borne out by anything we actually know of mind. All its known laws are as true in women as in men: its acts, its modes, its primary beliefs, its limits, are the same. It is almost a proverb that "mind is of no sex." So far as we can tell—not very far, for we can never possess another's consciousness—the same causes produce the same effect on our senses, and convey the same information to the perceiving mind. We attend, observe, remember, compare, and judge in the same manner: we reason by the same logical laws, and when the premises are perceived to be the same, we come to the same conclusions: we are liable to the same fallacies: we are weakened and strengthened by the same processes, and mental labour produces in each the same kind of physical result. Our moral affections are moved alike and by the same objects; the same things will under the same circumstances produce pain or pleasure in each alike; mental and moral habits are formed in boys and girls by precisely the same processes, and when formed they are found to exercise the same power. Where in all this is there the least trace of any essential and eternal difference—any difference that is in kind—of intellect? It is true that the varieties of human character are so great, that it is scarcely possible to predict the same result from the same causes in the case of any two human beings, except in the more simple processes of thought

* *Republic*, book v. c. iv. v.

or feeling. But whilst the mental differences between individual men, and between races of men are so great as to be often incalculable by us; these are far greater than any mental or moral difference that can be traced between the men and the women of the same race and educated by the same circumstances. The former difference is often so wide, it is difficult to believe the two beings are of the same species: but the latter when examined, will I am persuaded prove to be wholly circumstantial and on the surface. In the former case the higher is the cultivation and the greater the development of the contrasted races or individuals, the wider is the difference we mark between them. Look at the Greeks and the Egyptians of old, at the Latin and German races now. Look at a Coleridge and a Voltaire, a Wellington and a Talleyrand. But in the case of men and women, the very opposite occurs. The higher the cultivation and the character of each, the less does the difference become. Granted an educated man—I mean a man with all the essential manly attributes—with what qualities will you endow him to raise him to the perfect ideal man or hero? Must it not be with the essentially feminine qualities—single mindedness, gentleness, purity, a wide sympathy and a strong unselfish power of devotion to the right? And granted a true woman, how will you make her a noble woman but by gifting her with fortitude, width of mind, generosity, courage and resolution, in short with the virtues of the man? And in truth in the One perfect Man has not this difference wholly vanished? So far then from its being essential and eternal, it seems more probable that they who attain eternal life will leave it altogether behind them. The reaction from this extravagant doctrine of difference, in Miss Becker's denial of any distinction, I omit now: we shall have to consider it when we discuss the conditions of union.

4. On these grounds I cannot admit that there is any sense in which your problem affects women and not men also: and in considering it I shall not attempt to confuse it by introducing this irrelevant distinction of sex. And I must beg you also to remember, I only undertake to lay before you the premises and necessary conditions of your problem, so far as I can find them out; the conclusions that follow from these and their practical application to your plans for raising women's status in society I must leave altogether to you,

Mrs. Charlton. I am sure your statements will be deeply interesting: and we may well congratulate ourselves Miss Tryanon on having gained so able a champion for the equality of women with men.

Agatha (confusedly). Oh, certainly. Oh, yes. Only I don't remember anything exactly about that.

Mrs. Charlton. Not that there is absolutely no intellectual or moral difference between them?

Professor. No essential difference.

Agatha. Still thank goodness they are not identical; so if the difference isn't in kind, I suppose it must be in degree.

Sara. Mrs. Charlton I grievously mistrust the good faith of your new champion. He will mystify us all with these premises, and getting us unawares into a corner will compel us somehow to conclude the present state of our affairs to be all right, and best improved by our abstaining from all our well-meant reforms; ending like Tennyson's most sweet and rascally young Prince, "Lay your sweet hands in our's, and trust in us."

Professor. I promise not to draw that or any other conclusion for you.

Sara. Well we may at least ask questions I suppose about them?

Professor. As many as you please, only I don't promise to answer any I don't understand.

Sara. Then what is the problem before us?

Professor. I must say this is a highly intelligent beginning on your part. Mrs. Charlton, what is one to say to this young woman?

Mrs. Charlton looked rather alarmed, as if she expected to be called upon to answer Sara herself; but she only laughed and said, she feared she was incorrigible.

Sara. Now if you please I'm waiting your answer. You took away our little questions which were both pleasing and practical; and you jostled into their place something so—what do you call it—so abstract I don't twig it at all.

Professor. Oh, now do speak English, and then if you will restate your questions I will give you my form for them.

Sara. Agatha you say them for me, there's a little dear: only mind and say them in Johnsonese, or my poor brother will tear his hair.

Agatha. How are women to secure that full development, which shall put them in point of mental power and social independence on a level with men? And will women realize their true perfection best in professional cloistered or family life?

Sara. You are a wretch and a traitor.

Professor. Thank you: the subjects I propose to consider are:

1st. Human power; in what it consists, its necessary limits, and the conditions of its exercise and increase.

2nd. What freedom is and how we can become free.

3rd. What conditions or modes of life are most favourable to our growth in strength and freedom.

Sara. Now you see my dear friends what a blessing it is to you all, to have a puzzleheaded audience like myself assisting at your debates,—how it forces all you clever people to be clearer than fog. All I beg of you in return is, that you will keep a sharp look out after the thief in the premises. And now Tom begin.

5. *Dr. Melcombe.* Suppose we begin by settling what we mean by this power, which we wish to increase: and first what do our words tell us of its meaning? It is not exactly the same as strength. Strength is that which stringeth: the ability a man has both to do and to suffer, to act and to bear, is his strength. Power expresses more properly the active than the passive strength: Strength looks rather at the firmness and stability of the agent; power, at his energy or force. Our strength includes both our capacities and our faculties; power is manifested by the action of our faculties alone. Our strength depends mainly on the health firmness and harmonious proportion of the body and its organs,—on the capacity and endurance of the mind. Our power is the result of our strength conditioned by external circumstances, and may be indefinitely increased by the use of appropriate means: the possession of a true method of investigation increases our mental power even more than the invention of the steam engine has our physical power. Lastly "energy" is wholly of the mind; it signifies the power of producing positive effects, and has its opposite pole in "capacity" or the ability to suffer positive effects: "force" is either of mind or body,

and denotes the cause of change, from rest to movement.* These are its names; now how shall we define the thing itself; what is power?

Mrs. Charlton. Philosophers would tell us I suppose, that power is only the subjective notion which we interpose between the antecedent and the sequent—the cause and the effect. Modern science tends to the belief there is but one force in the universe, manifested in the uniform sequences or laws of nature.

Agatha. I fancied a law of nature merely meant the mode or order of change,—the way in which a force acts, not the force itself. When we speak of power don't we always include effort, and a purpose?

Mrs. Charlton. Science knows nothing of efficient causes.

Miss St. John. I fear it is indeed utterly Godless.

Agatha. Physical science cannot reveal God, but surely it is not Godless to try to learn something of the wonderful order God has established in His own creation, and of the way in which He sustains it.

Mrs. Melcombe. You mean there is no power but His: and what men call these laws and forces of nature, are only His ways of using His Power.

Miss St. John. So Hooker said "those things which Nature is said to do are by Divine Art performed, using nature as the instrument."

Sara. I am convinced however we have got a little stock of power at our own disposal: if nature is used as an instrument, we are let in some degree to use ourselves. I believe with my old copybook it's knowledge that does it. Look here; if I could do all I want to do, I should have as much power as I need: and if I only knew what it is I want to do, and how it is to be done, I should be able to do it.

Agatha. If you act according to your knowledge, but without that energy your knowledge lies very still and changes nothing. You must exercise power to get the knowledge, and you must exercise power to use it.

Sara. I wish you would take it for granted that power means being able to do what we want to have done. We shall never get on if we go hunting round our words in this way.

* Chiefly from Crabbe's *Synonimes.*

Professor. You agree with Mr. Mill then; if I remember rightly he defines power as "the conformity of the event to the volition:" characterizing it by the effect not by the cause—by the result of the action not by the agent. Perhaps for our immediate purpose it will be more convenient to use the word in a somewhat wider sense; as expressing the conformity of the event to the intention—the whole purpose of the actor, and not merely to the single or immediate volition. When the event is so conformable to a man's intention, that we look upon his intention as its antecedent, we infer his power as the efficient cause of the event. He has been able to do, what he wished and intended to do.

Miss St. John. That is as much as to say, human power is self will; and what we should be asking is how we can most thoroughly renounce and get rid of it, to become with St. Paul the slaves of Christ and His church.

Mrs. Melcombe. I do not quite understand you either; whatever powers we have are God's gifts and we must use them to do His will, not our own.

Professor. It is for that very reason, that all a man's abilities are given to him by God, and not derived from any man nor from society, that it becomes his duty to cultivate and make the most of them: it is not the part of a dutiful child to reject his Father's gifts, and say, he knows it is better for him to be without them. You must remember that all power is a means, not an end, and it has therefore no moral character of its own: its whole worth depends on the moral character of the designs which we accomplish by it. But as an instrument given to us by God, it must be good and right for us to possess it as fully, and to employ it as diligently as we can. It is true we are morally responsible to Him both for the kind and the amount of the use we make of it, for this use He has left to our own choice: but we can no more get rid of this responsibility by refusing to exert it in its fullest attainable measure, than we could by employing it advisedly in opposition to His will.

6. What is this energy; what part of our complex nature is the source of it; what name ought we to give it? All these and similar questions I must set aside. We are conscious of possessing it and that is all we know of its origin. We find by experience we have not enough; and

this want is the motive of all our civilization. It is the fashion rather now to assume that human energy, and indeed every phenomenon of life, is somehow the result of one "force," which is variously called "vital force," "nerve force," "heat force," and other names; all being in truth names for the unknown cause of known effects. "If a materialist tell us 'Mind is the result of organization' or the concomitant of nerve force:"— "we have only to ask 'what light he expects to throw on the question by such an assertion?' For that which thinks is known to us only by thinking"—not by running up and down nerves: "and that which is solid and extended, is known to us only by solidity and extension. When we say 'the mind is not material,' we simply express the fact, that it is known to us by properties altogether distinct from those properties to which we have given the name of matter, and that, so far as we know, it has no property in common with them."* Hence the phenomena of mind cannot be classed or compared with the phenomena of matter: the functions of mind have nothing, so far as we know, in common with the functions of material organisation. If we say, they have life in common—well when we know what life is, that may be saying something. When a Saturday Reviewer assures us "it is now known that mind may be best described, as a natural force or energy manifested to us through certain changes in matter;"† he forgets that as the fact he implies is one of those which are not knowable, so the description he gives simply describes nothing. Whatever is manifested to us is manifested in consciousness, and that consciousness is the very energy he calls mind. To tell us "that" consciousness "is best described as a natural energy that" becomes conscious of itself "through certain changes" which it is conscious of "in matter" is like the

* Abercrombie on the *Intellectual Powers*, Part i.

† *Saturday Review*, May 25, 1867, article on Dr. Maudsley's *Physiology and Pathology of Mind*. What is meant probably is that mind exists not as an independent substance, but as the energy or affection of some substance, probably of organic matter. If so the assertion is merely about words. Instead of using the word mind, as ordinary mortals use it, for the unknown cause of a group of known phenomena: he prefers using it to denote the changes that take place amongst these. If he means that now science ignores substances altogether, then it ignores equally mind and matter: no such great discovery, and one which pushed to its logical end sends matter away and keeps mind as the phenomena of consciousness.

children's play of hand over hand. "Mind and matter as known and knowable are names given to two wholly distinct groups of phenomena. Mind and matter as unknown and unknowable, are two wholly distinct substances in which those phenomena are supposed by us to inhere." Consciousness may be originated by certain changes of matter; but it is certain we can never know that it is, because that very consciousness is the only evidence we have either of matter or of its changes. All such phrases then as these; "matter is force," "mind is the product of combustion," "mind is a manifestation of material changes," or "matter is a manifestation of consciousness"—all these are merely verbal formula expressive of the absence of ideas.

7. Giving up the attempt then to know power in its cause, let us try to trace it in its effects. Now men's energy may be directed towards three ends: viz. for the government of physical or material events: or for the discovery of what is true: or for the government of men and their actions. Whichever of these ends we set before ourselves we cannot accomplish our purpose by any direct exertion of will; we can only attain our object by the employment of suitable means. This appears to be the difference in kind between Divine or absolute Power, and human power, which is always conditional: and it is this necessity under which we lie of employing instruments or means, that imposes labour upon us, and makes it a necessary condition of all our successful energy, and therefore of all our progress.

We are apt to speak of these ends as though they were accomplished by three different kinds of energy, if not by opposite kinds. But as we know nothing of the nature of this energy, we cannot pretend to classify it truly: and certainly the motives which set us on pursuing them, the modes in which we pursue them, and the results we obtain, are so blended together and so complicated with each other, that I believe it will make the subject much clearer thus to consider human force or energy as one; and to regard the distinctions we must make in examining the mode of its action, as distinctions of subordinate ends or means.

8. By a man's physical power we understand not merely his muscular energy, but the whole power he has of effecting his purposes by controlling physical changes or events. It

includes therefore all those instruments by the help of which he fulfils any part of the first commission given to men, to subdue the earth and exercise dominion over all that is on the earth. Now as we can only act on matter through our own material bodies; and as we cannot change a single law or succession of nature, but can only effect our purposes by availing ourselves of their action, the extent of our physical dominion is limited,

1, by the conditions needful for the continuance of our animal life,

2, by the laws of those material and organized substances over which we exercise it:

3rdly, by our knowledge of those laws.

Sara. I don't quite take that in: your reign over your chemical things for instance, will be clearly ended—as I've so often told you,—when you have blown yourself up with them: but your doing with them just what they will do, strikes me as being their power not your's.

Professor. It is mine if I can select such chemical agents and combine them in such proportions as will produce the results I want: to do that I must find out their laws, or the order of their changes. You will see at once that such power is at least as much the result of mental as of physical energy. Its proper object appears to be the promotion of our material well-being and happiness, taking these words in their widest sense as embracing all that affects our happiness through the senses; it includes amongst its instruments all arts which result from the application of science or of experience to matter.

9. The second purpose for which men's energy may be employed is for the discovery of truth. Intellectual action is thought; and its proper object is twofold; the acquisition, and the expression of knowledge. Now our knowledge is limited in the first place, to the knowledge of facts and their connections; or in other words, it is limited to the knowledge of phenomena and of their relations. What we perceive is a certain group of appearances, or phenomena coexisting together, and appearing only in conjunction with each other: and we remember successive states of consciousness. We assume that those phenomena are the properties of something, and to that something in which they cohere we give a

name: but of that something, apart from the effects produced on our consciousness, we know nothing. So also of our successive states of consciousness: we assume they are all states of something and we call that something mind, soul, or self. But all we really remember are phenomena of consciousness bound up together by the conviction, "I felt it." In the next place; we know only those properties or phenomena which we are capable of perceiving or can be conscious of; by our senses in respect of the phenomena of matter; and through consciousness in respect of the phenomena of mind. But we are not warranted to conclude, that the properties of existence are limited to those of which we are conscious; nor even that we know these properties or phenomena as they are, without addition or modification from our organs of sense or capacities of consciousness. All we know therefore, is known only under the special conditions of our faculties.* So much for the phenomena which furnish the materials of all our knowledge.

The question how the mind deals with these materials in its search for truth, and the conditions under which it works with them which result from the limitations of our faculties, will require a fuller investigation.

Again we must divide in order to understand, what only manifests itself to us undivided. Mind acting in the human organism manifests itself in two ways; 1st in sensibility, or that passive consciousness which exhibits itself in reception only; and here we can receive only in certain definite modes, which we call our capacities: and 2dly, in that spiritual energy we call will: this is the active consciousness which exhibits itself in attention; and which again acts in certain definite and limited modes, which we name our mental faculties. Our capacities then express our susceptibilities of being acted upon, and give rise to those mental wants or desires which are our motives for mental action: for it seems to be a law of our nature that whenever, and so far as we become conscious of a capacity, we are at once roused to desire its appropriate gratification. Our faculties, which strictly correspond to these, express the various modes in which we employ what energy we have for the purpose of satisfying these desires, and which again, when successfully employed,

* Sir William Hamilton's *Lectures on Metaphysics*, vol. i. lecture viii.

reacts on the capacities by giving us a more vivid consciousness of the pleasure we take in receiving, and so stimulating our desire for its repetition. The mental desires or wants which our capacities excite in us as we become conscious of them are as natural, and as much the necessary results of our mental, as the desire of food, of warmth, or of action, are of our animal organization.

10. They are chiefly these:

i. The desire of knowing the objects presented to our perception. We want to remember and to understand what we are conscious of. Hence comes our love of truth or reality. It would be unnatural and painful to endeavour to misrepresent them to ourselves, and it is impossible for us consciously to think them as they are not.

ii. Remembering the pleasure we have had in such discovery and wishing for a repetition of the gratification, we desire a continually increasing variety in the objects we know or can think of.

iii. The desire of order, proportion and harmony in the series of phenomena we are considering, without which we cannot unite them into an intelligible whole. This want seems to arise from our instinctive desire to find in every object we know traces of something akin to ourselves, with which we can sympathize and which can sympathize with us: we want to find the stamp of intelligent thought and purpose; we want to find the traces of personality. A series of phenomena which appears to us chaotic, without order or meaning, is painful and repulsive to us.

iv. The desire of power or of unimpeded and successful energy. Thus the sense of feebleness or of unsuccessful effort in any object is painful; but more especially if we find it in ourselves. The mode in which we seek to gratify this desire will be very much determined by habit and association: on that determination, on the urgency of the desire, and on the degree of energy which we employ in its gratification, will depend the main character purpose and tendency of our lives.

v. Lastly the desire of progress, the instinctive tendency to look onward and upward; to long and hope for some energy more complete, some satisfaction more perfect than we have yet experienced. It arises apparently from the fact that our

capacities are always greater than our faculties. It is these two desires, for power and for progress, that make us crave for freedom: for whilst we are free to act as we would, we have still the hope that we shall act to more purpose, *i.e.* to a higher satisfaction than we have yet enjoyed.

Our capacities and the desires they inspire us with are not aroused at once, are by many men scarcely felt at all. We become conscious of the higher capacity by the satisfaction of the lower: and the three last desires I have named will not be felt, or not felt as mental desires by those who have not laboured to satisfy the two first. To awaken them is a main part of education.

11. The different modes or ways in which the soul can exert herself for the satisfaction of these desires we call her faculties.* You must keep in mind that the division of our mental power into distinct faculties, intends nothing more than this; that as our knowledge is limited to the phenomenal and relative, so we are also limited to a few definite modes or processes of acquiring that knowledge. These modes, as given by Sir W. Hamilton, whose account seems to me the simplest and most complete which we have of this matter, are as follows: †

i. The mode in which all our knowledge is acquired, is by attending to our perceptions of external, and by reflection on our internal consciousness. This he calls the acquisitive faculty: it is the faculty of experience, which in its more active and voluntary exercise we call observation. It is the energy of attention directed to perceptions or to consciousness: on its accuracy depends the truthfulness of all our materials of thought, and therefore the value of our subsequent mental work.

ii. The conservative faculty, or memory: or, the power of retaining, and of reproducing or bringing back into consciousness what we have acquired.‡ In the exercise of this last power of recollection, we are controlled by the laws of mental association. In a mind once aroused to active acquisition, each succeeding perception is naturally linked on to a

* See *Spectator*, No. 600.

† *Lectures on Metaphysics*, vol. ii. lecture xx.

‡ Sir William Hamilton separates these into two distinct faculties or modes; the conservative, and the reproductive faculty.

preceding cognition which it either accompanies, or follows, or resembles and recalls; and itself becomes a link to the succeeding consciousness: so that the subsequent succession of our thoughts and remembered perceptions is neither accidental nor wholly subject to our own choice, but one thought suggests and recalls another according to some previously formed association, or connection established between them. And this suggestion may take place spontaneously or under the influence of the will, directing attention to one train of thoughts rather than to another. It is this last that is properly called recollection. The religious, moral, and intellectual character of these associations of thought mainly determines the character of all our mental work.

iii. The faculty of representation or Imagination; this is roused by the desire of variety. The act of representing is the energy of the mind holding up vividly before itself the thoughts and ideas which it has acquired retained and recalled; either for contemplation or for investigation. Thus imagination creates no new idea: it represents to the attending consciousness in a new order of arrangement, or it moulds into new combinations, the phenomena previously observed and now called to mind by some law of association, as they have been separated analysed and recompounded by the process of comparison. Imagination is the handmaid of these two processes. It expresses the vividness or energy of that act of representation which is essential to perfect recollection, and which is the basis of the subsequent process of comparison. The order in which we habituate ourselves to represent our ideas, and the character of the combinations which we are thus led to make, constitutes our culture, and determines perhaps more than anything else its degree and its value.

iv. The elaborative or discursive faculty. This mode of thought it is the highest function of our minds to carry on; it has only one operation, it compares. It is comparison, or the faculty of relations, and all the other faculties we have named are subsidiary to this, having only to furnish and prepare the materials on which it operates. In order to compare two objects or two ideas with each other, the mind must separate them from each other; divide each into its several parts; distinguish between the parts of each and

their relations to each other; and then join them into a whole again. "Analysis and synthesis are therefore the conditions of comparison." The result of the comparison is either that the mind affirms or denies one thing of another: if it affirms it, it joins them together, and this is again synthesis: if it denies it, it disunites them, and this is analysis. Generalization (the result of these processes of analysis and synthesis) is thus the result of an act of comparison; and is properly named "conception—a taking up in bundles, or grasping into unity."* Judgment, is the result of the comparison of two terms or notions together. Reasoning, is the comparison of two terms or notions with each other through a third. This faculty is "Thought" strictly so called: it corresponds to the Διάνοια of the Greeks, the Discursus of the Latins, the Verstand of the German philosophy. Its rules are the laws of logic.†

He adds a VIth., which he calls the Regulative faculty: the name is however singularly inconvenient; for that which he intends to express by it is not so much a mode of energy; as it is an inability to conceive certain relations as co-existing. What is intended is that the mind modifies all the knowledge it receives in conformity with certain necessary conditions, or limitations, of human thought. Thus for example whatever phenomenon I become conscious of, I think of it as existing.‡ I cannot think of it at all except under this condition of existence. My mind of itself and involuntarily, adds to the sensation or perception present to its consciousness this notion of existence. So again I am unable to combine together notions which are either contradictory or exclusive of each other: *e.g.* I am unable to think a thing exists and does not exist at the same time. This he calls the law of non-contradiction. He adds the principle of excluded middle—*e.g.* a thing either is—or is not: either finite or infinite. These conditions of thought are present in all human knowledge: they are such as no experience could contradict, because the nature of our intellect is such that we are incapable of conceiving their contradiction; we are unable to understand, that is we can attach no meaning,

* Sir William Hamilton's *Lectures on Metaphysics*, vol. ii. lecture xxxiii.

† Ibid. vol. ii. lecture xx.

‡ Either actually or possibly; in the present, past, or future.

to a proposition which contradicts them. If you tell me "this is a flower but it has no existence:" or "it exists but not in space:" or "it exists but in no time:" or if you point to the sky and say that has no limits and it is limited: all these propositions are senseless to me; I cannot think them. We will not go into the question now whether we have become incapable of thinking such propositions, through the absence of all experience: it is enough for us that now all our experience and all our elaboration of experience presupposes these first principles of thought. They admit of no proof, because every possible process of proof begins by assuming them; they are the axioms on which it is based and they are said to be incapable of demonstration,—as you will perhaps think oddly enough,—because they cannot be shown to the mind without being at once seen to be true. "This power, property, or condition of our intellect, regarded as a faculty, corresponds to the 'νοῦς' of Aristotle: to the 'Vernunft' of the Germans: to the 'place of principles' of some of our older writers: to the 'reason' or 'higher reason' of Coleridge; and I believe to the 'intellect' or 'common sense' of Reed and Stewart."

12. So much for the modes of mental energy or thought; its results may be distributed into two classes.

The highest result of mental power we call production or creation. The exercise of a free creative activity, as Mr. Arnold tells us, is the true function of man, and that in which he finds his greatest happiness.* I trust however we shall find that his true function and happiness is something much more satisfactory, much higher and nobler than the exercise of his own creative energy. Strictly speaking, as we have seen, the human mind creates nothing, it can only think of and work with the materials, *i.e.* the facts, given it in consciousness, and not one of these can the mind create. But we call a mind creative or original which is able with some freedom and energy to combine these materials and to express them in some new, self-consistent, and more adequate form; to draw out from them some hitherto unperceived principle or general uniformity; to apply the ideas or principles obtained from them to some new combination of circumstances; or to bring some motive thought to act on men's

* *Essays in Criticism.*

minds and wills with a new energy, so—as we say—as to inspire them with a new life.

To draw out, discipline, and enable men to exert freely as much of this creative energy as it is in them to exert, is the object of the highest or self education. It demands the concentration of the mind, its free activity in all the modes of which we have spoken in their combined harmony and proportion: the mastery of thought and of its expression; and above all such a clear perception and firm grasp of those first truths or principles of thought, that they shall penetrate and regulate the whole mental work. But the whole of this is not acquisition. Acuteness of perception, a sound and originating imagination "supplied with materials by a clear understanding carefully disciplined" must combine to give that power of anticipation which constitutes intellectual genius; and which is enjoyed as Dr. Thompson tells us "by those alone who have by long and extensive study" been prepared to catch the suggestion and to perceive its importance; "but which is not possessed by all of these."* And this because one at least of its essential elements is manifestly constitutional.

13. Subordinate to this and in truth indispensable to its exercise for any sound purpose is that result of mental energy which I would put into the second rank. I mean the power of sifting and judging our materials and their various combinations: of discriminating the true and false, of determining how far each is true or which is nearest to the truth: and of ascertaining what the object is in itself apart from the representations men make of it. There is so much incorrect mental drawing, false perspective, and bad colouring, in our accumulated store of materials, that before the creative man can exercise his activity to any good purpose, his materials must needs be thus examined sorted and judged. And before men can comprehend the truthfulness and beauty of his work, they must be able to appreciate in some degree the truth and the importance of the materials he has employed. This is the twofold office of the critical faculty; "In all branches of knowledge to see the thing as it really is, and to make the best ideas prevail:—to establish an order of ideas which if not absolutely true, is yet true by comparison with

* *Outline of Laws of Thought*, part iv. § 115.

that which it displaces."* But it is not necessary that the same mind should do both works; many can thus criticise and prepare the materials who have not vigour enough for original discovery or creative expression: just as numbers of persons can truly discern the merits and defects, and enjoy the beauty of a real poem or a noble statue, who could never produce even an ignoble one. The one work requires the energy for discovering and harmoniously reproducing what is true: the other demands the capacity for receiving and loving it: and this last seems to me to be the true result of that education which falls short of the highest, which can in a great measure be given, and which aims at culture. The successful accomplishment of this preliminary and subsequent work demands the habit of acting freely in all those five modes, but especially in that of comparison and judgment; together with the possession of an adequate amount of information on the specific subject on which the man is to exercise his judgment. For that universal truth, "propre à tout, propre à rien;" is even more signally true of the critic than of the poet.

14. These then are the ways in which the soul exerts herself in acquiring, examining, and arranging for her further use, all such knowledge as is within her reach: and these are the results of human energy expended mentally. But how about that energy itself—what is its limit, and how can we acquire so much of it as will enable us to satisfy our mental capacities? The answer to this last question would give the best method of intellectual education. The answer to the first is plain. Mental energy means nothing else than the power of voluntary, continuous, and concentrated attention. A man must indeed practise himself in observing, recollecting, imagining, comparing, and reasoning on his materials, and in regulating his ideas by common sense, if he would be able largely to satisfy his mental craving for the acquisition and the communication of truth: but the vividness, accuracy, and thoroughness of all this work, the degree of command he has over these faculties, and the amount of energy he can employ in them; is measured in all cases by the amount of attention he can command himself to give. Attention is consciousness, applied by an act

* Mr. Arnold's *Essays in Criticism.*

of the will, under the law of limitation; "*i. e.* that the intension of our knowledge is in the inverse ratio to its extension;" or, the fewer the objects we consider at once, the clearer and more distinct will be our conceptions of them. On the ability a man has of thus concentrating his consciousness at will on one object of thought or on one train of thoughts; and of sustaining this effort undisturbed by outward sensations, steadily excluding—refusing consciousness so to speak—to all other trains of associated thoughts impertinent to the subject or to the relation which he has set himself to consider;—on this depends his power or the success with which his labour will be rewarded; for by this effort of attention all the energy he has is employed on the facts he desires to know, through each faculty in turn, until his investigation is completed and he obtains a reasoned knowledge of them. "Attention not only doubles all their efficiency, it is the primary condition of the activity of all these special faculties:" and as a man exerts it mainly in one or another of them, he will be characterised as an acute and accurate observer; as possessing a good memory or an active imagination; as a close reasoner, or a man of much common sense; or if he exerts it in all in their due proportion—as a man of sound intellect and an independent thinker.*

15. Now this power of willed attention is in all cases the fruit of long, patient, and sustained effort, and of the habit which continued effort slowly forms. Its acquisition therefore presupposes that the strength to sustain that effort was present; and this strength is certainly dependent partly on physical, and partly on moral conditions, both which we will consider presently. What I want you to notice now is this; that the amount of attention a man can give, is the measure of his intellectual ability: and that the amount he will give is the measure of his actual power. It is this that makes all the difference between the train of desultory and frivolous notions—strung together by a purely casual association,—which passes vaguely and without purpose through the else vacant head of a club lounger; and that chain of thought in the mind of a Plato or Aristotle, a Bacon or Newton, which will for ages mould the opinions of the civi-

* Sir William Hamilton's *Lectures on Metaphysics*, vol. i. lecture xiv.

lized world and determine the history of mankind. It is the labour of making this effort which constitutes the whole difficulty of thinking: for the most abstruse chain of reasoning goes on step by step, inference from inference; and each single step is easy for a child to comprehend, is scarcely too hard for a child to discover. But with most of us, the new inference suggests by some accidental association some other notion, and that another and another; and we have let go the chain attention was grasping, and must begin the argument all over again would we recover our hold of it. The difficulty of keeping our attention fixed through a long chain of such inferences, when they are of such a nature that they cannot be secured at once by some visible symbol, constitutes the great difficulty of the mental and moral sciences. "When we turn our thoughts on any given object for the first time, a hundred other things retain possession of them. Even when we are able by an arduous exertion to break loose from the matters which have previously engrossed us or which every moment force themselves on our consideration: even when a resolute determination or the attraction of the new object has smoothed the way on which we are to travel; still the mind is continually perplexed by the glimmer of intrusive and distracting thoughts, which prevent it from placing that which should exclusively occupy it in the full clearness of an undivided light." To overcome this difficulty he tells us that the new object must be made an integral part of the system of our previous knowledge, and so by the aid of time and custom it will be united with and itself become one of our established associations of thoughts feelings and desires. In this way "if we are vigorous enough to pursue our course in spite of these obstacles, every step as we advance becomes easier; the mind is more animated, the attention more exclusively concentrated, and our kindred ideas flow with more ease and abundance." * It is this power of attention which we are told constitutes the secret of genius: "in the exact sciences at any rate," Cuvier said, "it is the *patience of a sound intellect* which, when invincible, truly constitutes genius."

16. Here you have an instance of that I alluded to before,

* Sir William Hamilton's *Lectures on Metaphysics*, vol. i. lecture xiv.

—the impossibility of understanding human nature by analysis alone. In studying men for the purpose either of educating or of serving them, it is useless to divide them into intellects, moral feelings, and animal bodies. Such division, like the division of mind into distinct faculties, helps us greatly in speaking about men or about mind; but it hinders us sadly in conceiving rightly of either. A human being is neither mind nor feeling nor body, but the result of the union of all three with the unknown quantities life and personality at the centre. However complex his nature, still his unity transcends his complexity and controls all its phenomena. And as man is one, so his power is one; and it can only be rightly understood when seen in operation as one. Accordingly now we have come to that which is the sum and substance, the root and the measure of intellectual power; and it resolves itself into a moral force sustained by certain physical conditions. It resolves itself into the strength and endurance of the man's will, and it depends for its exercise on his acquired habit of self command. Intellectual success thus depends on—genius itself consists in—a moral virtue. So Chalmers speaks of attention as "the chief link between the intellectual and the moral departments of our nature." * We cannot recollect just what we will: we cannot choose to believe that to be true, which to our senses or our understanding appears to be false. But we can attend or refuse attention to the proofs of its truth; and so far we are responsible for the truth or falsehood of the opinions we hold; and for the emotions and actions which naturally result from them. So also the highest moral influence of which our nature is susceptible,—the Christian faith;—can only enlighten our minds and purify our hearts, in the degree in which we choose to attend to its truths. Other religions may govern through fear and hope alone: the Christian creed is a series of historical facts, which can only mould our feelings as we make them the subjects of our thoughts. To this effect Sir W. Hamilton quotes the following passage from Malebranche, with which I will conclude our lecture to day.

§ 4. "The attention of the mind then is a kind of natural prayer, by which we obtain the illumination of reason. But

* *Sketches of Moral and Mental Philosophy*, ch. iv. § 20-27.

since sin entered into the world the mind often finds itself in the midst of barren and dismal solitudes; it cannot pray; the labour of attention wearies and disheartens it. Indeed this labour is at first very great, and the recompense scanty; and besides we find ourselves continually solicited pressed and agitated by the imagination and by passions, whose inspiration and motions we follow with pleasure. However there is a necessity for it; we must call upon reason if we will be enlightened by it. There is no other way of obtaining light and intelligence but by the labour of attention: faith is a gift of God which we cannot earn, but intelligence is a gift usually conceded only to merit. Faith is a pure grace in every sense; but the understanding of the truth is a grace of such a character that it must be merited by labour or by co-operating with grace.

5. Those then who are fitted to undergo this labour, and are always attentive to the truth which ought to guide them, have such a disposition as without doubt deserves a more magnificent name than those that are given to the most splendid virtues. But though this virtue be inseparably joined to the love of order; it is so little known among us, that I know not whether we have given it the honour of a particular name. May I therefore be pardoned in calling it by the equivocal name of force of intellect?

6. To acquire this true strength by which the intellect supports the labour of attention, it is necessary to begin by times to labour: for naturally we can only acquire habits by acts, and can only gain strength by exercise. But perhaps the great difficulty lies in beginning. We recollect that we began and that we were obliged to leave off: we get discouraged; we think ourselves unfit for meditation; we renounce reason. If this be the case, whatever we may say to excuse our sloth and negligence, we renounce virtue also, at least in part. For without the labour of attention we shall never comprehend the grandeur of religion, the sanctity of morality, the littleness of all that is not God; the ridiculousness of the passions and of all our inward miseries. Without this labour the soul will live in continual darkness and disorder, for there is naturally no other way to obtain the light that should conduct us; we shall be eternally under fear and in strange perplexity, for we fear everything when we walk

in darkness, and think ourselves environed with precipices. Faith indeed doth guide and support us, but it does so only as it produces some light by the attention that it excites in us: for light alone is what can assure minds like ours which have so many enemies to fear."*

* Malebranche's *Treatise of Morality*, ch. v. part iv.

LECTURE III.

OF HUMAN POWER, ITS MODES AND CONDITIONS—continued.

Our life is compassed round with necessity, yet is the meaning of life itself no other than freedom, than voluntary force: thus have we a warfare; in the beginning especially a hard fought battle. For the God-given mandate, "Work thou in well doing," lies mysteriously written in our hearts, and leaves us no rest night or day till it be deciphered and obeyed; till it issue forth in our conduct a visible acted Gospel of Freedom. And as the clay given mandate, "Eat and be filled;" at the same time persuasively proclaims itself through every nerve; must there not be a confusion, a contest, before the better influence can become the upper?—*Sartor Resartus*, ch. 9.

1. *Professor.*—We have already in speaking of mental power, entered on our third subject,—moral power: or the employment of our energy in the government of men and of their actions. We will go on from this point to-day.

The exercisers of moral power, and the subjects over whom it is exercised are moral beings, possessed therefore of reason and will, that is they are alike persons. And the means by which moral power is exercised are moral means; that is, they are motives addressed to men's conscience reason or feelings, and fitted to determine their actions as free persons. You must clearly distinguish between this moral government of men, which directs their actions by persuading them to adopt for their own satisfaction the course you desire; and that physical control which compels them to obey you by virtue of the hold you have over their physical nature, and its necessities. The slaves who built the Egyptian pyramids did indeed effect their owner's purpose, and their physical strength formed a part of his physical power, being expended by him as so much mechanical force: but their owner was not thereby made a king of men, nor did he necessarily possess any moral power at all.

Absolute moral power that man alone possesses, who is

the controlling cause and ruler of his own actions; who can direct his thoughts efficiently to such subjects as he pleases to examine; who can restrain from action or let loose at will his own desires emotions and passions: who can govern his own words, actively in expressing what he would express, passively in repressing what he would conceal. Such a man may justly be said to be mainly the author of his own character: for though no one can be exempt from those influences of physical constitution, of race, family, and circumstances, which determine what he is; yet is his own resolution the predominating cause of what he is becoming. If we can get to the understanding of this, the typical form of moral power, and can see how it acts in self-government; it will be easy to understand its operation in its second and inferior mode,—that of governing other persons.

Energy physically employed has for its organ, or acts through, the body and its senses. Energy employed for the discovery of truth, acts through the understanding, in all its modes or faculties. Energy employed morally for the determination of human actions, has for its organ, or acts through the will. Philosophers indeed may refuse to recognize the will as distinct from individual acts of volition: "Will" they say "or simple volition, is that state of mind which immediate precedes action: we will a certain act, and the act follows, unless it be prevented by physical inability to perform it. . . . We make up our mind and resolve to do the act, this is followed by the mental condition of willing or simple volition." * This account applies very well to the process of bodily action; I think it is rather puzzling when applied to mental actions or thoughts. "I make up my mind and resolve" to attend to a given chain of reasoning: "this is followed by the mental condition of willing or simple volition, and the volition is followed by the" attention. Well it may be so: but I think all we are conscious of, is the desire to understand, the effort to attend, and the attention. But as Sir W. Hamilton said, we have no word in English answering to the "Bestrebungs-Vermögen" of the Germans, to express that which is common to the moving desire and the resolving will. Harris named it "the powers of volition," used in an extended sense so as to include not

* Abercrombie's *Moral Feelings*, part ii.

only the will, but the passions and appetites; all in short that moves us to action.* Sir W. Hamilton suggests the terms Phenomena of Exertion, and Exerted faculties: the effort itself he calls Conation. "By will is meant a free and deliberate, by desire a blind and fatal, tendency to act: that which is common to both, is their tendency towards the realization of their end. 'Phenomena of exertion' is perhaps the best term to denote the manifestation, and 'Exertive faculties' the best to denote the faculties of will and desire.† Conation is the power of overt activity which pleasure or pain set in motion: the pleasure and pain is of the present; Conation has reference to the future: it is the striving to maintain the present state, or to exchange it for another."‡

However we name it, the energy manifested in willing is in a special manner the energy of the man himself: and it is this which determines the voluntary exercise of all his faculties; both choosing the end for which they are to be exerted; commanding the employment of the means by which his judgment advises that end to be sought; and determining the degree of energy with which they shall be employed: or rather it is itself the living force which acts in these various modes. The measure in which a man manifests this energy, is the measure of his force of character. Force of intellect or attention, depends ultimately on this energy of the will. Our physical power is only our own, as it is set in motion by our own resolution, and it is the energy of the volition that mainly determines the vigour of the action. Many have said, and I cannot but think truly, that this will-force will be found ultimately to be the one only force acting in our universe. This at least is certain, that "No assertion has ever been made by physical science, of its ability to point out a single active cause in the universe, which must necessarily be an ultimate one. . . . So far as we know, Mind alone is active, and a Will the only origin of power."§ However this may be, we are I think

* *Hermes*, book i. c. ii.

† Sir William Hamilton's *Lectures on Metaphysics*, vol. i. lecture xi. p. 185, 186.

‡ Ibid. vol. ii. lecture xlii.

§ Rev. F. Myers's *Sermons before the University*, Cambridge 1846; see also Prof. Fraser's introductory lecture, to a course of lectures on Mental Philosophy, given to the Edinburgh Ladies' Educational Association, 1868.

fully warranted in asserting that the degree of moral power a man possesses will be determined by the energy of his will; and we have now to consider how that energy is roused and on what conditions its amount depends.

2. The immediate ends of moral power are human actions: such actions that is as men do of themselves. "For all things whatsoever which men do, not of themselves, they do either by chance or by compulsion, or by nature. But the things which they do of themselves some they do from custom and others through natural desire; and this partly through desire influenced by reason, partly through desire devoid of reason. Now the act of wishing is desire accompanied by reason fixing on some good as its object; because no one wishes for anything other than what he conceives to be a good. But the desires devoid of reason are anger and appetite." * The ultimate results of the exercise of moral power are states of being as physical mental or moral character, both in ourselves and in others. There are three antecedents to all voluntary action. The first is mental,—the perception, consciousness or knowledge of an object: the second is emotional,—some feeling of pleasure or of pain connected with that object, and occasioning a desire to attain or avoid it: the third is moral;—the will or determination to make the exertion necessary to satisfy that desire. Without consciousness of any object there can be no desire: without some feeling of complacency in it, conscious endeavour after it is incomprehensible: and without the exertion or will, or without conation, the action will not follow the desire. Here is the point where, if at all, the man's moral power comes in. Neither the cognition of the object nor the desire for it are directly subject to ourselves. We receive the cognition, we suffer the desire, we do not directly choose either. The feelings and emotions which occasion all the phenomena of pain and pleasure, and which are more or less common to all men, are parts of our mental constitution. They have been variously classed: for our present purpose we may conveniently group them all around the two universal and predominating desires; 1st, the Desire to exist, and 2ndly, the Desire of existing well, or of happiness.

* Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, book i. ch. xvi. translated by J. Buckley, Bohn's edition.

To the first class of feelings belong those relating to self-preservation. To the second belong:

i. Feelings relative to personal enjoyment.

ii. The social affections; which make the well being of others necessary to our own happiness.

iii. The sympathetic emotions; those which proceed from the feeling of and desire for sympathy: such as compassion, admiration, vanity, shame or pride, &c.

iv. The desire for the development and exercise of our powers whether faculties or capacities. These we have tried to class in speaking of our intellectual desires.

v. The feelings relative to the moral law, or law of duty.*

These feelings are the intermediate links between cognition and conation. As one or other of them is dominant in any one, so is his moral character or disposition, which indeed means nothing more than his tendency to act in one way rather than in another. And as are the objects with which that dominant feeling associates itself, and in which he is accustomed to seek its indulgence, so will be his general course of action, or his life. What these objects will be, depends very much on a man's external circumstances: they are obviously limited to such as are within his knowledge and his reach, or at most within his hopes. But the causes which determine character, and which give predominance to one set of feelings or desires above the rest, are far more numerous and subtle. Amongst the chief may be placed, race, climate, and the wealth and degree of civilization which determine the mode and the occupations of our lives: the intellectual atmosphere, beliefs, and associations which we have inherited, and which are the legacy of past ages and generations of men to our own: the laws and political institutions of our nation; the family life and social discipline to which we have been subjected; our own constitution; together with the moral and mental habits which we have already formed under the influence of these various causes.

3. It is the combined action of all these circumstances,—each itself the result of manifold causes, and each acting simultaneously upon us in the proportion of its presence and

* Sir William Hamilton's *Lectures on Metaphysics*, vol. ii. lecture xvi. p. 518.

comparative strength,—that determines which of the affections I have named shall be most constantly felt by us, causing us most of that pleasure or pain which rouses us to action. It is clear then that we ourselves are the subjects of moral motives; but it is not quite so clear how we can possess any moral power. And if these causes I have named and all similar ones are in fact the only causes of our acting in one way rather than another it is certain that we do not possess any, but are ourselves merely passive links in a chain of causes and effects which we did not create and from which we can in no way break free. That there is such a chain of causes and effects producing our actions when we ourselves do not cause them is undeniable: but when we have completely made out this chain, there is a residuum of effect in men's actual characters, in their lives, and in individual actions: there is a residuum of effect which we are conscious of still unexplored and unaccounted for; a residuum not always, but yet continually present; and ever markedly present or absent in those actions which determine the crises of men's lives or which mark the decisive changes of their character. And the cause of this residuary effect is that self-moving, self-determining power by which we are conscious we can, and by which we actually do increase by a voluntary effort of resolution, the force which one of the motives present to us possesses over us; so increasing it as to make it dominant over our action although it was not, either by reason of our character or our circumstances, or of our habits, the motive that roused in us the strongest pain or pleasure. To say that we do this, by reason of the power we have of attending to one motive and of refusing attention to the conflicting ones, until the selected motive reaches its full force;—which may no doubt be the true account of the matter;—this only shifts the difficulty of the self-determining power from the desired action itself, to the act of attention which precedes and causes it.

You are well aware that the existence of this moral power has been denied and often logically disproved: but facts are sometimes wholly indifferent to the logic of our understandings, and persist in remaining in spite of the very clearest demonstration that they ought to vanish. And I am persuaded it is so here; and that no complete explanation can

be given of the phenomena of conscious exertion on the one hand, and of men's actual actions on the other, which excludes this fact. And as there can be no society without government: and as all government proceeds on the assumption, that men can control, and are responsible for their own actions,* I shall venture to take it for granted that we do rightly possess and can exert this moral power of determining our own actions. The moral power by which we control the formation of our own characters,† I need not speak of, as it is obviously dependent on and involved in the power of determining our actions, and thereby voluntarily forming our habits. Our character does not indeed come into our own charge as a blank sheet: many causes which were in operation before our individual existence began, and many more which lie wholly beyond our control, have already moulded it: but the main causes of its subsequent changes and of its development are our own actions. Our moral power here therefore is limited to direction and modification; and it is only when a Higher Will cooperates with a man's own will, that we witness the phenomenon of a change of character, of purpose, and of life so complete as to amount to a new creation. The same remark holds good of the power we possess over our circumstances: for the most part,—and in the first instance always,—they are created for us: but the fact that some men do so shape them as to make them their servants and the instruments of their will, instead of allowing them to be their masters; is a most evident proof of the reality of their moral power. The energy of a man's will and therefore the amount of his moral power, will be in proportion, in the first place, to the vividness of his conceptions and the strength of his feeling. There is hardly a greater delusion than that of supposing that strong affection and intensity of feelings, are unfavourable to the exercise of moral power. A man of shallow

* "All political discussion, speculative or practical, constantly assumes that man is a self-moving agent, that he determines his own will; that he has the power of choosing or rejecting any given course of conduct. All the proceedings of Governments rest upon the same assumption. All deliberation likewise assumes, that the choice between alternative courses of action is free."—Sir G. C. Lewis's *Method of Reasoning and Observation in Politics*, vol. ii. ch. 23. § 9.

† J. S. Mill's *Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy*, p. 516, 517, 1st edition.

affections or feeble desires, is never a man of steady or vigorous determination. He vacillates if he is left to his own guidance; he cannot be depended on if he follows the guidance of others. For if his desires are feeble, the actions they put him on will be indolent; and if no emotion predominate, he will be readily turned aside from the pursuit of one object by the presence of another. And hence, whilst the presence of one strong emotion will often atone for great mental and physical weakness, bracing even a feeble mind to a fixed resolution; so we find there is no man so incapable of being morally governed by others, as he who is thoroughly and stupidly unintelligent and insensitive. He who has much force of character is ever the man of vivid conceptions and strong affection: he is often a man of narrow and short-sighted intellect, and his mental horizon may embrace but one or two objects; but he is one who sees vigorously all he does see. As "force of intellect" depends on the power a man has of concentrating his whole energy on one series of thoughts at once; so this "force of character" depends very much on the unity of a man's ruling purpose, and on the vigour with which he can concentrate his whole energy, mentally, morally, and physically, on its pursuit.

Another element of moral power is courage, or the energy of hope: a thorough conviction that the means we use can, and most probably will, effect the purpose we have at heart, is more than half the battle: without hope the strongest will flags, and the man feels that he can not put out his full strength. Doubt and its child fear are destroyers of moral strength.

Sara. Then what do you make of the energy of despair?

Professor. I do not think that is any exception: when you come to look at it, it is the very same principle reversed: the energy of hope is directed to attaining some good; the energy of despair, which only begins when doubt and fear cease, is the resolution not to submit to some imminent evil. If the patriot cannot save his country he can refuse to witness its ruin, or he may hope to set an example by which others may save it. If the soldier cannot conquer he can escape the shame of being conquered; or he can revenge himself on his conquerors. If he really had no hope of doing either, he would have no motive for action. To sum up then; the

amount of a man's moral power is determined; (subject to condition that no man can expend in any mode a greater amount of energy than he has;)—

1. By the vividness of his conceptions.
2. By the intensity of his affections.
3. By the harmony and concentration of his desires.
4. By the degree of his courage, or hope.
5. Lastly, and above all, by the amount of self-government he has acquired by practising it; for if he has sufficiently habituated himself to its exercise, he will be able to throw into the action he has decided on the whole force which he is capable of exerting.

§ 4. There is nothing perhaps in which men practically differ from each other so much, as in this strength of will. And as this is the governing power, which determines—not indeed the extent of our capability, but the power we actually exert either mentally or physically; it is of the greatest moment to possess and increase it as much as possible. Like all modes of power, it grows by exercise, and by exercise alone; it diminishes by disuse.

Purely physical sensations tend to become indifferent by repetition; they lose much of their power of giving us pain or pleasure when we are used to them. But it is a law of all moral feeling, that the more it is indulged by being carried into action, the greater is the satisfaction its indulgence gives, and the greater the satisfaction the stronger is our desire for it. In feelings of the painful sort, the same law holds good; the more we yield to the impulse of avoiding the painful object, the greater is our dread of it and our desire to be freed from it. Probably the feeling of pain is intensified by the attention we give it, and by the horror with which our imaginations surround it; whilst the habit of setting aside and refusing to act on or attend to the emotion of fear—

Sara. Snubbing it in short.

Professor. Now don't—has the opposite effect. The less we indulge any emotion the less we feel it, or the easier it becomes to us to resist it. So that we know of no definite limitation either to the possible increase or diminution of our moral power over ourselves: it seems rather to be capable of continual increase; indirectly, in the increasing depth and intensity of the affections which we resolutely carry out into

action; and directly in the habit of self control, and the increasing strength of purpose. Whether it can by habitual disuse and uncontrolled indulgence of impulses, be so entirely lost as that a man becomes morally irresponsible for his actions, is one of the most difficult questions that legislators and casuists have to answer. The habitual criminals bill seems to show that the former at least are beginning to see, that moral power may be so far lost as that the man practically is as though he had none. I believe that here the law is invariable,—"to him that hath shall more be given; from him that hath not, shall be taken away even that he seemeth to have."

5. The moral dominion which a mere man can attain over other men, must always fall far short of that real sovereignty a good man may acquire over himself: but though far less in degree it is of the same kind, and effected by the same means: So far as a man morally governs the actions of other men, he does it,—either by the greater energy of his mind compelling their attention to his clearer thoughts and more definite opinions, in such a manner as to exclude conflicting facts and ideas from their attention, or as to convince them of the superior truth of his own: or by the greater energy of his passions and desires, exciting theirs by the law of sympathy: or by the greater energy of his will, directly determining theirs, and by his superior force of character: or by that influence which a clearly marked, vigorous, and homogeneous example naturally exercises over the imaginations and lives of men of a more confused and indeterminate nature.

This moral dominion over others may be exercised consciously and intentionally, or unconsciously and without design. No doubt the latter is far the most extensive of the two; but whilst we are responsible for its moral character, its extent and power are not directly under our control: we may say indeed that there is no human being whose conduct and character have actually no influence at all over the moral feelings and the actions of some other person. But there are also probably none above the age of infancy, who are not continually trying to influence others, and directly endeavouring more or less consciously to form their opinions, determine their actions, and rule their lives for them.

It is therefore a question of importance, how can I do this

most effectually? And it ought to be a question of much greater interest, how far ought I to do it at all? how far is this interference with others justifiable? or what right have I, or any man thus to attempt to govern another? I am fully persuaded that no true rule can be framed in answer to this last question, which is based either on our absolute certainty of the truth of our own convictions; or on the benevolence of our intentions towards them. Justice, not benevolence, must be its basis; and then the true test is not hard to find, though it may be very difficult to apply. If the tendency of our moral power over any human being, be to strengthen his own moral power over himself; and to make him more free to govern himself, then it is just to exert it to the utmost. But if its tendency be to make him in any way more dependant on our guidance, or on any external circumstance; if it in the least hinders or weakens his own power of self-direction, then it is unlawful for us to exercise it. Even an unjust power may be used for immediately good ends, but that is no justification of its use.

6. Then we must remember further, that this just or righteous moral dominion is the only dominion any individual man may lawfully exercise over other men, and the only human dominion to which we may voluntarily submit with a good conscience. And by lawful I mean here, according to God's law as expressed in our own nature or in His revealed word; and according to this Divine law we find, that all else in this world may rightfully be subdued by us and employed as the instruments effecting our own purposes, by virtue of the original gift of God, their Owner. But men have not been so given to men, their Creator retaining them as His own: so that the human power which uses men as machines, or solely as means to an end, is and ever must be sheer usurpation. "The principle which is the groundwork of all law and justice, is that a person can never become a thing, or be treated as such without injustice; but the distinction between a person and a thing consists herein, that a thing may rightfully be used altogether and merely as a means; but a person must always be included in the end and form a part of the final cause." "If then no individual possesses the right of prescribing anything to another—except what coincides with that law in his own mind, which is at

once the cause, condition, and means of his free agency;—— Society, the aggregate of individuals can communicate that right to no one."* And although through the insufficiency of its own moral power on the one hand, and through the defective moral nature of some of its subjects on the other, no State can maintain its sovereignty without physical force: yet it is not lawful for any State to exercise such force over any of its subjects, except those whose actions have proved that they have fallen below the rank of free persons, by their neglect or refusal to exercise reason and moral control over themselves. Nor will even this necessity justify a Sovereign in dealing with these criminals as merely mechanical instruments of its will, or as merely things: it must also "include them in the end" it seeks in their punishment. The true King of men, with omnipotence in His Hand, rules men only by moral force, and will accept only moral,—that is free and willing,—obedience; and is thereby, and for that very reason, the only Absolute Sovereign.

7. That moral dominion over others which is due to intellectual predominance, is the most abiding in its results, and the widest spread. I have already had to point out how much the character of nations and the history of the world is determined by the intellectual opinions, religious faith, and moral sentiments which prevail amongst them; and that these are due in almost every case to the intellectual power of some great thinker who having discerned, and grasped some fundamental truth, has succeeded, often long after he himself has passed away, in rooting it in the minds of his people. The amount of moral power thus exercised depends not only on the truth contained in the teacher's doctrine, but also on the capacity of the men amongst whom he lived or for whom he wrote, to comprehend its truth and its importance. And for a people thus to discern, out of the multitude who offer to instruct it, "him who is wisest, is a very difficult thing: nay the higher the wisdom, the more incomprehensible does it become to ignorance." † And thus it comes to pass, that the moral power of the new truth is never what it ought to be, either in amount or in character. For the greater part even of those who do receive it, receive

* *The Friend*, first section, essay iv. p. 118–120, ed. Bell and Daldy, 1866.

† Herbert Spenser's *Essays*.

it with more or less of error; partly perhaps they receive it as the complete truth, and it is incomplete: partly from the inevitable inadequacy of "the matter moulded forms of speech," through which alone it can be communicated: and partly from their imperfect conception of it who first received and then handed it down. In old times if there were few thinkers, there were comparatively few writers and speakers to distract men's attention from their thoughts. In the present day whilst great thinkers are scarcely more plentiful than they were; almost every one desires to be listened to, and would teach: so that the task of discerning the wisest has become too arduous for the general public, and the utmost it can do is to discover who is in some measure wise. Probably the greatest man would now be listened to,—because he could only be heard,—by a very small portion of the listening public; and he could no longer effect any intellectual revolution. This work of renovation and progress must now therefore be accomplished, if at all, by the vigilance, love of truth, and labour of many minds, distinguishing between the substance and the form of truths old and new.*

8. Far less enduring and wide spread, but in its more limited sphere more complete and powerful, is that moral dominion which directs others by forming their moral and social habits, and their associations. This is the moral power which is exercised at first mainly by mothers; then by fathers and the whole family; by schools and their masters; by the teachers and Ministers of religion, and by the national laws. All these in different degrees govern those who are subjected to their influence, by determining their social character, or how far the well-being of others has become by early association a necessary part of their own happiness: by determining their moral code and fixing their standard of what is admirable and what is shameful: and by determining the class of objects with which their desires of happiness for themselves or others are most strongly associated, and in the pursuit of which their powers will be most willingly employed. Very few men comparatively ever attain so much power over themselves in these respects, as is all through their lives exercised over them, by those whose moral energy—or whose want of moral purpose—has moulded their earlier years.

* Bunsen's *God in History*, vol. i. book i.

9. As to the influence which the character and habits of those amongst whom we live exert over us; whilst no man can be wholly free from this influence, its amount and the kind of effect it will produce, depends mainly on ourselves. To act upon us as an example, there must be some kindred quality or sympathy in us, making us susceptible to its attraction: if this is absent, the presence of the example will rather act on us as a repellant, urging us towards the opposite course. But there is also a third way: the moral principle expressed in the Example may be so remote from us, so completely absent from our conscience or experience, as to exercise no influence upon us whatever; it finds no part in us. Thus it is that whilst "to the pure all things are pure, unto those who are defiled and unbelieving nothing is pure, but even their mind and conscience is defiled."* Just as it is intellectually so it is morally: just as now "a million of blockheads looking authoritatively into one man of what you call genius or noble sense; will make nothing but nonsense out of him and his qualities, and his virtues and defects, if they look to the end of time.":† so 1800 years ago, and ever since, a whole world of worldly and self-seeking men, beholding Christ and His Example, have been able to see nothing in Him that they should desire Him.

§ 10. To sum up this part of our subject, then, we find that Energy directed to physical purposes, has for its object the continuance and the enjoyment of our present outward life. Energy employed intellectually has its end in the apprehension of what is; and limited as we have seen our knowledge must be, it yet contains the keys of those two empires which Our Creator has assigned to us, and bidden us take possession of—the empire of the outward world on which we live, and of the inner world in which we live. Energy directed to moral purposes has its appropriate end in the attainment of our true good: but here we are told to stop till a true teleology has discovered to us in what that good consists. Meanwhile some say the Good is happiness; some say that it is safety; some that it is holiness; all will perhaps allow that moral power results in a state of being, and not like the two preceding powers in a state of possessing.

Agatha. Is it really necessary in order to be philosophical,

* *Titus* i. v. xv. † Carlyle.

that we should make believe not to know what our greatest good is?

Professor. Not unless you like: but it is out of my province just now. The next point to which I want to draw your attention is the mutual interdependence of these three modes of exertion. In our present life at all events, our mental energy is dependent for its successful action on our physical capacities, from its first step—the collection of information through the senses, to its last—the expression of our thoughts in words. In like manner our moral power is conditioned by our mental capacities. But still more emphatically are both the amount and the value of each lower mode of power, dependent on the degree in which we can command the higher. It is a commonplace remark that man without mind would be weaker and more miserable than any other warm-blooded animal; and the value of our physical work almost always depends on the amount of knowledge, of thought, and of purpose that has been put into it. And whilst nothing so effectually deadens and brutalizes the intellect, as the absence of moral control of the animal appetites; the want of an energetic will, determining the subject on which the mind shall be occupied, concentrating the attention on it and securing its steady investigation, is destructive of any real success from mental labour. So that unless the highest or moral power is ours, the lower powers will be exerted in vain: and unless the lower conditions are present, the higher will manifest no energy.

11. Let us consider the physical conditions of mental and moral energy first of all. We must admit that in all thought the brain is used. How or why I cannot tell you; that it is used is evident from the following facts. If a man's whole strength is required for continued muscular exertion his mind cannot be actively employed at the same time: after great bodily fatigue he must rest and recruit his bodily strength, before he can turn with vigour to active thought. And equally we find, that after long continued exercise of thought we require fresh air, food, a brisker circulation of the blood, (which can only be needed I believe to repair the waste of fibre or other substance,) and sleep, before we can go on with our work: and unless we get the three first we often cannot sleep, which we know to be a constant result of

physical exhaustion. And not only do we require all these purely physical supplies just as much after the labour of thought as after muscular labour; it is said by competent authorities that to sustain continued abstract thought, or thought which requires a considerable effort of willed attention, for any length of time, purer air and food of a more highly nourishing kind is necessary than muscular labour demands. It is quite certain that no amount of resolution can keep the mind up to continued attention without these physical supports: even with them, "Under the tension of mind resulting from the steady contemplation of great and mysterious subjects," says a writer in the *Saturday Review*, "the physical energies of the body are exhausted; so that it is not impossible that thought may literally kill. Especially may this be the case, when to a fragile constitution is united an ardent piety and a capacity for acute and profound speculation, with a bitter sense of the disappointments of life." You will find the whole article well worth considering.

Nor can you by giving more nourishing food, purer air, and more sleep increase this physical endurance of exhausting thought, beyond very definite limits. There is certainly some proportion between the size of the brain and the intellectual strength a man possesses: for there is a minimum of its bulk below which intellect appears wholly absent. Besides the digestive and respiratory organs have their limit, beyond which they cannot work at the assimilation of nourishment, without loss of power. Not one of our vital organs can do double work, however urgently a doubled exhaustion demands it of them. And if people will overwork these vital organs, especially if they overwork the brain, by demanding from themselves a mental labour in excess of their energy, the results of that labour will not be sound. The freshness and vigour of thought goes first, then its clearness. Next appears a false excitement; an exaggeration of their conclusions; an over eager estimate of their importance; a distortion in drawing them; and the seeker of truth becomes the passionate finder of error. Parallel with these mental phenomena, lie these two well established facts; that habitual overwork of mind produces positive organic disease of brain;†

* *Saturday Review*, May 21, 1864.

† In some persons the heart gives way first.

and that insufficient mental exertion produces a morbid condition of nerves. That cheerfulness of temper, that freedom from anxiety, that placid state of nerves, that pleasure in exertion, which are requisite for sound and successful mental work, are mainly, if not wholly, dependent on that state of bodily health, which the wholesome and justly proportioned exercise of all our faculties tends to produce, and which is lost alike by their overwork, and by their inadequate employment.

The law which regulates these phenomena, has been thus announced by Professor Bain. "There is a definite equivalence between mental manifestations and physical forces, the same as subsists between the physical forces themselves. . . . The mental manifestations are in proportion to their physical supports; or there is a numerically proportioned rise and fall of the two together."* It follows from this that every mental exertion, expending an equivalent amount of a man's energy, leaves so much less for physical purposes; and in like manner that every physical exertion expending an equivalent amount of vital energy, leaves him so much the less to sustain the expenditure of mental exertion. To assume from this that mind is a manifestation of physical force, is as reasonable as it would be to assume that matter is a manifestation of mental force. Food-combustion may sustain mental exertion; but it will not itself go on, except in a living organism: and purely mental emotion may,—it actually has,—depressed the vital force to such a degree that food combustion no longer goes on; and the body dies because the mind has drained it of life. If the supply of force which a man has to expend is limited; and if mental and bodily exertion alike expend an equivalent amount of it, the results of exhaustion by either cause must obviously be, what Professor Bain tells us it is; there must be "a numerically proportioned rise and fall of the two together."

12. It is remarkable that moral power once attained in any considerable degree does not appear to be dependent for its continued strength either on our physical force or our intellectual strength. The mental labour of continued attention must I believe in every case be suspended when physical exhaustion has been produced: but that this does not neces-

* "Correlation of Forces," *Macmillan's Magazine*, vol. xvi. p. 372.

sarily suspend the action of the will seems to be proved in the case of those who have voluntarily starved themselves to death; refusing even in the last stage of exhaustion to yield to their ravenous longing for food.* And many martyrs—not for religion only but for fidelity to their fellow criminals,—have endured the utmost torture and gradually died through exhaustion under it, who through all have kept firm to their determination not to speak the word or make the sign that would have freed them. It appears then that he who has sufficiently accustomed himself to the exercise of this moral mastery, can keep his power unimpaired even when his thoughts are wandering and his physical power has wholly gone. Continually also we find such moral strength greater and more enduring in those who are physically weaker and more timid; and sometimes in those who are mentally less capable, than the average.

Mrs. Melcombe. I am sure that constitutional strength of nerves has a good deal to do with people's enduring power.

Agatha. I never knew why strong nerves came to mean comparatively insensible ones: as their business is to feel, one would think the stronger they are the more sensitive they ought to be.

Professor. I fancy what is called strength of nerve is much oftener strength of resolution: or else that it means that vigorous circulation and well nourished brain which with healthy employment, creates a cheerful temper.

13. And now as to the possible increase of our power by education. If we can assign no definite limits to the possible results of the energy of mankind, yet the effective power any individual can become capable of exerting is very definitely limited. For the exercise of his active powers rests upon and is conditioned by his corresponding capacities; and these, which vary in each individual, give the measure of the exertion he will make, as it determines the amount of pleasure he will find in their satisfaction. Now to a certain extent these capacities may be enlarged and their desires intensified: for by reason of the law of habit the active exercise of every faculty has a reflex action which increases

* Whether any have thus withstood the greater torment of thirst may be doubtful. But this produces delirium, and the will cannot command where there is no consciousness of action.

within certain limits the capacity which aroused it. Thus the active exercise of memory on one subject increases our general capacity for remembering; and the habitual indulgence of any moral emotion—(*i.e.* by allowing it to determine our actions,) as of love or pity or hatred,—increases our capacity for loving or hating. So the disuse or insufficient exercise of any faculty will diminish the corresponding capacity: and the exclusive exercise of energy in one mode, by preventing the due exercise of the other modes of thought has the same effect; the gratified capacity grows, and the rest dwindle. It is by disciplined and many sided exertion that a man makes the most of himself.

The principal condition of a man's making very much of himself, is health; or that due proportion and harmony between the vital organs, between the various mental faculties and capacities, and between body and mind, which constitutes a healthy man, possessing a sound mind in a sound body. Strong capacities for feeling with a feeble development of mind, makes an unhappy, unsatisfied, ever restlessly feeble being. A man's body with a child's mind, or with a child's powers of self-control, makes an imbecile or a criminal. Our strength then as measured by the exertion we are capable of making without loss of power, is like that of a chain, equal to the strength of the weakest part: and the increase of which it is capable is equal to the exertion which that weakest organ can be made capable of, without lasting injury. Nor is it sufficient for the fullest development of our potential energy, that all our faculties are thus far exercised and disciplined: to reach their full perfection they must be so exercised as that the exercise itself gives us pleasure. "Pleasure" says Sir W. Hamilton "is not only the consequent of the most perfect exertion of power, but it reacts on the power itself, by raising invigorating and perfecting its development: we make no progress in a study except we find a pleasure in its pursuit."* The proof that increase, or development of power is going on is increasing health, and increasing pleasure in the exertion demanded.

14. It is then the man's physical and intellectual organization which determines the amount of his strength: the

* *Lectures on Metaphysics*, vol. ii. lecture xliii. p. 452.

amount of power he actually will exert depends on these and on his own resolution,—his conative faculties or Bestrebung-Vermögen. It is limited by the capacity of the living instruments he employs as the vehicles of his energy, for sustaining continuous exertion without fatigue: and on the power of the repairing organs to maintain these instruments in working order, throughout the waste caused by their vigorous action: and this again depends much on the supplies of food air and rest he obtains. When the brain is large strong and well nourished; when the organs of nourishment and circulation are sound and well balanced; when the senses are keen and the mental perceptions acute vigorous and wide; when sensitiveness is great and the exertive powers energetic: it is not want of training which will prevent that man from being strong: it may prevent his effecting much, but whatever he does he will do strongly and intelligently. On the other hand where the perceptions are dull, the brain small, the circulation languid; nervous force deficient and the whole temperament feeble and ill nourished, there no amount of training will produce a vigorous or a clear sighted mind.

This constitutional strength I call the man's capital. Education may enable him to use it aright, and in the most economical way, making the power he has go as far as it can. But the amount of this constitutional capital, must in the end still decide the amount of what he can do. The quality of his work, or the actual use he will make of his capital is more dependent on his education. The intensity of his mental force is determined by the degree in which he has acquired the habit of concentration; and its efficiency, on the degree in which he has acquired "a perfectly accurate habit of thought and of expression. This is something which is almost entirely within our own power to acquire; and which nature unassisted never yet gave to any man."* Partly also it will depend on the economy of the method he employs in working.

15. Our last point is the law of its expenditure. Every educated man arriving at manhood in a normal state of health, finds himself in possession of a certain amount of capital of strength, accumulated during his growth from

* Lord Stanley's *Rectorial Address*, Glasgow, 1869.

infancy to manhood out of the estate he inherited at his birth. The available amount of his capital will therefore depend partly on the original value of his estate, and very much on the way in which it has been managed by his guardians. They may have wholly neglected it: they may have allowed him to forestall it: they may have invested it in unavailable securities; in the public funds, or at the highest possible rate of interest. But now this estate is placed entirely in his own care; excepting that whether the interest it daily brings in be great or small, a fixed sum is daily deducted by sovereign nature for the keeping up the estate, and spent in carrying on those vital actions which are needful for the continuance of his life, and in repairing the waste of muscle, brain, &c., consequent on the work of the preceding day. Whilst he continues in health, the rest of his interest is at his own disposal: but if he desires his life to be a healthy and enjoyable one, he will take care daily to expend another portion of his incoming energy, in keeping those instruments which he does not employ in his daily work, in working order by exercise. He may spend his interest in the indulgence of mere animal appetites; he may allow it to be expended in those emotions and passions which external circumstances arouse within him: he may spend it in the gratification of a desultory curiosity or aimless acquisition of (to him) useless knowledge. He can spend it almost entirely in active amusements, with no more exercise of thought than is needed to direct them. He can spend it mainly in mental labour. Or he may spend it in subduing those lower appetites, in controlling and carrying out in action those emotions; in promoting the happiness and welfare of others, in convincing their minds and persuading their wills. Or in all these ways he may spend his daily income of energy, overcoming the obstacles that lie between himself and the accomplishment of his purpose. But however spent, the whole amount expended daily ought to be no more than is received in the day, and whatever he spends in one mode, leaves him so much less to spend in another. As in mechanical, so also in moral force, the power expended in effecting one result represents an equivalent incapacity to produce another result; and every advantage obtained by its expenditure in one mode, is obtained by relinquishing the advantages that might have

been attained by expending labour in another way.* If educational reformers would but believe in the old adage "you can't eat your cake and have it," they would be saved much wasted labour, and I should be saved the necessity of dwelling upon such a truism. To return to our heir: if his income of vigour is not below the average, he cannot without considerable difficulty spend the whole of it in one mode: for the instruments he employs in that mode, being living ones, will get wearied before his whole available energy is spent. And further, no one ever does whilst in a sane state expend the whole force he could spend, unless it be in an instinctive and momentary struggle for life or for something dearer than life. Apparently an instinct of self-preservation restrains us: we could use much more energy if we would, but nothing but an extraordinary excitement can make us willing.

There are many ways of wasting this estate. It is wasted if the income is not expended: like the manna of the Israelites it cannot be accumulated by hoarding it up; and not only is the interest lost, the capital which produced it will be found to be diminished in value. He who habitually neglects to expend this income will receive less and less; his capacity for exertion dwindles away. Or it may be wasted by being spent before it comes due,—by drawing in fact on the capital, which will thus yield less and less interest. A man begins probably by absorbing in his daily work the time and strength which should have gone to keep his unused faculties in exercise; and so these are practically lost to him. Then he encroaches on that portion which nature bad him set apart for rest and reparation; and he loses the vigour of health: if he now persists in this course, his interest ceases, for he falls ill: his creditor nature, bent on preserving him from ruin, has seized on his estate and put it out to nurse. But though by such forced intervals of rest and supply, he may recover a good portion of his capital, it will never again pay him such high interest: the freshness and the joy of exertion has gone from him; and there is great risk—if the extravagance be often repeated there is a certainty, that in the exhaustion of vital strength, or in the overstraining of one or another of the living instruments he

* Herbert Spenser's *Essays*, vol. ii. "Railway Morals and Politics."

has employed, some lasting injury will be caused either to the instrument itself or to some of those organs on whose soundness his healthy activity depends. The only exception to this rule is an apparent one merely. The income of strength is received daily, and for perfect health should be spent daily. But within certain limits a man may spend the principal portion of his yearly income in one mode, in say nine months, and then roughly balance the excess by resting from that mode and exercising himself in other ways for the remaining three. At least he may do this in respect of mental exertion: any great excess of physical exertion over physical supplies produces immediate injury, is less reparable, and also less possible. In the case of moral energy, no such arrangement is possible; the law of habit forbids it.

But if our heir habitually spend nearly his whole income and no more, in steadily labouring for the accomplishment of some adequate and definite purpose, though his capital cannot increase, yet he will get higher and higher interest for it in the shape of results; so much easier does it become to him to repeat the exertion to which he has habituated himself: in other words, he expends so much less energy in producing the same result, than he did when the exertion was new to him and when his faculties were unaccustomed to their task, that the same force consciously expended, will produce far greater results, and those of a much higher kind, than it did at first. It is this skill which has been justly called "the enormous economy of educated force." The process by which force is educated, or the best investment of our capital, will be our subject next week.

16. *Sara.* It is wonderful how much more interest some folks get for their capital than others. I get so very little for mine, I'm just a casual pauper, living on the alms of the witty.

Agatha. I suppose that will depend on what our capital was, as much as on the way it was invested by our education.

Mrs. Charlton. Women have never been allowed to invest theirs as advantageously as men may.

Mrs. Melcombe. "My dear Mrs. Charlton I don't think they have nearly so much to invest.

Sara. Then it's all the more a burning shame not to invest what they have in the best education going. Now isn't it, Tom?

Professor. Which do you call the best, what gives the highest interest, or the safest?

Agatha. Well, neither; the highest that is reasonably sound.

Sara. I know you are not to draw our conclusions, but I should like to know what conclusion you intend us to draw from all this, as to the possible increase of women's wits.

Professor. I should wish you to draw the right one: it's your affair to find that out, not mine.

Mrs. Melcombe. You have made it quite clear. No one can deny that in physical strength men have the supremacy, and you have shown how much all the rest depends on that.

Agatha. Except moral and religious power.

Mrs. Charlton. I cannot allow that even in physical work women are surpassed by men. They are often more skilful in those finer manual employments, in which delicacy and dexterity avail more than weight and muscle. We have found them quite as competent and even quicker in telegraphy, in compositors' work and in watch making: and no doubt when women are generally as well trained for such work as men are, their ability will be more widely proved.

Mrs. Melcombe. But it is not, as my husband says, by merely working such machines that men subdue and govern the earth; it is by inventing them: and no woman ever invented one, not even a knitting loom: even now they are invented the women who work them can never be got to understand them.

Sara. That's a very disagreeable fact for us. I wonder Agatha what use you think you are of, sitting there all calmly smiling. Say something clever directly to help us out of this pitfall of Emily's.

Agatha. I doubt it will be more prudent for you to change your ground and avoid it. Don't waste power by setting all the world to do exactly the same thing; but say that whilst men are best fitted to subdue the earth, women are remarkably well qualified to enjoy it when it is subdued, without abusing it.

Sara. I do say so: and I will stand to it too. It's the most charming instance of the division of labour,—so essen-

tial you know Mrs. Charlton to what's-it's-name—to the progress of civilisation.

Mrs. Melcombe. It's a mere evasion.

Sara. Oh hush Emily. My dear Tom I'm quite content to know myself more than competent to enjoy as much of this earth as you will ever subdue.

Professor. What chemicals and all? I defy you; you know you dare not touch them.

Sara. Oh that's because you have not yet subdued them sufficiently. Of course I should not enjoy being blown up with one of your rebellious gases.

Mrs. Charlton looked rather annoyed; she is never quite happy when people are jesting. I suppose she is too much in earnest; but it's a pity too. Now she begged us to be serious and said, both must share alike in the labour and the profit. If the rough material is prepared by men, does not all that adapts it for comfort and grace come from the deftness of women? But men have kept all the rule, and nearly all the work that is remunerative or elevating in their own hands: and this is why manual labour is still so sordid and narrowing, and does so little to ennoble and refine the labourers. You will never find the flowers and fruits of toil growing kindly until women have their full share in the work, adding grace and tenderness to the products of man's strength and inventive genius.

Professor. I confess manual labour never seemed to me sordid or mean, till I saw the women and young girls in Switzerland and in France carrying burdens to the fields.

Sara. You know Mrs. Charlton I am your devoted follower; only I declare it seems to me that the flowers and the fruits grow very kindly in our gardens where Adam and his sons have put them—and Eve and her daughters have gathered them—ever since we left Eden.

Professor. I am afraid you find your devoted follower incorrigibly idle; but I assure you she will get no encouragement from me in escaping her share of the work or in denying her power to do it.

Mrs. Charlton. After all it is mental not physical endowments, that must govern both things and society.

Agatha. If mental power consists in attention, I can say

from experience, that when continued attention brings increasing headaches, it cannot be kept up.

Mrs. Charlton. No comparison of that kind can as yet be fair. We are only just beginning to understand the laws of health in their application to the education of girls. And then the custom of mental activity and education is at present all in favour of men: women's brains have been comparatively inactive for some centuries.

Agatha. Yes, I saw it stated the other day that women now get uneducated brains from their uneducated mothers, and men educated brains from their educated fathers. It's very curious, because in my day we always had a father and mother apiece.

Sara. If our labour of attention limits the education we can receive with profit, we may all grow a little wiser together: but if it comes to a race between us weight and endurance must tell, and we shall not all grow equal.

Agatha. And heaven forfend we should: the civilised world is dull enough already without our making it any more monotonous.

Mrs. Melcombe. Then you give up mental supremacy to men?

Professor. I would not if I were you. I should refuse to consider the question at all, as St. Paul advises. For as it is in the church, so each necessary function in the commonwealth is appropriate to those who are best qualified to perform it. What each and all have to consider is how best to fulfil, or how best to fit themselves for fulfilling, the function for which nature has adapted them or to which circumstances call them. Whether any one else might be able to fulfil it as well or better, is a very irrelevant question. It is enough that the functions to which women generally are called, demand as much—not to say more—of mental and moral strength as any one can by any possibility attain.

Sara. Then giving up the hope of doubling our capital we must try to find out how we can best invest it. I wish Emily you would give us fish every day whilst these lectures last.

Mrs. Melcombe. Why do you want fish? and in such weather as this too!

Sara. Because I am given to understand that fish is the nourishment best adapted for sustaining extreme mental exertion: also coffee. We shall be drawing on our capital every week if you don't take care, and finally die of thinking. And for my part I don't think that's at all worth while.

LECTURE IV.

EDUCATION, AND ITS OBJECT.

"The science of education can never be understood, much less display its powers as the nisus formativus of social man; never can society comprehend fully the permanent distinction and occasional contrast between cultivation and civilization; or attain a due insight into the momentous fact, that a nation can never be a too cultivated, but may easily become an over civilised race; whilst we voluntarily oppose ourselves to that grand prerogative of our nature, the hungering and thirsting after truth, as the appropriate end of our intelligential, and its point of union with our moral nature. . . . Alas, how many examples are now present to our memory, of young men the most anxiously and expensively be-school-mastered, be-tutored, be-lectured, anything but educated; who have received arms and ammunition instead of skill, strength, and courage; who are varnished not polished, previously over-civilised, and most pitiably uncultivated."—*The Friend*, § 2, essays ix. and x.

1. *Professor.* Our next question is, what kind and degree of education will enable a man to make the strength he has go as far as it can. Physical education I am incompetent to speak of: that moral discipline which prepares us for the exercise of self-government and social influence, we shall have to go into in part, when we come to speak of freedom and of union: in part it is secured by the process of mental education; to which last I purpose now altogether to confine myself.

The problem discussed in nearly all the papers on this subject, with which Mrs. Charlton has supplied me, is this; how to secure for women the same thorough and high education which it is assumed is enjoyed by men of the same classes. And the plans proposed for effecting this end are mainly such as these:

i. That girls instead of being left to the chance of getting educated at home, shall be taught in large classes, and under some kind of public inspection and regulation.

ii. That the teachers of these classes and the subjects

taught shall not be chosen by the parents alone; and that none but those whose competency has been certified by adequate authority shall be admitted as teachers.

iii. That the subjects in which they are instructed shall be on the whole the same as those employed in the education of boys, *i.e.* classics and mathematics; but with the addition of some modern languages more thoroughly taught than at present; of history; of the physical sciences; of English literature; of music taught scientifically; and of drawing and geography. Besides these there are "the special branches of female education"; a mysterious subject on which no precise information is vouchsafed us. From scattered hints, as well as from the strongly expressed determination of the Cambridge examiners never to examine girls in these branches, I should guess that they include the arts of sewing, cooking, and housework; the management of the nursery and sick room, household economy and a few other unconsidered trifles of the same kind, as a general knowledge of medicine and hygiene.

iv. To secure their real progress in these studies, and justice being done them by their teachers; it is proposed that they shall from time to time be examined not by their ordinary teachers, but by graduates selected for the purpose by our universities; and on passing the final examination they are to receive a certificate of their proficiency. For those who can afford it, this school course is to be followed by a regular university course of study; and they are—those who intend to enter professions necessarily—the rest optionally—to try for degrees on passing the same examination as men do now. To take the same degrees, but without honours; at least by most it is strongly urged, that all these examinations, with their prizes, certificates and degrees, are to be gone through in the strictest privacy, and unrewarded by any public fame or applause.

Mrs. Melcombe. Unpunished you mean my dear.

Professor. Fortunately I need not discuss that. But what is here demanded is in effect, that the instruction given to girls for strictly educational purposes shall be greatly increased, at once in amount and in thoroughness, in extension and intension; that young women shall go through a good deal more work than we require of our young men, in the

same space of time, and without that stimulus of immediate fame, by which we strive, for the most part in vain, to keep up their brothers in some degree to the requisite exertion. When I say the same space of time, you must remember there is a difficulty about that: we cannot, and we do not pretend to give this higher education to young men, unless they give us at least the ten years between twelve and twenty-two. Those who leave us at eighteen or nineteen are sixth form boys not educated men. But that is by the way.

Equal work requires equal strength, more work, more strength: the more thorough mental work is the less its amount must be, and the greater the extension of our knowledge, the less is its intension. I do not perceive how these plans propose to provide that increased power which they propose so freely to expend. I quite allow that our girls' intellectual abilities have not yet been fully developed, and that by our present system of teaching they never can be. I cannot believe they are, or ever can be made physically capable of undergoing the same amount of mental labour, that young men of the same class can bear. And over-exertion does not educe, it destroys mental power.

2. I am afraid after the brilliant schemes contained in these papers, you will find me very tedious when I call back your attention to the first abstract principles of education. But true to my purpose not to meddle with your practical conclusions, I can only consider with you these four questions. What is the object we are aiming at in all mental education? What is the process signified by it? What subject will on the whole be our best instrument, for attaining with the least loss of time and labour the highest education we can give, and our pupils can receive? And lastly, how can we best induce them to receive it, under the limitations imposed upon us by the laws of the minds to be educated on the one hand, and by our imperfect access to, and command over those minds on the other?

First of all let us have some more definite end than this of educating girls as thoroughly as boys are educated. What do you desire to do for your pupils by educating them?

Sara. We are not agreed about that. Some people wish to make men's equals of them: some aim higher, and would

have them made into very superior women: and some to say the truth appear to aim at producing a chemical combination, that shall be both and neither; but in a heterogeneous kind of way better than either ever yet were.

Agatha. Then we all propose to make them?

Mrs. Charlton. I could be satisfied with nothing less than such an education as shall raise women to the standing-point of the age; embuing them with its spirit of free untrammelled enquiry; and with such well stored and varied knowledge as may enable them not only to comprehend modern thought and science, but to take their place in its foremost ranks.

Mrs. Melcombe shuddered visibly. "I am very old fashioned you know: and I should wish my children to be so educated, as that by God's blessing they may be able to do their duty in whatever state of life He may be pleased to call them."

Sara. I think I expect you to make them so far clever and wise that they may be able to become good and to do good with a merry heart. Please observe that this sentiment is intended to be the flattest possible contradiction to Mr. Kingsley's views about women.

Professor. What's that?

Sara. I'll sing it to you to-night if you behave pretty:—that the sweet girls are to be good and not clever—and so of course the women (being failures), are to weep and leave their betters to work: that's a digression, now Agatha what's your ideal end?

Agatha. I should like them to be able to think a little, independently and not in flocks: and to be so far educated as to have some slight comprehension of the extent of their own ignorance. I suppose one is allowed to be Utopian.

Dr. Melcombe. Well you all aim high enough certainly. Mrs. Charlton would agree with the essayist in Oxford studies, who would have the highest education aim at the formation of the philosophical temper, founded on a universal knowledge; or in "un talent acquis par le travail et par l'habitude, pour juger sainement de toutes les choses du monde."* My wife may adopt Milton's definition: "a complete and generous education is that which fits a man to

* *Oxford Essays*, 1855, p. 269.

perform justly, skilfully, and magnanimously, all the offices, both social and private, of peace and war."* Sara had better come down to Mr. Grote's standard, and be content with "placing the growing human creature in such circumstances of direction and restraint, as shall enable her to make the most of herself."† I confess to my mind Locke's definition of the tutor's business is much the truest practically, though it is much humbler: he says "it is not so much to teach his pupil all that is knowable, as to raise in him a love and esteem of knowledge, and to put him in the right way of knowing and improving himself;"‡ to excite his thirst for knowledge, and to teach him by obliging him to practise, the best method of obtaining knowledge is a really practicable object to set before oneself.

Sara. But what have you got to say to Agatha's aim?

Dr. Melcombe. Only what Miss Tryanon says herself,—it is Utopian. You remember what Pascal says of it? As we did not we got the book and read this passage. "Les sciences ont deux extrémités, qui se touchent: la première est la pure ignorance naturelle où se trouvent tous les hommes en naissant. L'autre extrémité est celle où arrivent les grandes âmes, qui ayant parcouru tout ce que les hommes peuvent savoir, trouvent qu'ils ne savent rien, et se rencontrent dans cette même ignorance d'où ils étaient partis. *Mais c'est une ignorance savante qui se connaît.* Ceux qui sont sortis de l'ignorance naturelle, et n'ont pu arriver à l'autre, ont quelque teinture de cette science suffisante, et font les entendus. Ceux-là troublent le monde et jugent plus mal de tout que les autres."§ He gives a different account of the matter from Mr. Pattison, and no doubt he is nearest the truth. But we are speaking of that education which can be given, which has to do with the beginning, not with the end of our earthly life; and with the preparation for mastering knowledge, not with the conclusion to which they may arrive, who have examined all that men can know. I must however thank you for reminding us of this end and completion of all human knowledge, because it so strongly enforces

* Milton's *Prose Works*, "Tractate on Education."
† *Cambridge Essays*, 1856, "Old Studies and New."
‡ Locke *On Education*, § 195.
§ *Pensées de Pascal*, 1re partie, article 6, § 25.

the distinction I want effectually to establish between education and instruction.

3. Education as you well know is the educing, or drawing out into activity, those capacities which are already within. It follows from this that there are three things which education is not, and does not do. It is incorrect to speak of its making people this or that; education makes nothing. By no possible training can we give a new capacity, or exchange those faculties a man has, for others which we think would be more desirable for him. We cannot even materially change the proportions which his individual nature has established between them. Instead therefore of determining that men and women ought to come up to this or that ideal standard, and endeavouring to raise them to it; we must strictly limit our attempted education to the putting it into their power to make the most of themselves, of their merits, and deficiencies; so that it shall be possible for them, if they will, to become and to do the best which it is in them to do and to be.

Next, education is not the putting correct notions or sound information into the mind. Its object is not the possession of truth, but the attainment of the power of acquiring and possessing it: that is of the power of freely putting forth, in every mode of mental exertion, as varied, vigorous, and sustained an energy as the man is capable of. But whilst giving instruction forms no part of the object of education, it is necessary as the means by which the mind is educated; we must oblige our pupils to learn something. To exercise their faculties they must have some subject on which they can employ them: and we can only teach our scholars how to learn (which though a subordinate is an essential part of their education) by carrying them through the process of learning. But our work is not "to fill bucket by bucket the leaden cistern, it is to open anew a well of springing water; it is to awaken the principle and to teach the method of self-development: it is not to assist in storing the passive mind with the various sorts of knowledge most in request, as if the human soul were a mere warehouse or banqueting room; but it is to place it in such relations and circumstances as shall gradually excite the *germinal power that*

*craves no knowledge but what it can take up into itself, appropriate, and reproduce, in fruits of its own."**

And lastly; education is not, and has nothing whatever to do with, preparing a man for any special profession. It has to prepare and fit him to live well and worthily the life he is to live in this world: to prepare him for his life as a man; or rather, taking the highest form of humanity, as a Christian or free man, serving God and governing himself; and for his life as a citizen, serving his country and governing in the State.

Professional training is a wholly different thing; and though, in the higher professions especially, it demands and presupposes education, it does itself form no part of it whatever, and ought in all cases to be given subsequently. Education aims at enabling a man to make the most of himself: professional training at enabling a man to make the most of his trade. Education aims at man's perfection for God's glory and his own happiness: professional training aims at his perfection as an instrument, for supplying society with something it needs. "And as these two perfections of man, as an end and as an instrument are not the same but generally opposed to each other, so the training requisite for their acquisition is different. If the profession is not all the man, and we do not wish it to be so, then it must be our object to make education as unprofessional as possible: and since after a time the man will have to give his best thoughts to his profession; we shall try all the more before that time to direct them to something else, and to save what we can of him from absorption; to furnish him with springs of activity and sources of interest independent of his profession, and to enable him to take a larger and more intelligent view of his profession itself." We must try so to season his mind, so to strengthen and widen it, that he may effectually resist the inevitable tendency which every limited subject of thought has to warp the judgment and narrow the faculties that are habitually exercised in considering it in one aspect. And every profession as such, even the highest, is a limited, a single-sided pursuit. Professions are the results of that division of labour which civilisation enforces, and which compels every man to do, not all he is capable of doing, and

* *The Friend*, § 2, essay vii. p. 314.

not all which he would be the better for doing, but only or mainly one thing or one class of things. In the patriarchal life each head of a family was king and judge, priest and soldier, merchant and manufacturer, herdsman, agriculturist, and hunter. Now half-a-dozen men divide the manufacture of a pin between them. The pins of society are much better and cheaper for this: the men who constitute society are also much cheaper; but they are not the better, very much the reverse of better.

I leave it to you to decide, whether we shall gain or lose by using up the ablest of our women also, in this professional labour. Perhaps women have not the same inveterate habit most men have, of considering women as means and not as ends. I hope at any rate, you will wholly get rid of the habit, before you frame your scheme for their higher education. And whenever you hear a man beginning "we men like women to be—" be on your guard: he is looking at the question from an egotistical point of view, perhaps regarding women only as means for his own happiness, certainly not thinking of them as persons; for persons are always to be dealt with for their own sake. But this thing is clear; if you intend them for any profession, you must be the more careful to secure for them such an unprofessional education as will place them above it, and give them a wider view than their profession will. There is no other way of enabling any one to comprehend the whole of his special work, and to see it in its true bearings and proportions; and without this he will never form a sound judgment as to its natural tendencies or its proper limitations.

Mrs. Melcombe. Is not that educating people above their work?

Professor. Well to be master of one's work, one ought to stand somewhat above it. That is just what a real Christian faith does—it puts those who have it above their present visible work; and so doing it gives them a fuller mastery of that present work.

4. *Mrs. Charlton.* But for those women who will take up the ordinary profession, domestic life, you would of course educate them with a view to that. Every mistress of a family in the present day, should understand something of the laws of hygiene, of chemistry, of domestic economy and

of education; and an enlightened public opinion will certainly demand for them an education embracing all these.

Dr. Melcombe. In the first place, I do not admit that domestic life is a profession at all. It seems to me to be the one enormous advantage which women have over us, that even in a civilised state, they are not for the most part subjected to that division of labour which having a profession implies. To be the mistress of a household, is to lead a life as manysided, and requiring as manifold ability, as the patriarchal life used to do: its duties are such that the highest and most thorough education that can be given, will never make a woman competent to discharge them, without much experience, intelligence, and thoughtfulness. What it demands is not so much intensity, as extension of mental power; a breadth of mind, a well balanced education of the faculties, and "an harmonious expansion of all the abilities which go to make up the worth and the beauty of human nature." It demands a real standard of perfection, an earnest endeavour after it; and that flexibility which a just appreciation of the end gives, by enabling us to estimate truly the value and appropriateness of the various machinery employed to promote it.* In short it demands the widest attainable culture. This should be secured first: the arts you name as necessary will be readily acquired afterwards. If public opinion does not demand this culture for women, it would not the less appreciate the benefits of it, could it be once secured: But we are asking now what is true, not what people say or think. Then in this world, where life is short, the main thing is either to do a thing or not to do it. Either then give women this higher education, or don't give it, only know which you do, and why you do it. If you try to give both kinds at once, you will end by giving neither.

Mrs. Charlton. We must be guided by the opinions and the movement of our age, unless we are altogether to fall behind it: the very reason for desiring a higher education for women is that they may get into harmony with the spirit of the age, and no longer lag so far behind it in information and in opinion.

Agatha. A highly educated class is a rather expensive luxury if that is all they have to do, isn't it?

* *Culture and its Enemies*, Cornhill, July 1867.

Sara. If our honour women are to turn out our leaders, it won't do at all to teach them to think with the crowd: anybody can do that without the bother of a higher education. Why I could do it, if I could only bring myself to read magazines and reviews enough. They ought to think for the crowd I feel sure.

Dr. Melcombe. I think you are right there. A really educated class is needed to form and guide public opinion, and to resist the false tendencies of the age, not to swell the tide. We are not proposing that women should not learn the arts you speak of, but that they should acquire them after they have received a sound and liberal education, not whilst they are receiving it. At any rate this is the way in which men are educated: they don't learn law or medicine or theology for their profession before they have taken their first degree. But I think you may be better able to agree on this matter, when we have enquired what the process of education consists in, and by what instruments it is best carried on.

We take then as the end of mental education, the putting it into a man's power to make the most of himself. We want to give him the key of his two empires, or at least to put the mastery of each within his reach: that key is knowledge and he has the mastery of it who has the power of acquiring whatever special knowledge he needs. And this education does in three ways: 1st, by exciting and disciplining those capacities which furnish us with all our motives for mental exertion: 2nd, by exercising and training us in all those modes of action, or those faculties, through which alone we can satisfy our mental desires; and lastly, by teaching and habituating us to practise such methods of investigation, as will at once economise our labour and tend to insure its success. We will take these in order.

5. These capacities and faculties, these natural desires and the modes of satisfying them, represent the raw material with which the educator has to deal. His first work is to arouse, his next to train them.

The first step of all education is to awaken the desire of knowing, or to awaken curiosity. When once the pleasure which its satisfaction gives has been tasted, it will, if fed by a sufficient supply of material, and not overborne by too free an indulgence in other pleasures, become a ruling passion,

which left to itself and uneducated produces a purposeless and idle activity making the man frivolous or gossiping. To be of any use, the love of knowing must be educated into the desire of understanding, *i. e.* of knowing phenomena in their causes. Once habituated to this intenser pleasure a man loses all taste for unintelligent or useless knowledge; and rejecting trivial and unmeaning facts his mind only retains those which he can use or thinks he can use, for the discovery of some intelligible principle. It is thus that the love of knowing must be educated into the love of truth.

In like manner the desire of unimpeded activity, when once aroused by experience of the pleasure of power, will if left to itself grow into an impatience of hindrance, a dislike of obstacle, and a hatred not of error, but of doubt. In a vigorous mind it may turn into a blind and passionate dogmatism. It has to be disciplined and habituated by education to a patient and continued attention, and changed into the love of intelligent, regulated, and successful labour. That natural desire of finding something human in all we know, which we traced to a longing for sympathy with ourselves, and a desire to have some share in, or to sympathise with all the changes we see, has to be awoke and to grow into the love of order and harmony. But this left to itself may become purely egotistical, and produce a habit of measuring all things by our own notions of what is orderly and right; our little knowledge, our limited range of feelings, becomes to us the standard of the universe, and we learn to deny the existence, or to dislike and condemn all we cannot harmonize with ourselves. Hence come our party politicians, our religious bigots, our bitter sectarianism. It has to be educated into the desire and endeavour to know things in their true relations and proportions; to discover the ruling principle, the intelligent purpose that runs through all, and gives them their true unity. The desire of a more complete energy and satisfaction than we have yet enjoyed;—which springs probably from experience of the inadequacy of all the satisfaction we are able to obtain, completely to satisfy our capacity for happiness, owing to our energy being unequal to our capacity:—this desire though truly natural, can only be sound in those who have obtained some degree of mental education. When it is left morally undisciplined it produces a restless

and continual desire for change. To such a mind whatever is new is irresistible. Or it produces the tyrant reckless of all but himself, his own glory, his own supremacy. It must be turned by education on the man's self, changing into the desire of progress and the longing after perfection. It must be taught to seek its gratification in the harmony of reason or true knowledge with conscience or right feeling, and to find it in conformity to the Divine purpose and Nature.

6. In like manner each mental faculty or mode of thought admits of a lower and a higher energy, as the mind is passively affected by their involuntary excitement, or is actively determined to their exertion by some definite desire or purpose. Thus there is the involuntary consciousness roused by the perception of some object or emotion; and there is the voluntary consciousness to which we more properly limit the name of observation, when the mind concentrates its attention on some phenomenon, and commands itself as it were to be conscious of it. So in memory: there are the ideas that are recalled involuntarily by the laws of association, and those we purposely seek for and bring back into consciousness. And so of all the rest; only that the higher faculties admit less readily of this passive excitement, and require more of voluntary effort to rouse them to action. But in all it is the higher and voluntary energy alone with which the educator is concerned; the formation of the habit and the development of the power of voluntary attention, being at once the secret of the successful cultivation of every faculty, and the main end of its enforced exertion. Indeed this includes the whole sum and substance of mental education. The exercise of attention in the way of perceiving and observing, of remembering, and of imagining, constitutes the primary education of children. Its exercise in the way of disciplined comparison, in all its various processes, is the higher or secondary education of our youths and young men. Its exercise in the perception of principles and the discovery of their application to things and to conduct, the attainment of common sense or a right judgment in all things, constitutes the highest education: this must be the work of self-education, best guided in most cases by experience and the work of active life.

7. The exercise of attention is in truth the only mental exertion the tutor can command, for it is the only one over

which the scholar's will has any direct control. It is obvious that his power of attention can only be strengthened by being exerted in obedience to the law of attention: that law is, that the sum of attention that can be expended on all the objects of consciousness taken together, is equal to the amount of force the mind has to expend, and it follows, that the greater the number of objects we attend to, the less will be the attention given to each, and the fainter the vivacity of our consciousness of each. The state of mind resulting from such extension, we call Distraction. On the other hand the fewer the objects placed before the mind the greater is the attention it can bestow upon each; or the less divided the mind's consciousness is, the more vivid will be its cognition. The state of mind resulting from this concentration is Attention: and the consequence of such concentration, when it becomes habitual, is that the mental activity waxes stronger and the thoughts become clearer and more abundant. Now as the power of attention in childhood is feeble and soon exhausted, the tutor who wishes to strengthen it will be careful to present one object of thought at a time and to exclude all others: and that one he will make as simple and definite as he can, requiring one quality, one relation only, to be attended to at once, and not displacing it by another until it has been distinctly observed, comprehended, and confided to memory with vividness.* The tutor who wishes to foster a habit of distraction, will of course do just the reverse of this: he will bring rapidly before the child's mind a succession of unconnected objects, and heap on its memory a crowd of names and of miscellaneous information about them. And this many teachers will take the greatest pains to do, under the notion that they are awakening a love of knowledge, exciting intelligence and "enlarging" the mind as it is called; or else under the notion that every educated person lies under some fatal necessity of knowing a certain number of facts. Just as a feeder of turkeys might justify his cramming his victims by the supposed necessity that to be a fatted turkey the creature must, by some traditional rule, have swallowed a certain weight of substance, but whether nourishing meal or unnourishing chalk it mattered not. Does not such a suppo-

* *E.g.* he will not force the sign and the thing signified, the name and the idea it stands for on the child's mind at once, but in succession.

sition imply on the part of the educators a deficient education of that primary faculty, observation?

8. Our education does not begin with this: the senses themselves require much education before our perceptions can be accurate and acute: but as this is a matter that concerns the young creature's life, nature wisely keeps it in her own hands. When she has done her part it is time for us to begin, by educating the faculty of acquisition to acquire profitably. Nowhere is the difference between an educated and an uneducated faculty more strikingly marked than here, nor is it anywhere perhaps of more essential importance. As little children pick flowers, not selecting the best but those they can most readily catch hold of; so does an uneducated observation heap together without any order those materials which lie next at hand, without the least consideration of their accuracy, their intrinsic importance, their real connexion, or their possible utility. Dame Quickly's discourses have been repeatedly quoted as an instance of this. The way in which an educated man, watching the very same phenomena, will instantly and without any conscious effort, allow all the unmeaning circumstances to drop out of consciousness; selecting with unerring instinct however great the crowd, those circumstances that have a meaning, and observing these in the order of their connexion; this is more like a flash of intuition than the exercise of a patiently acquired skill. Thus the power of correct observation implies not only accurate perceptions, but comparison and judgment based on comparison. "The observer is not he who merely sees the thing which is before his eyes, but he who sees what parts that thing is composed of. To do this well, is a rare talent. One person from inattention, or attending in a wrong place, overlooks half of what he sees. Another sets down much more than he sees, confounding it with what he imagines or infers. Another takes note of the kind of all the circumstances, but being inexpert in estimating their degree, leaves the quantity of each uncertain. Another sees indeed the whole, but makes such an awkward division of it into parts, throwing things into one mass that ought to be separated, and separating what might more conveniently be considered as one, that the result is the same or even worse

than if no analysis had been attempted."* So much of the worth of all our subsequent labour, and of the value of our mental power, depends on the accuracy and judgment of our observation, that it is truly grievous to reflect how much educational labour is spent in weakening, and even in destroying this faculty. Civilisation, and especially perhaps its great multiplication of books, is wholly antagonistic to its cultivation: so that the habit of correct observation and the acuteness of the senses which that habit cultivates, has come to be regarded by us as a mark of savage life. I suppose we must pay something for the blessing of books, but if we abuse the blessing by an immoderate gluttony, we shall have to pay a good deal, not for the blessing but for the curse. I will leave it you, whether the power of intelligent observation is likely to be increased or diminished by supplying children with numbers of books beautifully illustrated, which tell them all and far more than all they could themselves observe in a life-time of the birds and insects and animals about them, of the trades and occupations going on around them; and which so carefully scatter their attention over every conceivable science. Turn their attention to any one of these present things, and I think you will find that one little fact about it, observed by themselves, will give them far more delight and rouse far more interest, than a thousand facts read in a book or seen in pictures. As this latter mode of satisfying curiosity makes it quite superfluous for them to find out anything for themselves, as it gives them so much more information whilst saving them all exertion of their own faculties, as it satisfies so much more curiosity than they possess or it can excite—it seems to me I confess to be a complete example, so far as education is concerned, of the great art how not to do it.

Mrs. Charlton. But a general intelligence is not to be attained, without much more general information than we can get by personal observation.

Professor. General intelligence is rather a vague term: unless it means an intelligent exercise of all the special faculties of the understanding, I confess I can attach no meaning to it. General information, if it be the result of such an exercise, is very valuable: if it be the effect of

* Mill's *System of Logic*, vol. i. book iii. ch. vii. § 1.

the exercise of memory alone, it is anti-educational and purely obstructive, and a healthy active-minded child will find it insupportably uninteresting. His knowledge of nature depends on his power of observing nature; and every one who would be a student of nature must acquire this. Those who desire only to acquaint themselves with the discoveries and opinions of experts in these sciences, may dispense with it. But the knowledge of what has been discovered of mind cannot be acquired without accurate personal observation; for these discoveries can only be understood by the voluntary production in ourselves of those states of consciousness of which others speak, and by observation of and reflection upon that which passes in our own minds: language is as inadequate to express this consciousness, as it is to convey the sensations of colour or of sound to those who have not themselves experienced them. And the yet more complicated knowledge of men, of character and conduct, can be acquired in no other way than by long-continued, accurate, and keen personal observation. Language has no shades fine enough to paint their variations. The true education of this faculty must be from the first self-education; all the tutor can do is to excite the curiosity by drawing the child's attention to such objects as will easily repay its attention, and interest the child in watching: and then by pointing out its omissions or additions or hasty conclusions, to secure its watching accurately. It is useless to require this exertion as a task: unless the child observes with pleasure and freely, it will never observe well; and as Mr. Mill has said, "there is no art of observing: there may be rules for observing as there are for inventing, but these do not teach us how to do it, but how to make ourselves capable of doing it." But the pleasure derived from intelligent observation is so great, and so accessible, whilst the labour it demands is so light; that when the desire has once been roused and the habit in some measure formed, it will grow spontaneously, needing only occasional direction and sympathy from the educator, and some leisure time for its exercise.

9. The education of memory lies much more within his power. Its exercise as a part of education has often been spoken of as though it were opposed to the cultivation of understanding and reason. No doubt the overstrained exer-

tion of memory, as of any other faculty, is injurious; both because it absorbs in one mode of thought so much of mental energy, as to leave little or none to be exerted in other modes; and because by making an undue demand on that energy, it weakens and diminishes it. This is more obviously (not more really) true of memory, because it can be more readily overtasked by the tutor than any other faculty can be, and that with the least trouble or ingenuity on his part: and an incapable teacher will be much more tempted to overtask the memory, because it is the faculty which makes the most show of results, being the only one which admits of cramming, or which can be made to counterfeit all the other faculties. It has another peculiarity; it is more evidently and immediately affected by physical causes, than any other mental faculty, and it is the first to suffer from excessive mental work. The first sign of overwork, is failing recollection. The first token of approaching brain disease, is generally the loss of memory of words. Dr. Abercrombie gives some singular instances, in which the memory of one special subject of knowledge appears to have been fairly knocked out of the mind by a blow on the head, or lost by fever.* And it appears that as the injured brain certainly acts on the memory; so also the overburdened memory may so react on the brain, as to render it physically an unfit medium for the consciousness of the soul's more complicated actions.

But all this is no proof at all, that the possession of a powerful memory has any natural or healthy connexion with the possession of a feeble understanding. On the contrary a little consideration shows us, that a tenacious memory and an active power of recollection are at once essential elements of a powerful intellect, and necessary conditions of the free development of all the intellectual faculties. As far as the discovery of the truth is concerned, it would be useless for us to observe anything if all our observations became inaccurate as soon as the object passed out of sight. Imagination, which cannot act at all unless memory supplies it with material, cannot act freely and with vigour unless that supply be both plentiful and distinct. We cannot compare

* Abercrombie, *On the Intellectual Powers*, part iii. § 1; see also Dr. Winslow, *On Obscure Diseases of the Brain and Mind.*

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the simplest perceptions nor draw the most elementary conclusion without memory. As the necessary foundation of all higher exercise of mind, the strengthening of the memory forms the principal end of all primary education: for which this process is also pre-eminently adapted, as it requires none of that continued labour of abstraction and reasoning, which a child's mind and brain are alike unfit to sustain. Its discipline forms also an important part of the higher, or secondary education: and none but those who are accustomed to mental work, can have any idea of the enormous economy of time, of labour, and of mental energy, secured by the possession of a vigorous, accurate, and educated memory. Without this such work is a true toil of Sisyphus, a vainly exhausting struggle.

Memory is exercised in two ways; by receiving new matter, which we call committing to memory: and by voluntarily recalling what has been so received. This last effort is very dependent for its success on the order, or method employed in the exercise of the first. It must be exercised in conformity with the law of memory; which Sir W. Hamilton states thus:—*

1. The intensity of the present consciousness determines the vivacity of the future memory: vivid consciousness produces long memory; faint consciousness—short memory; no consciousness—no memory.

2. Those thoughts suggest each other, which had previously constituted parts of the same entire act of cognition, or of the same train of thought.

3. Those trains of thought are most readily recalled which have been vividly presented to the mind, and repeatedly, from time to time, renewed and their association strengthened.

It follows from the first of these, combined with the law of attention I named before, that the more facts or names are committed to memory, the shorter time will they be remembered. It seems then that the true art of developing a tenacious and active memory consists, first in securing an undivided attention to each fact, idea, or word that is to be remembered; and placing it distinctly and vividly before the mind, first in each part of the notion or each essential circumstance of the fact taken one by one; and then as com-

* *Lectures on Metaphysics*, vol. ii. lecture xxx. xxxi.

bined into the whole. Next it consists, in strictly limiting the amount thus entrusted to the memory: not suffering the young mind to spread its attention feebly over too wide a field, or too many fields at once. And lastly, by requiring it from time to time to recall the whole series of thoughts, and to reproduce them as a whole, as exactly, distinctly, and fully as when first learnt; and also in parts, as any one of the series may be applied either as a rule, an illustration, or a contrast, in some new series which the pupil is acquiring. The difficulty of doing this arises from our inability directly to recall a past cognition. We can however voluntarily fix our attention on a certain class of associated ideas, and refuse it to all others until by the vivacity thus given to it, we recover the whole of it, and the particular fact we wanted comes back to us with it. The difficulty however increases with the increasing variety, rather than with the amount of the matter committed to memory. If the subjects of instruction are very limited and closely connected together, the scholar will advance step by step, with comparative ease, in acquiring the knowledge of their most complicated relations and most abstruse distinctions; and that with an increasing grasp of memory, because its energy has been concentrated on a few definite and closely associated trains of ideas. He loses no portion of his labour, but the work of one year taking up and carrying on further the work of the preceding years, confirms his memory of what he has learned, and unites it by the strongest associations with all he is learning. Such a scholar will know few things, and know them well: and for whatever he may afterwards desire to learn, he will find himself furnished with a strong and a tenacious memory. If the subjects of his instruction are very varied and changed from time to time, the reverse will be the case: new acquaintances will be continually pressing old ones out of sight, and what he does remember, he will remember vaguely and in disjointed fragments. He will vaguely remember something about a great many things, but he will be master of none. And whatever subjects he may subsequently study, he will learn more readily, and lose with a still greater facility. To call a child's attention from the main subject of his instruction to all the pleasant bye-paths that turn off from it, and continually to suggest to

him some new and unconnected enquiry, so as to open out to his view the wide field of knowledge and excite his curiosity to run over the whole at his pleasure,—all this is very charming to talk about: but as far as regards the strengthening of his memory, it is pre-eminently the way not to do it.

The discipline of memory mainly consists in determining the nature of the associations which we accustom ourselves to form, and whereby we bind our acquired ideas into distinct series. Unconnected facts are soon forgotten, and can only be recalled by accident. If the connexion once firmly established in memory, corresponds to the real connexion we have discovered subsisting between the facts, our memory will easily furnish us with materials fruitful for further thought or deed. If it merely expresses the accidental connexions of place, time, or irrelevant circumstances our memory becomes an obstacle to our progress towards truth, and will for the most part serve only to increase our distraction.

Sara. Your plan would make one remember well the particular thing learnt, but I don't see how it would make one's memory for other things a bit stronger.

Professor. Not directly; you cannot directly strengthen any faculty: only by exercising it in its due proportion, both in intension and extension, to the whole mental power; until the mind has formed such a habit, as that it is its second nature to energise freely in that mode. A man whose memory has been disciplined in this way, will at once and as a matter of course, when he acquires any new information of importance, search through his previous acquisitions for something to which he can link this new possession, and so he imparts to his recollection of it all the tenacity of the established chain of thought. Thus my plan as you call it,—it is not mine but nature's,—has these three advantages: it saves the memory from being weakened by attempting too much: it teaches the man how to secure memory; and it makes him to know when he does not remember; so that he does not mistake a few vague and lingering notions about something he once learnt, for knowing it now.

10. I am afraid the notion is still lurking amongst us, that the chief thing the educator has to do with imagination,

is to repress and get rid of it as much as he can: and that to assert that one of his most important duties is to rouse, stimulate, and cultivate it, will be thought very idle. This faculty used to be spoken of as though it were a tare introduced into our minds by the enemy for the express purpose of leading us astray; as though all the energy that is given to the imagination, were spent in injuring the judgment; as though all that the mind represents to itself must be a delusion, and that which is presented to it by the senses the only truth. St. Paul thought very differently of it. He bids us fill up all our leisure moments for thought, with all manner of true and innocent, just and lovely, and noble imaginations: not with reflections on the wickedness of the world and the backslidings of the age, but holding up before our minds whatever virtuous and praiseworthy thing there is in it or above it. What an admirable refreshment such a habit would procure us! It is not imagination but the want of it, that makes people selfish and unpractical: imagination is the mental basis of all sympathy; our power of comprehending and discerning the feelings, desires, and characters of other men, our power of putting ourselves in their place, and therefore our practical ability of doing to others as we would have others do to us—our ability to sympathise with others, is entirely dependent on our power of imagination. It is therefore specially needful for the right discharge of all womanly offices, that women should possess a lively and cultivated imagination. And so far removed is this faculty from frivolity, that if we would not drift aimlessly through our lives, it is imagination that must frame and hold up before us that moral ideal or exemplar by which conscience bids us fashion all our conduct. Not less unfounded is the opposition often drawn between imagination and reason. Without this power of representing distinctly and vividly to ourselves, what we have by recollection recalled into consciousness, we could not examine, analyse, or cross-question the phenomena recalled. And the most subtle analysis will only mislead us, if we cannot by another act of imagination reunite the parts we have distinguished, and view them again as forming one whole. So Hermes tells us; "were there no sensations the imagination could not operate: and were there no imagination there could be

neither reasoning nor intellection. The soul in vain seeks to exert her higher powers, till imagination fix the fluency of sense, and thus provides a basis for the support of those higher energies."* Unquestionably imagination is essential to the advancement of the physical sciences: without it our observation would be limited to the few facts which present themselves: with it, we devise experiments, imagine new combinations, and pushing science far beyond the limits of actual experience, anticipate the phenomena that pass beyond the reach of our senses. No tolerable hypothesis was ever framed, and no prediction was ever made in science by a man of feeble imagination. And Sir W. Hamilton points out, that "a vigorous exercise of imagination is as indispensable a condition of success in the abstract sciences, as in the poetic and plastic arts;—it may be reasonably doubted whether Aristotle or Homer were possessed of the most powerful imagination."† I said it is the handmaid of memory and comparison: it is in truth the handmaid of every mental process: would we consider one or two qualities of objects apart from the rest, as in geometry: would we arrange the various qualities of our object under their respective relations; would we trace out and represent to ourselves the consequences of any principle or the effects of any cause; would we represent to our own minds or to another all the circumstances which concur to persuade us to a certain course of action, or to rouse or calm our passions; would we understand how and why our friends feel and act as they do: we must exert imagination.‡ And since men have such constant need of it, and there is so much thoughtful and delicate work for it to do, it must be the more carefully aroused and practised in all these ways: and whilst its awakening may be well accomplished in early childhood, its full development and its discipline must be carefully attended to, in every stage of education. And this cannot be done unless both leisure and energy are spared for it, out of the labour of acquiring. Like observation, unlike memory, it cannot be commanded by the tutor; if it is to be exerted at all it must be freely exerted; and unless the scholar finds

* Harris' *Hermes*, book iii. ch. iv.

† *Lectures on Metaphysics*, vol. ii. lecture xxxiii.

‡ See the quotation from *Ancillon*, same lecture.

pleasure in the exertion;—which he will never do if he is pressed and weary;—he might better not make the effort.

The discipline of the imagination consists in habituating ourselves to represent our conceptions in a certain order. Our master tell us there are three principal orders men follow in this.* i. The natural order; either that chaotic or unmeaning order in which the impressions were first received, or that of the spontaneous suggestion of one idea by another. "The thoughts which follow each other in this succession, form tedious conversations and tiresome books." ii. The logical order, presenting notions in such connection that the first explains the next or *vice versâ*; either placing the general notion first, and then the particulars included in it, which is the deductive order: or else enumerating the particular facts first and thence ascending to the general fact in which they all agree; which is the order of induction. And iii., the poetical order; "seizing on individual circumstances, and grouping them in such a manner as that the whole represents an object or series of phenomena, such as might be presented by the senses," or by consciousness. And which of these orders we accustom ourselves to follow, is a matter of the gravest importance in fixing the degree and the kind of mental power we shall attain.

Now the earlier part of this education is very easy, for the simple exercise of imagination is very pleasant to children, and when they have once tried it they will willingly repeat it.

Mrs. Charlton. You would use poetry then in the earlier education? if its beauties are pointed out to them and explained, it might answer.

Professor. Children's poetry,—whatever that may be. From my own recollection I should have said it was "Robinson Crusoe" and "Arctic Regions:" but from Minnie's experience it seems to be Andersen's "Fairy Tales."

Sara. No it's her dolls, her two children: she likes your fairy tales because they are so *very* fond of hearing them.

Professor. Well I'm sure she could not have more wholesome poetry. I would always let children read poetry or not as they like; and certainly I would leave them to find out

* *Lectures on Metaphysics*, vol. ii. lecture xxxiii.

its beauties for themselves, under fifteen I should say. They must learn to see with their own eyes, not use mine. And above all I don't want a child to talk or even think about its own perceptions of beauty: it had far better "love a roasted fowl" in peace, than get the notion it is a fine thing to love what grown up people think beautiful.

Though this first stage is easy; the culture and discipline of imagination is like all true education laborious, and therefore irksome. As the memory becomes somewhat furnished, a child may well be required to produce from time to time such a representation of the facts he has learnt, as he is able to make for himself: this is the best and I should be inclined to say the only use a child can make of history. At first one would require nothing but exactness in describing the events he remembers in the order of time. (I never forgot the order of the great Grecian battles, because my brother and I invariably stopt when we had read the history of one, to fight it out together with little wooden swords and shields, before we would go on with our lesson. My mother only insisted we should take it in turns to represent Athens, lest we should fight in earnest for that privilege.) As his judgment grows, he should be accustomed to represent his facts in a more intelligent order,—the object with its qualities—the cause with its effect—the principle in connexion with its consequences.

Agatha. You mean in writing themes.

Professor. Exactly so, or verbally with the tutor's help in catechizing him: writing themes is also an exercise in the art of expression. A higher exercise of imagination would be to take some event or narrative, and—still observing this logical order,—to represent it with the various circumstances that actually attended it grouped around it in such a manner, as to reproduce the emotions they would naturally raise in the actual bystander if he could witness them all. Macaulay's Armada; his description of the trial of the Bishops; the picture of the Death of Chatterton; and the best parts of Haydn's Creation are instances of this kind of imagination; which stands on the level of that cultivated mental power that can discern the best materials and make the best use of them. The highest exertion of imagination, would be the endeavour to reproduce those qualities, causes, or principles

which a man has detected at work, and to exhibit them in operation under such ideal circumstances as would tend to raise their action to the highest degree of intensity; grouping them into some new and harmonious whole. This is creative imagination, and its productions are true poetry. The madness of King Lear; the last scenes in the "Idyl of Guinevere;" the scene in the 14th chapter of Isaiah; the chorus, "And behold the Lord passed by," in Mendelssohn's Elijah; or Hunt's picture of the Finding in the Temple, are I think instances of this kind of representation.

Through all this process of education of the imagination, the general law of mental force will have its way. Representation of some kind is as much a vital necessity of our minds, as movement is a vital necessity of our bodies. The desire for it is irresistible: the gratification of that desire is of two kinds; either men satisfy it by passively receiving the imaginations of other minds or by actively forming their own. It is however only the lower and most obvious imaginations that can be passively received; and when we come to true poetry, the effort of imagination which is necessary to comprehend and enjoy it, is as great as most of us can hope to attain. If the mind is fully occupied in receiving the representations of others, it will have no energy left for representing; if the supply of representation be so great as to satisfy the desire, it will have no motive for the active exercise of its own imaginative faculty; and the greater the variety of the objects it has to imagine, the feebler will its images of them be. To represent to your pupils, is not to cultivate their imagination, but to supersede its exercise. They must indeed be required to learn in the first instance the facts and the principles they are to reproduce; they cannot be required, and ought not to be allowed to invent them; but neither may they copy the representations made of them by others: these they may study to see how the thing ought to be done; but first let them try to make such a representation of their subject as I have spoken of, for themselves; then it will be time enough to give them some true work of art, on the same subject, to compare with their own. Very bad and feeble theirs will be; not at all the thing to make a show of in an examination, or to be read aloud to the class, but let them learn to

creep before they fly: far better to creep all their lives on their own hands and knees, than to set off flying at once on other people's wings. That which destroys—I do not think I speak too strongly in saying that which has destroyed—the imaginative faculty in our young men and women, is the frightful amount of vivid and interesting representations, of tales, of histories, of scientific information made interesting, which is poured out upon children through the press. The supply is so abundant it not only supersedes, it prevents the exercise of any active imagination: the desire is not so much roused, as surfeited before it can exist. The effect is like that of eating opium; the imagination is so dulled and enfeebled, that in order to rouse it at all, the caterers for its satisfaction must provide increasingly coarse and violent stimulus; science made interesting no longer interests; histories are stupid; children will read nothing but tales; and really imaginative tales like "Robinson Crusoe" are "slow" to many of our little dram drinkers; whilst nothing but the raw spirits of sensational novels is endurable to the *blasé* youth of eighteen or twenty. What an amount of pure and exquisite enjoyment is lost to them. Nothing short of a general torpor, if not an entire absence of imaginative power can account for the abundance of and the rage for such trash as these;—works that to any person capable of exercising any active imagination at all, must be unspeakably tedious and repulsive. I know no way of averting this monstrous evil, if parents will not strictly limit their nursery and school room libraries to some half-dozen standard children's books in each: except that of absolutely forbidding any new book to be opened until the child has made a full representation of the book last read.

11. As these three operations of the mind are subsidiary to its main function of judgment by comparison; having for their principal ends the acquisition and preparation of the materials which the mind requires in order to judge truly: so the education we have been considering is preparatory to that work of strengthening and educating the faculty of comparison which is the main business of the higher education. In its simpler modes this faculty has been exercised, in every exercise of observation and imagination. Henceforth its education must be self-education: all the educator can do, is

to lay before his pupil the premises of thought, show him by examples what the process of thinking is, and urge him to make the effort and think: he cannot ensure his thinking, he cannot easily make it difficult for him not to think. And it is only the actual exercise of thought—it is only by actually abstracting, classifying, analysing the whole into its constituent parts, and recombining the parts into a whole; it is only by comparing propositions as wholes and parts together; by seeing in what they agree or disagree and deducing a further proposition therefrom;—it is only I say by thus reasoning that we can learn to reason: and it is only by reason that we can become competent to judge. The work of the educator is now limited to rousing and stimulating the student, by every motive he can bring to bear upon him, thus to employ his mind: directing him to the study of such subjects as, beginning with the simplest and leading him on to the most complicated processes, afford the most suitable material for the full exercise of his powers of comparison and reflection, without overtaxing them: to keeping him back from studies which,—either from their being too abstruse for his growing power of attention to grasp,—or from requiring too extensive a basis of facts for his memory and imagination to acquire and represent with sufficient vividness—he could only at present study superficially. He may still further aid him, by correcting each part of his work, from the collection of his premises, and the stating them in the most convenient order and reduced to their simplest form of expression, to the clear arrangement of his argument and the accurate limitation of his conclusion. In no part of mental education is more careful guidance needed than in this, both to prevent the scholar from falling into fallacious habits of thought, and to teach him how to economise his labour. At every step the quality of his work must be tested and made clear to him, as to the correctness of the conclusion at which he arrives, and as to the fallacy or legitimacy of the method by which he has arrived at it. The fallacy of the conclusion is indeed here of little moment, compared with any fallacy in the method of obtaining it: but I mention both because there is a great danger that the tutor will overlook the fallacious or the slovenly method, if the result be correct or promising: and because of the great probability that the

student will overstate his conclusion if he be clever and eager. The tutor has to guard him against all these idols of the understanding as Bacon called them: such as inaccuracy either by redundancy or deficiency in the premises; putting a part for the whole or *vice versâ*; taking as a part of the verified premises, what is really an hypothetical inference from them; substitution of ideas through confusion of names; confusion of the incomprehensible with the impossible; impatience of partial knowledge; mistaking the indefinite for the universal, or the obscure for the profound; and many such like errors, which to enumerate now were tedious; but which for the most part have their root in that main error, the making man's limited knowledge the measure of fact, and his limited understanding the measure of truth: an error into which young and active minds half-trained are almost certain to fall.

Here again I must repeat, to require the student to learn by heart all the known facts, the processes of reasoning and the conclusions, whereby these facts have been built up into a science; this is not to educate his faculty of elaboration; it is to supersede the necessity for his having it. To require him to get up several such sciences, distinct from each other, with their facts, investigations, and results ready made out and proved to his hand, is to secure his devoting a feeble amount of attention, and therefore of memory, to each. To require him to get up, and reproduce at intervals before his examiners, six or seven such sciences, is to do everything man can do, to make it impossible for him to think at all: it is to prevent, so far as man can prevent, his getting himself educated at all. Bishop Butler's wish that in matters of reasoning it had been the custom to lay before people nothing but premises, and to leave them to draw the conclusions for themselves; which he says, "though it could not be done in all cases, might in many"; ought to be regarded by tutors as a law of the Medes and Persians, a law without exception.

12. It is by no means necessary, nor even were it possible would it be desirable that all educated persons should qualify themselves to judge aright in scientific questions: but "every person should as far as his means extend, make himself master of the methods of scientific investigation, so as to be able to judge whether in the treatment of any

question," the practical conclusion from which it concerns him to know, "a sound and correct method, conformable to the precepts of a philosophic logic, has been observed."*

The object of reasoning is a right judgment: but something more is requisite for judgment than the power of reasoning well, and this something more must be wholly acquired by self-education; we have now altogether passed the educator. What it is, and how it is to be acquired, Faraday has told us; and with his account of the moral and mental habits that go to make up a right and sound judgment, I will conclude this part of our subject. The first thing he names is—

1. The habit of self-examination; that we may discover the extent of our own ignorance, in respect of many things which our neighbours are instructed in; and that we may keep ourselves open to correction in all things.

2. The habit of resisting our own inclination to believe one thing rather than another, until it is proved to be true. This he names as the most important point of self-education.

3. The habit of never allowing ourselves to judge, or to express any judgment, until we have informed ourselves of the conditions of that of which we desire to judge.

4. The habit of forming clear and precise ideas; and—to ensure our having and retaining them,—the habit of expressing them in correct language.

5. The imagination must be taught to view the subject we are investigating in all possible and even impossible ways.

6. We must accustom ourselves to balance the different data, thus clearly conceived, one against another; so as to form a judgment strictly proportionate to the evidence; or where this cannot be done, to maintain an absolute reservation of judgment.

7. A habit of patience and labour of thought.

8. For true and sound judgment, the first and last requisite is humility.

With this ends the training and discipline of the understanding; or education in its ordinary sense, as the training purposely given by men to themselves or to the young, as a preparation for the work of life. And when that ends—our

* Sir G. C. Lewis's *Influence of Authority on Matters of Opinion*, p. 112.

education by life itself begins under another Educator: it is possible to defer this education too long.

13. *Mrs. Melcombe.* Then when is that other faculty you spoke of, that which gives people principles and common sense, to be educated? That is the part I care for much the most.

Professor. If the foundation is well laid in an educated and disciplined understanding, or intellect; then reason as "the fountain of ideas and the light of conscience," will be best ripened in most persons, by the actual affairs of life. For every thing that befals the educated man, all he himself does and fails in doing, all he sees others doing, gives him a lesson how to live and act, and teaches him to discern more clearly and to trust more entirely those universal laws or fundamental principles, which underlie all that appears and passes in the world of matter or of men, which are embodied and expressed in these visible phenomena, and which make them what they are. Thus his "regulative faculty" is educated. And the effort to discern these causal principles, reacts upon the understanding, matures and ripens it, making it a fit instrument for the service of humanity, and for "the right discharge of all the offices of peace and war." So that with all deference to so high an authority, I cannot but think it would be a misfortune, could Sir W. Hamilton's ideal of University education be restored, and our graduates generally kept there until they have taken their second degree. Life is too short, and a noble life too difficult, to admit of our putting off its commencement till five or six and twenty.

Sara. So you dismiss your double firsts with the information that now they have learnt all you can teach them, it is high time they set about getting a little reasonable common sense. Well, it's a very just remark.

Agatha. Most likely the double first man knows without being told, he cannot rightly apply his knowledge to practical affairs without experience. It's your single third class or junior optime who thinks that because he has just managed to get his degree, he is quite able to guide the affairs of a great nation out of his own head.

Sara. You need not be personal: besides it was not junior optime.

Mrs. Melcombe. It seems to me a far cry to your end, at least for girls whom one wants above all things to see growing up into sensible Christian women. If after all this worry to get them educated they have still to learn how to live, I would try to teach them a little common sense and right principle at once, instead.

Professor. You hardly comprehend the situation my dear. Common sense uneducated, is that kind of tact people get from observation combined with imagination and a good courage, and which gives them some power of anticipating immediate events in such matters as they have some experience of. But educated common sense, is the power of anticipating not merely these passing results but also the permanent and ultimate tendencies of things: and this power is derived from their discernment of the principles that govern the course of events, combined with the power of judging how these principles will manifest themselves and what will be their results under given circumstances. To discern them is the office of reason and of conscience: to determine the best mode of carrying them out in practice is the work of the intellect, and can only be accomplished by those who have the command of a thoroughly educated and powerful understanding; and to give men this command is the object of the education we have been speaking of. No amount of understanding without right reason or principle and conscience will teach men how to live: but neither can we make much practical use of right reason, or bring a sound and healthy conscience to bear with any practical success on the actual affairs of life, without understanding.

A true statesman must not only clearly discern the principles, which as they give him the standard at which he aims and determine the end of all his work, ought also to be the law of all that he attempts: but he must be able to judge what will be their best possible application under the complex and imperfect circumstances of his nation; or what will be the nearest approach to that standard which is practicable. This demands genius it is true: it demands experience and judgment: but above all it demands that firm faith in the unchanging truth of moral principles, as contrasted with the partial and variable truth of passing events, which alone can make a far-seeing and prudent statesman,—prudent because

he is bold enough to act upon that which is, rather than on that which seems to be.

Now such work can only be done by those who have come into the full and free possession of their understanding, in all its faculties; and it will only be comprehended by the intelligent: so that its practical value to the nation will very much depend on what kind and how much of intelligence the nation itself possesses. But neither will the highest degree of intelligence be of any avail for human progress, unless it work under the guidance of reason, and of the truths that reason alone discerns. "To go on in the quiet uniform course of the present we need only understanding: and also we choose only to use the understanding. So that we no longer see the extraordinary work which every ordinary day demands of us; or if we know it, we find a thousand reasons for not doing it. An intelligent man is much for himself; but for the whole he is little."* Thus a thoroughly educated class which is to be much for the nation, must possess something more than intelligence, and must believe in something more.

But we have not yet got it educated: we have still to consider which of all the knowledges that men can acquire, is the best fitted for the purpose of education; and by what means the scholar will be most effectually induced to get himself educated. In a word what is the best educational instrument, and what is the most powerful educational motive.

* Goethe, *Wilhelm Meister*.

LECTURE V.

EDUCATION, AND ITS INSTRUMENTS.

"The cripple in the right way, as the saying is, outstrips the runner in the wrong; and the prudent choice of the means is more effectual, than either the enforcement, or the accumulation of endeavours."—*Advancement of Learning.*

"It is idle to throw away our time on the details of anything which is to form no part of the occupation of our practical energies."—J. S. Mill's *Inaugural Address.*

DR. MELCOMBE began to-day at once, by reading the following paper.

1. For carrying on that process of mental education which I tried to describe to you last week, we found you will remember, that although the giving information on any subject whatever, forms no part of the object of education; yet that in educating the faculties we must have some subject on which to exercise them; that in imparting to our scholars the true method of learning, we must carry them with us through the process of learning something. As Hermes says, "every Energy doth not only require an energizer, but is necessarily conversant about some subject."* We start to-day from this point, and it will be our business to enquire which of all the sciences man can know, are the best fitted to be used as instruments of education. Such instruments must unite many and very varied qualities; but mainly these three: they must be the most educational, the most useful, and the most continuous or united sciences we can find.

In fixing on any subject as our instrument of education, the first test of its fitness is its educational power. For all knowledge is no more educational, than all matter is nourishing. There are many facts which are by their very nature unfruitful, utterly unproductive of any effect on the mind at

* Book i. ch. 9.

all, except as a dead weight on the memory. The greater part of technical or practical knowledge is of this sort; it is of value to those to whose art it relates so far as it assists them in practising their art; it is useless to all others; and it is worthless in education, for the most part requiring little or no mental effort for its acquisition and not in itself suggestive of further thought.

2. To be used educationally, our subject must be one that can be taught and learned thoroughly, or—which is the same thing—scientifically. For that is learned thoroughly which we learn methodically, each essential circumstance in its real order and connexion; and which we know in its causes. And every subject so known is a science. Whatever else our instrument is or is not, this is indispensable; it must be a science to be educational. Then there are two ways of learning a subject thus thoroughly: your scholar may begin by observing, and collecting in his memory, all the individual or special facts that he can discover belonging to it: then he may proceed to classify and name these, and to discover their connection with each other: and by abstracting from them those qualities or circumstances which are common to them all, he may attain the general facts and the laws which govern their succession and changes: this is the inductive method. Or he may begin with the general law, learning it implicitly and proceed to hunt out its results, by applying it in as great a variety of instances and circumstances as he becomes acquainted with, and explaining them by it: this is deductive science. It is necessary he should be practised in both these methods; but as children are of necessity practised in deduction in respect of all their moral and Christian duties; being first instructed in the general precept, and then taught to apply it to particular actions; it is more convenient that the method practised in their mental education should be for the most part inductive. I imagine that the great defect in the education of women has been, that they have learnt little or nothing thus thoroughly; hardly practised in science at all, but spending their labour in acquiring merely technical or empirical rules for individual, or at most for unclassified instances. What little science is employed in teaching them is almost always taught deductively.

And as nothing but a true science is fit for our instrument,

so it is not every science that is in a state, or of a character to be so employed. Any science which is so far advanced, as to offer its students a long tract of conquered territory, in the shape of a great mass of details to be acquired by memory, before they can be classed and their meaning understood, is unfit for our purpose. For as the amount of knowledge acquired in these gives no measure at all of the mental power exerted; so neither does its acquisition of itself afford that exercise of the faculties, which is essential to their growth and discipline. In this respect truths differ widely from one another: "whilst one will require much, another demands but little effort in acquisition; and whilst the original discovery of a truth may evolve the maximum of the highest quality of energy, the subsequent learning of the same truth probably involves a minimum of the lowest."* On the other hand, sciences that are rapidly growing through the discovery of new facts and the formation of new hypotheses, are still more unfit: this is the condition of geology for example. For the purposes of education we must have a science founded on strictly defined and established laws, that can be taught with authority and with permanence.†

3. Then it must also be a subject of such a character, that the scholar's progress in it, and the amount of mental exertion that progress involves, can be accurately tested and known. The process of acquiring it must be such, that the tutor can readily test the accuracy of his pupil's memory, the correctness and completeness of his analysis, and the clearness of his apprehension of its general laws; and this not by his power of recollecting them, but by his ability to apply them as rules for the explanation of new individual facts, or for the construction of new examples. It must be a subject which does not admit of being crammed, and which will not suffer mere memory to simulate thought. And it ought not to be a subject that is naturally, or can readily be made very interesting to the learner. It is a waste of labour to form in any one a habit of attending to that which interests and amuses him: that is a habit we all form for ourselves, only too readily and too exclusively. The tutor is needed, education itself is mainly useful, because it compels

* Sir William Hamilton's *Lectures on Metaphysics*, vol. i. p. 8–19.

† Rev. S. Hawtrey's *Narrative Essay on a Liberal Education*, p. 41.

us to form the habit of attending with all our might to whatever duty bids us attend to, though it does not amuse,—though it may be very irksome and wearisome to us. It is a waste of labour to compel a lad to learn that, which he would learn without compulsion, if you only put it in his way, and did not watch him at it. And it is also a great spoiling of good things. For whatever a boy is set to learn, he will learn as a task—as a thing which he has got to do, and in which his chief pleasure is the getting rid of it by getting it done: so that by commanding him to learn that which he would gladly have learnt if uncommanded, he loses the pleasure in it he might have had. So convinced was Locke of this, that if a boy is so intent on his play that he neglects his lessons, he recommends that he be set to his favourite game as a task and required to go on playing at it so many hours a day, whilst he is barely suffered to set to work at his lessons in his spare moments.

4. *Mrs. Charlton.* Surely it is a great waste of labour to make study repulsive: what is learned with pleasure is always learned without fatigue, and far more rapidly.—What makes study laborious to the young is that we choose a subject for their instruction which like grammar is utterly uninteresting to them; and that we force it upon them in the form of a dry set task. If children were taught in an easy and attractive way, as nature teaches them, they would love to be taught: and to secure that self-exertion which is you say essential to education, it only needs to abolish the task, and instruct orally, in the way of intelligent conversation, and of experiment. There is a beautiful sketch of such an education, in one of the numbers of the "Social Science Review."

"We want a schoolmaster who will shut up the schoolroom, and take his school for instruction into that room the canopy of which is the heaven above, and the walls the horizon; who will make all youth a perpetual holiday, as it ought to be.—Such a schoolmaster in his rambles, and in quiet hours with his boys and girls around him, will repeat in simple language the great wonders of the past, the glories of the present, and the possibilities of the future. He will press no book into the unwilling hand,—stimulate no brain into maddening exertion; but will watch for indications of

independent learning, and encourage that as may seem to be discreet." The writer postpones all artificial learning till after the fourteenth year; and then he would make it easy and pleasant: "has a language to be learnt, let it be gently instilled, as the native language is, by conversation, teaching of words, and reading. Has history to be explained, let it be illustrated rather than read: has a science to be acquired —let it be taught by experiment."

Agatha. That's the kind of teaching described in one of Elia's essays; but he seems to think it would be so terribly dull.

Mrs. Melcombe. He would use up all the fine weather in lessons.

Sara. How much his boys and girls would long to get away from him and his glories!

Mrs. Melcombe. I should not let any girls go with him,—scrambling all over the country with a moonstruck mortal like that!

Professor. You are too bad. It seems to me a rather flowery description of a nursery governess or infants schoolmistress's work: and up to seven years of age it would be just the right thing,—in their hands. But after that,—I am afraid Mrs. Charlton, that what makes all real mental exertion toilsome to the young is not the perverse ways of schoolmasters, but the inevitable laws of human nature. The first exertion of an untrained and undeveloped faculty, is and must be painful: and therefore no knowledge is attractive to the uneducated mind, which is so far difficult as to require a real effort for its acquisition. So that even if you could find such amusing subjects of instruction as would continue to amuse when enforced and when their novelty was over; Yet they could afford no moral and very little mental discipline; and by the very fact of being attractive, they would prove themselves not to be educational, for they would call for none of that moral self-control which we found to be so essential to intellectual education: no one can acquire the government of his own thoughts, except by habitually compelling his attention to that which is not immediately preferable, but which duty and future benefit, or postponed pleasure, direct him to study.* On the other hand,

* I could not help observing here, that it is one of the first and last difficulties

the fact that a study is difficult and demands an effort that is painful, shows two things: first that the faculty it calls into exercise greatly needs developing; and next, that it does exercise it: thus "the more difficult the appreciation of geometrical reasoning is to a boy's mind, the more does that mind stand in need of Euclid; and the more good is the teacher doing to the boy in trying to make him understand it."* And as long as he does help him to understand it,—which is not the same thing necessarily as helping him to learn it,—he cannot help him too much. Here all depends on how he teaches. Any subject that is ill taught will become repulsive; because the tutor at once demands and baffles a mental exertion; neither directing it in harmony with the laws of mind, nor satisfying the desire that roused it. But any subject, however taught, which permits of no mental energy but mere memory, will ere long become as wearisome as it is educationally useless. Every really educational subject well taught and in its proper order, will be difficult and in some measure painful throughout: but the pleasure it gives as each step is successfully won will be equal to the effort of winning it; and as experience of past success gives a confident hope of future victories, this pleasure will much more than equal the pain of commencing the next step.

People talk of the barbarity of pinning a luckless boy down to his Latin grammar, when it would do him just as much good and make him so much happier to be learning chemistry or botany. I doubt he would be no happier: a boy's main happiness in his lessons will always consist in knowing he has done well what he has to do, and so being well quit of it; and it is much easier for him to be sure of this, if his task is a fixed portion of a grammar book, than if it is the examination of a plant. Some who have tried it, tell us "that girls for the most part appear to exhibit the same invincible aversion to botany, which boys always manifest." But the truth is, if you do not absorb too much of your

in trying to help uneducated women, that scarcely any motive will induce them to do, or voluntarily to endure what they dislike, or what is irksome. It is the all but hopeless bar to our efforts to raise the condition of our poorest girls and women, that they will patiently submit to any privation rather than persist in doing what they don't quite like to do.

* Rev. S. Hawtrey's *Narrative Essay on a Liberal Education*, p. 34.

pupil's energy in his educational tasks; if he has plenty of time for himself, with free access to suitable books; and above all, if he is living amongst well informed and intelligent persons, called on perhaps to assist in their researches in natural science, not as a lesson but as a privilege;—you may depend upon it he will find out what does interest him, and learn it too, without your making a task of it. Only for pity's sake, don't curtail and spoil young happiness, more than education positively demands, under the pretext that you want to interest and amuse him. It is your business to educate him; it is his business to amuse and interest himself,—and you too for that matter.

5. Our next test of a sound educational subject, is its utility. Its utility that is to say to men as men: professional utility is here out of the question. Then I would ask; shall the subject which is to engross their best energies for eight or ten of the most important years of life, be one for which they will generally have no further use, which the majority will forget as soon as it has done its educational work, and throw overboard as so much lumber? Or shall it be that science which is of so great utility as indeed to be indispensable to all educated men; which no man ever casts away, or ceases to use whilst he lives and retains his senses? Shall it be a science which is complete in itself and which leads on to nothing beyond itself; or shall it be one which brings its student to the threshold of all sciences, and giving its master the key of all, diminishes the labour of acquiring any one of them by one half? Shall it be some science which may enable him to recreate himself in his vacant hours amongst the things of nature: or shall it be that knowledge which will qualify him to live and act as a man amongst men, to know himself and to understand his fellows? Surely considering how much there is to know, and how little time to learn, common sense forbids any other conclusion: and we must educate our pupils by instructing them in those sciences, the possession of which is the most essential for the conduct of life and the fulfilment of its relations, and the most useful for its human intercourse. Now whatever be our profession or occupation, that which all of us most need in actual life, is the power of weighing evidence, of interpreting it rightly, and of estimating the amount of probability that attaches to

it; this is the power of thinking clearly: and next to this we need the power of accurate expression. "The principal and most characteristic difference between one human intellect and another, consists in the ability to judge correctly of evidence. The most incessant occupation of the human intellect throughout life is the ascertainment of truth. We all require the ability to judge between the conflicting opinions offered us as truth."* And as it is impossible for us to qualify ourselves to judge on every subject, what we need, in all those cases in which personal observation and reasoning is impossible, is the power of discerning who are the best authorities on that special subject, and whether the results they give us have been obtained by a true or fallacious method. It is in "the hunting field of probability" we have to labour all our lives; and in this we must learn "to rest satisfied with that degree of precision which the nature of the subject admits; and not to seek for exactness where only an approximation to the truth is possible." And therefore my next mark of our true educational subject is, that it must be one that deals more with contingent matters than with necessary truths. And it must be so far central to all specific sciences, as to open the least laborious and the most advantageous road to them. Now they can acquire any science with the least labour, who can the most readily master its scientific language: and they can prosecute it with the most advantage, who understand beforehand the true method of investigation which its subject-matter admits of or demands. These are the two keys of every science.

6. The last requisite is, that our instrument of education must be mainly one, not many: one closely connected and continuous series, not half a dozen unconnected sciences supplementing each other in their educational power. For otherwise the law of memory and of attention will be broken, and much time wasted. At the beginning of every science, lies a tract which is suited for the primary education: and every fresh science our pupil begins, he has to go over this tract again, as though he had made so many false starts. To know one subject, thoroughly, is in the power of almost all; and is the special characteristic of an educated man. But to know nothing thoroughly—and what science can be known

* J. S. Mill's *Inaugural Address.*

by two years of a lad's study?—is to be uneducated. The powers of the mind are not fully exercised, and must be very imperfectly disciplined, by this plan of wading ankle-deep into different sciences. The man will not even have learnt when he knows and when he does not know. Our instruments of education then must form one continuous series, the different parts of which are capable of being arranged in an ascending scale: the first steps must be such as require some mental effort, including but going beyond that lowest one of learning by rote, and yet not requiring a greater effort than a child may make: each succeeding step must include and presuppose the mastery of the previous steps, and must require some further advance, some new effort; and must itself also be the means of raising the scholar to the next step. And each step must be in itself a gain: if possible a gain both of mental exercise and of useful acquirement, but in any case of the first of these: so that those who cannot afford to go further may stop short without loss of the benefits already received. It must be a subject which will require the student as he advances to manhood, to exercise a higher degree of mental energy; and which shall open to him wider fields of thought and study, in which those who fall short of the highest capacity, may be exercised to the full extent of what capacity they have; and may carry away with them healthy and well-trained faculties, habits of labour and self-control, a stock of important and fruitful knowledge, and some mastery of that resultant art, accurate expression, which both as individuals and as citizens they will certainly need. And its highest stages must be sufficiently arduous to elicit the maximum of the highest quality of mental energy from those who have it to give. And therefore it must be a subject which in its highest summits cannot be fully comprehended by the understanding, nor adequately expressed in its forms: in which the further the scholar climbs, the more clearly he sees how much there is which not only lies as yet beyond him, but which is, and ever must be, beyond his reach. Thus, learning the necessary limits of his own mind, he will be taught how to regulate all his efforts at self-government in regard to his own intellect, and in aiding his fellows to approach the light. It must then be a subject which leads up to, and can

intimately ally and subordinate itself to that highest knowledge which man most needs, which men cannot discover, and which God has therefore revealed; that knowledge which rises to the footstool of the eternal Throne, and ceases only in the light of God. If it stops short of this—if it fails to land its true student on this threshold; it falls short of the true work of education, and fails us just at that point where the highest capacity of the man and his true worth to humanity should have begun to bud forth.

And the same series should as much as possible be used as the instrument for every stage and for every degree of education, in order that each class, at whatever stage of education they stop, may yet be in sympathy with, capable of understanding in some measure, at any rate capable of appreciating the value, of their work who go on higher. It is only in this way that a highly educated class can really benefit the nation; nor can I admit that any education however high it aims, can be truly liberal, which does not thus tend to unite the lowest and the highest classes of its recipients in one community of mind. An education which separates the class which receives it from the rest of the people, however good it may be in itself, is *ipso facto* illiberal and sectarian.

7. Where shall we find such an instrument? There are four principal claimants for the place of the educational science. First the physical sciences, those which acquaint us with the changes of organic and of inorganic matter, teaching us about things. Next, the mathematical or exact sciences: which treat of those properties that are common to all bodies, *i.e.* of magnitude, extension, figure, divisibility; and of number, proportion, and motion. Then history, which informs us of the actions and circumstances of the different political communities that exist or have existed amongst men. And lastly, Philosophy; which aims at acquainting its students first of all with themselves and their true relations and then with other men. This is the science of mind.

Sara. But tell me, what do you call Natural Philosophy, and where do you place it?

Professor. Well I call it a misnomer for physical science, which seeks after knowledge, and results in recovering for the human race that power over nature which belongs to it

by divine bequest;* and in all the arts that minister to the convenience and civilization of our external life. Philosophy takes for its subject man himself, and engaged in ascertaining his nature and relations seeks after wisdom, and aims at the recovery of that mental and moral sovereignty which Christ has redeemed for mankind; and in those arts of education and of politics which minister to the progress of men.

8. We may very briefly dismiss the inadmissible candidates. I do not think I need say anything to you on the utter inadequacy of mathematics as the main instrument of education. A subject in which everything is certain, can never prepare us for a world in which almost all things are uncertain. You will hardly require me to prove that a young woman whose mental training consists in a knowledge of the abstract relations of number, extension, and figure; and in having the full command of the algebraical calculus and of fluxions, or in being habituated to the mathematical method of reasoning, is not very advantageously placed. "For when men, knowing nothing of that reasoning which is universal, come to attach themselves for years to a single species, wholly involved in lines and numbers only; they grow insensibly to believe these last inseparable from all reasonings, as the poor Indians thought every horseman inseparable from his horse."† History is altogether inadmissible. Political societies are composed of individual men; all their phenomena, are phenomena of human nature; and all their actions originate in the nature of the individuals that constitute them, modified by the various circumstances under which they act. Taught superficially, history is a narrative of the events that have occurred in different nations; so taught, it ranks educationally with fiction of the merely narrative and unideal kind: it affords an easy and interesting exercise of memory, and a considerable stimulus to the imagination, which it exercises in its lowest, or natural order of representation. Studied scientifically, its aim is to penetrate through those events and actions which it records to the discovery of their causes in the aims, the plans and means, the tendencies, passions, and principles of the actors: and thence it would ascend, by a series of sound and wide generalizations, from the particular facts thus ascertained,

* See *Novum Organon*, appendix, 129. † *Hermes*, preface.

and explained by reference to the general laws of human nature, to the discovery of the laws of political or national life and progress. From such an induction, when completed, the principles of government might be deduced, and applied to any given circumstances with scientific certainty. So that history if taught unscientifically is only educational in the lowest degree: and taught as a science, it presupposes that knowledge of men's motives and actions in their causes, which I may venture to call applied philosophy. And without this basis, its facts may be recorded but can never be explained or accounted for; they remain a mere narrative catalogue, which may indeed be employed empirically by men of great experience and judgment, but which can not be employed educationally. As Mathematics fail to educate the mind for the work of life, because they deal with one relation only—that of space—and that one in which every premise is necessarily and absolutely true: so history would fail, because it embraces so many relations and those so indefinitely, that we cannot grasp them up together. As we cannot learn to reason rightly for the practical purposes of the world, by practising reason exclusively or mainly on a subject where wrong reasoning is impossible: so neither can we learn sound reasoning by studying a subject in which all induction is premature. Our pupil must be an old man, before he can hope to have collected and sifted the evidence for all the facts and the connections of the facts which are necessary to warrant his deducing from them any general principle; and he must have been educated in philosophy before he begins his collection.* There is really not much exaggeration in the assertion of a Saturday Reviewer, that the man who has collected and remembered facts enough to enable him to become an historian at thirty, must have reduced himself to a state of idiotcy by the sheer strain on his memory.

9. We come to physical sciences. In the first place these must be taught by words: and the thoroughness with which they are learned, will in almost all cases depend on the exactness with which the scholar comprehends the signification of the terms employed, and the correctness with which he uses them. Every physical science has its own scientific language; and these are almost universally derived from the

* *General Education and Classical Studies*, p. 299; *Cambridge Essays*, 1855.

Greek: and therefore before he can study these sciences, he ought to be so far acquainted with this language as to be able to trace the derivation and comprehend the force of its compound words: and this, mark you, with scientific precision, not with the vagueness which suffices us in our words as used in common life.* Then again; to study to any advantage those sciences which are sufficiently certain and fixed to be taught educationally, he must have acquired a considerable knowledge of mathematics, and a practical acquaintance with and skill in the methods of mathematical and of probable reasoning. So that, in order to educate by physical science, we must begin our education by teaching language and logic. But these sciences fail to answer the test of utility; for they acquaint us only with things; they teach us very little of ourselves and our fellow men: they give us knowledge, and what we need is wisdom: they help us to promote the arts of material civilisation; and it is our business to promote mental cultivation. Which of all these sciences can be seriously recommended as affording the best preparation for the life of a man, or the duties of a citizen?

But not only do both the mathematical and physical sciences fail to prepare a man for dealing with those social and moral problems which all life long he will be engaged in solving; so far as they form his mental habits they rather tend to unfit him for dealing with them wisely. They accustom him to deal with things, and the main thing it concerns him to know, is how to deal with men: the main thing it concerns him to get rid of and conquer, is the temptation to deal with men as things. They habituate him to rely on his understanding, and what he needs in all social problems, is the habitual subjection of understanding to reason and conscience, and an accurate knowledge of its limited capacity.

* "A competent knowledge of Greek appears to be requisite for the medical students, from the fact that much of the language and terminology of anatomy, medicine, and botany, &c. is derived from that language, not only from the Greeks having been our earliest masters in many of the sciences, but also for the sake of convenience, from such terms being short, expressive, and explanatory, and ill supplied by the tedious circumlocution of modern tongues. With these terms, of constant recurrence, the uneducated student cannot fail to be puzzled; and he must either content himself with ignorance of their import, or bestow much time and suffer no very agreeable fatigue, in hunting out their etymology."—*Report of the Royal University Visitation*, 1835, Scotland.

Mathematics habituate him to deal with certainties, and all his practical social work lies amongst probabilities. Physical phenomena also "are wholly subject to immutable laws, are produced and reproduced in the same invariable succession, and manifest only the blind forms of a mechanical necessity."* The phenomena of men are not wholly subject to physical laws, and whatever theory we hold about them, they cannot practically be dealt with as inevitable or necessary. Again, "it is a characteristic mark of physical sciences that their phenomena in general involve unity of causation; of the moral sciences, that their phenomena are produced by a plurality of causes. Hence inductive reasoning is so much easier, more direct, and less fallible in those, than in these."† And hence also the habit of dealing with the one, will be a poor security for dealing wisely and patiently with the other.

10. Not less do the physical sciences fail to answer the test of continuous unity; for though each one ascends, no one is complete by itself, no one ascends to the height of man. And taken together, they do not form a continuous series, but a collective bundle. In no point of view can physical science be deemed central to human knowledge: out of her own domain she is blind and powerless. Even the true mode of investigating her facts must be obtained from a knowledge of the organ of investigation—the laws of the human intellect, and by applying these to the conditions imposed on our investigations by the laws of matter and the limitations of our senses. But the attempt to discover the laws of mind from their practical application to the discovery of the laws of matter, is "like attempting to infer the nature of a locomotive engine, by an inspection of the passengers and goods it has conveyed."‡ In this sense mind gives us the measure of physical science; but where physical science has been made the measure of mind, of its laws and forms, she has done and she can do nothing but create superstitions, wandering blindly as she must in a vicious circle and drawing nonsequent results from irrelevant premises. And lastly, as physical sciences can tell us nothing of man, so they can

* Sir William Hamilton's *Lectures on Metaphysics*, vol. i., lecture ii., p. 28.

† Sir G. C. Lewis's *Methods of Reasoning*, &c.

‡ See Prof. Masson's *Recent British Philosophy*.

teach us nothing of God. Studied exclusively, there is nothing in their whole range that can reveal to us any higher power than our own; to speak more truly, any power so high as our own. Whilst therefore they glorify man's intelligence, they cannot call forth his highest capacity—that of apprehending and reverencing what is above him. It was not untruly said by Comte, that "now the heavens," testifying only of mechanical law, "declare no other glory than that of those who have aided in discovering its laws." This has been warmly denied; but it has been denied by thinkers who, having brought to their physical science the higher science of God's revelation, have interpreted the lower in the light of that higher.

Those who know no higher light, fully justify Comte's assertion—

> Our modern thinkers, turning back
> The strata—granite, limestone, coal and clay,—
> Concluding coldly with—here's law, where's God?

"We believe in God, not by reason of the nature which conceals Him, but by reason of the supernatural in man, which alone reveals and proves Him to exist."* I need not ask whether of these two, matter or mind, nature or God, you will deem the fittest subject of your scholar's meditation, or which will afford the higher or the more profitable communion for young and growing minds.

Mrs. Charlton. Do you then make no account of all that the physical sciences have done and promise to do, in dispelling illusions, and supplying forms of thought even to those who try the most steadily to resist their influences?

Professor. I trust not: certainly in their own domain the accurate knowledge of physical phenomena has dispelled many errors; and I have no doubt their future advance will discover many more, amongst the notions we now mistake for truths. But out of that domain, and applied as they now so frequently are to explain the immaterial phenomena of thought and of mind, they are creating a whole host of illusions and superstitions, far more mischievous and degrading than such errors as Nature's abhorrence of a vacuum, or ghosts in a churchyard ever were.

* *Jacobi*, quoted by Sir William Hamilton.

Agatha. I thought it was considered a thing to be lamented that men are forced to express their best thoughts "in matter moulded forms of speech:" surely if the thoughts themselves are to be matter moulded by science, we shall be further from the truth than ever.

Mrs. Charlton. We must not allow ourselves to be frightened back from knowledge because it threatens to overthrow our most cherished illusions. If the phenomena of mind are the highest results of those organic forces which in their simplest form are to be traced at work in the single living cell, we must mould our thoughts accordingly. Mind will not be less wonderful because we have found its true origin.

Agatha. No indeed: it would be a most wonderful wonder,—a thoroughly unnatural production of nature.

Mrs. Charlton. You must admit that it is the vast progress of these sciences which has stamped the intellectual character of the present age, and which is revolutionising the whole form and substance of our opinions on all subjects, human and divine. Surely the growing minds of the rising generation ought to be at once made familiar with these results of modern thought, and to be trained to think as the world around them is learning to think.

11. *Professor.* That depends on whether the world around them is learning to think justly on things human and divine, by the aid of dissecting knives and microscopes. If they are not, there can be no reason why, because the fathers are eating sour grapes, the children's teeth should be set on edge. If they are, it will not be the less true, that the duty of educators is to prepare the children to attain a true and independent standard of thought and reasoning, and not to bias their opinions on questions not yet proven. Now this is just what the physical sciences, when used as the instruments of education, fail to do. They fail to answer our first and most important test; and that they do so fail, I will prove out of the mouth of a most unexceptional witness, the most passionate advocate for their adoption I have met with; and the writer of that article in the *Westminster* of which you so much approve. He is comparing these sciences with the science of language, and he states it as a fact that "a portion of the blame" for the neglect or the ineffectual results of the study of natural sciences, as instruments of education, "must

be allowed to rest on scientific men themselves. They are apt to regard the one science they teach as complete in itself, and to ignore its relations and its place in a rational system of the sciences. Chemists press forward into ground which really belongs to the biologist; and biologists attempt to explain facts which admit of no explanation until history is called in to aid." That is to say, scientific men are very apt to prove themselves to be uneducated men, even by the way they deal with their own subject; not being able to distinguish where they know and do not know. Surely such a fault points to a deficiency in that enlargement of mind and soundness of judgment which true education produces? And again he says, "the most ardent advocates of the cause of physical science are too often compelled to allow that it has fallen into the hands of men incompetent to teach it to any good purpose; of men *who are as inferior to classical scholars in mental power, as they are superior to them in the accident of their subject.*" Now as Aristotle said long ago, "the power of teaching is the exclusive sign of thorough knowledge." It could not be from mere chance, if classical scholars were so far above scientific men in mental power; for in modern thought you know every effect has its cause. Can it be then that the very inferior subject naturally attracts men of higher mental power, whilst physical science attracts only such very inferior men that they are incompetent to teach their very superior subject educationally? This explanation is ridiculous; and when you think over the names of our scientific leaders it is obviously false. Well then shall we say, that setting out with equal abilities, the superior subject of the one set of men has left them furnished with so much less, the inferior subject of the other with so much more mental power, that the first are incompetent to teach their more suitable subject with half such good effect, as the last are able to produce with their inferior instrument? Then as mental power is the very thing we are trying to educe, that subject is the best for our purpose which evolves the most. But looking at the names of our great men of science, I really must deny that they have less mental power than our great scholars: although it is true that their subject exercises it chiefly in one mode, whilst classical studies and philosophy exercise it in all modes. And this is just what makes the

difference between an adequate and an inadequate instrument of education. But whatever cause you may assign for it, the fact remains confessed; physical sciences, much as they have been cultivated and triumphant as they are, have so far failed as means of education, because they have failed to educate the educators.

Mrs. Charlton. Well, I am very curious to know where you find your central science. Certainly it cannot be in Latin and Greek.

Sara. I expect it will be, though; isn't it too bad?

12. *Professor.* No, it is in philosophy; or the science of mind in its three successive stages: of which the first deals with the sensible forms, or as they have been called, the instruments of thought, as seen in the phenomena of language analysed and explained by grammar. The second considers the laws of thought, analysing the process of comparison, or reasoning; and is called logic. The third is philosophy proper, or pure and applied metaphysic. Let us see how these three consecutive sciences answer to our three tests.

If I say these are the most useful subjects we can select, I say less than I ought, for they are useful in such a sense as that we cannot educate by any other subject until we have taught language and logic. No science can be taught, until the learner is capable of understanding and of using language with some degree of accuracy and clearness: and no science can be scientifically learned, until the learner comprehends the truth of the method employed in its processes. All human knowledge involves two factors—the object known and the mind knowing; and in all acquisition of knowledge there are two conditions present—the phenomena to be investigated, and the method by which the mind discovers and explains them. The first differ in each distinct science; the latter are the same in all. And ignorance as to the capacities and limitations, the forms and method of the knowing mind, exposes us incessantly to fallacies in the investigation of every subject which we may desire to understand; and in truth, reduces it from the rank of a true science to that of an empirical art. Not only for educational but also for all the purposes of information, it is the acquisition of a true method of discovery, that next to the mastery of the language in

which the information is conveyed, is the most important. Of the comparative value of these two Bacon says, not unboastingly: "If men have thought so much of some one particular discovery, as to regard him as more than man who has by such benefits made mankind a debtor; how much greater a thing is it to discover that by which all else shall be discovered."* Thus it appears that the knowledge of mind is the really central knowledge: and would we learn anything else to any purpose, we must first learn how to learn. It is impossible to foretell which natural science our scholars may have need of in after life: but the mastery of a true method of investigation is equally useful, and equally essential to success in any. As for the usefulness of a knowledge of men, and of the laws of their mental and moral constitution, to those who are to be their prime educators, it is surely needless to say anything. It is obvious that if you wish to educate women, who shall be capable of rightly training and teaching their children, morally and mentally, and of exercising a real and a salutary influence in society, and in the State; you will do this not by instructing them in the relations of quantity or in the laws of organic matter, but by acquainting them with and habituating them to reflect on and to apply the principal laws of human nature. I would ask any person of common sense; which is it the most important for a mother thoroughly to understand—the force and the growth of habits, and the laws of mental association; or the chemistry of food and the laws of hygiene? Or which of these would it be safer for her to deal with empirically, under advice from a competent adept?

13. Take our next test; unity. These form a consecutive series, from the first and lowest, to the highest flight of human thought. The first stage is concerned with the forms of thought, that is to say, with the acquisition of language and its laws of construction. It begins where nature begins, and it follows nature's order. Language in its widest sense "is the expression of some energy or motion of the soul,"† in which consciousness takes a sensible form, and becomes a possible object of reflection and examination. It includes therefore not only vocal speech, but painting, sculpture, architecture, music,—whatever art is directly employed in

* *Novum Organon*, aphorism 129. † *Hermes*.

the expression and publication of some mental energy. But taking language in its usual sense, for the embodiment of thoughts in words; we may say that Grammar is the science and teaches the laws of construction of the forms of that thought that is concerned with being, or the category of existence: and that Arithmetic is the science, and teaches the laws of construction of the forms of thought that is concerned with number, or the category of quantity.

Grammar is the analysis of speech into its several parts, and determines the relations of those parts one with another. "When we have viewed speech thus analysed, we may then consider it as compounded. And here we may contemplate that synthesis, which by combining simple terms produces a truth; then by combining two truths produces a third; and thus others in continued demonstration, till we are led, as by a road, into the regions of science. Now this is that superior and most excellent synthesis, which alone applies itself to our intellect or reason; and which to conduct according to rule constitutes the art of logic." * Thus from the laws of language as the instrument or form of thought, we ascend to the consideration of the processes of reasoning, its laws and conditions. "Pure logic is the science of the necessary laws of thought in their own nature. Applied logic is the science of the necessary laws of thought, as employed in attaining truth." † The former is one, and stands in the same relations to all sciences: the latter is manifold, as it is employed in accordance with the various conditions of each particular science. All science consists in collecting facts and in drawing conclusions from those facts: applied logic is the science which, applying the principles of pure logic to the circumstances of each special science, teaches us what conclusions can be justly drawn from the facts it has collected, and proportions the certainty of its conclusions to the degree of evidence we have for its facts. Applied logic may be conveniently distinguished into two kinds, as determined by the nature of the subject-matter on which it is employed. For either it is employed in drawing necessary conclusions from premises that are necessarily and absolutely true; or else in deducing

* *Hermes*, book i. c. i.

† Dr. Thompson's *Outline of the Laws of Thought*, introduction, §§ 3 and 4.

contingent conclusions from probable premises. The purely logical process is in each case alike in principle; the difference proceeds from the nature of the science in which we are carrying it on. The type of sciences dealing with contingent matter is moral science, which is consequently the most arduous of all: the type of sciences dealing with necessary or absolute data, and admitting therefore of absolute demonstration, is mathematical science.* The word itself originally signified the discipline which the mind acquires in studying a science, rather than its subject-matter: but geometry being almost the only science which admits of perfect demonstration, the name "mathematic" has been transferred from the mental discipline to the subject which usually affords it. In pure mathematics the premises are either intuitively known, or demonstrated truths: in most other sciences, but specially in the conduct of life and in social affairs, the premises from which our conclusions must be drawn are probabilities. In mathematics the premises are few and precise. In all the higher sciences—of mind, of moral truth, of man, of history, of government, and even of law,—the premises are so many and so imperfectly known, that the chief work of their student consists in discovering, analysing and defining them; in making sure that he has them all, or else in ascertaining the degree of probability which pertains to conclusions drawn from an incomplete knowledge of the premises. This is, as I said, far more arduous work: but you will see from this hasty sketch, how important it is for those who would readily and justly estimate the probability of their conclusions, to have been at least so far disciplined in mathematical reasoning as to have got a true standard of what demonstration or absolute proof really is.

Therefore, to be thoroughly mastered, logic should be studied both theoretically as a science, and practically by means of mathematics and of some inductive and contingent science. Of these, language is at once the most convenient for the educator's purpose, and the most useful for every student. But for many it may prove too difficult: and it should if possible be supplemented by the study of the logical process as applied in some natural science, not too

* Sir William Hamilton's *Discussions*, "Study of Mathematics," p. 268.

voluminous in its facts, and sufficiently advanced to be taught with some authority. On this point, I believe Dr. Whewell will be found right, in recommending the history of the natural sciences as a better instrument of education in the inductive treatment of nature, than any one such science could afford. The practice of a sound logical method which is afforded by the getting up of a physical science is, no doubt, an excellent preparation for the more arduous task of employing it in the pursuit of a moral science. This is, I believe, the only legitimate use that can be made of any physical science as an instrument of a liberal education. But neither mathematics, nor physical science, can afford us any preparatory discipline for moral science or social affairs, equal to that which is secured by the study of language; and they constitute the lower and easier part of logic.

From the laws of reasoning the transition is obvious to the higher science of the thinking mind. Mind can only be known to us by its actions, as manifested to us in our own consciousness, and inferred from its effects on the actions of other men. Now the phenomena of consciousness, and of the various modes of mental action, have been approached and partly ascertained and analysed, whilst we were analysing the forms of thought and the processes of comparison. "For language is the true offspring of our intellectual nature, and bears the image of such ideas as rise up of necessity in the mind from our relation to the things around us. Words are the signs of thoughts, and from words themselves we may see into the natural feelings and judgments of men before they become warped by the prejudices of sects or the subtleties of system."* Language and logic supply the discipline and the instrument whereby the student can be prepared to enter successfully on the field of metaphysics, if his strength do not fail him. Here then we have found one subject of instruction; commencing with that which is the simplest, the universal and necessary subject; proceeding through that which is the most useful for every man who is intended to think at all; and leading up, with the most complete economy of labour and of time, to the highest and most arduous subject of thought, and that which is at the same time the most important in relation to human

* Sedgwick's *Discourses on the Studies of the Universities.*

progress. And we have found also the central subject—the different stages of which afford the readiest entrance to every other science. Is it the subject which is most educational?

14. In reply, as I said before, we have at the first no practical choice in this matter. Nature *will* begin education by language. And it is simply idle to teach, still more to attempt to educate by teaching any science whatever, until the pupil has learnt to speak, to read, to write, and to understand something of the meaning of his own language, with some degree of accuracy and clearness. Reading writing and arithmetic are, by the necessity of things, the arts by and through which systematic mental education must be given.

Reason and practical experience are also entirely in favour of language being employed as the instrument of the next stage of education. No subject can be taught thoroughly until its learner is capable of understanding and using an exact, *i.e.* a scientific language. And the mental discipline gone through in acquiring this, is declared by all our best authorities to be the best—some say the only efficient training of the reasoning powers. These witnesses are so numerous, it is difficult to make any selection. The article I quoted from the *Westminster* proves it, so far as experience can prove it. Take the Commissioners' Report: they recommend for girls schools, as indispensable, "the introduction of Latin in its elements, as a means *of mental culture and strengthening the intellect;* and for the mastery of grammar and language." They speak of its successful introduction by right methods of teaching in some of these schools; and of the perceptibly ill effects of its absence in others.

Mr. Hawtrey, taking his experience partly from Eton, but mainly from St. Mark's,—a school for labourers' children—says, "The foundation of reading, writing and arithmetic well laid, what next? Is it to be history, geography, the knowledge of common things? An insight into the interesting discoveries of our age? My experience tells me *no*. These are not mental *cultivators*. These are not what dig, plough, harrow the brain. These are of the nature of seeds, which, when thrown into the ground already prepared, take root there, grow and bear fruit. Then what is the mental

cultivator that is to prepare the ground? *Language* I should say undoubtedly. . . . As an instrument for cultivating the mental faculties, what can be better than an exercise that requires a simultaneous effort to get number, case, tense, mood, person, all right together? What is wanted is that their knowledge of language should be systematized, drawn up in orderly array, under well-defined rules which they can apply." *

As for logic—as the process of inferring is that which occupies men's minds all through life, so the practice of inferring truly must be the main exercise in education, whatever subject be employed. And "if there be rules to which every mind consciously or unconsciously conforms, in every instance in which he infers rightly, there seems little necessity for discussing whether a person is more likely to observe those rules when he knows"—and is practised in —"them, than when he is unacquainted with them." †

15. As a complete system of education must not only be adapted to make the most of the average mediocrity, but must also be capable of eliciting and disciplining the highest powers of the most gifted and powerful intellects, so we have the almost unanimous consent of those who have really tried it, that no other subject affords for these a discipline at all equal to that of metaphysic. "If any think," said Bacon, "that philosophy and universality are idle studies, he does not consider that all arts and professions are thence supplied with sap and strength. And this I take to be a great cause which has so long hindered the advancement of learning; because these fundamental knowledges have been studied but in passages, and not drunk deeper of. Hence it proceeds, that princes when they have to choose men for business of state, find a wonderful dearth of able men about them." ‡ "Of all literary exercitations, whether designed for the use or the entertainment of the world, there are none so immediately our concern as those which let us into the knowledge of our own nature. Others may exercise the understanding, or amuse the imagination; but these only can improve the heart, and form the mind to wisdom." § "The clearest light

* *Narrative Essay of a Liberal Education*, p. 18, 22.

† Mill's *System of Logic*, introduction, § 6. ‡ *Advancement of Learning.*

§ *The Friend*, essay xvi., introductory, quoted from *Warburton.*

is ever necessary to guide the most important actions; and whatever the world may opine, he who hath not much meditated upon God, the human mind, and the summum bonum, may possibly make a thriving earthworm, but will most indubitably make a blundering patriot and a sorry statesman."* "Philosophy (the science of sciences,—the theory of all that we can do, and know, and think, in a word—the knowledge of ourselves), is the true object of a liberal education, and the requisite condition of every other liberal science. . . If men are really to know aught else, the human faculties by which alone this knowledge may be realised, must be studied for themselves in their extent and limitation. To know, we must understand our instrument of knowing; 'Know thyself' is a heavenly precept in Christianity as in heathenism. And this knowledge can be compassed only by reflection—only from within: it tells us at once of our weakness and our worth; it is the discipline both of humility and of hope."† "This thinking of thought is the most improving of mental exercises, conducing above all others to evolve the rarest and highest of the intellectual powers. By this the mind is not only trained to philosophy proper, but prepared in general for powerful, easy, and successful energy, in whatever department of knowledge it may more peculiarly apply itself."‡ "Having myself experienced that no delight is equal to that which accompanies the distinct perception of a fundamental truth relative to our moral being; having, long after the completion of what is called a learned education, discovered a new world of intellectual profit opening on me, not from any new opinions, but lying as it were at the roots of those which I had been taught in childhood in my catechism and spelling book; I hoped to find a lesser public, susceptible of the same delight."§ So Prof. Masson describes the moral sciences, as dealing with "those questions of the most deep and enduring interest to man, which have occupied thoughtful minds in all ages of the world; which are handed on from age to age; which each generation, however much of previous thought con-

* *The Friend*, essay xv., introductory, quoted from *Siris*.
† Sir William Hamilton's *Discussions*, appendix, p. 787.
‡ Ibid. p. 788.
§ Coleridge, *The Friend*, essay ii., introductory.

cerning them it may inherit and preserve, has to resolve over again for itself."* This is the great educational advantage, on which all these writers insist; *i.e.* that all work in these sciences must be self-work. Knowledge may be communicated by another: but philosophy is reasoned truth; and in it each man must reason for himself. It is then evident that this compels a higher mental exertion than the acquisition of all the sciences can secure. "Themes like these not even the genius of a Plato or a Bacon could render intelligible, without demanding from the reader thought sometimes, and attention generally. By thought I here mean the voluntary production in our own minds of those states of consciousness, to which, as to his fundamental facts, the writer has referred us: while attention has for its object the order and connection of thoughts and images already and familiarly known. Thus the elements of geometry require attention only; but the analysis of our primary faculties, and the investigation of all the absolute grounds of religion and morals, are impossible without energies of thought in addition to the effort of attention."† "In the science of mind we can neither understand nor be convinced of anything at second hand. Instruction is only instruction as it enables us to teach ourselves. A fact of consciousness, however accurately observed and described, is to us zero until we have observed and recognised it for ourselves. It is this condition imposed on the student of doing everything himself, that renders the mental sciences the most improving exercise."‡ His great opponent Mr. Mill speaks of the "narrow bounds" of mathematical and physical, as contrasted with mental science.§ And again, "A system of education is not intended solely for the many: it has to kindle the aspirations and aid the efforts of those who are to stand forth as thinkers above the multitude; and for these there is hardly any discipline to be found comparable to that which these metaphysical controversies afford. For they are essentially questions about the estimation of evidence; the conditions which justify our convictions; the real meaning and import of words and

* *Recent British Philosophy.*

† *The Friend*, essay ii., introductory.

‡ Sir William Hamilton's *Lectures on Metaphysics*, vol. i., lecture i.

§ Review of Professor Sedgwick *On the Studies of Cambridge.*

phrases we use from infancy, and which lie at the foundation of human language, but of which none but metaphysicians have given themselves a complete account. No one can come out of the discussion of these questions without increased vigour of understanding; an increased demand for precision of thought and language; a more careful and exact appreciation of the nature of proof." *

"The discipline, training, and expansion which the mind undergoes in the study of its own operations are not benefits to be lightly appreciated. It cultivates habits of accurate observation and reflection, of patient attention, rigid induction, logical reasoning, which qualify the mind for the ready pursuit of the knowledge required for the practical and active business of life. It is a mental gymnasium admirably fitted for the development, regulation and cultivation of those faculties of the mind on the right exercise of which depends our intellectual advancement and happiness. I would go a step further and say, that a knowledge of the philosophy of the human mind is indispensable to the successful prosecution of physical science: and that without a knowledge of mental phenomena, a high degree of perfection and accuracy cannot be attained, in any of the collateral branches of knowledge." †

16. *Mrs. Charlton.* But allowing that this were in itself the best educational subject we could find, still it is certain that no one subject can be the best in relation to all minds alike. The old scheme of education entirely overlooked the fact of the different inclinations and dispositions of our students; the great object of the modern scheme is to take advantage of these, and by finding out what special occupation or study the child has a natural turn for, to teach him that, which as he will learn it with the greatest ease, pleasure and success, will make the most of those qualities of mind with which nature has endowed him.

Professor. You will remember the question we have been considering is, what is in itself the most educational subject; or the one that elicits the greatest amount of the highest kind of mental energy. The modern theory you now mention is as much opposed to the view of the *Westminster* as to the old practice of our schools and universities. We certainly how-

* *Inaugural Address.*

† Dr. Winslow's *Obscure Diseases of the Mind and Brain*, p. 43, 2nd edition.

ever ought to consider it. But you must remember that the fact assumed that a number of our scholars are indisposed to that most educational subject—whatever that be, can in no way affect the fact that it is the most educational. The inferior subject will not do for any one, however great his inclination for it may be, that which the superior subject could do: at the same time it is true, that if he is naturally incapable of being benefited by the higher, he may still be—in some less degree—benefited by studying the inferior educational subject. You will not find that the various degrees now granted at our universities, though nominally equal, are regarded by those who know the men as in any respect equal tests of their ability.

Let us determine first what we mean by saying a boy has a turn for studying some specific subject, together with a natural disinclination for studying some other—such as natural history, languages, mathematics. I think what is meant is, first the fact that he takes more interest and makes more progress in the one than in the other: and secondly, the assumption that he does so on account of something in his own disposition which makes the one more suitable to him. Before we can tell how we ought to deal with such cases, we must endeavour to ascertain the cause of his preference and of his aversion; that we may see whether it is a good thing to be increased, or an evil thing to be made the best of.

And first, let me suggest that the number of children who have these special turns is comparatively very small; too small to admit of a general scheme of education being framed to meet their case. The great majority are capable of being educated, and the great majority have no turn or special liking for the process of education, by any instrument at all. As for the minority, who may be said to have special dispositions for one study more than for another, how have they come by it? A disposition to employ oneself in one way rather than another necessarily implies a habit, without which the disposition certainly could not be known; and it infers that the habit springs from some natural cause, some conformation of mind or body, which gave rise to the formation of the habit. Now it is certain that no one can be born with a habit of acting in one way more than another; and so far as the special disposition or turn consists in habit or

originates in a habit, it must be acquired. And our question is, does this habit of preference spring from the child's natural constitution, or from circumstances which have determined him to that particular exercise? I think the answer must be,—from the concurrence of both; for certainly without favourable circumstances the habit would not have been formed; and it is no less certain that the same circumstances do not produce the same habits in all.

A child early shows a peculiar power of drawing. Should he afterwards turn out a great painter, it will at once be said he was born a painter: should he, as often happens, cease to care for drawing at all, his early preference is forgotten. What do his early drawings prove?—that he had a correct eye for figure and for colour, a hand and fingers flexible enough to enable him to reproduce what he sees, and a not too great physical energy. They show also a love of imitation, *i.e.* of reproducing or representing what he sees or what he thinks of, and a power of observing. Now these are the two primary faculties or modes of energy: and in these modes this particular child energizes with some freedom. Was it then born with a disposition to observe and represent? Certainly not. But that child has somewhat more than the ordinary energy; and its capacity, or need of satisfaction through the expenditure of energy, which overflows its physical organs,—has been aroused at an age when observation and representation are its highest modes of conscious thought. It naturally forms a habit of observing and imitating in the mode which its physical gifts of eye and hand make the easiest to it. And these modes of mental action and the habit of gratifying them in this particular way, having got the start, will keep it if circumstances are not too strong, and unless the mental energy develop itself so vigorously as to demand other, more various, and higher outlets for its full satisfaction. Had the child with exactly the same mental vivacity possessed great susceptibility of the sense of hearing, and capacity for delight in harmonious pulses of sound, its observation would have been of tune, and its representations in musical notes.

A boy of seven dissects a dead bird: this inspires his parents with the idea of his being a surgeon; they notice and encourage his work. He turns out an eminent surgeon

and people say "men must be born with a turn for the profession, for look at him." What he showed at seven was exactly the same kind of curiosity and love of observation, which leads another child at four to get into disgrace by breaking open all his toys and dissecting his sister's doll: added in the infant surgeon's case, to a dexterity of fingers and the possession of a knife, which enables him to indulge his curiosity on the bird with some degree of success; a curiosity directed no doubt by some casual hint and stimulated by encouragement: perhaps also by a certain obduracy of nerves, or a want of that keen sensitive sympathy with life which excites in so many young children an imaginative horror of what is dead.

Another boy at fourteen shows you say an invincible repugnance to and slowness in mastering his Latin grammar, and takes very kindly instead to books of travels or to natural history. And therefore it is argued, that it is silly to make him slave at languages in which he will never excel, and better to teach him geography and natural science, in which he is likely to make great progress. This assumes does it not that our business is to teach him a certain quantity; that information on any subject is equally useful; and that educational progress consists in acquisition of knowledge? Were we to answer in the same empirical way I should observe; that if he will read travels for himself it is a thousand pities to make him learn them, or the geography which they will teach him much better without our meddling than with it. And further, that experience gives us no reason for supposing that a boy who is not fond of lessons and likes amusing himself with natural history, will be equally fond of the latter when turned into a science and an educational lesson. But let us really to understand his position, lay aside all question of what we ought to do with him, and consider why he shows this dislike, this preference. What is the main difference between the exercise of the mind in studying grammar, and in studying a natural science—botany for example? Both require observation, both exercise memory; both demand imagination; and both practise him in that kind of comparison which classifies, distinguishes, and names. But the botany demands observation of external, visible, and tangible objects: grammar—of his words, and

therefore in some measure, of his own consciousness. Botany requires him to represent to himself visible objects and their changes: grammar demands from him the simultaneous representation of signs and the ideas they stand for: he cannot aid himself by seeing or touching that relation of an action to time past, present, or future,—that assertion of a positive, conditional, or imperative proposition, which obliges him to modify his verb in so many different ways: nor can he understand any description of these relations without reproducing them in his own mind. He can see the combination of an acid and an alkali, he can hear, taste, or see its effect, and it requires a good deal less of energy to notice, recollect, and reproduce sensible phenomena, than it does clearly to grasp and reproduce a purely mental succession: so that whatever can be taught by sensible experiments can be learnt with much less labour than what can be only known by reflection; and the more senses it is addressed to, the less of labour does it demand. So also when he comes to compare and classify his facts or objects: the natural science requires him to abstract one sensible phenomenon from others: the grammar demands abstraction of the relations of ideas. In short the one is easier, the other more arduous. So also it is with the invincible dislike of metaphysics and the preference for mathematics; or the aversion to mathematics and the delight in literature, which characterises older scholars.

No study can be pleasant which cannot be carried on with success; or rather with a strong and near hope of succeeding. We found, you will remember, that the exercise of mental energy which invariably gives the highest pleasure, is that which most fully satisfies the highest capacity a man possesses; provided he can make the necessary effort freely and without exhaustion. Apply this to the case of boys. If a boy has the requisite energy and has so far acquired the habit of exerting it in the requisite modes, that he can exert it with hope of success, then the more difficult exercise will please him the most. But if he have not yet sufficient power; or if he have not gradually overcome this difficulty of unwontedness, then any subject which demands from him a less exertion, or attention in a mode to which he is accustomed, will necessarily appear preferable to him, or at any rate it

will be the less hateful. Therefore even if adopting your practical conclusion, I should not state the case in the same way. Instead of saying, such a boy has no turn for Latin and Greek, but he is quick in acquiring general information or he is very fond of experimental science; I should say; such a boy has not ability enough for the higher work of our ordinary classes; we must try what we can do for him by easier work. And I should be very slow to say this; trying hard to help him to do the real work first, and diminishing its quantity and velocity rather than its quality.

But it is not worth while wasting what power he has in vain attempts to do what is above his powers; it is not worth while making a lad miserable because he is weak; neither is it at all educational. We must however carefully distinguish this from that general turn for being not educated which is common to most boys; and to which did we yield, not only would there be scarcely any educated, there would be almost as few tolerably instructed men.

I believe then that what mainly determines this preference for one subject or another, is the degree and the kind of mental exertion called out by it. The same subject may be painful to some because it demands a too continued attention; and repulsive to others because it limits that attention to a single chain of thought or a single relation. Much will also depend on the age when the child's mental activity is first roused to a pleasurable degree; and his habits and associations are first formed. If it be roused very early, the habit of observing outward objects gets the start. If it lies dormant two or three years longer, it is likely that the exercise of imagination will charm him the most. But if his mind sleeps on some years longer, that subject which attracts his attention and which first calls him to compare, classify, and reason will be the one which he will be said to have a turn for. But a liberal education is no more designed to educate to particular turns than to create them. However brilliant such special turns may prove, unless they are supplemented by a general development, by a liberal education, they are brilliant onesidenesses.

And so much for the instruments of that mental education which aims at making the most of a man in respect of his mastery of truth.

17. A silence followed, and we all sat doubting, till Sara asked what we must make of this? Then said Mrs. Melcombe; why you, of all men in the world should put philosophy in the place of religion! And Mrs. Charlton declared she could not believe Dr. Melcombe could seriously mean that the dreams of metaphysicians are the central starting place for a journey through the realities of science. "I fear this is one of your ingenious paradoxes." Sara suggested that "an apprehension of the meaning and use of one's words, might possibly be useful in learning, and in affairs: at any rate she could say from personal experience, that the want of such comprehension is very disagreeable." And Agatha asked if the highest philosophy would not be a true Christian theology.

Mrs. Charlton. If we aim at producing a perfect culture, a philosophical comprehensiveness of thought, we cannot afford to ignore any important class of ascertained facts: for the means of attaining this harmonious development of the intelligence, is nothing less than all the extant knowledge of the age in which we happen to live.*

Professor. An acquaintance with all the extant knowledge of the age of Plato might have been possible: but he certainly did not consider it to be the basis, or the cause of Philosophy. He would have called it a polymathy—a busy meddling with sciences which ought to be professional. As to an acquaintance with all the knowledge extant in our day, I should imagine, that were it possible—which happily it is not—it would be much more likely to produce softening of the brain than an harmonious intelligence, in all but the millionth man perhaps.

Mrs. Charlton. Do you allow nothing then to the rest of the million, of that width of mind and liberality of judgment, which is the fruit of extensive information, and which can only be gained by a course of reading and study embracing all the more considerable branches of science? Would you call a person educated, who is ignorant of history, geography, and of nearly all the natural sciences?

Professor. Education and information have the same connexion together as strength and riches have. Generally

* Here Mrs. Charlton is quoting from "Oxford Studies," *Oxford Essays*, 1855—quoting but not as I think understanding.

speaking, strength is favourable to the acquisition of riches: but if you asked me, would you then call a man strong who has not a penny in the world? I should say, by all means, if he is a strong man, let us endeavour to call him so! And so in answer to your last question, I can only answer; if this so far ignorant man be educated, let us take care to name him an educated man. In matter of fact an educated man in the present day, when information is so readily obtained by all, will seldom remain long a very ignorant man: though you will generally find he knows, or appears to know, less by a good deal than most merely taught persons know, just because he will not absorb all the information that is promulgated around him. Then as to your first question, I should estimate the possession of general information very highly if the possessor were an educated man: I should count it worse than ignorance, if he be uneducated. In most cases however these extremes are not found: people get a little education, which rouses their taste for knowledge, and then they bury their faculties under a heap of miscellaneous information far greater than they can digest and assimilate. And this puts a complete stop to the education that had begun. This is not my experience alone: I think any one who has tried to educate will tell you the same thing. "Multifarious reading weakens the mind, more than doing nothing; for it becomes a necessity at last, like smoking; and is an excuse for the mind to lie dormant, whilst thought is poured in and runs through; a clear stream over gravel on which not even mosses grow. It is the idlest of all idleness, and leaves more of impotency than any other."*

Mrs. Charlton. But as Mr. Mill says, it is not the utmost limit of human acquirement to know one thing only: but to combine a minute knowledge of one or two things, with a general knowledge of many things.

Professor. Certainly not the utmost limit; but we do not expect our average scholars will at all approach that limit. But the province of the educator is to secure his thorough study of one thing—the method of learning—for the purpose of enabling him to acquaint himself with any other thing which he may afterwards have occasion to know. Once rouse his faculties and train them to their work, you may

* Robertson's *Life and Letters*, vol. ii. p. 208, 209, 1st edition.

safely leave him to acquire as much general knowledge as he can make any use of. This is true even of children who live in an intelligent family, if they are not bored by having information forced on them faster than they can assimilate it. And the man who has learned what real knowledge is and how it is to be attained, by means of his own attainment in his own subject, will be able to discern in other subjects, who are the guides he can safely follow, and whose opinions he may rely on. But without this previous preparation, general information does but add to his negative ignorance, the positive error of imagining he knows, and can judge.

Mrs. Charlton. Was not Faraday a thoroughly educated man, and educated by those natural sciences which you say are not educational?

Dr. Melcombe. Unquestionably he was. But he was one of those very few men, who are certain to educate themselves whatever instrument falls into their way. One man can kill more foes with the jawbone of an ass than others with the keenest blades of Damascus; but for all that we don't arm any of our men with jawbones, of malice prepense.

Mrs. Charlton. But is not the plan you propose, the very same which has been tried so long, and of the results of which the public are so utterly weary. Whatever the theory may be, is it not now confessed, that to feed the youthful mind with words instead of with things and sounds instead of facts, is utterly unsatisfactory in its results.

Sara. Giving us innocents and hungry, stones instead of bread.

Dr. Melcombe. I deny the opposition altogether. Or rather I should say, the facts are intellectually stones until we can express them intelligently in words. Whereas words, even when learnt at first separate from the ideas they embody, contain always a living germ of thought, storing up as they do the results of men's past experience and thoughts, and therefore capable of becoming fruitful of further thought and deed, however petrified or decayed the shell may have become by reason of its having fallen into evil use. But we cannot go into the riches of words now. Next time we have to consider the practical limitations of education which result from the disinclination of our patients to being educated; and how this can best be overcome.

Mrs. Charlton. I wish I could persuade you not to create the disinclination. Children acquire their native language most readily and gladly, and without any direct teaching will speak it grammatically. And for other modern languages two or three years are sufficient if taught in the same way. And after all languages are only useful as the medium of knowledge, giving access to other literatures than our own.

Agatha. Are we not thinking of quite different things? when we speak of knowing a language, we mean the power of reading and speaking it: but Dr. Melcombe says it is essential to possess language in order to bring any thought to pass, even in our own minds.

Sara. I wish you would explain this first, How words and thoughts stand to each other; or what truth there is in the ordinary opposition of tongues *versus* brains?

Dr. Melcombe. Well, if you want an extra lecture, you must wait a week; or else set to work to make the extracts for it.

LECTURE VI.

OF LEARNING THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE: OR THE TRUE RELATION OF WORDS TO THOUGHTS.

"The advice to dismiss words, and look into things for himself (which indeed no one has it in his power to follow), is in reality an exhortation to discard the whole fruit of the labours of predecessors; and to conduct himself as if he were the first person who had ever turned an enquiring eye on nature."—*J. S. Mill.*

I SUPPOSE Sara preferred the latter proposition, for we were summoned together as usual on the next Friday afternoon, and at once adjourned to the lime tree terrace: the weather had again taken up, and the early golden harvest was being reaped on all the hill sides, under the golden blaze of the August sun.

1. *The Professor.* I have first to make good my assertion that the thorough mastery of a language is essential to the thorough acquisition of any science, whatever its subject may be: and then I propose to enquire how such a knowledge of our own language can be obtained with the greatest economy of time and of effort.

I, say then, that we cannot grasp any idea until it is clothed in some form; and the form of all human, or rather I should say of all discursive thought (for perhaps words are not necessary to our consciousness of intuitions) is language. No process of thought beyond the very simplest can be carried on without words. "To 'utter a thought' is literally 'to put it outside us;' as to 'express' it, is to 'squeeze it out.' Thought is not even present to the thinker till he has thus set it forth out of himself;—Man comes first to himself in uttering himself." * If you make the attempt to think without words, you will find that distinct and consecutive thought is practically impossible; nor is this the

* Tylor's *Early History of Mankind*, 1st edition, p. 14–16, 68.

result of habitual association merely, for Kruse, himself a mute, assures us "the deaf and dumb must have a language, without which no thought can be brought to pass." What would it be to work out a sum in long division—nay even to count up to a hundred without using fixed mental signs—that is words—to express the numbers? And if so simple a process would require an almost superhuman effort of attention, a perfect *tour de force*; what would be necessary in any more complex problem, were we called to reason it out without signs, by which to grasp each conception and hold it apart from the rest? Further, precision of thought is impossible without a corresponding precision of language: so Tylor speaks again of "the certainty which speech gives to a man's mind, in holding fast ideas in all their relations." "Language is evidently one of the principal instruments and helps of thought; and any imperfection in the instrument, or in the mode of employing it, is confessedly liable—still more than in almost any other art—to confuse and impede the process, and destroy all confidence in the result." "Since reasoning or inference usually takes place by means of words, and in complicated cases can take place in no other way; those who have not a thorough insight into the signification and purposes of words, will be under chances, amounting almost to certainty, of reasoning incorrectly." *

And the knowledge of nouns, of their true significance, contents, and relations, is the knowledge of very fruitful facts: each one is a storehouse of accumulated experience and comparison. So far from feeding your pupils with stones by teaching them words, and by making the right use of words the central subject of their education; I affirm that unless you do this, and until it is done, you have nothing but stones, indigestible stones to give them: and if it seems otherwise, it is only because, and only so far as, in teaching them your facts you are compelled to explain, and they are obliged to acquire the precise meaning and true use of the words in which you communicate them.

For after all the main matter is not whether men have notions passing through their minds; but what manner of notions, and of what value; and what power they have to

* *System of Logic*, vol. i. ch. i.

grasp them up into unity. As Mr. Austin writes, in one of the most profoundly satirical sentences ever penned: "It really *is* important (though I feel the audacity of the paradox), that men should think distinctly, and speak with a meaning."* And so inseparable did these two things appear to be to that great thinker, that the larger part of his work on jurisprudence, intended by him as a text book of the philosophy of law, is one continued effort to get rid, in his special science, "of those ambiguities with which language is oppressed, and which are the main obstacles to clear and determinate thinking." His first volume consists almost entirely of definitions of words and of attempts to distinguish between words.

2. Consider too what an amazing influence words have over the earliest series of our thoughts, and how very much they mould our notions and determine our mental associations all through our lives. I am speaking now only of their intellectual effects: their moral influence over a child's feelings and passions, whether in exaggerating or in calming, in refining or degrading them, is even more remarkable; but this lies outside our present object. Not only do our words give us or withhold from us a definite grasp of our thoughts, but they affect their substance; they not only determine to a great degree our mode of thinking, they furnish one principal part of the matter of our thoughts, at once extending our ideas through the whole treasury of past thought which they contain; and tending to limit our range of thought to those relations which they are best fitted to express. Nor will you question this, if you carefully observe how far the train of your thoughts on every subject is determined by association, and how very large a proportion of these associations are verbal ones. It would be little exaggeration to say, that the intellectual character of our nation is that which our language has made it; for though doubtless nations stamp their own character on their language, yet first of all the individual minds of their citizens have been cast in the mould of their language. And if the intellectual progress of a race mainly determines the character of its material civilisation, it is itself equally determined by the character of its language, and by the degree of correctness

* Austin's *Jurisprudence*, vol. i. p. 49.

with which it uses it. Mr. Maine affirms that "the human mind has *never* grappled with any subject of thought, unless it has been provided beforehand with a proper store of language, and with an apparatus of appropriate logical methods."* And he shows that the subjects of thought which have occupied different races has been mainly determined by the capability of their language for expressing them.

Agatha. Then that's why women have such an aversion to science and to metaphysics.

Sara. What is why, oh most unluminous?

Agatha. Why—you know—hardly any of us know Greek.

Sara. Go on Tom; she is wandering on the hills, gathering wool: by-and-bye, when night comes on, she will return to us with all her wits.

3. *Professor.* I dare say that has a good deal to do with it. Mr. Maine gives us one very striking illustration of this power of language to determine the course of national thought: he points out how the whole character of the thought of Western and Modern Europe has been formed by the character and limited by the deficiencies of the Latin language.† The distinctive feature of Roman thought was its tendency to regard all questions in their legal aspect, and to this the Latin language was fully adapted: but when they wanted to philosophize they had to borrow from Greece; their metaphysical discussions were always conducted in Greek, at first pure, and then in a dialect of Latin expressly constructed to give expression to Greek conceptions. Now the earliest language of the Christian Church was Greek; and its earliest intellectual food was that for which the later forms of Greek philosophy had prepared the way: in that language, and in that thought the Church found the words and ideas "out of which the human mind could furnish itself with the means of engaging in the profound controversies as to the Divine Persons, Substances, and Attributes. The Latin language and meagre Latin philosophy were quite unequal to the undertaking, and Latin Christianity passively accepted the Creed, which its narrow and barren vocabulary could hardly express in adequate terms. But the Latin

* *Ancient Law*, p. 340, 2nd edition. † Ibid. ch. ix. p. 353–359.

speaking countries possessed a vocabulary for legal questions as accurate as it was copious;" and as soon as the Western and Eastern Empires were separated, "the Western Church threw itself with ardour into a new order of discussions,—the same which to this day have never lost their interest for any family of mankind, that has once received its theology through the Latin communion;" and the consequence has been that all the metaphysical questions that have deeply stirred Western Europe, "are stamped with the character of Roman thought, and betray throughout their legal parentage." Thus it appears that the aptness of the Greek tongue for philosophy, determined the character of Christian thought in the Eastern Churches: whilst the perfection of the Latin tongue for the discussion of legal questions; the fact that the founders of Western thought spoke and thought in Latin; and the necessity which Christian teachers amongst the Teutonic races were under, of borrowing Latin phrases in expounding Christian morals, at a time "when the language of Roman jurisprudence supplied the only sufficient means of exactness in speech, and of exactness, subtlety, and depth in thought," this necessity has determined the character and formed the language of Western divinity.

Our natural sciences have each a vocabulary of scientific terms of their own mostly taken from the Greek; which is of all languages perhaps, the one that affords most facility for creating compound words expressive of perfectly definite ideas to those who understand their roots: and these technical terms remain fixed and definite, because they are only used by scientific men and for scientific purposes. But our mental, moral, and social sciences employ terms that are also used in the common affairs of every day life and intercourse; and which are consequently continually losing their original meaning, and getting united to some new sense; or else they are applied in so many and such different senses, as virtually to convey no particular meaning at all. You will find a good deal on this subject in the three first chapters of Mr. Mill's "System of Logic." He speaks very strongly of the "utter darkness" in which our knowledge is often involved, by reason of our confused apprehension of the import of the different classes of words and assertions; and he declares that the loose mode of classifying and naming objects, which

obtains in our ordinary intercourse, has rendered the vocabulary of our mental and moral philosophy to a very great degree unfit for the purposes of accurate thinking.

Sir W. Hamilton gives us an instance in point:* he says that our loss of two English adjectives since the days of Locke, has materially checked the development of mental philosophy in this country, and involved it in the utmost perplexity and misconception: "deprived of these terms the critical—indeed the whole philosophy of France—would be a blank." And he attributes this loss to the ambiguity which had crept into the use of their respective substantives, by their careless misapplication in ordinary conversation: as happens to so many words much used in common affairs. When I tell you,—you will probably have guessed,—that the missing adjectives are "objective" and "subjective," words evidently expressing a real, and for the purpose of accurate thought on the processes of the mind, an important distinction; and words which were formerly used by English thinkers as freely as they now are by French and German writers; but the attempt to reintroduce which has been resisted, ridiculed, and met on the part of most English people by a most contemptuous refusal even to try to understand the distinction they point out: you will I think allow, that we have here a remarkable instance of the truth, that if a nation would think clearly and distinguish truly, it must keep its words distinct, and use them correctly; since the loss of one or two words may not only contribute its quota to that degeneration of thought which the slovenly or the vulgar use of language inevitably produces; but may also prove, like the loss of the nail from the horse's shoe, equivalent to the death of a science.

4. And by the vulgar use of a language, I do not mean the use of those dialects of our different counties, which Government inspectors and certificated schoolmasters are so busy in rooting out. Their old words and racy idioms are often mines of historical, and even of intellectual wealth, rich in vigorous thought vigorously expressed. I mean slang, specially as used in our own class. There is no bar to the growth of mind and thought more fatal than this silly and coarse habit of using words without attaching any distinct

* *Lectures on Metaphysics*, vol. i. lecture ix. p. 160.

meaning to them, and of expressing all meanings and shades of meaning by one or two adjectives. When I hear these two words, "awful" and "jolly," applied to every occasion, I am irresistibly reminded of an untaught puppy dog which expresses all its ideas by a lively but monotonous bark: but the puppy's intellectual level is probably the higher, for his discourse is certainly the least unpleasant. How much the habitual use of slang does to destroy all perception of difference and proportion, and to make sense and no sense equal in men's eyes, is increasingly manifested in the literature of the other side of the Atlantic: there are many sentences in Emerson's writings, and far more in W. Whitman's and other younger men, whom we are told to admire as their best and foremost writers—which would convey exactly as much sense, and indeed exactly the same sense as at present, if you cut out their principal clauses, and fill up the gap with an equal number taken at random from the great Panjandrum himself. For the habit of expressing all meanings and shades of meaning by the same words, which is the essence of slang, quickly induces that other habit, of employing any words to express our meaning, without the least regard to their appropriateness and exactitude, which is the essence of this mystical fine writing. And between this impartial use of the first big words that come to hand to express our meaning, and the having no meaning to express, there is scarcely a step.

How much a less degree of slang amongst ourselves, tends to destroy all imagination, all noble thought, and all enthusiasm, we are I fear already proving in our own class at home.

Would we understand other men's thoughts, or be able to think to any purpose ourselves, we must make ourselves masters of the language in which we read and think. And as no one can be called an educated man, who cannot in some fair degree both penetrate through the words of his countrymen to the thought stored up in those words, and communicate his own thoughts to them; so no one can justly be called uneducated, who has so far mastered his native language as to possess the franchise of its books, to know his own meaning, and to say what he means. How then can we master this English language of ours, with the greatest economy of time and of effort?

5. You see by employing the mastery of English as the instrument of education you effect a great economy, for you take up and carry on the education already begun, when by a process in which happily books have no part, nature has taught the child to strive to clothe its vague conceptions in words, and so to classify them in some sort of order. It is however of no small importance how he has learnt to do this. For his companions have given him words, and he has fashioned his notions to meet those words: the moral and mental character of his associations already depend in a great measure on the character of his words. Notions for which he has no words will slip past him; he is occupied with those for which he has words. I believe this relation is invariable; slang words = no notions; vulgar words = inaccurate notions; coarse words = coarse notions: and correct and pure words are equivalent to notions which are true, however inadequate; and capable of growth because their nouns lead on to true trains of association.

Distinctness of thought is secured in children, as it is in men, mainly by correctness of speech, by the right word in the right place. And unless they form this habit not only cannot they express their ideas, they will have very little distinct thought to express. There is more in the power of words even than this: for as "without a language no thought can be brought to pass," so without coarse words a child cannot form and will not retain degrading thoughts; and without being habituated to pure and good words, he cannot comprehend ennobling thoughts. A little later, and we find that correct and incorrect pronunciation are not without their effect on the development of his ideas. Without correct pronunciation he has lost something of the force of his words, and is apt to miss its true associations; so he loses the little clue which would have led him on to connect it and the thoughts it suggests with their true relations.

Thus the first step in this education by means of language, answers to that which is the first step towards real knowledge: it draws out and disciplines the mind by the art of naming things and ideas correctly. To "name" requires observation, classification, and generalization: to understand a name, demands a similar exercise: without naming and understanding names, no further process of reasoning can be

made intelligible, and in carrying it on we are mainly indebted to language, *i.e.* to correct naming of things, ideas, and relations,—for our success. "To know a thing means more than to recognise it. We know a thing, if we are able to bring it and any part of it under more general ideas. We then say not that we have a perception but a conception of it, or that we have a general idea of it. . . Now the first step towards this real knowledge, a step which however small in appearance, separates man for ever from all other animals, is *the naming of a thing*, or the making it knowable."* And what is this process of naming? "When by a first combination we have obtained a complement of notions as complex as the mind can embrace," or grasp up together and at once, "we give to the complement a name; and considering it bound up together under that collective name as itself a unit; by a second combination we accumulate these collective units into a new complement to which we give another name. It is on this principle arithmetic proceeds: ten, one hundred, one thousand, are so many factitious units, which enable us to form notions—vague indeed—of what otherwise we could have obtained no conception at all."†

Even when your pupil has acquired the power of reading, writing, and naming correctly in English; even when many of his words have a meaning; yet his too fluent use of the language, owing to his having read too many books and learnt many more words than he has a meaning for, will greatly baffle the real educator, who can scarcely guess how little the child has really represented to himself the things of which he so readily speaks. Still more painfully does this baffle the child, who is suddenly called upon to produce meanings for words the sounds of which are so familiar to him that both he and his teacher take for granted he knows them, whilst in truth he has no idea at all standing under their sound. This is a vice that baffles grown-up students almost as frequently. "In hosts of cases," says Mr. Herbert Spenser, "men do not distinctly translate into their equivalent states of consciousness, the words they use. This negligence is with many so habitual, that they are unaware they

* Max Müller's *Science of Language*, 1st series, lecture ix.

† Sir William Hamilton's *Lectures on Metaphysics*, vol. ii. lecture xxxiv. p. 282, 283.

have not clearly represented to themselves the propositions they assert; and then they are apt to assert they can and do think things, which it is really impossible to think."*

6. The remedy with children, is to oblige them to translate their words into equivalents in another and unwonted language. But here I would observe that no amount of languages learnt in the same way as that in which we learn our own, will in the least help us to overcome this great fault: this way of acquiring them has other advantages; it will greatly enrich the scholar's vocabulary, and furnish him with a widely diversified store of instruments of thought; so that meanings and distinctions which he cannot adequately express in one language he will be able to grasp in another: but it will never help him to think with any greater accuracy, than the learning his own language in nature's way has furnished him with. To return: our next step must be to enable him to get at the exact meaning and force of his English words: that he may understand accurately what he himself is saying, and what others have said. This knowledge is essential to all true discourse; and the science which teaches it is therefore called Etymology. It embraces two subjects; by tracing the origin and derivation of words, it teaches us the reason of our names for things, ideas, or actions, and so explains their meaning: and by ascertaining the various inflexions and "modifications, by which the sense of any word can be so diversified, consistently with its original meaning or its relation to the theme whence it was derived," as to be made to correspond with the changes and modifications of the things or acts denoted, or of their relations:† and thus it teaches us "how the forms of language are made to correspond with the universal forms of thought."‡ It is this last which is ordinarily taught first to children. But in order to study this matter with the least expense of labour,—indeed in order to do it at all effectually, we must get mentally outside our own language: and this is very hard indeed to do unless we can study it from the standing point of another language. When we have learnt to think in a language, it is most difficult to analyse its parts in our

* *Essays Scientific and Political*, "On Mill and Hamilton," vol. ii.

† *Encyc. Metrop.* arts. "Grammar and Etymology."

‡ J. S. Mill's *Inaugural Address.*

thoughts; and it requires a constant struggle to fix attention on the words which have become things to us; which are so familiar to us and mean so many things for us, that when we would examine them our attention is scattered amongst a hundred associations: nor can we easily persuade ourselves there is any occasion for us to stop and ask what the reason of their meaning was. Now learning another language in the same way, that is orally, would not help us at all: but learning it with precision, out of books and by grammar, does help us: the child is now obliged to translate his words, one by one, into their true equivalents; he is forced to construe to himself their exact meaning in each place in which he finds them; and to hunt out the different modifications of the sense of each word as expressed by the inflexions it submits to and the position in which it stands: Thus he is obliged to distinguish the different force of words which at first sight appear synonymous, and he learns "clearly to represent to himself the proposition he is considering. One great hindrance to all learning, and all thought, is the habit we get into of mistaking familiar words for accurate ideas, or indeed for ideas at all. The majority of civilised mankind are at this moment reasoning falsely about Governments through the force of this habit: they mistake their knowledge of the words Government, State, and so on, for the possession of a distinct idea of what Government is and therefore of what it can do. And the best corrective of this fallacy is the discipline obtained in 'translating with accuracy from one language into another; and hunting out the meanings expressed in a vocabulary not familiar to us, and not therefore liable to be mistaken for accurate knowledge.'"*

7. Then further; it is true in a measure of all modern European languages, but perhaps most especially of the English tongue, that we cannot get at the full force and compass of its derived and compound words, without knowing them in their original form. And that is principally, in Latin and in Greek.

Mrs. Charlton. But have not the great majority of our Latin words come to us through the French? And at the best Latin leaves the greater part of our words unelucidated. How much more extensive a knowledge even of our own

* J. S. Mill's *Inaugural Address.*

language might be acquired by the early acquisition of German and French than by the years now spent in Latin and labour. If taught in nature's way, by oral instruction and by practice in talking, a mere child will acquire both these languages almost imperceptibly and without effort; and all the years after seven or eight, when he has learned to read them, would be saved for the purposes of real instruction, and for the enlargement of the mind through the stores of literature that would be thus thrown open to it.

Professor. If our object is to enable our pupils to talk, or even to read the more, this might probably be the way to do it. But if it be to enable them to comprehend what French and German and English thinkers have thought;—then I really see no connexion at all between the means and the end. If any language could be mastered in this easy and conversational way, its acquisition would be educationally a repetition of the discipline through which nature carries babies between one and four and no more. But a mere child cannot by any possibility "acquire" a language, if to acquire includes to possess and understand:—it is not in two or three, nor in four or five years we can master our first and native language. Whereas really to master Latin is, owing to the comparative perfection of its grammar, to have the key of languages. But if we limit ourselves to the mastery of English, then to know French would in no way help us: for to know the force of its words we must learn it on the basis of Latin. "The full weight," says a writer in the *Saturday Review*, in an article well worth preserving—"the full weight of French words as used by the masters of French style, cannot be appreciated by a person ignorant of Latin: he would try in vain to comprehend the depth and width of such expressions as civilisation, liberté, justice, sénat, magistrat: he would completely lose sight of that under current of thought—that distant background of meaning, enriched and ennobled by a long line of ancestors. In historical languages like English and French, nearly every word seems, like the notes of a musical instrument, to convey to an attentive listener not only its own sound and meaning, but also a number of harmonies and bye meanings; which even when not fully realised impart to each word its peculiar

quality or 'timbre:'" "the true ring of the word," as he calls it afterwards.*

Sara. But to discern the ring of English words, we ought surely to learn Saxon, or as Mrs. Charlton says German.

Agatha. If you remember, Max Müller says, that of our 43,500 words, about 29,800 are derived chiefly from Latin, with a mixture of Greek, and not quite half that number, about 13,200, from Teutonic sources.†

Professor. Besides English is not descended from modern German, and to know the sister language is a very different thing from knowing the mother. On this side we should have to go up for the full force of our words, as Max Müller implies, to Gothic or higher still. Happily on this side it is hardly necessary. Our Teutonic words are the common ones; the nouns of every day life, of visible objects: the verbs of ordinary action: and the adverbs and prepositions whose fullest force is known by their various applications in actual use, not by their ancestral relationships. The child knows the full force of "father," "mother," "home," "school," just as well without, as with knowing why he calls them so. And these words are also monosyllabic or one-idea words: it is the compound words that are difficult to grasp. I acknowledge the difficulty will be only in part met by a knowledge of Latin, since English is probably fuller than any known language of words derived from the most distant sources. But then the words we have derived from Latin and Greek are precisely those which are mainly affected by it, being those whose meaning is least easily ascertained by common usage, and those which we use whenever accuracy is more important than a ready and popular apprehension. When we are simply narrating, our Saxon words serve us: but the moment we want to employ general and abstract terms, we betake ourselves to our classical words. When men are discussing legal or political questions, they use Latin words: when they have to state scientific facts and distinctions; or when they are expressing accurate philosophic thoughts, they take their substantives from the Greek tongue. You will find it almost impossible to do otherwise: just try to translate such sentences as these—(I take them at

* *Saturday Review*, Nov. 19, 1864, "On Curtius' Greek Grammar."

† Max Müller's *Lectures on the Science of Language*, 1st series, lecture ii.

random—out of the nearest books—and one is our German's) —into Saxon English.

"The Missionaries attempted to restore this dialect to some grammatical correctness, by publishing translations, and a dictionary of the Neo Syriac language." "Peculiarities of face which we find regularly associated with these significations of intellectual inferiority; and which, like these, disappear as barbarism grows into civilisation, may reasonably be concluded to have, like these, a psychological meaning." To lay down as a rule, that good English means Saxon English, is really nonsense. I conclude that whether we would understand our English thinkers, or attain to precision in the use of our own words, with any reasonable economy of time and mental labour, we must study English etymology through Latin. And if we wish further to master any natural science, or to know anything of philosophy, we shall do so with much less waste of labour and a much firmer grasp of our ideas if we first learn at least the etymology of the Greek language.

8. *Sara.* Well I am quite willing we should go in for Latin; not but that the "timbre" of this argument sounds to me more fastidious than real. I flatter myself I can read most English books—barring chemical and algebraic ones—with a humble comprehension of their words and grammar, when they happen to have that latter commodity. My difficulty is not having information enough to take in their subjects;—and having also a vast aversion to getting up the information in case of scientific books.

Mrs. Charlton. Very true my dear: and it is hopeless to expect the Latin grammar will enable you to understand without that.

Agatha. Well I am ashamed to say it is the words that baffle me in reading any thoughtful English book. I have a vague sort of notion what they refer to; but I can so seldom define them: and when I do, I can't remember the definition next time, or else any new inflexion or application throws me out. If there is a thing I envy men for, it is that they seem to know so exactly what they are writing, or reading.

Sara. And you pretend you don't?

Agatha. No, I don't know at all exactly what they are saying.

Sara. This is getting serious, for you learnt Latin.

Agatha. Very little: but that little is really all I can do in English: it is the Greek words that baffle me.

Mrs. Charlton. Any good dictionary will give you both their meaning and their derivation: and a few hours spent in ascertaining in this way the signification of the scientific terms, is all that is needed as a preliminary for entering on the study of any science.

Agatha. Well I don't find it so. A foreign noun one knows from a dictionary, is just a proper name: it has no associations with other more familiar words, by which you can recall its meanings, or understand the variations of its meaning. It's really a terrible pull on one's memory to retain the abstract and complex idea it stands for. And if you do retain both name and meaning, it's a mere sound, standing for one idea in that particular application in which you first met it. A word one really knows is like a living tree bearing many branches and fruits, all united by the one stem, and all springing from one root. But the foreigner you get out of a dictionary, is like an artificial notch cut in a dry stick, to put you in mind of some fact or notion: you can't think with it, you can't find out for yourself all that is stored up in it: and any other collection of syllables would for you have done just as well. It's not only the ring of the words, it's the connecting links between them and the thoughts they stand for, which is missing.

Sara. I told you so: I said that as night came on she would return to us with her wool all nicely spun.

Mrs. Melcombe. I think what you say is very true of scientific and learned books, and I never read them because their terms are so unintelligible, not knowing Greek. But surely in ordinary English books there is no such difficulty? at least if there is, I'm ashamed to say I never found it out. Our best writers write now such good English: it's true very often I don't understand them, because the subject is too hard for me, but I know the words they use.

Professor. I very much question that my dear. If you knew all the words used,—then if they were rightly used you would understand the matter; and if wrongly used, you would nine times out of ten detect the error. I think it is that fatal facility women have of getting a view of the argu-

ment and of its conclusions at a glance; which tempts you to rush over the words employed, taking their sense for granted from their context, when you don't quite know what they mean if standing by themselves.

Mrs. Charlton. You are rather hard upon us. I do not think women are so thoughtless as that: or so unable to understand men's writings as they must be if Miss Tryanon's description were generally true: in that case educated men and women would have different languages; whereas you can hardly tell their writings in our best reviews and papers. There are as many Latin and Greek words in the one as in the other.

Agatha. Yes, a dictionary, and much observation of how men use them helps one to use them correctly when one can't do without them. But most likely most of the women who write on subjects that need them, do know Greek and Latin: but generally the women who read these books do not I think grasp these words. I fancy I have noticed of late years a growing separation of mind, both in the character of thought and of its subject, between our educated men and women: that men who think accurately are thinking more and more with the help of Greek words, and are becoming less comprehended by us; and that we women are thinking more and more by ourselves; and in ignorance of what men have done before us. We think in Saxon English eked out with German and French: and we seldom take much interest in any subjects for which Saxon English does not supply a tolerably adequate language. But one can hardly read a page now of men's writing that expresses any real head-work, without coming on some unknown Greek words, or proper names for complex thoughts.

Professor. Would you give us some examples of the sort of words you mean?

Agatha opened a little note-book; I put down most of these words to hunt out what they mean, in reading Liddon's Bampton Lectures, and one essay of Herbert Spenser's: both you know are books read by women just as much as by men. "Correlation," "Dialecticism," and what has it to do with dialect? Polemics, Morphological, Prophylactic, Synthesis, Analysis, Diathesis, Antithesis, Thesis, Hypothecate, Abnormal, Empiricism, Diagnosis (I put that down though,

because so many women use it I wanted to know it), Microcosm and Macrocosm.

Sara. Those words are too hard, and if people are so stupid as to use them, we must defy them with Pascal's "je hais ces mots d'enflure."

Agatha. Weapons of precision rather; but don't you see, if men will write in this way, we are losing "the franchise of books and the accomplishment of perfect and ready reading in one's own language," for want of knowing Greek?

Professor. If it is really true that women ordinarily well educated have only a vague notion of words of this origin, I should say it is only extraordinary that so many women are able to read, and take as much pleasure in studying really thoughtful books; for the additional labour must be something enormous.

Sara. Now Agatha, on your honour; how much has this hindered you in your book work?

Agatha. I think it has wasted two years out of six: and made it all so much less clear besides.

Professor. I can very well believe it. For as we have only a limited amount of mental power available at each moment; and, as whatever force is absorbed in the machine is lost in the result; so the more time and attention it takes to interpret the words, the less attention can be given to the truth contained in it.*

9. So much then for the value of Etymology, as the foundation of a sound and economical education. The next step is to examine into the orderly construction, or method of language. Syntax stands in the same relation to the art of writing, as Etymology does to that of reading: it teaches us to combine our words in phrases and sentences in such a manner, that they shall convey to others our own changing consciousness, with as much exactness as is possible. Here again we find that the grammar of most modern languages, and of English perhaps more than any other, has suffered so many losses as to be scarcely intelligible, without the help of such a grammar as Latin affords; to point out to us the breaches which this decay has made, and to show us the true force and meaning of those loose affixes by which we fill up its place, and construct congruous sentences out of inflexible

* Herbert Spenser's *Essays*, essay i. vol. ii.

words. Syntax indeed, which teaches us the universal laws of construction in language, can as well be learnt from the analysis of English alone, as Zoology could be learnt from exclusively studying the varieties of the domestic dog. It needs no argument to show that those languages will teach it best which are no longer subject to the changes inevitable in every spoken language, through the wear and tear of its market use: and which having once been carried to a high degree of perfection, were crystallised in that state, and "so still possess the most definite rules and provide distinct forms for the greatest number of distinctions in thoughts. In this respect the classical languages have an incomparable advantage."*

No modern language can afford the same mental discipline; for being still in the process either of growth or decay, their grammar is not equally definite, cannot be equally well known, nor consequently equally well taught. Nor can it ever be taught with that authority, which is an essential condition of a true educational instrument. The tutor must be able to demand conformity to one fixed standard; he cannot allow his pupil to choose haphazard amongst many. That this last is all that could be done in teaching English construction, you will see I think, if you will look over "The Queen's English," and consider the way in which this phrase is accepted and the other is rejected, as it suits or displeases the author's ear. In truth we have no surer test than that of cultivated but individual taste; nor do I mean to object to the particular decisions given in that work: but it is certain that no two cultivated English scholars can be found who would agree with them all.

10. Now just consider the process a boy goes through in learning his Latin or Greek grammar: and compare it with the process you went through when learning by means of the French or English grammars. The tutor cannot here begin with that fatal and stupid blunder, of demanding from boys the exercise of mental faculties which as yet they possess but in embryo, and the results of which they are thereby driven to sham. He must begin by making them learn by rote the common meaning of a great number of words and their inflexions: and this he does just at the age when their

* J. S. Mill's *Inaugural Address*.

memory for words is most retentive; and when therefore we find that a task, which would be felt to be great drudgery after the maturer faculties of the understanding are awakened and crave for action, produces no such impression.* But the memory is exercised to the due extent of its energy; and it is strengthened, by constant repetition and the continual demand for the recollection of these words and their inflections, until they are so graven on the mind as to be henceforth recalled without any conscious effort whatever. And when he proceeds to decline and conjugate fresh nouns and verbs, after the pattern of those he has learnt,—when he is thus practised in classification and analysis,—is not every step of his work an exercise of comparison? Considered merely as an intellectual exercise, why, as Mr. Heurtley asks, should this be less valuable than the arrangement of stones or flowers in classified order? And there can be no question as to its being more generally useful: but few men comparatively will ever find stones or flowers to be the subjects that will occupy their practical energies. But every man who is to live among men, will be in constant need of language: and there are no more fruitful facts to be known than words afford. Then he goes on to Syntax. Mark the process again. He learns by heart a certain number of definite laws, and is required to apply them for the explanation of the construction of every sentence he reads, and in the formation of every sentence he writes. The reason of the rules given him is philosophical and as yet far above his reach; but they are so definite and so certain that their practical effects are perfectly simple. By their aid, he analyses his sentences: observes the relation in which each word it contains stands to the rest, the influence it exercises on them and suffers from them, and the consequent modifications of the whole sentence: and then he has to combine them again in an intelligible whole. What is this but a continuous study of the relations of cause and effect, of correlation and harmony, an incessant practice of analysis and synthesis? When he is sufficiently familiar with this work, he begins to read some classical book: and to translate it, orally and in writing, into his own language. He has to hunt out for himself the various meanings which each word

* J. S. Mill's *Inaugural Address*.

and clause may bear, to observe and compare the various shades of meaning; to select the one that harmonises best with the context and the general intention of the whole paragraph—and to discover the exactest equivalent of that sense in his own language. Every step of this process is an exercise in reasoning and in judgment; but with words, not that is with very complex phenomena, but with single facts or thoughts.

Sara. Now he has got into the fourth form, and talking of sorrowful wolves is himself sorrowfully knocked down by his master.

Professor. Whereby it is strongly impressed on his mind, that words really have a meaning; and that it is an immoral thing to apply epithets indifferently. Well, this process he must carry on,—

Sara. The being-knocked-down process—poor fellow?

Professor. No—this process of analysing and reconstructing, until he understands the construction and the force of each sentence in his author, and is able to reproduce it in English.

Sara. When is he to write verses then?

Agatha. Oh do let him get to the University to study Prosody.

Professor. Before he goes to the University, let us consider what mental exercise and discipline this kind of work represents? Attention has been exercised throughout, in observing, remembering, representing, comparing and judging, on such a subject that the tutor can exactly ascertain the amount of the effort made: and at first on single objects put one by one before him and briefly as suits a child's power. Then as a preparation for and an introduction to the practice of sound reasoning what can be better than this?

"The study of language, if conducted on rational principles, is one of the best exercises in an applied logic." * "Grammar is the most elementary part of logic; the beginning of the analysis of the mental process. The principles and rules of grammar are the means by which the forms of language are made to correspond with the universal forms of thought. The distinctions between the various parts of speech and their declinations are distinctions in thought.

* Sir William Hamilton's *Discourses, &c.* note, p. 268.

Nouns and verbs express objects and events; but the modes of putting nouns and verbs together express the relations of objects and events; and each mode expresses a different relation. The rules of syntax oblige us to distinguish between the subject and predicate, agent, action, and thing acted on; to note when an idea modifies or only unites; and when assertions are categorical or conditional; when they express similarity or contrast, conjunction or disjunction." *

"The classical student is unceasingly employed in collecting and classifying particular examples, and applying general laws. In determining the sense of his author. . . . he is perpetually arbitrating between conflicting probabilities. It would take many pages to write out at length the inductive syllogisms which have to be proposed and solved in determining the true sense of a difficult sentence in Thucydides and Tacitus. The facility and rapidity with which an accomplished scholar does this, ought to enhance in our eyes the value of his previous training; not to lead us to underrate the difficulties he is enabled to master. Intuitive perception of truth is not a lucky guess, but a masterly condensation of long observation and painful reasoning." †

Sara. But that is the result of the University teaching, and are not our unfortunate girls to begin English before that is over?

11. *Professor.* Certainly; they began to study English at least as soon as they began the Latin syntax. In truth each lesson in Latin etymology should be a lesson in English,—and in French if they have learned that as children. French and German are so very inferior as educational instruments to Latin and Greek, that I would have them learnt, when learnt at all, in nature's way, as English is, and with the least possible expense of effort. French should be learnt in early childhood, if possible, after English; and German, if it appears desirable may be readily acquired after the school's work is over, in the same manner. But I would only have one language studied scientifically, that is grammatically, by girls, and that must be Latin: "that ancient language which is the foundation of most modern languages, and the mastery of which makes it easier to learn four or

* J. S. Mill's *Inaugural Address.*

† "General Education and Classical Studies," *Cambridge Essays*, 1855.

five of the continental languages, than it is to learn one of them without it." *

When the child can read and speak English and has began the Latin grammar, as she makes acquaintance with a new Latin noun, and with its family of verbs, adjectives, adverbs, and their compounds; let her give a list of all the English words she knows that are derived from it. And if she has began the French vocabulary let her give the French derivatives also; or if she is reading a French book, let her with every new French noun name the Latin word whence it is derived, as well as the English synonyme. This might seem slow work at first, but it would prove a very great economy and strengthener of memory. Then every lesson in construing a Latin sentence into English and analysing it, should also be a lesson in the grammatical construction of its English rendering. "If every translation into English," Grote says, "were an exercise in English as well as in Latin; and every translation into Latin, a test of the degree in which the force of the original has been entered into, it is not easy to see in what way English could be better taught.†" For thus the difficulty of studying English is obviated—we get outside it as it were, and cease to mistake its familiar sounds for accurate ideas. If you add, into French as well, the same thing will be true. These three languages indeed, from their natural affinity, may be readily studied together if Latin be made the basis; the same Latin classic being rendered into English and into French, and the same English or French classical passage translated into Latin and into French. But in any case Latin and English should proceed with equal steps if our object be to master English.

12. When our pupils advance to the study of English classical literature it is another affair. If it is best in every subject we study for the purposes of education, to study it in its best and highest form, then Greek literature ought to be studied as our standard. And English literature can hardly be better studied than as Coleridge tells us he studied Milton and Shakspeare at Christ's Hospital, at once and comparatively with the Greek Tragedians.

* J. S. Mill's *Inaugural Address.*

† "Old Studies and New," *Cambridge Essays*, 1856.

Agatha. Are not four languages too much for girls?

Professor. I should think so, but no doubt there are girls and girls. In making out an ideal education it is necessary to determine the best; in practically educating, the second or third best may often prove more desirable. But Greek stands on a different footing, educationally, to Latin. I consider that a knowledge of the Latin language and grammar is not only such a help to the mastery of French and English, that those who would acquire either will do so most economically through Latin: but also that we have practically no choice about it, but that it is, for persons of ordinary power, the only way in which they can master these. I really do not see how it is possible, without an impracticable expenditure of strength, either to master grammar through English, or to master English itself without Latin. And if Miss Tryanon is right, an acquaintance with Greek Etymology is most advisable, perhaps essential, for securing the franchise of English books. But the use of Greek as our young men study it is different. We want Latin mainly for the sake of mastering our own language, French, and the vocabulary of modern thought, and of obtaining an understanding of modern social thought itself. We need Greek as supplying us with an adequate vocabulary for science and philosophy; as a standard of literature; as opening to us new forms of thought, and thereby setting us free from the trammels and grooves of current thought. And here comes in its value in producing culture, *i.e.* a sound and enlightened—a free and liberal—mental taste or perception; of which we may have something to say presently. But now having somewhat mastered their own language, our scholars are to employ that skill in the study of its literature.

Agatha. Would you explain first what you mean by that? I cannot find any real definition of literature.

Professor. The literature of any language includes all its written productions, except those that teach natural and professional sciences, and the fine arts. But when we speak of it as the instrument of the lower stage of a University course of instruction, calling it humane letters, we include in it "all empirical dexterity at language, all familiarity with literary products and all acquaintance with historical record!" "It signifies a knowledge of the facts; the knowledge of the

reason or cause in all these matters belongs to the higher department of philosophy."* The main difference, as it seems to me, between the education given to women and that which is open to men, is this; that the former has never gone any higher—has never recognised the possibility of going higher than this empirical stage. And therefore even literature itself has never been well taught to women: those who have been mistresses in it, have either been quite exceptionally educated, or for the most part probably have fought their own way into it. How can it be adequately taught and adequately mastered?

May we take as the test of this degree of education, the effectual rousing and disciplining of the critical faculty; and as its end, culture of mind? We said that the critical faculty is manifested by the sifting and judging the various materials brought together in any work, and the modes of their combination; discriminating the true and false materials, and the degree of truth preserved in their combination; discerning how far the representations made are true to the objects represented, and how far they are beautiful and complete in themselves.† And our present aim is to cultivate this faculty in our scholars as to enable them to exercise such a judgment in respect of English literature, and thus to produce in them as much of culture as English thought and literature can give.

13. Just as we saw that to understand the grammar, and thence to enter into the force and genius of our own language, we must get outside it by learning another language whose forms we can compare with its forms, and that can show us their cause or reason: So now in order to enter into the richness of our own literature and appreciate it justly both in its merits and deficiencies, we must compare it with the literature of another people: and for this purpose we should select the most perfect literature we can, as our standard. Or if we would enlarge our own cultivation and enrich our native literature with new and various modes of thought, then we must leave its beaten track and habituate ourselves to quite different modes and forms of thinking. And if we desire to go still further, and to obtain a reasoned knowledge of English lite-

* Sir William Hamilton's *Discussions*, appendix iii. "Oxford as it might be."

† Above, Lect. II. p. 61.

rature; and to know not merely what our own classical writers have thought and written, but why they thought in that mode, and expressed themselves in such a fashion—then we must go back and ask this of the fathers of modern literature,—of the great writers and thinkers of Rome and of Greece.

Mrs. Charlton. I quite agree with you that to be thoroughly educated now our women must no longer be limited to English literature and thought, with all its insular prejudices and narrowness. But ancient literature can do nothing in the way of giving a knowledge of modern thought and life: instead of going back to the ancient cradle, they ought to be early acquainted with and penetrated by the best ideas of Modern Europe and of America.

Professor. It is certain that Modern European thought and literature has been mainly caused and moulded by the faith of Christ: but all in it that has not sprung from this,—as well as the special forms which Christian thought itself has taken amongst us, is mainly due to the thoughts and literatures of Rome and Greece. In the higher departments of philosophy, Ancient Greece is still our teacher; and the profounder questions of Christian theology cannot be thought without the help of the Greek vocabulary. So that if we would know not only what modern thought thinks, but how it came to conceive of things in the way it does, and the merits of that way, we must as I said know its sources and its educators. You say very truly, we need to get into wider fields of thought and different ways of looking at things: modern thought is indeed ever changing—flowing on if you like; but still it is in each age somewhat monotonous; its banks are high and its streams not too various. "The acquisition of an ancient, far more than of a modern language, involves the gradual habituation to new modes of thought; the acquisition of Greek or Latin is thus a slower and more difficult process than the study of French and German: but at the same time it is far more efficacious in bracing the mind to unfamiliar processes of thought." * In fine, "for all these purposes, the old Greek masters are preferable to any other; partly on account of the very high standard of excellence which they give us in every branch of literature, in

* *North British Review*, No. 80, "Dreams of a Schoolmaster."

history, in philosophy, in poetry: partly because they lead us into entirely new forms and modes of thought, as no modern literature can: partly because their standard works have been so long and thoroughly examined that nothing in the course of them can be said to be left to the varying taste of fashion, or of the passing age, which in all modern literature is constantly raising up some new author as the standard of perfection and throwing down the old. And if our students are hereafter to guide the literature of their age they must needs get one foot at least on some firmer standing ground."*

Omit these, and where shall we find firm standing ground for our culture? Dante, Shakspeare, Milton, Schiller and Goethe, what Frenchman shall we name? A history such as Grote's Greece, or Gibbon's Decline and Fall; Butler's Analogy, or Locke. It is an unhomogeneous, fragmentary bill of fare: its unity can only be discovered by going down to the roots whence these have sprung: and indeed the three supreme names that stand first are not to be thoroughly understood if taken singly, without the ancient classics. Then remember you cannot make up by quantity what you lack in quality, for the essence of this sort of education is, that it is limited to a very small number of books.

Let us take stock of our student again: in our imaginary university he is now ready to take his first degree, *i.e.* to pass in literature or humane letters.

Sara. No, not yet. You have quite forgotten to teach him his Prosody: and I want so much to hear you prove, that we can't be educated without writing many bad Latin verses.

Professor. Then I am afraid you will be disappointed. I am not even going to prove that you have not been properly educated if you fail to delight in, or are unable to discern good English verse,—of the rank suited to your capacity. As to prosody, little sister, I've been pressing it on your attention, apparently quite in vain, for the last two pages.

14. In learning the forms and constructions of his language, and in mastering the practical application of the universal laws of grammar to its special conditions, he has continuously exercised his understanding, his powers of comparison, of reasoning, and of judgment: he has been well grounded in

* "Old Studies and New," Grote, *Cambridge Essays*, 1856.

that kind of applied logic which deals with contingent or probable reasoning, which, as it is the most difficult, so also for the practical affairs of business and of life is the most essential. By arithmetic and Euclid he has been habituated to necessary reasoning,—the other part of applied logic. Then again being habituated to the analysis of language, he has acquired the method of scientific investigation, practically; and he has already advanced some way in the analysis of the mental process involved in it; *i.e.* in applied Philosophy. For as language is the outward and sensible form of thought, so the science of language—the knowledge of its laws and its reason—is the true sesame to the science of thought or reasoned truth. But if he never goes on to master this philosophy of thought, it is much that he should have mastered the forms themselves; for at least he has acquired "the art of easy and perfect reading in his own language; he has the franchise of its books:" he will henceforth understand the meaning of his own words, and of the words of others: he will know clearly what he himself thinks, and will be able to discern through the cloud of their words what other men mean. Whatever knowledge can be communicated in words or acquired from books lies open to him. He knows one thing thoroughly, and his one thing is the key to all knowledge that is communicable by words: it is even the key to that most important of knowledges which can only be attained by reflection. "In no way had Socrates so much learnt to fulfil the oracle, 'know thyself,' as by reflecting on the words which were continually passing from his lips: in no way could he so effectually stir his pupils to obey the same oracle as by leading them to cultivate the like habit."* And further, he will quite clearly comprehend that there are heights and depths still above and below him, of which he as yet knows nothing whatever: he sees that he is at the foot of the hill, not on its summit. I call this no mean or unworthy result of eight years of education.

But it is not all. In learning his language he has been disciplined and habituated in the observance of general rules, laws, or principles. He has been taught that even in his most voluntary and unimportant actions,—in his idlest

* *The Conscience*, by Professor Maurice.

speeches,—he must observe law or altogether fail of his purpose, neither understanding himself nor making himself understood. Now I think you will find that the grammar of modern languages, taught by itself, does not effect this moral discipline. Look at any ordinary German grammar, for instance: what principle or order is there in it? There are a vast number of rules each applying perhaps to some twenty words, and the exceptions which follow each so often exceed in number the examples of obedience, that the choice of the rule appears to an intelligent girl vexatiously capricious. She is inclined to say of her grammar, as a little boy a patient in a London hospital, once said to a friend of mine, "there are so many rules in this place nobody can draw straight lines from them." And is not the effect of this defect very perceptible among educated women? Have they generally that sense which educated men have, that law is to be obeyed; that it is universally applicable; that it is a sure guide? Are they not apt to make every particular case a question, if not an exception? The value of any discipline is perhaps more evidently seen in its absence than in its presence.

I need not go over again the course of that higher education for which this is the best preparation. Each scholar, whether he proceeds to that, or at once applies himself to his professional learning, must become his own educator: and out of the field of science now open to him he must choose his own department, and confine himself mainly to that, would he make any real progress in it, or add anything worth adding to the common riches.

> He must work through months of toil
> And years of cultivation
> Upon his proper patch of soil
> To grow his own plantation.

But such an education as I have tried, very inadequately, to describe, is alike advantageous, I should say alike necessary, to whichever plot of ground he betakes himself. For the really educated man is not him who knows something of everything, but who knows one thing well: who knows when he knows and when he is ignorant; who knows how to set about investigating any fresh subject with which it becomes needful for him to acquaint himself. He can judge

whether in any subject of which he is ignorant, the results given him by professed adepts have been obtained by a trustworthy and sufficient investigation: he knows how to choose trustworthy guides in matters of which he has not qualified himself to judge, and he is disposed to trust in them freely. He is not determined in any opinion by the voice of the uninstructed multitude; he can estimate evidence and the degrees of probability; and he neither demands a higher degree of evidence than the subject admits of, nor forms any opinion when it is insufficient to determine either way. If he only aims at obtaining and promoting literary cultivation, then this real mental discipline must first be secured, without which all cultivation is a pernicious sham. If he aims at becoming an active producer, then the discipline which has given him the command of his own faculties, and the instruction which has given him the power of expressing with precision what he is enabled to think with clearness—these are the things which will enable him to make the most of himself; and which will place him on that vantage ground that is occupied in every civilized nation by the really educated, and by those alone.

Sara (very much astonished). So that is what you call learning Prosody at the Universities.

15. *Mrs. Charlton.* But is it not notorious that this narrow English education, so far from placing our youth on any vantage ground, makes our schools the laughing-stock of all educated foreigners?

Professor. Several Englishmen have said so; but I cannot make out that foreigners do. In a very intelligent book, "Old England," written by Professor Hopper of Yale College, you will find him wondering at it. He quotes the contrast drawn in some article in the "London Quarterly" between the young Englishman leaving the University with so little to show for his time and money, and the young foreigner leaving his, "full of information and accomplishment:" and then again between the same two men ten years later; the foreign University man "still *a lad in mind* and a babbler on the surface of every subject;" and the Englishman, who "has gone into the business of life with a mind so trained that he grasps at will the necessary knowledge of the subject he has to deal with." And his comment is this:

"There must be *something* in English education, with its everlasting drill in Latin and Greek composition, and its hard metaphysics and logic; which after all develops and toughens the mental faculties. It may be narrower than the American course of study, but it nevertheless;"—(one rather wonders he did not see his way to "and it therefore")—"draws out the intellectual faculties and gives them manly force and grip." I think it is M. Reyband who, speaking of the real work done in our public schools and Universities, and the moral vigour that is given there, calls it in contrast with that given abroad "une éducation mâle."* Depend upon it if you wish to educate girls as thoroughly as Englishmen are educated, you must do it by limiting their subjects even more narrowly than ours, not by requiring of them so much more.

Mrs. Charlton. I cannot see why they should be more limited: why should you think our best students will be necessarily unequal to such mental exertion as you expect from your ordinary men?

Professor. It is not our ordinary men who are successful competitors for honours, as I understand you wish these girls to be. And I certainly do not think girls as a rule are equal to the physical exertions which those young men make who do succeed with us. You know we don't at the Universities handicap these hard-headed young fellows: weak and strong must all fare alike; and the race is so hard that it is constantly decided by sheer physical health and endurance.

Mrs. Charlton. Girls have hitherto had such very inferior teaching: when they are equally fortunate with their brothers in this respect, I am sure they have enthusiasm enough to carry them through a much greater amount of subjects than most Eton boys or Oxford undergraduates dream of.

Mrs. Melcombe. But what if, as my husband says, this greater amount of subjects only weakens them? And just think how much more they have to learn than public school boys:—English, literature, universal history, universal geography, French, German, and now Latin; music and drawing and arithmetic, chemistry and botany, and all the sciences.

Sara (very gently). And religion.

* *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 1 juillet 1865, p. 185.

Mrs. Melcombe. Oh Sara, how can you!

Sara. Dear me, Emily, you don't suppose we mean to let them grow up heathens?

Dr. Melcombe. Depend upon it with all this to learn they will not have a moment to spare for being educated.

Mrs. Charlton. No doubt the curriculum must be revised and readjusted. But if we are to succeed we must consider what public opinion requires, and have regard to the demands of the age in which our scholars have to live.

Dr. Melcombe. The question turns not on what is expected but on what is possible. The law is inexorable; and really can no more be altered to meet the views of the age than the law of gravity could: the more labour is spent in acquiring information, the less can be given to the active exercise of thought upon that information. If your age demands incompatible results you must instruct it that it cannot have them.

Sara. Treating it like that apocryphal baby that cried for the moon.

Mrs. Melcombe. But it is not a baby; it is very old.

Agatha. Then we may hope it will not cry, although there are many things most worthy to be known, of which its daughters are still profoundly ignorant.

LECTURE VII.

EDUCATION: ITS LIMITS AND RESULTS.

Behold there went out a sower to sow.

And as he sowed, some fell by the way side, and the fowls of the air came and devoured it up.

And some fell on stony ground where it had not much earth; and immediately it sprung up, because it had no depth of earth. And when the sun was up it was scorched; and because it had no root it withered away.

And some fell among thorns: and the thorns grew up, and choked it; and it yielded no fruit.

And other fell on good ground, and did yield fruit that sprang up and increased, and brought forth some thirty, and some sixty, and some a hundred fold.

Professor. It cannot be too often repeated that all real education is self-education. You may put your pupil through the course we have been describing, and she will be just so far educated by it as she has voluntarily worked through it, and no further. She must exert herself in each of these modes in which you have endeavoured to call out her energy: she must herself control and discipline the efforts she makes: just so far as she does this, she will be educated by doing it: just so far as she reluctantly suffers it, no trace of education will be found in her when she escapes out of your hands. And soon the fowls of the air will have devoured the seeds of knowledge you vainly strewed upon the outside of her mind.

And therefore having considered what is the culture the educator should aim at giving, this question still remains; how much of it can the educatee be brought to receive, and by what motives? I assume that to whatever point this training is to be carried it is to be real and thorough as far as it goes, counting surface work, or veneering, for nothing. And then the education actually received will be limited by four conditions.

1. By the length of time which can be spared for education, before it is necessary for the scholar to begin the work of life by learning his profession or trade.

2. By the quality of the material and the kind of training the educator is able to supply.

3. By the amount and quality of each which the educated is capable of receiving.

4. By the amount and quality of the mental exertion he can be induced to make.

The first condition is that of time.

Roughly allotting the first ten or eleven years of life to nature's free growth; and laying on them no greater burden than the acquisition of the arts of reading, writing, and numeration; and the exercise of memory, observation and imagination, incited but not demanded by the educator: we found that whilst the ten or twelve following years are generally the most that can with advantage be spared for the express purpose of education, they are barely sufficient for its completion. Until men are grown up, and so have come into the possession of that strength which nature has made them severally capable of acquiring, they will not be made the most of, if any of their strength be expended for any purpose except that of growth: *i. e.* the development and increase of strength. When boys are taken from education to professional work at eleven, at fifteen, at eighteen, their minds cannot be made the most of. But I think by eighteen they may have been so far trained, that they ought to be able to carry on their own education, and make if not the most yet a good deal of themselves. And you must remember that to draw on their capital for the (nominal) purpose of education, but really for the purpose of obtaining pecuniary prizes offered to successful scholars—is to put them into a profession, using them as means not as ends. Whenever they are driven to excessive exertion or are crammed for the sake of such a prize; in either case under the pretence of educing, their guardians are selling their best powers for gain. And this is a fraud of such a nature that though ignorance may excuse, no repentance can remedy it. Yet is this crime openly committed every year at the bidding of avarice, and with the concurrence, and even by the instrumentality of the highest authorities in the land; and at all our great centres of education.

The higher education can only be given, in ordinary cases, to those who can spare the years from eighteen to twenty-two—all the years of growth in fact, for the work of receiving it.

2. But assuming the time can be spared us, I am afraid it will be found that the education given fails far oftener by falling below, than by exceeding, that which the educatees could receive if they were fairly made the most of: and the fault generally lies in too great haste for results and too great carelessness in the means. It constantly happens for instance at our public schools, that boys leave them without any results at all of an intellectual kind. The attempt has been made to give them a higher culture than they were prepared to profit by; and it has ended naturally enough in their receiving none. But in these cases the real error is not that the instrument of culture has been wrongly chosen, but that it has never been used. The foundation has never been laid, the boys have never been drilled in the first steps of their work: and then they are sent to school at thirteen or fourteen, and pushed and dragged and beaten through each form;—set to parse Virgil before they can tell a substantive from an attributive; set to produce Latin compositions before they understand the construction of a single clause; made to construe Homer when they ought to be learning Greek verbs;—and ordered to mumble through Euclid "before they know the angles they are naming." All such work is repulsive to them, in proportion to their natural intelligence, just because it is to them utterly unintelligible and unmeaning. Whose fault is that? Mainly it is the fault of parents. And the true remedy is not to adopt an inferior instrument of culture; still less to leave off cultivating and to take to piling up knowledges, like seeds on the untilled ground: neither is it to lower the work done down to the level of parents' negligence. It is to have a maximum age for each form, and to refuse to admit any boy into the next form, who is not thoroughly grounded in the work of the preceding form. Such boys need more individual care either to make up for lost time or because they have too little power for self-education: and yet no one would willingly deprive them of all the moral discipline of a public school. I would therefore pass every such boy into a bye-class—con-

taining not more than six boys say: and each such class should be under a master who would give his entire attention to them. They should do rather less than more work; but they should learn their lessons and write their exercises in their master's presence and with his help: and each boy should repeat the lesson by himself. And I would charge the parents for every such boy at least double what they would pay were he in the regular form: and then very few indeed would have to be passed up from bye-class to bye-class. Parents would contrive to send them properly grounded, and they would then be found fit for the regular forms and able to profit in them. This is an instance in which the education given is limited by the want not so much of ability, as of applicability on the part of the educators. In the case of girls, I imagine the ability is too often wanting also; and that their teachers fail to educate through being themselves uneducated. It will also be often limited, by their want of the moral power of influencing their pupil's desires and wishes.

3. Our next limitation is a more important one. The education received is limited by the amount of instruction and training which the educatee is capable of receiving. The higher degrees of education can by no means be given to all. Many have not the capacity necessary to receive it; many are utterly averse to that exertion, self-control, and discipline, which form the essence of it. Every stone may be made the most of, but it is not every stone that will bear polishing. Every kind of soil may be sown with good seed, but it is not every soil that will bear a deep cultivation: and so every mind may be taught, but it is not all minds that can be highly educated. For this education demands a continued and severe exertion of mental energy of the highest kind, and it can only be made with profit by those who can make it without weariness: it can only be made with profit by those whose physical health is such as freely to sustain the energy demanded: and by those whose emotional energy is not unduly excited by purely intellectual work. Now of course we cannot in ordinary cases tell who will prove able to receive this education and who will not. There is very little risk in trying with healthy young men whether they will or not. For in a healthy and vigorous nature there

is an elastic power of resistance which absolutely refuses to grow in moulds, or to be forced beyond a slight and wholly superficial degree. You may stimulate effort and demand results as forcibly as you please; such a healthy lad will creep under, climb over, go round; he will coach, crib, and steal; he will endure almost any amount of impositions; he will cram almost any amount of verbal and apparent results; but he will not really exert his mind, except in contriving ways of escape, nor admit one bit more of culture than is good for him. The more you take out of him in the shape of memory the less he will give in the shape of thought: the more of form you compel him to produce the less of meaning will he put into it. And thus, by aiming at more culture than he can receive, you effect a good deal less than you might have given, but you do not do him much positive harm. But in less vigorous constitutions the effect of transgressing this limitation is much worse. Your grapes and your wheat you cannot grow in moulds; but your pumpkins you may. You cannot force your rough oak trees or your mountain pines; you can force your orchids or your ferns. If your pupil is not this sturdy Philistine, you may do much harm. For if his mental energy is disproportionally greater than his physical vigour—if he is too much alive to ideas or too keenly sensitive to moral and mental excitement, then this over culture with its over exertion is eagerly welcomed and carried on with enthusiasm: it produces not weariness but feverish restlessness, it leads to the disproportionate and morbid development of the active faculties as compared with the regulative faculty—to a feverish eagerness in opinions; to distorted judgment; and finally to the probable loss of bodily health and to the certain diminution of mental strength. Whether therefore it would be desirable that the ordinary rule should be for girls as it is for men, that they should go on at eighteen to attempt that higher education at a college; or whether the rule should be that they should turn at once to the work of acquiring their professions—as household economy, and the domestic arts, chemical or others—may be a matter of question. For my own part I should leave it to natural selection to decide. If a girl seriously prefers the former, I would give her every facility for carrying it on for herself, and if possible at home; but

I would never press it, nor offer any stimulus at all beyond taking interest in her progress.

4. If however the deficiency arises not from the redundance but from the feebleness of your pupil's mental sensibility, then your over culture has the effect not of stimulating but of smothering the brain. Driven on too fast for his slowly moving mind he comprehends nothing, and the more you teach him the more stupid he becomes. As soon as such a pupil emerges from the compulsion of school, books are thrown aside, and all he seemed to have learnt is forgotten, or only remembered as a painful nightmare: the only abiding effect of the most careful and painstaking education is a rooted aversion to every mental exercise. Minds are too often now-a-days made into a wayside ground by the quantity of knowledges that are carted over them. There is another form of character on which an over education operates differently. A youth may be produced by it, possessed of much information and many arts. In all things, human and divine, he knows what is admirable, and he takes for granted he admires it. He has his regular tests and rules for what is true and for what is beautiful: he knows the words of art and the last hypotheses of science. He is a senator ready made: he has got up his history, and political economy, and the technical principles of his party. Or he is well up in theology, and knows to a hair's breadth what set of words is orthodox, what set of sentiments is proper, and what are unsound and reprehensible. What is correct he knows: but as for what really is—the question itself is irregular, and shows an ill-regulated state of mind. Memory enables him to apply his straight ruler; if curved circumstances arise to which a straight ruler will not apply, he can no more think for himself how to deal with them than he can fly. His arts are but crutches; his training has but crippled him. What little ability he had has been beaten out so thin, in order to cover the whole extent of those formulas which it is so essential that every cultivated person should be acquainted with, that it has entirely lost not only all solidity, but also all elasticity. Had he possessed more vigour, he would never have been half so accomplished. However the stony ground is the least improvable; and these thin minds are just those which it is most difficult to make anything of.

(This description reminded me of a tutor and pupil with whom I fell in at the Manchester Art Exhibition of 1857. Standing before Fra Angelico's picture of "The Last Judgment," I heard a solemn and harsh voice close behind me saying, "This is a picture well worth your attention; notice the beauty of those angel forms. Those however," and here a hand waved towards the left side of the picture, "are objectionable in a work of art: and they render the whole picture reprehensible." Turning round I saw the speaker—who looked about twenty-eight—was addressing not me, but a small boy of nine or ten. I instantly fled from the spot, but did not escape. Lingering in the crowd before "The Three Marys" the pair came upon me again, and by this time the child had learnt his lesson. In a sharp treble, with an expression of great self-satisfaction on his thin and weak little face, he turned to his tutor. "How true to nature is the death-tone in the colouring of the flesh.")

Professor. The over cultivation of girls perhaps more often produces this thinness than the dulness of which we spoke. People who have been made dull in that way dislike intelligence, and whatever influence they have goes to prevent or to slander it in others. But these last admire information exceedingly, and are ready to worship any intellectual lion. But the only notion they have of the aim of education, is that of making all people exactly alike, all conformable to the same rule, all holding the same standard of excellence—present public opinion: and this, in obedience to that imperious instinct of the civilised human animal, which feeling no ability for freedom is impelled to deny freedom to any.

Sara. That power of resistance you spoke of is an unfair advantage that boys have over girls: a healthy dunce of a boy can't be made to work his brain too hard; but the more virtuous and unhappy girl goes on drudging as long as she is bid, without a struggle for her wits.

Agatha. The resisting power of the boy is perhaps more successful as against the primary task of learning: in declining the subsequent exertion of thinking, and in the art of forgetting, overtaught girls seem quite equal to their brothers.

Professor. Well, it certainly is hard to over-teach boys: you think you are ramming it into them, and it all slips off

their minds like rain off a duck's back. But for your comfort, Sara, I should say that growing nature, fighting for the dear life, will in one way or another, in girls as in boys, baffle all ordinary attempts at suffocation. However, some such results as these are the highest that can be obtained by any education beyond the primary, that is not fundamentally voluntary education. And as the pupil advances towards manhood, the two processes of imposed and of self education become so far incompatible as to be mutually exclusive; so that if more than the full measure of culture he is capable of receiving be imposed upon him, he will neither have the time, the strength, nor probably the inclination to carry on the self-education. And whoever does carry on the latter, will instinctively refuse the symmetrical completeness of the former.

Mrs. Charlton. But we cannot secure the results we require unless we direct and mould the growing mind throughout.

Professor. Well, you must remember that the only result we said we should aim at, is the putting it in our scholars' power to make the most of themselves; and as that is not the same thing as compelling or bribing them to make the most of themselves, so it is quite a different thing from our making the most of them. It is as different as is the gardener's from the artificial flower maker's art. If you want flowers made after a prescribed pattern, and up to a fixed degree of perfection, you will go to the latter. If you want growing plants, you must put up with such flowers and fruits as the plants, the soil, and the climate will produce. In the words of Bacon, "it is in knowledge as it is in plants; if you mean to use the plant, it is no matter for the roots. But if you mean it to grow, then it is more assured to rest upon roots than upon slips." And just so, if you mean the young mind to grow, you must not expect from it your ideal results. It is its own nature and vigour that must determine both the size and the character of its growth. We would secure strength. Now the condition of sound mental strength is health: and that health results from the just balance and proportion between food, rest, and exercise on the one hand, and the vital force of the growing creature on the other. If this proportion is maintained, the result is a healthy, hopeful,

and pleasurable activity, free alike from excessive eagerness and anxiety, and from morbid languor and dulness. If it is not maintained the result is a loss of strength—not only of interest but of capital. Nor can we by any management maintain in any one a higher degree of vigorous health than his whole constitution, as measured by its weakest part, is calculated to support. It is true that a skilful trainer of mind or of body can bring a man for a time—and no doubt he could bring women also—to a much higher state of vigour than this. But what is the result? his too vigorous health, and the energy it excites him to exert, wear him out. If this were not so, we should hear little of paralysis brought on by excess of mental labour; and little of heart disease or consumption brought on by physical training. Mental and bodily health are in the long run inseparable. It is no new observation that bodily health suffers from insufficient mental activity; and it is certain that the mind suffers from insufficient physical exercise. The difficulty is to hit on the true proportion, and to rouse and persuade our scholars to make the full amount of mental exertion which they can sustain with advantage, without urging them to exceed it.

5. This is the last problem,—Sir W. Hamilton calls it "the great postulate"—of education. How is the pupil to be persuaded to exert himself in these studies with his full energy? How can the tutor secure from him that mental labour without which all study and all learning is educationally worthless? Here again we have to reconcile apparently contradictory conditions.

i. We have seen that his faculties cannot be thoroughly educated and brought under his command, unless he exerts each energetically and continuously; so as to form in each mode of mental action that steady habit of exertion which shall make it his second nature so to energize. He can only acquire the command of his own attention, by forming the habit of attending at will: or the power of thought by forming the habit of thinking.

ii. But the exercise of attention, unwillingly constrained, proves rather antagonistic than helpful to the growth of this habit, by reason of the reaction which its irksomeness must produce. As food to be fully nourishing must not only be wholesome, but eaten with relish; as physical exercise to be

fully beneficial must be performed with delight; so it is in all exercise of the mind that is intended to improve the mind: unless the scholar does his work with a good will to the work itself, not merely to the prize it secures, he will be little benefited by it.

iii. The next condition arises from the fact we noticed before: that all unwonted labour is irksome; and that mental labour is unwonted to the young. It both requires them to exert an energy as yet feeble and incomplete, and it restrains them from exerting that which being more complete is positively pleasurable. For the body in healthy youth ever outruns the mind in growth and in vigour. And though this difficulty diminishes with their growth, it never ceases; since all really educational work is a calling out either of a degree, or a kind, or a mode of mental exertion, which is still imperfect and unwonted.

iv. You must therefore adopt some means of inciting your students to apply themselves heartily to the work to which you call them: you must give them some motive for undergoing the irksomeness and pain of it, which shall effectually overcome their natural disinclination to it, and lead them to give up for its sake the employments they naturally prefer. And this motive must be a present one—one they actually feel and are influenced by now: Not one they would be influenced by, if they were sensible grown-up men and women, and saw their fate lying plain before them. Now what motive will you adopt?

6. *Mrs. Melcombe.* Obedience.

Professor. That will do very much, in the way of conscientiously fulfilling a steady routine. It can hardly reach to the energetic activity which pleasure in the work itself gives.

Sara. I believe the approved motive for persuading boys to consider assiduous diligence more pleasing than the voluntary pretermission of their studies is flogging.

Professor. That only applies to young boys; with whom the strong and steady will of their master, armed with the lawful authority of a parent, and exercising it with the justice of manliness, has power enough: for the mental exertion required of them is so simple it can be demanded and secured as obedience. The difficulty we are now con-

sidering is with older scholars; we cannot secure the exertion we want these to make by authority, because it is not directly in their power to make it. It is not merely exertion but zeal and heartiness in the exertion we must win from them.

Mrs. Charlton. We must awaken in them whilst quite young the love of knowledge and implant in them high and noble aspirations; showing them the great part they will have to play in the world's future. If their minds are early stored with a rich variety of information, as they advance towards youth, they will anxiously seek to learn how to use those stores, eagerly emulating those great minds, whose nobleness you have all along kept before them.

Agatha. Wouldn't that be taking a mean advantage of their innocent credulity,—when one thinks how very small a part they will have to play?

Professor. I am afraid it would show great credulity in us did we expect young and healthy creatures to devote their best time and strength to an irksome work, with no other inducement than a vague and remote desire for their own and their race's perfection. The nobleness of cricket and rowing and hunting comes much more home to most young lads.

Sara. But you will see, my dear friend; in our college for maidens we are to strengthen their moral intellects to that degree, they will rise superior to chatter and croquet and devote themselves to philosophy. Then your young men, seeing them so far advanced beyond them, will be astonished and ashamed, and leaving their plays will toil after them in the ways of wisdom.

Professor. Pray how do you intend to do this?

Sara. If I knew I should not tell you, because it is your duty to tell us. So just say at once, how we are to get our undergraduates to grow this philosophical mind, whilst as yet they are wholly innocent, not only of having it, but even of conceiving what it would be like?

Professor. I have sketched out the course of study suitable for a university, and I wish you would not call that growing a philosophical mind. However you seem to agree with me, it is idle to expect that pure love of wisdom and delight in mental labour—which is the highest fruit we expect from

education—will be present in your scholars before they are educated, and will be the means of inducing them to educate themselves. But instead of giving you any plan of my own, I would rather refer you to Sir W. Hamilton's scheme for meeting this difficulty, and inducing our undergraduates to get themselves educated; for his answers much more nearly than mine would, to the plans your friends are adopting.

7. He defines the ends proposed by a university, as these three.*

1. To supply the competent instruction.
2. To excite the requisite emulation.
3. To grant a true certificate of progress.

He says that to accomplish the first end, the University must prescribe those studies which call forth the strongest and most unexclusive energy of thought, and which supply the object and occasion of exerting our faculties in their highest measure. It must secure, by adequate pay and by marked honours, the most capable men who can be obtained, as its teachers; not selecting them exclusively from its own body, but from the whole world: and engaging those who have not only a practical but also a philosophical knowledge of their own subject, with a good will to teach it. And it must select the books which are to be used by them as text-books, in every branch of the instruction given.

To accomplish the second end, and excite the requisite emulation, he recommends the following means.

First, Continual examinations. This he tells us, constrains the scholar to accurate, minute, and comprehensive study, and secures his knowing the subject in its whole and its parts, in itself and its relations: it calls out self-activity and clear distinct thinking: it educates to presence of mind; to prompt and precise expression; it abates conceit and convinces of deficiency. To induce the scholar so to prepare for and go through these examinations, as to secure his obtaining these advantages, they must be conducted both orally and in writing; and in large classes for the sake of securing publicity and the emulation that public contests excite.

Mrs. Melcombe. Very well, then Minnie will not be examined.

Professor. His second means is Disputation: which is in

* *Discussions*, "Oxford as it might be."

a certain sort the condition of all improvement. "As motion would cease were contention taken out of the physical universe; so all human progress would cease were contention taken out of the moral." * "Requiring it calls out, and calling out it educates to the most important intellectual virtues; to presence of mind, dominion over our faculties; promptitude of recollection and of thought, and a perfect command of temper. It stimulates the disputants to a more attentive and thorough study of the subject to be discussed; and it checks all tendency to irrelevancy, disorder, or repetition in statement, by confining them to a precise and logical order in bringing out their arguments." This also must be carried on publicly, in the presence of a large class, and before as many professors or tutors as may be, to be in any way an effectual stimulus. Will you deprive Minnie of this also?

Mrs. Melcombe (indignantly). It's needless answering such a question.

Professor. His third method is by repetition. "It is," he says, "far more improving to read one good book ten times, than ten good books once." He recommends this mainly as a check on the increasing vice of the age,—the reading and knowing everything: which has brought us "to so sorry a pass, that with all our various and vast information, we stand as individuals, intellectual dwarfs, in contrast with the ignorant but thinking giants of old. . . . Once involved in the bustle of life, few are able to realise what they deem to be the best; and all of us are more or less seduced into the knowledge of a thousand things, tending only to amuse, to distract, to dissipate the mind. To correct this hapless tendency, this Vielwisserei, this superficiality, there is nothing but a good education,—a sound erudition." Arm your scholars then beforehand against the temptation, by making them read their few text-books over and over again and then recapitulate them in a rational analysis both orally and in writing; and I should say in each of their two languages. "In Oxford four years are spent in preparing about fourteen books for examination; but those fourteen books had been the subject of school work for years. These are made text-books, read, re-read, digested, got up; until they become

* See this matter fully discussed in Mr. J. S. Mill's *Essay on Liberty*, ch. ii.

part and parcel of the mind. About four histories; four philosophical works; four poets, and two or three miscellaneous; the choice master works of two languages, and whoever has mastered them is a scholar indeed."* I am well persuaded the main advantage of attempting to assimilate the education of girls to that of our young men will be lost, unless you copy it in these respects, of limitation and repetition. This if it does no more will at least save them from becoming mere sciolists weighted down with a mass of useless, because unusable, unassimilated information.

Fourthly: by written compositions, exercising at once in thought and in its expression. The student should write in answer to questions that confine him to definite points, so compelling him to think definitely and pertinently: and the exercise should be strictly criticised by the tutor or professor, and read, or written in the hope that it will be read, before a large auditory, to be rewarded with immediate approbation or disgrace, and to be counted towards or subtracted from the ultimate honours.

Mrs. Charlton. This is what is done now in our educational lectures to ladies, excepting that there is not so much of approbation or disgrace as there should be. Perhaps it would be better if the names were always given.

Agatha. Who is to disgrace the inferior writers and to honour the others with public approbation? the lecturer has not generally white hair.

Mrs. Melcombe. Well I must be content to be old-fashioned; but no girl in my care shall ever be subjected to rudeness from any one, nor for any conceivable object: and if they can't be educated without it, they must remain uneducated.

Professor. I dare say you will find a much less violent stimulus quite sufficient with girls; the exercise in itself is a very wholesome and interesting one.

Fifthly, there is "conversation with and interrogation of the learned. The tutor or professor, at the end of lecture shall tarry for a time; and if any scholar wish to argue against what they have advanced, or may otherwise have any other doubts; they shall listen to him with kindness and satisfy the difficulties or questions proposed to them." He

* The Rev. F. Robertson's *Life and Letters*, vol. ii. p. 208, 209.

recommends also social study as supplementary to their private reading.

Lastly; teaching in order to learn. Sir W. Hamilton calls this, "a necessary condition of perfect knowledge. Teaching constrains him to a clear and distinct consciousness of his subject in its several bearings internal and external: it brings to his observation any obscurity or want that was lurking in his comprehension of it, and urges him to master any difficulty in it which he had before postponed." "The necessity he is under of answering the questions of others, obliges him to interrogate and answer himself; and what he learned synthetically he is now obliged in the inverse process of teaching, to study analytically. But he who teaches will neither give nor receive any benefit, if he simply pours out what has previously been poured in." I should add that this is the completing part of our University education; it is practised only by those who have taken their first degree; and Sir W. Hamilton would have made it a necessary condition of obtaining the second, or Master of Arts degree.

8. He hopes then to keep the students up to the height of their ability, by the goad of constant and urgent emulation. He would secure this emulation; 1. by attracting to his University the highest living examples of learning and of intellectual power; thus maintaining a very high standard both of attainment and of mental excellence; preventing any tolerance of mediocrity in the public opinion of the place; and keeping the students up to a vivid consciousness of their own ignorance and insufficiency: 2. by the publicity of all their work; by the numbers and coequality of the classes that compete together in all these five ways, when the accruing honour is signal and immediate: 3. by the exact classification of the students according to merit, in the final examination; by the publication of their names with the value of each man's work attached; by the truthfulness of this final certificate; the signal honours and material and lasting benefits bestowed on the highest, and by the proportionate disgrace and loss incurred by failure.

Mrs. Melcombe. I really don't know whether the honour or the disgrace would be the worst for girls. But the whole system seems to me false, using a bad motive, and teaching them that mere cleverness is worth more than goodness.

All who conscientiously take the same pains, ought to be equally honoured.

Sara. But my dear Emily you would not have the Dons show their reverence for morality by telling such a dreadful fib, as proclaiming the lowest plucked man superior in intellect to the senior medalist, because he has approved himself a most virtuous dunce?

Agatha. At any rate it would be very unjust to Mr. Feeblemind himself: he had far better know his own real name once for all: and showing him where he stands amongst his contemporaries, may go a long way towards helping him to get into his right place.

9. *Professor.* You must remember that a University has a double duty to perform; to her students by obtaining from them the best exertions they can make; to the public by granting such true certificates of progress and ability, as may enable it to secure its ablest men for its more important and difficult work. Now certainly such a course of instruction as he proposes cannot be gone through without considerable labour, involving the exercise of the students' highest powers; and it is calculated to draw out, train, and discipline these to their fullest measure. And so far as this is done, the benefit is lasting. When men boast of having forgotten their education as soon as they left college, they make a remark more stupid than if they complained they had forgotten all the food they had eaten, all the cricket they played there. Men don't lose the free and vigorous use of their legs and arms, when they forget the particulars of the process by which they educated them. To give them that free use of their own minds is the main end of University education: the granting of degrees is useful beforehand as a motive and guide for exertion; and afterwards, they secure to each the credit due to his achievements, and enable him to start fair in the great competition of life. He has been measured with his fellows, and learnt pretty well what he can and cannot do in comparison with the average men of his day. But this does not form any part of education itself. I mention this, because I seem to see a confusion here; and "admission to degrees, to the temple of knowledge, and to education" all jumbled up together as though they were one and the same thing. A degree admits to nothing, excepting to a certain

legal status in the University and in some professions. The degree does not educate. As given in our older Universities, it certifies a man is educated: as given in others, more modern, it certifies a man is taught, in certain subjects, and up to a certain point.* The temple of knowledge is opened to those alone who are educated, and just so far as they are educated. The same remark applies to public examinations, and all other stimulants of exertion: it is the exertion that educates, not the stimulus. Indeed private examination, in the way of catechising in each lecture given and each section read; when each thought or fact is explained by the tutor, and reproduced by the pupil in words of his own,—this is direct exertion of mind. But the main effect of public examinations,—apart from their moral effects—is to put on the pressure requisite to secure the greatest amount of that kind of exertion that is likely to tell in winning the prizes. And there seems to me to be great truth in what Mr. Pattison says; "that the beneficial stimulus which examinations can give to study, is in an inverse ratio to the quality of intellectual exertion required." † The constant excitement of, and the continual preparation for, examination, has the same effect on the quality of this exertion, that serial publication has had on the quality of our novels. Each monthly number must have its plot and its event. Each term's examination must be the main object of the term's work. Continuity of study is sacrificed to the exigencies of honours. The demand for something clever enough and complete enough to win the honours of an examination every two, three, or four months amongst many tolerably equal competitors, so far as it influences their work at all, must limit it to that kind and degree of study that can complete and produce its results every two or four months. In the first stage of learning examination is indispensable, every lesson demands it; but its publicity serves no end. In the next stage, it is useful in moderation, and at wide intervals, so long "as it is instituted for the sake of testing the success with which the study has been pursued,

* Dr. Melcombe desires me to add here; that the scheme of examination of the London University for women, is such, that their certificates will show those who gain them have been taught in a miscellaneous crowd of subjects. Those given by the Cambridge University, will on the other hand be certificates of education so far as they go. January 1869.

† *Oxford Essays*, 1855.

and not the study pursued that it may be examined into." It is useful "if all attempts to supply the want of a real comprehension of the subject by appropriating others' thoughts upon it, is treated as an imposture to be detected, not as an effort to be rewarded."* But the higher faculties of the mind grow in silence, and the highest subjects require for their successful study, repose, freedom from excitement emulation and anxiety, and leisure for slowly ripening results. I believe all our best schoolmasters agree that it is not their ablest pupils who are selected by competitive examinations.

10. *Mrs. Charlton.* Yet how can we ascertain the progress of our ablest scholars without continual examinations, or satisfy the public they are progressing?

Agatha. Is there any particular reason why it should be satisfied?

Sara. You are always so cross with the public; the poor thing only wants to know how its own children are getting on, and I'm sure it's very natural.

Agatha. It only wants to see what is in its very nature unseeable, and I am sure that is very unreasonable. But there are two publics: one is sensible, and knowing it cannot educate its own children, chooses the best teachers it can get, and then trusts them: and the other is feeble, and insists on continually rooting up the seeds its schoolmasters have sown, that it may run about with the little shooting plants in its hot hands and say, see how nicely mine has grown!

Professor. We shall all agree the good of our scholars is not to be sacrificed to curiosity, which after all is not great in the public. An efficient tutor has abundant opportunity in the regular course of his work, to note what progress his pupils are making. It was not for this, but as a stimulus to exertion that Sir W. Hamilton so strongly advocated examinations. I think he exaggerated their value: but he gives altogether a noble picture of an ideal University.

Sara. And you are trying to raise yours to it.

Professor. No indeed. An ideal University should have ideal scholars: but I hardly think I should like to see our University in the state he describes, if it were practicable.

Mrs. Charlton. If not practicable now, we may still aim at

* *Oxford Essays*, 1855.

it. It seems to me just what we should desire to realise, in obtaining a University education for women. To provide thorough instruction in every branch of knowledge: to gather together the ablest and profoundest thinkers, giving a high tone to the whole community, and inspiring their scholars with their own ardent love of science; inciting them to a generous emulation in the pursuit of the noblest objects, and crowning the successful with the honours they have justly merited—what more could you wish?

Professor. No more certainly; I desire less.

Mrs. Melcombe. Well, Minnie will not go to it, so there is no danger of her being shamed by being successfully crowned with notoriety. It's all very well for men, but she will be a shy and modest little woman.

Sara. But why should a girl be ashamed of being clever and working harder than the rest?

Agatha. Would you like to come forward in a crowd of young ladies, professors, and strange parents, and to be commended before them all for your ability by a University Don or a young College Tutor?

Sara. I?—that's nothing whatever to do with it. I was not weel entered when I was young.

Agatha. But should you like it; would you submit to it?

Sara. Certainly not: do you think at my age—

Professor. Just old enough to take your first degree.

Sara. Be quiet Tom. I am not going to have my little merits discussed and certified to an enlightened public by any tiresomely profound set of philosophers in the world. I am private, and the public has no right to know about me. That's quite a different thing and has nothing to do with Mrs. Charlton's plan.

Agatha. I don't quite see the difference, except that grand one of I and not I.

Mrs. Charlton. They could have the same education and pass the same examinations without the publicity that is desirable for men. The names of the most successful candidates might be kept private, if they wished. And the examinations themselves are conducted in the strictest privacy; none but the candidates, their parents or intimate friends, and those officially present are admitted.

Agatha. I cannot think what can have happened to our

young girls, if the presence of a hundred or so of strangers, and a competition with thirty or forty companions is no hindrance to their doing their best in a *vivâ voce* examination, at the bidding of a London University tutor; but appears to them quite an ordinary domestic event.

Mrs. Melcombe. It is not; I have been told it is intensely and painfully exciting. I know some timid modest girls who dread it all the year round.

Professor. If the names were kept from the great world, they hardly could be from their own, and in matter of fact they are published in all the London newspapers. Undoubtedly this is a new element in women's education, and one of very considerable power. Two questions are before you: can you obtain the same results of high and continuous labour from girls, with a much less motive force, much less pressure than we use in the case of young men? and then—whether any such strong pressure can be employed with advantage on girls? Certainly they respond to it much more readily, and are more liable to be injured by overwork. But this is for you to determine: I have only to lay before you our experience.

11. There is one defect in our present system of education, which you would do well to avoid: it would I imagine be far more marked if Sir W. Hamilton's plan were fully carried out. It is its great tendency to educate our best men to the n^{th}; and to leave those who cannot receive and will not endure this high pressure education, uneducated. Whereas these being less able to educate themselves, really require the most careful education and attention. It may be a question, whether the best men would not in the end become more, if they were left to climb without very much pressure, and only shown the way. But from our average crowd of scholars, those who do not go in for honours, we hardly require and certainly do not obtain that simple exercise of their faculties which merely learning correctly, and comprehending the meaning of what they appear to learn, could not fail to give them. It certainly cannot be an impossibility to make the most of our best men, and also of our average men: but of the two, the last is far the most important; partly because they are the most numerous, partly because they will never make much of themselves without our help. I think how-

ever this evil is almost more to be deplored, on account of the clever men themselves, they get so early separated into a small and mutually admiring clique of thinkers; they lose the benefit they might derive from intimate intercourse and co-operation with the men of action; and they form their theories of philosophy, theology, and government from reasonings as to what should and must be, uncorrected by the practical experience which those others might give them, of what actually is. And thus they find no medium—no interpreters through whom they can bring their principles to bear on the multitude. The men of the Poll have been so little educated, and are left so far behind them, they cannot understand them sufficiently to learn from them: and so they set them aside as speculators,—"awfully clever but quite useless to a fellow," with a real contempt and an affected humility. Now had our average men of the so-called educated classes been educated as far as they might have been, we should have been in a very different position as a nation, from that in which we find ourselves: for though no education will ever make the many equal the few in original power; it might make them quite capable of co-operating with the few by their critical skill; and of applying to the solution of our practical social questions, that science of men and of society, which they could not themselves discover. Whilst we need more great thinkers, we need far more, more interpreters; persons able to learn from the thinkers and to put within the reach of the busier and less instructed crowd the principles which those great men have thought out, translating it for them into the language of the markets. Nor shall we ever get anything but an uneducated mass, until we have a whole army of such interpreters, instructed and at leisure for the work. It is for want of such a class, that our more thoughtful artisans are groping their way to a re-discovery of old and long since exploded falsehoods,—are seizing on them as pearls of great price and are adopting them as their principles of social legislation. It is for want of such a class, that it is still as true now as in the days of Pascal, that "Rien ne passe pour bon que la médiocrité. C'est la pluralité qui a établi cela, et qui mord quiconque s'en échappe par quelque bout que ce soit." To the nation the loss is immense, our really great men scarcely influence the tone of society, and have little if any influence on the Government. Whilst

the great majority of the governing classes are left ill informed and wholly uneducated; "fearfully over civilised and perilously under cultivated." Now it seems to me that this place of interpreter, is just the place which educated women might, and ought to fill in numbers. They have the leisure for it (if they do not go into professions), just the necessary qualifications, and far the most effectual opportunities. Not themselves originators of thought or science, they comprehend with greater quickness than most men the thoughts of those who are; and they can often bring to bear upon such general principles that practical sense and acute judgment, which—perhaps because we cannot equal its rapidity,—we like to call intuition. And were they reasonably well educated in attention, precision of thought and expression, and in the methods of reasoning, they would be just the very persons needed for this most necessary work.

Mrs. Charlton. I would not have women confined to the easy drudgery of following the thoughts of others.

Professor. Nor I, but in fact no educated person who is capable of original thought, can be "confined" to following. Not that it is such easy work to follow an original thinker in philosophy or political science. Coleridge at least tells us that he found it, and warns us that we shall find it demands a very arduous exertion. "The reader who would follow a close reasoner to the summit and absolute principle of any one important subject, has," he says, "taken a chamois-hunter for his guide; who will indeed take him the shortest way, and save him many a perilous turning, but he cannot carry him on his shoulder. We must strain our sinews as he has strained his, and make firm footing on the rocks for ourselves by the toil and blood of our own feet."*

12. You must not omit also to consider the moral and social habits that are formed by this system of education and by the circumstances amidst which it is given. Though by design its effects are intellectual, it is none the less powerful morally.

In this respect I think it will be agreed that the training given to our young men is on the whole reasonably well adapted to the necessities of their future lives. We take them from home at ten or eleven;—not wholly, but for nine

* *The Friend.* Essay vii. p. 30.

months in the year, they are separated from its tenderness, its protection, its minute guidance: we assemble them in large numbers, exposing them to a wholesome degree of roughness, both morally and physically: we put them under absolute laws, far less numerous and far more inflexible than home rules must generally be. We accustom them to carry out these laws themselves: we expose them to the public opinion of their equals rather than of their superiors; we oblige them thus early to take care of and think for themselves. We purposely do not attempt to keep them wholly ignorant of or free from all possibility of such temptations as we know that they must in a very few years live in the midst of and contend against. We accustom them daily to work together and to contend with each other both in lessons and in games: and the promotion which is won by work not only confers social immunities and privileges highly prized by boys but lays upon them fresh responsibilities. Whilst the higher distinctions to be won at the Universities brings them the admiration of their equals, respect and importance at home, and pecuniary independence. Now all this is a good preparation for the world in which they are to live and work. It weans them from home care; it teaches them to walk without moral leading-strings: it loosens the exclusiveness of family ties, family modes and grooves of thought and feeling; it gives them a much wider field for the selection of their friends. It exercises them in precisely the same kind of contest which they will have to carry on as men, giving them presence of mind, boldness, and the ability to do their best in public as in private: it gives them a reasonable knowledge of what they can and cannot do; and so arms them with a reasonable confidence, destroying that nervous dread of public failure which often paralyses those not early drilled to it. It teaches them to bear and forbear, to control temper, to exercise reserve; and it blunts or wraps up in armour of proof that sensitiveness, which if exposed to the rough usage of the world would either be killed, or would kill those finer natures that possess it; and which can only blossom freely and happily in the safety of a true home.

13. *Mrs. Melcombe.* All very right for boys my dear; but what on earth has it got to do with girls?

Professor. It will do just the same for girls that it does for boys I imagine: only that as the more sensitive the scholars are, the more susceptible they are likely to prove, this training would probably act with very much more violence on women, than on men.

Agatha. But all this striving and struggling won't prepare women for their life: we have not got to compete with other women.

Sara. Oh you benighted individual, are we not going into professions and affairs, and are we not to compete with men for their prizes, in a fair field and no favour?

Mrs. Melcombe. I thought all the professions were too crowded already?

Sara. To tell you the truth, I am rather sorry for men too: they've not behaved well to women: but then "they are made so comical, heaven help them"—I suppose they really can't help being—well too clumsy, to make comfortable and resting homes for themselves: and if we are to throw up their service and become as rough and contentious and laborious as they are—it's a dismal prospect for them.

Mrs. Charlton. That would never be. When educated men and women are engaged in the same pursuits, there is a mutual interchange of benefits. Men are softened and refined by the presence of women; women's minds are enlarged and strengthened by free and equal intercourse with men. And how much would the comforts of many a home be increased, were the wife properly qualified to be her husband's partner, and to assist him in his professional work.

Professor. We shall have to consider that point, when we speak of union. But you must remember that if women are to start fair, in these professions, they must be trained in what is essentially the same way. Those cannot possibly succeed in the rough and eager competition of trade and of professional life—not in the long run—who have grown up in the safe and quiet shelter of home, ignorant of evil, protected from all harm, refined and tender. Men who have grown up so, don't succeed in the world, as a rule. No; women who are to succeed in such a course, must be used to defend themselves—able to defy bullying, and morally at least to thrash insolence—it would be better if they could

thrash it physically on occasion. They must be cured too by early practice of all aversion to the public gaze—of being ashamed—indignant as Sara seems to think she should be of applause or disgrace: else how can they ever produce their best under the public eye and in the face perhaps of public opinion? To live and work in public, one must needs be educated in public, "weel entered" as Sara says, when quite young. Then they must learn not only to be bold in action, which women often are, but unabashed in speech—self-contained—self-reliant. And they must contrive to get rid of all sensitiveness that is too delicate and gentle for the working-day world.

Mrs. Melcombe. My dear how *can* you propose such an education for girls—you know you would think them odious.

Professor. But I never did propose it: and I decline to say, before seeing, whether I should think them odious or not. I am merely suggesting that similar causes ordinarily must be expected to produce similar effects, and that the same work demands the same preparation.

Agatha. I doubt whether you will ever get women to fag on at education pure and simple up to two and twenty: excepting those comparatively few who would in almost any case educate themselves and might best do it in their own way.

Professor. Then what will the rest do?

Agatha. Leave off growing and begin to live.

14. *Professor.* I should hope that in forming your plans for giving a thorough education to women, you will avoid that mistake into which, as I told you, we have fallen; and that you will take more care to have your foundation well laid and sound, than that your spire be high. It were far better to secure a careful education for all your scholars, even were it limited to the primary education,—from ten to eighteen: and then to let those girls who are desirous of it be aided and directed in the study of the higher subjects, as far as they will go into them voluntarily and without any pressure: far better to do this, than to spend your efforts in raising to the highest standard all you can drive there, whilst allowing those who cannot attain to that, to remain uneducated. Throw your pressure on the lower and earlier work, which nearly all can go through with advantage; and on its

quality not on its quantity, which are ever in the inverse ratio of each other. And then be content with leaving the higher paths open, clearly marked out, and provided with guides, books, and lectures, that those who like may try them.

Agatha. I am glad we are not all to be driven up to the same height: life amongst us is quite monotonous enough already.

Professor. You will find it is the uneducated who are monotonous: the more educated people become, the greater variety of thought and character we get.

Agatha. Still it will be a very weary world, if women as well as men are to be prepared for a life of striving by a youth spent in competitive examinations—no room left for being, all absorbed in doing—all restless alike—one great monotony of struggling.

Professor. I hope you are not going to deny the happiness and nobleness of labour?

Agatha. If labour has no end but labour, I don't see its good. Rest ought to be its end; and you are turning rest out of its last refuge. Besides, if we are all to be competitive, what's to become of our union?

Mrs. Charlton. When women take their true place by the side of men, both advancing hand in hand in the same path of progress—each supplying to the other what each taken separately needs—and so mutually educating each other to the full possession and energetic exercise of their divinely given intellect, then at last there will be true union: and there will be no competition then, except that generous one —who shall do the most for all.

Mrs. Melcombe. If all you want, dear Mrs. Charlton, is to get them to go hand in hand, do, for pity's sake, let them be married, and go comfortably.

No one answered, and Sara ordered coffee.

LECTURE VIII.

OF REST: ITS NECESSITY AND ITS CONDITIONS.

The world is too much with us. Late and soon,
  Getting and spending, we lay waste our powers:
  Little we see in nature that is ours;
We have given our hearts away, a sordid boon!
The sea that bares her bosom to the moon,
  The winds that will be howling at all hours,
  And are uplifted now like sleeping flowers,
For this, for every thing we are out of tune,
  It moves us not.

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1. *Professor.* We have been considering how a man may attain and make the most of mental power, by the exertion and discipline of his faculties and the acquisition of a right method in their employment. Before we go on to the question how is he to attain the most of moral power: I want you to consider another side of the problem;—how far a man's making the most of himself depends on the room there is left in his life for the development of his capacities; and how far repose is essential to their full growth, and therefore to his actually becoming all that he potentially is. You will remember that education embraces both these objects, *i.e.* 1st, the awakening and developing the mental capacities; and 2nd, the drawing out the man's energy and giving him the full and free command of each mode of its manifestation. We found further, that all exertion is determined or motived, by that awakening of a capacity which makes us sensible of a corresponding want: that the end of the active exertion is in every case the satisfaction of the capacity that caused it; and that not only does the specific exertion, if successful become easier, but also the capacity that demanded it grows stronger through the satisfaction it receives. It is the en-

joyment of this kind of satisfaction which makes life itself a pleasure.

It follows from this that action is not an end in itself; it is a means and has no value but as a means. Ultimately its end is the development of the man, of his capacities, his life; immediately, it is a means to satisfaction, or rest: and this rest becomes in its turn as essential an element of that development, as the active exertion which procured it was. Action then is only a means: rest is both a means and a real end.

Now I want you to set the distinction between that which is a real end, and that which is merely a means, very clearly before you. For it is of the nature of all subordinate ends, which are truly only means to our real end, that if we pursue them for their own sake we lose them: it is only when, keeping steadily before us our real end, we use those subordinate ends as means, that we can win the good things they have to give us. So it is here; by regarding the exercise of active power as everything, we are not only in danger of losing its real object; but our active power itself is dwarfed and crippled.

Sara. Then you are going after all to set up a true teleology.

Professor. No; because you are engaged in considering how you are to accomplish one definite object, an end not the end. We took up one special problem of social science, *i.e.* how we are to secure as much of strength freedom and union as possible: and at present our end is strength: activity and rest are both, in our point of view, means of attaining it. But however the case may be with rest—satisfaction—or happiness; it is obvious that action is always a means, cannot be an end to itself, nor to us. And if it cannot be an end to us individually, neither can it be an end to us as a nation. You will say this is a truism: so it is, but we need to be reminded of it just now. However to make it appear something more let me state it so; as active labour can never be a rational end to any man, so neither can it be a true means if he uses it so as to exclude that other means, rest. A man works that he may live—live in the true sense of the word, as fully as he is capable of living. He who lived only to work, would have no more reason for living

than a steam-engine has. And he whose work is so pressing and continuous that he does nothing but work, both loses his end and works ill; the reaction of satisfaction in perfecting his active energy, being lost.

2. It cannot be denied that in the present day we are in great danger of getting to consider a life of active labour to be the exclusively and universally admirable ideal of what men's lives should be. And few thoughtful men will deny, that the tendency of our modern or democratic civilization is to make it the exclusively possible mode of life. Rest both as a means and as an end is a thing our modern ideal of life is very apt to forget; a thing which the modern circumstances of life is terribly apt to make so difficult as to be practically impossible. "From being a comparatively idle world," says Dr. Richardson, "we have of late become an insane world on the subject of labour." *

It is difficult duly to estimate the importance of possessing a sound ideal of what the aim of our lives is to be. It is of great importance that it should be a high one; it is of vital importance that it should be a sound one, that is, a real and possible one; an ideal in harmony with the facts of our nature and the truth of our relations. For every real worker has, consciously or unconsciously, some ideal and all his efforts tend towards it. And now that public opinion has so much force: now that "the spirit of the age"—as it loves to call itself—sweeps down most of us before it, and yearly governs individual lives more tyrannously; the question, what is the ideal it has laid hold of, is one on which the direction of human progress and the chances of human happiness very much depends. For by that ideal the general conscience of the nation frames its rules; by it public opinion measures off its notions of right and wrong, of true and false, and regulates its demands on individual citizens; and by it, the most part of men direct their actions and regulate their lives, so far at least, that they never dream of aiming higher. The more powerful this general ideal of life and the aim of life becomes, the more important it is that it should be as complete as possible, and that it should not be suffered to omit any essential element of progress: for whatever it omits will be practically omitted from the nation's life, if not denied

* "Diseases of Over-worked Men," *Social Science Review*, January 1866.

and persecuted. And you will I believe generally find that a really popular and general ideal—an ideal that possesses the minds of any progressive community, is true in what it asserts and is wrong or false only by reason of what it omits. And therefore it is much more important to urge the omissions, than to enforce the truths already popularly asserted.

This democratic or modern ideal of mankind—which inspires the progressing portion of the civilized world, and tends to substitute the majority for the individual and the State for the family; tends also to measure human life by the work done in it; and to measure the work done by the money it earns: it tends therefore to enforce on all a course of active competitive education preparatory to a life of competitive productive energy. The life thus approved for all, has really been extended to all in the United States: there as you know they boast—and educated Englishmen are to be found who are anxious to make their boast our ideal—there is scarcely a man to be found who is not engaged in some profession for the purpose of earning his own livelihood. What is the consequence? Such a state of society is immediately favorable for the growth of wealth, and of that sort of civilization which wealth secures. Is it equally favorable for the growth of intellect, of culture, of morality? is it favorable for the growth of men? There is much mental activity, but there is exceptionally little of true intellectual wisdom; if there were much of that, there could not fail to be more humility. The background is wanting; the faculties—the modes of action are exercised; but the capacities—the modes of being—are very much suffocated. Ideas of a sort are there in plenty; an endless variety of notions, but little power of selection: the ability to discern what is true or nearest to the true, and the power to make that prevail, seems absolutely wanting to the nation. Is there any other nation who could have formed so silly a judgment on the matter of the proclamation of neutrality, or persisted in it so long as they have done? The background is wanting: they have excluded repose from their lives, and with it they have shut out reflection. Neither can dwell in a nation whose ideal is to go ahead.

3. Now what is the truth asserted in this kind of ideal? It seems to me to be this. When mental power has once

been roused to activity it grows by action; and as it ceases to grow, it begins, however slowly, to decay. Change may be the law of animal life, but upward progress is the law of mental and moral life; and progress cannot be secured without continued exertion. Let us apply the truth thus contained in our democratic ideal to our scholars, now they are starting in life. If they do not continue to exert their energy in all those modes in which they were educated, they will, slowly perhaps but surely, lose the power they do not use.

Some of them will by no means work: they mean to drift, getting as much pleasure as they can by the way. We have nothing now to do with these who have nothing to do with life—who are slowly stiffening under the tyranny of custom, into death. These are the dead weight of society and represent its inertia: they may have their place and use; but it is not that use of which we are in quest, seeking as we now are for the men who are the living forces of society, and desiring to discover the influences to which they are themselves subjected. Now all these, desiring to live, must work. Each one must choose, out of the work there is to be done, some portion sufficiently limited to allow of their concentrating their attention and power on it. This work we may call their profession; it is their means of attaining something which they must regard as the main end of their present labour, and the means of their satisfaction. Whatever it be, it has this characteristic; in order to be successfully pursued it must be so far limited that it falls short of the man's capacity, and does not include every relation in which he stands; so that it leaves a great portion of his true life uncultivated and unpossessed. And here we come, I think, to the first error in our democratic friends' ideal. Partly owing to their not having been so educated that mental work has become their delight, and its fruits their "only truly satisfying pleasure;" partly owing to want of power; it is unquestionably true that the majority of men will only work thus really and continuously, under the stimulus of having to work for their livelihood. Nor, however well men work, is there any outward and visible sign of the success of their work equally available to the public satisfaction with the fact of their earning money. And for both these reasons comes these sweeping conclusions; that a

condition of society in which every man is earning his income, is distinctly higher, juster, and happier than one in which a considerable minority are living on an income already secured to them; and that we can never depend on work being well done which is not done for money.

4. To support such a theory several facts must be omitted. As this; that in a perfect condition of society, every free and educated man would be free to choose his own portion of the work, and to do it in his own way; and that the exigencies of earning an income always diminishes, and generally precludes, his enjoying this freedom. It omits the fact, that work is a means to true rest, or satisfaction in the natural result of the work done. Of intellectual or moral work this natural result is an intellectual or moral result: of physical work—a physical result. The money earned is a purely accidental and artificial result; and if it is all the worker looks for, if it is his sole motive, his work will never be his best: for that interest and pleasure which the natural result should give is essential to the perfecting of his skill. Nothing else can draw out his full energy. If a man has no leisure to enjoy this natural result, he must fall back on the tangible satisfaction of the money he earns, and fix his hopes—without which voluntary exertion is unnatural and impossible—on making so much money as shall enable him to give up working. It omits the fact that the moral conditions under which a man works are of greater importance in determining the value of his work to the commonwealth than the selling price of his work: or that a free man's work is of less importance than the man himself. The riches of the nation depend on what the citizens can earn: the happiness and the progress of the nation depend on what the citizens are. And therefore it is no more lawful for a state to place men in circumstances, or to set them on work which will necessarily dwarf their mental and moral stature, than it would be to force them to labour which must dwarf or cripple their bodies. We must consider these omitted elements a little more closely.

5. A man who has been once educated has not become a fixed quantity: he is ever growing, ever changing for better or for worse. The uneducated man may be a fixed quantity; and those who have never been awakened to the volun-

tary and active employment of their own minds, do seem when they are grown up to remain in a dormant state, little altered by circumstances, little susceptible to intellectual influences, the subjects of fixed habits and potentially what they were. But the educated man has become highly susceptible; and his value to himself, his nation, and mankind, is continually increasing or decreasing; in part according to the nature of his work, but chiefly according to the manner in which and the ends for which he does that work. Every considerable circumstance that befalls him, every new relation in which he is placed, changes him, not so much by its direct influence, as by the way in which he deals with it, and whether he masters it, or allows it to master him. Now we have been trying all along so to develope our scholar's mind as to give him a standing point outside his future profession or station; being mindful of that law of mental sight which forbids our seeing that in which we ourselves are, and makes it impossible for us to understand or truly judge any subject unless we can place ourselves outside it, see it in its relations to other subjects, and compare its importance with theirs. And now finding we have got a changing being, the question arises, will the education he has received prove adequate to resist the narrowing tendency of his work: will it enable him to resist the strain of worldly short-sightedness his professional life brings on him: will he not, after all, narrow down his sympathies and his mind to the range of his work, and get practically to regard it and its profits as his universe, or at least as his sole concern? Most men will certainly not resist, if the ideal which society presses upon them unites with their own self-love to urge them to make it their all; if the circumstances of society are such as tend to the exclusion of all counterpoising motives, and to put all other delights out of their reach. The same difficulty meets us here, as before in education; *i.e.* the true proportion between concentration and diffusion: only here the decision is taken out of our hands. In the world, and especially in this eager crowded competitive nineteenth century world, doing and being get separated; get even into opposition. The man who has no definite work dwindles into death: the man who does work is so pressed and hurried he ceases to live.

"Men the workers"—that is thoroughly true,—negatively

and positively true. But it is not the whole truth; nor is this necessity of labour the only necessity for men and for their culture or progress. Our modern theory of life, as of education, errs in this; that it recognises no other necessity: it regards men as workers and acquirers only; it values men for what they do and can accomplish, not for what they are or might become; and inasmuch as it regards the increase and employment of their acquisitive faculties and altogether overlooks their receptive capacities: inasmuch as it believes in and cares for nothing in men but that which can be seen and measured and certificated; it not only leaves half of human life unoccupied, of men's capacities uncultivated, of their true relations unfulfilled if not denied; but it practically crushes them out. And not only is this neglected half of at least equal importance, whether for personal happiness or for social progress, but its neglect inevitably tends to weaken and distort that active power for the sake of which we have neglected it; and so we unfit men for that very usefulness which we aimed at securing.

6. Active professional work is injurious to the agent because it is one-sided: it employs his mind on one set of facts; it obliges him to consider them mainly in one relation; it employs him, in short, in studying them out of their true proportion. And practically every such occupation is growing narrower. This is true even of the most purely mental occupations: those numerous subdivisions of knowledge, which its great increase and its many-sided applications to our practical wants have rendered necessary: and the great subdivision of mental labour which these increasing materials, and the increasing competition for work have introduced, and must necessitate more and more, tends greatly to increase the evil. It is not only the recognized divisions of professions which show this: the unrecognized but actual divisions show it much more. Formerly, a lawyer was a lawyer, and a physician a physician: he knew, or was expected to know, the whole of his science. But now we go to one for his skill in one disease, and to another for his skill in another: to one for his ability in finding out what is the matter; to another for his experience in curing it: we go to each for that one minute part of his science he is supposed to have studied with the most success. And surely

what can benefit society more than that each man should do that one thing he can do the best? All very well for the work, though not without grave inconvenience: but how for the workers? We have indeed too much reason to fear lest the materials with which our educated men have to work are becoming so vast; their work so urgent; and the share each of them takes in it so limited; that they themselves will be sacrificed to it: and that from the sheer impossibility of attending to the whole of any one distinct branch of science they will cease to comprehend or direct the whole; they will become mere fractional parts of society's thinking engine, each working out his own share of the results society demands, but without comprehending, and therefore without any power of directing his work to, any higher end than that of blindly satisfying the immediate market: that each man will be working at his own square inch, without a conception of the meaning and spirit of the whole engraving. Surely one need not be a prophet to see this evil spreading amongst our best and strongest workers:—to see how more and more men's minds bear the stamp of their subject; how less and less their work bears the impress of the workman's mind. And if this is so, is it so very well for the work? Depend upon it, the real welfare of the nation depends far more on the strength and completeness of her workmen, than on the abundance, rapidity, and ingenuity of their work. There is no absolute escape from the influence of habit: and the utmost we could expect from men so placed and so fully occupied would be, that their sound and liberal education should enable them to remember that their premises and conclusions are one-sided. Yet this will scarcely save them, practically, from applying the principles which guide them in their own special province to all men and all provinces; or from looking for and consequently finding everywhere only that side of human life, only those motives and aims, with which their own profession has made them familiar. This is no trifling and no imaginary evil: all our most pressing social dangers arise in a great measure from it. It is one main reason of our disagreements: our different classes cannot see alike when they are each looking from different standing points and with a different purpose. The great men of old, when they would see what the world is and how

it moves, went out of its turmoil and used telescopes: we have no leisure for that; we stop in it and use microscopes. And we are so busy, each with his own microscopic bit of it, we can neither see nor care for anything that is out of our focus. This is the cause of the narrow intolerance that threatens to split our Church into fragments:—we look at vestments with microscopes, and mistake an embroidered cope for Babylon the Great: we look at our lighted candle with microscopes, and it so blinds us, that when it is put out we declare the Light of the World has been sacrilegiously extinguished: we look at the great truths of our creeds through microscopes, and seeing a letter badly formed we imagine the truth is denied; or seeing a microscopic mite walking across the lens, we mistake this at once for the creed, and the Devil. No inconvenience can be so trifling but that if you will only look at it long and anxiously through a good solar microscope, you shall see it to be so gigantic, that nothing short of the whole power of the State shall be able to grapple with and overcome it. This is the reason why we are calling the Imperial Government off from its proper duties to sweep the snow off our streets, carry our messages, drive our cabs, take care of our luggage, and nursery-maid our children. All these men are using microscopes, and getting from them an overwhelming conviction that what they see therein is bigger than whatever lies outside their focus.

7. Then further; a life of mere activity, though it were of the highest and widest activity possible, if it occupies the whole of a man's energy does not and cannot occupy the whole of the man. As we have faculties to exert, so we have capacities to satisfy; and personally the true object of exerting the former is to nourish and expand the latter. And therefore whilst the human mind is manifested in action alone, its forces are founded on and nourished by repose also; and unless its active faculties are underlain and sustained in all their higher efforts, by an equal development of its passive capacities, they will be exercised in vain: truth may be discovered, but it will not be possessed and enjoyed. The two must indeed grow together: but think how little worth the fruits of the highest mental energy would be to us; how much of life we should lose; if action were all our

life. Sir W. Hamilton indeed declares that we exist only as we energise; and that ceaseless activity is the only satisfaction of which the intellect is capable. But he was not speaking of a purely acquisitive activity. And even if it were so—the man is nobler and of more worth than his intellect: even if it were so,—that the fruits of intellectual effort may be harmonized and perfected, truly possessed and shared out amongst the crowd; they must be received and enjoyed—brooded over so to speak, by many who are themselves at leisure from active research and production, at leisure from self: and not inferior in capacity for reception and enjoyment to the active worker.

But it is not altogether so. Even in nature,

> There are powers
> Which of themselves our minds impress;
> And we can feed these souls of ours
> In a wise passiveness.

Nature herself has lessons to teach which she does not always impart to those who are busied in dissecting and analysing her handiworks, and in dragging to light her secret processes. Her profusion and her desolation: her innocent loveliness and her relentless fatalism: her patient, endless, objectless industry ever burying her dead out of sight to raise them again in new but dying forms of life: her exuberant joy and her infinite melancholy;—all are sacraments whose inner truth is received by those alone whose minds are hushed from effort, and attuned by the music of self-silence to catch her faintest whispers.

Still less is it true when we turn from the world around us, and strive to rise, by means of that world which lies within us, to the higher world above us. For there "far beyond the mere feeling of energy, lies the perception of order and of harmony; of an infinite fellowship with a Being who is above us, and with the beings around us."* The most important and the only truly satisfying truths, because the only truths which at once satisfy the highest capacity of the intellect and the intensest feelings of the human heart;

* "Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy," *Encyc. Metrop.* Professor Maurice, "Ancient Philosophy," p. 171, 4th edition, Griffin and Bohn.

—the first principles on which the whole edifice of human thought is built up;—and the highest truths which no human intellect can grasp, which reason cannot discover nor understanding compass, which we can only behold;—all these alike we can only receive as they are given to us. And it is these ideas which alone can stir the deepest feelings of our nature, "for these belong as by a natural right to those obscure ideas that are necessary to the moral perfection of the human being—the ideas of being and form and life; of law and freedom; of immortality and of God: objects whose very sublimity renders them indefinite." * But for all these ideas the active life of productive acquisition which the circumstances and the spirit of the age impose so tyrannously upon us leaves no room, as it admits of no leisure. How many marks would such reflection gain in a competitive examination?

8. There is another element of human strength, without which intellectual energy however great in itself and however highly trained, must remain incomplete; is indeed never fully possessed in the sense of being the man's own. And the modern ideal of life and of society would go far, could it be realized, to cut away the roots whence this better strength must grow. It results not so much from the extent as from the due regulation and harmony of the man's mental powers; and still more from that just balance and supremacy of his moral nature, which gives him the absolute command of himself and of his own powers, be they more or less. It is only this that can give us a resting-place from passion and desire, from anxiety and eagerness. There is a strength in the repose therein resulting of which they can know little, who are swayed by that insatiable desire of energetic exertion which marks at once the comparative vigour and the absolute weakness of the human intellect; and which one of its greater prophets has described in those most mournful words:—"It is ever the contest that pleases us, not the victory. Thus it is in play; thus it is in the search for truth; thus it is in life. The past does not interest; the present does not satisfy; the future alone engages us." † This strength of character arises, as it seems to me, from the harmony of the

* *The Friend*, Coleridge.

† Sir William Hamilton's *Lectures on Metaphysics*, vol. i. lecture i. p. 11.

man's moral will with his intellectual judgment, when the truth which the one discerns, is by the other kept in an honest and good heart, and its fruit is brought forth with patience. Where the will opposes or influences the judgment there can be no satisfaction; where the judgment overrides the will, there may be satisfaction but there can be no repose; whichever side prevails, the house is still divided against itself. And truly this is the case in some measure with the best of men, who are still combating with self and not as yet perfect. But in all truly great and good men and women both these elements of strength are present, and uniting if not yet at one: so that their work, springing from and guided by a judgment and a will agreeing together, attains to sound, vigorous, and healthy results. In ordinary men sometimes the understanding sometimes the moral affections predominate, in either case enfeebled and thwarted in its action by the want of the opposite pole. But of the two, the deficiency of the moral power is the more pernicious: and I believe that the keenest intellect whose efforts do not originate in, and are not regulated by the man's moral power, will prove like a stream that flows from a tank, not from a living spring: it will not flow long; and while it does flow, there is no freshness in it. But the union of these two is the fruit of reflection and of leisure.

9. And how about that citizenship for which we undertook to make the most of him? The successful student, whom we left in communion with the giant minds of the old and the new world, sitting under the plane tree with Socrates, questioning and being questioned on all things divinely human: or searching into the laws of mind and the modes of human thought and feeling; or examining the foundations of law and the universal principles of government; is now the hard worked lawyer engaged all the year round in studying the extremely concrete cases, and defending the material interests of his clients. But whilst this work absorbs all his energy and nearly all his time, it neither gives play to all his capacities nor includes all his relative duties: it tends to make him as a thinker one-sided: as a citizen and ruler, it helps him to lose sight of the greater part of human nature and motives: whilst as a man it binds him down to earth, compelling him to live for the moment, tempting him to be

forgetful of his immortality. Think for a moment what an educated Englishman ought to be, besides and above what he is professionally. A christian, pledged to live the faithful soldier and servant of Christ, and endowed for His service with the ten talents; he has a warfare to conquer in and a service to fulfil, demanding the best thoughtfulness and self control he can give, and constant spiritual communion. He cannot postpone, or subordinate this relation, without fatal hindrance to his own progress and loss to his fellow christians. As a citizen, entrusted with a share of political power and a still greater share of political influence, the responsibility lies upon him of doing the best he can, and using his best judgment for the State. He is a member of society, a friend, and probably the head of a family, and responsible for the well being and in a great measure for the future well doing of his children. Will active mental energy, mainly absorbed in professional work, enable him to fulfil these relations? All this is an exaggeration you will say: no man is really responsible for doing more than he can. No, but he may be responsible for undertaking to fulfil more. Do you remember how Dr. Arnold—no mean instance of an all embracing energy,—complains of "the extraordinary apathy and abstraction from every thing good, which the routine of this world's business brings with it. It is," he adds, "almost awful to feel the tendencies of life to pare down our affections and feelings to the minimum compatible with humanity. There is one's trade and one's family; and beyond that it seems as if the great demon of worldly-mindedness would hardly allow one to bestow a thought or a care." It seems then that men will never do their best, if they do the most they can do. Clearly there is something false in a scheme of life, which, neglecting all the rest of human nature for the sake of producing the greatest amount of power and placing it at the disposal of the nation, does thereby only enfeeble and pervert that very power it would cultivate: and by pursuing this incomplete ideal of life we shall only succeed in unfitting men for that social usefulness for which we undertook to prepare them, and for the sake of which we are ready to sacrifice the individual in them. "We are possessed by the ambitious desire" of securing great and clever men, by forcing them "to make immense efforts:" and we pay the

forfeit of indulging in "a hope as vain as it is pernicious," by not only spoiling all our best men by over-work, but by making all the work they do unwholesome.*

I grant that this life is for most men inevitable. Unless there be in the nation a large majority who devote themselves to it, we shall probably lose all,—certainly the best part,—of our mental vigour, to say nothing of that material prosperity without a good measure of which successful mental labour is practically impossible. And if I am more persuaded of one thing than of another it is this; that where mental vigour is lost, moral vigour cannot stay. But then such a life of practical active energy being by itself a partial and incomplete one, can only be beneficial when it is carried on in union with another life, demanding reflection and affording repose for reflection; aiming at something higher than this world and more enduring than this world's business. The laws of men's spiritual life are not the less certain, because their action is not so obvious as the rules of men's business are. Neither are they the less important to society, because they determine the course of men's personal progress or degradation; and not the increase of their wealth. It always has been and always will be true, that "without solitude, without contemplation; without habitual collection and recollection of ourselves from time to time; no great purpose is carried out and no great work can be done. It is the bustle and hurry of our modern life which causes shallow thought, unstable purpose, and wasted energy in too many, who would be wiser and happier, if they could commune with their own heart, in their chamber, and be still."†

10. Where then is the remedy? certainly not in your scheme. You are aiming at bringing about a state of society, in which this active competitive and productive life, shall be as much as possible the life led by all our best, and best educated minds. The system of education you propose for women is expressly devised to prepare them for it; and the new occupations into which you propose to bring them are such as will fit them to take an active part in those industrial, scientific, and political affairs, which have hitherto engrossed men only. So far as your plan succeeds you consecrate

* "Oxford Studies," *Oxford Essays*, 1855, p. 308, 309.

† Rev. C. Kingsley's *Lives of the Hermits.*

women also to the routine of the world's business; as though you would resist "that great demon of worldly mindedness," by bringing both halves of mankind under his influence, and by doubling the number of his votaries.

Mrs. Charlton. When we remember the vast number of women who actually are supporting themselves by their own labour, and who have no other support; it seems idle to question whether they had better be industrious or not. To fit them for better work is the only way we have of giving them a chance of rest, and freedom from anxiety.

Professor. The number who earn their own livelihood is very great, still at present it is a minority. And in determining how you are to help them, the preliminary question, is it in itself a good or an evil to the nation, that women generally should be occupied in remunerative professional work? is not as it seems to me unimportant. For if it be a good thing, we shall seek to increase it; but if a bad thing, to diminish it as much as possible.

Mrs. Charlton. Well then it is a good thing that women should have some active and determinate work. If men's work has hitherto made them hard and worldly, it is probably because they have refused the companionship of women by so jealously excluding them from their due share of it. This has practically separated the lives of the two sexes so widely, they can no longer understand each other's wants or interests or aims. The remedy must be sought in admitting women to their full share of usefulness, and in ceasing to degrade them by binding them down to the enforced frivolity and helplessness of the past.

Professor. Pardon me, but are you not assuming the whole question, in assuming that women not professionally employed have been useless? To me it seems that "to be most useful," means "to supply that which is most wanted." To be busied in doubling that of which there is already too much, is to be uselessly and frivolously busy. What our world has too much of,—too much for health, for strength and strong work, too much for upward progress; is a bustling activity, a fever of getting and spending, of life lived wholly in the present. What we want most of all, is tranquillity, reflection, lives contemplating immortality and embracing both the past and the future. Without this no truly

great intellectual work can be brought to pass: and there never perhaps was a time when the civilised world, or our own nation, stood in greater need of such work than at present. Unless we obtain much more of it than we now have, it seems as though we must ere long cease to be an organised nation and become an unorganised aggregate, at once tyrant and slave. "Persons who by reason of their wealth or their sex are at leisure to fix the amount of their own activity, would do well to consider what it is they throw away, when they suffer themselves to be drawn into the general tide of hurry, which carries away all who do not resolutely set bounds to it. There are people whose company is as restful as sleep: in whose presence hurry seems like a bad dream when it is past; and whom one leaves with a sense of refreshment and renewed energy, such as is produced by a good night's rest. To afford such refreshment to others may often be turning time to a better account, than to crowd it with self chosen business."*

Sara. I knew there was miching mallecho, when my brother of all people in the world was so suddenly taken with a fit of admiration for repose.

Professor. What is wrong now?

Sara. Only the thief come in at last: and a very simple fellow he is too—to think that flatteries and coaxing will keep us out of his workshop, when force won't. Such noble things as men forsooth—they must not be sacrificed as means, they are ends. But when it comes to women—oh they are only means for promoting men's progress: their own is of no consequence.

Professor. I protest I won't stand this: When I say women are fit for something better than the coarse work of the world's markets; I am told I make them out to be useless: and if I say they are more useful at home than they would be in the courts, then I look upon them merely as utilities.

Sara. It's all very well protesting Tom, but are they to be dealt with for their own or for men's profit; yes or no?

Professor. Yes and no.

Sara. It's so odd you will not speak out.

Agatha. As either or as both it makes no difference so far

* *Saturday Review*, March 21, 1867, "Leisure."

as the propriety of their making the best and the most of themselves is concerned.

Mrs. Charlton. Well then whilst women are shut out from all part in the great affairs of the age; from science, from politics, from public interests—from all which braces and energises men, they are not allowed to make the most of themselves. And they can never regain their proper influence amongst men, or in the world, until they do share in these. It is because they are excluded from all that is really important, and are bound down to the routine of petty details, and to the unspeakable dulness of inactivity, that their lives are so poor and their minds so frivolous. True repose is not the fruit of leisure, but of the highest mental culture, and the most intense and many sided activity employed on noble and worthy objects.

11. *Professor.* Our minds can never rest on the heights of their own attainments: the height of philosophy is to see

> The summits slope,
> Beyond the farthest flight of hope,
> Wrapt in dense cloud from base to cope.

But even were intellectual satisfaction attainable, it would not give the rest we need. We are not simply intellects. Neither can we find rest in the perfect balance and control of our powers and our affections; which could we attain, we should still be resting on the slippery edge of the persistence of our own wills. But far as we are from this moral perfection, we can form a conception of it which forbids us to find satisfaction in our own or our fellow's moral condition: which compels us to a growing dissatisfaction with both, the further we advance towards it. There is that within us which, when we have leisure to listen to it, forbids our resting in human nature; which can only rest in that which is higher than humanity. What makes men restless, what sets them on action, is the unsatisfied capacity aroused within them: only in the satisfaction of their highest capacity can they again attain repose.

It is the scheme of life against which I am contending, that would make your lives and ours poor and worthless, by neglecting this noblest, this only truly satisfying portion of life. Is there nothing great, nothing that can brace and

energise men's souls except science and politics? Is there nothing ennobling for men, except the taking an active part in supplying, professionally or philanthropically the social wants of the moment? Or were it possible, would it enrich our lives if we were all ennobled in one way, to the neglect of all other ways?

Practical faith in the wisdom, knowledge, and love, of the Eternal Father; the patient endeavour to copy the pattern of that goodness which has been given us by the Son; leads us in the most convincing way to a conviction of our own weakness and ignorance, to a humility such as few philosophers have attained by their more arduous path. To dwell habitually and consciously in the presence of that Divine Love, Infinite Wisdom, and perfect Holiness: to abide as to outward life under the shadow of the Almighty, in the fearlessness of perfect trust in His perfect Truth: to occupy your thoughts with the habitual contemplation of Him, Who is indeed beyond the grasp of our acutest understanding; but Who reveals Himself to the pure in heart, and dwells with the humble and contrite spirit: to be able to judge all circumstances, means, and aims, as they are seen in their true proportion and value from this central standing point of reality:—is this a petty life of dull detail? is it too narrow and too little bracing for you? If such a life were possible, would it not satisfy the highest cravings of the noblest mind; would it not give true wisdom and a sound judgment; would it not be both strength and rest?

And if such things are possible, can their influence be neglected in the cultivation of the individual or of the race, without grievous degradation? Or are they such as may be expected to ennoble us without our consent; may they be left to come to us of themselves, without our making much room for them in our minds and hearts, without our leaving space for them in our lives? Or will such lives be inferior in their results to mankind, than a life of the highest and most ceaseless activity spent in the visible service of society? I go further and ask, can there be any abiding strength, wisdom, freedom, or satisfaction, in a national life however active and prosperous, which is not leavened throughout by this spiritual influence? The answer is not merely a conclusion from reason, it is the answer of history: which affirms that this has proved to be the strongest social influence that has

acted on nations or determined their history. "The last prayer of Jesus, that His redeemed might know the only true God, *has been* answered in history. . . . How does this keen strong sense of God's present and majestic Life, leave its mark upon manners, literatures, codes of laws, national institutions, national characters. How utterly does its range of energy transcend any mere employment of the intellect. How does it again and again bend wills and soften hearts, and change the drift and current of lives, and transfigure the souls of men." *

It is this spiritual life and influence which is wholly, though respectfully excluded from our lives, by the spirit of the age; and contemptuously rejected from the passing philosophy of the day. And so far as this reigning philosophy gets itself realized—as it ever does in some measure—it will shut out man from it. The old Greeks believed in a world administered by living persons: subordinately by heroes, supremely by Zeus; we are trying our best to believe in a world administered by Dynamic forces. They recognised the presence and agency of God in all human events; we are trying to persuade ourselves there is nothing present amongst us but a succession of phenomena. We are trying hard to fall back from the faith of Greece to the monstrous worship of the Syrian idols, deifying again, though in another form, the material forces of a brute nature; much in our fashionable philosophy is irreconcileable with any other worship. But it is as vain to deny the existence of a nobler faith, and the actual presence of a higher and supermaterial power amongst us, as it would be to deny the presence of the lives which that faith guides, and that power animates amongst us. Thousands of men and women have lived and are now living it. Christian truth once known may be neglected or verbally denied: it can never again be excluded as a force. There is no going back to a younger stage of growth: what was once alive, is dead for us to whom a more perfect knowledge and a higher life has been opened.

Vain thought that shall not be at all,
Refuse ye or obey.
Ye who have heard the Almighty's call,
Ye cannot be as they.

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* Liddon's *Bampton Lectures*, lecture viii.

We must henceforth be a Christian nation, or we must be worse, far worse and more degraded than were the lowest heathens.

Sara. Then why should we toil so painfully after your philosophy, when our toil only prevents us from receiving the higher wisdom of faith?

Professor. Now you are off again at the opposite extreme: who ever said a true philosophy hindered faith? If you want to frame a scheme for the advancement of womankind, you must not omit any essential condition of human progress. Knowledge and thought are two of these essential conditions: and to secure them, the mind must be roused to act vigorously, freely, and in a disciplined method. You admit that I suppose?

Sara. No I don't: I did then but I don't now.

Agatha. Yes, yes, you do: don't you see the mental and spiritual life are necessary to each other—the one incomplete and the other unattainable by itself? Don't go and knock down either of your pillars because you want to place the keystone on your arch.

Professor. Well then; knowledge, thought, and therefore mental education, are necessary conditions of the highest life, because of faith itself: and they are not all that we need even for the right guidance of that lower life, which is busied in the world's workshops and markets. The highest development of intellect will never satisfy a creature capable of contemplating, loving, and holding communion with the Creator: but it is necessary to the highest satisfaction of this supreme capacity. Without some development of intelligence and some exercise of its faculties, that capacity cannot be so far awoke as to become the subject of consciousness. And the circumstances of our physical life are such as to compel men, (by the Divine order) to devote far the greater part of their energies to the task of subduing the earth, by discovering the laws of nature and enlisting them in our service. So we come back to the question how shall we maintain the just balance, between the necessities of our external condition and the wants of our spiritual being. If we try to know all things we understand none: if we attend to one definite portion, we lose sight of its relations and proportion to the whole. If we limit our energies to the

narrow bounds of our profession, our lives are one-sided and incomplete: if we do not concentrate them, our work is all ineffectual. Whilst the active work to which you have devoted your students demands their whole attention; how are they to be kept from sacrificing themselves to their work. And what remedy shall we find for the nation; if all her educated and influential minds are to be actively employed in measurable and certificatable work, what is to keep the nation from "falling into that apathy and abstraction from everything good—that minimum of the affections compatible with humanity,—which the routine of the world's work brings with it."

12. *Miss St. John.* The whole priestly order is set apart, and all the services of the Church, her seasons, fasts and festivals, to be a witness for and to maintain the religious life in the nation.

Mrs. Melcombe. Dr. Arnold was a priest: and a clergyman who is good for much nowadays, is almost more overwhelmed with present work than a man in any other profession.

Miss St. John. The religious orders however, devoted to prayer and spiritual contemplation, did supply this need to the nation, and were a constant protest against the worldly spirit: we must restore these, in order to recover this essential portion of national life.

Professor. The very essence of their constitution was separation from the rest of the nation. Their own lives were weakened by want of active employment and intercourse and their repose did nothing for the rest of the nation with which they had no common interest.

Miss St. John. The presence of the Church and its work, must be the great remedy.

Agatha. Yes: but the difficulty is how is its presence to be brought home, daily and hourly, and be present to the man through all his business.

Miss St. John. By daily services.

Agatha. Bells ringing for services, speak only to those who are not absorbed in work in the midst of the world's clamours; not to those whose duty calls them there. Most of these must use that shortest prayer, "Thou knowest how busy I must be to day: if I forget Thee, do not Thou forget me."

Professor. The remedy against an evil habit must be as constantly present and as extensive as the danger. If half our daily life tends to form it, the other half must counteract it.

Sara. Then the only remedy I can see under these unfortunate circumstances, is that your unhappy student must have two souls, one strong and active for his outward work and the other thoughtful and wise for his inward life.

Professor. Exactly, he must double himself. And so also for the nation: not by aiming at one ideal or adopting one measure for all; but by securing to all the education of family life and home, and by accustoming her members to aim at supplying what others want, instead of aiming at being all in the same place; she will obtain in one or another portion of her citizens all the essential elements of a sound and noble national life. This mutual dependence and support is the secret of all true union; and so far as we have it not, we are not a nation but a mere aggregate of people. However I cannot go into that matter now, for my time is up. There is a passage from St. Chrysostom, which will show our student how he can obtain that second soul, which Sara has decided he needs: and thereby I think find something of the repose for which he has been waiting so long.

"Wives in true practical wisdom have the advantage over their husbands; because for the most part they sit quietly at home. But thou sayest, there is much unquiet in the house; yea because thou wilt have it so, and encumberest thyself with a multitude of cares. The husband who busies himself in the markets or in the courts of justice, is tossed hither and thither by the unrest of the world. The wife remains at home as in a school of wisdom, collects her thoughts, and can occupy herself with prayer and reading the Scripture. Like those persons who have withdrawn themselves into a solitude, she is disturbed by no one; she can enjoy perpetual quiet. And when her husband comes home, burdened with a multiplicity of cares, she can calm his temper, restore harmony to his soul; prune off strange and distracting thoughts; and thus enable him to leave the house purified from the evil he brought from the market, and accompanied by the good that he has learned at home. For nothing is more influential than a pious and intelligent

wife to form her husband and to influence him as she will. I could tell of many a hard and inflexible nature, which has been thus softened."

Sara (looking across to Mrs. Melcombe). That woman has power.

Professor. And that man has rest.

Mrs. Charlton. It is very beautiful in theory: but practically women get frivolous and irritable, not calm and wise, by being shut up idle at home. I had hoped that by this time we had had enough of the old world notion that women must be locked up safe and kept spinning clothes for men—or of the "Men must work and women must weep" cant.

Sara. There's no doubt of it, Mrs. Charlton, men must work: life would be too dreadful if their idle hands had nothing to do. Why good heavens if one was to have them dawdling about the house all day long, expecting to be amused, and snipping one's work and spoiling one's scissors —(here she rescued hers from her brother who was trimming the moss with them)—and generally driving one wild! It would be no wonder if the poor housewife took to weeping. Only if she did she would never calm his dreadful tempers, which is you see what my brother relies on her doing, in order to keep the world from going agee.

Mrs. Charlton. I cannot consent to consider the question from men's point of view—what is best for men. What we have to consider is what is best for women; that is sure to be in the end the best for society.

Professor. That is quite true. But on your own ground: Would this woman herself have been better, or happier, or greater, or more powerful for good in the nation; if busied in the markets and the courts of justice, she too had gone home weary and full of cares, with her wearied and careful husband; and needing herself to be calmed and purified, and to have harmony and a sound judgment restored to her, before she could help her husband or her children?

Mrs. Charlton. All women are not wives: and all wives have not such passive natures as this woman must have had.

Professor. A passive nature would never do it,—never influence men much. But all I meant to say is that no women have more power for good, or more need of strength than these. And they need not all be wives.

Agatha. Perhaps the nation wants its pious and intelligent women to purify it from the evil of its markets and prevent its forgetting the good it learnt at home in its childhood.

Sara. Then if women have so much power and are in their proper place already, why is our social condition so bad? if we need no reforms, all things should be right with us, and that they certainly are not.

Agatha. Do not women want a reformed education and a changed life, to become truly intelligent and truly pious?

LECTURE IX.

OF FREEDOM.

"When God gave man reason, He gave him freedom to choose; for reason is but choosing."—Milton's *Areopagitica.*

1. *Professor.* THE second grievance of women which we undertook to consider was this: they are not allowed to use freely or to the best advantage such abilities as they have. The bondage complained of is twofold, legal and social: and there is some confusion of thought in mixing up these two together, when both the cause and the remedy are in each case quite distinct. Amongst ourselves the law makes no difference between men and women in the restraints it imposes upon them. Unquestionably it does not give adequate personal protection to women: to make them equal in point of security from tyrannical oppression or injury with men, it ought to give them much more protection, and it does give them a good deal less: but as increased protection means also increased direction, this does not come into our present enquiry.

Mrs. Charlton. But the law refuses all political liberty to women, and it makes them the chattels and slaves of their husbands.

Professor. It withholds from them that share of political power which is conveyed by having a seat in Parliament, or by voting for members of Parliament. But such a seat and such votes are trusts held for the good of the whole nation; to have them may increase my power, it cannot increase my liberty. As to married women, our law considers husband and wife as one person, and their interests as one; making the husband the spokesman. The practical effect may be, and I am afraid often is, the making the wife a slave: it

certainly makes many a poor man the slave of his wife; but its natural tendency is to make them both stronger, and therefore more free; so far it is but the expression of what ought to be the fact. That our English law practically overwhelms this fact by the confused and unjust regulations by which it has sought to maintain it, I am afraid we must admit. But nothing it can do in this direction, would be so fatal to the freedom of women—and therefore to the freedom of the nation,—as loosening the marriage bond by making it easy for man and wife to live as two distinct and separate persons.

Then with respect to the bondage in which women are held by society. Whatever restraint is thus put upon women, is enforced by public opinion alone. Now public opinion if seldom absolutely wrong, is never more than imperfectly right; and it is ever varying. It is both meddlesome and tyrannical to those who slavishly follow it: but those who differ from and brave it,—if the result proves them to have been in the right,—are sure to succeed in changing it. And however it may be elsewhere, no man or woman here is really compelled to comply with it. If it is more meddlesome with women than with men, it is only because women are more anxious to fall in with it, and more afraid of it. And whilst it would be hard if those whose opinion constitutes it, were not at liberty to form and express their opinion: it may be doubted whether those who allow themselves to be coerced by it, when its dicta are seriously opposed to their own judgment, would be found, even if altogether freed from its influence, to have strength enough for that independence of judgment, force of will, and courage of action, which are essential to the enjoyment of freedom. As to the excessive power which individual men may exercise over those connected with them,—if it trespasses on their outward liberty of action; it ought to be, and in most cases would be, restrained by the State. But it seems impossible that the State can protect those, who have not the courage to apply for its protection. And if it is the undue influence over the wills of women, of which you complain; you must remember that this is inevitable, those will in the long run get the upper hand, who have the greater strength: those will on the whole get their own way, who have the greatest intelligence, the strongest wills, and the most persistent

resolution. The weak, whether they are men or women, will always be more or less guided by the strong: to emancipate them from this guidance is impossible, and would be no true kindness.

Mrs. Charlton. In that case no law would be necessary, to compel weak women to be ruled by their husbands. Our law which compels this by making all wives dependent and powerless only takes effect, according to this, when the husband is naturally too weak to govern, or the wife too strong to be naturally subject: and in either of these cases it is tyrannous. It would be better to leave it to nature to decide, and have no law at all.

Professor. It would be very inconvenient: and there are cases, as Coleridge affirmed, when laws become just because they happen to be expedient: but I grant that where such laws impose additional restrictions on any one class of persons, the expediency which justifies them ought to be the expediency of that class, and not of the class which gains additional liberty by means of it. But pray put an emphasis on *in the long run*; and remember that it is a special mark of great weakness to think itself strong and wise. However I cannot go into the subject of our marriage laws at all; I merely wish to suggest the points where the danger of exaggeration in your statement of grievances lies. And now to the question before us; as to the means by which women can become free.

2. As before in enquiring about power, so now here, I cannot go into the matter at all, without so enlarging as in fact to change the question. Women as such are not in any separate or peculiar bondage: they have and exercise as much freedom as men do: "as little" would more accurately express the true state of the case with each. As the distinctive happiness and nobleness of humanity is to be free, so the misery of all of us is, that we are not free. And it is this which makes the acquisition of greater strength so important to our progress and our happiness; that until we are stronger we cannot become free. I must then state our question thus: how can human beings realize and possess their freedom? With this alteration I beg you will believe that I would maintain women's right to be free, as broadly, and that I desire their freedom as earnestly as any of you can do. The only fault I have to find with your writers is, that

they do not claim it thoroughly; they scarcely seem to appreciate its importance, the greatness of its blessings, the terrible misery which arises from our want of it.

Being agreed then as to the necessity of obtaining freedom; we shall have to consider the causes of the bondage in which we find ourselves: the means by which that bondage may be overcome: the conditions which are necessary for the practical enjoyment of freedom. First of all, and perhaps the answer to this question may solve the rest; what do you understand by freedom—when is any one free?

As no one answered Dr. Melcombe put the question again, turning to Mrs. Charlton. You claim freedom for women; what is it exactly that you mean to claim?

Mrs. Charlton. I would have a woman free to obtain as good an education as she desires, and to follow whatever profession her talents fit her for: free to do the highest work she is capable of doing: free to manage her own property independently or else in equal partnership with her husband: and free to direct her own personal conduct without interference or reproach or social penalties.

Agatha. But no one can have such liberty as that.

Sara. Why not? it's true I always am let, but why must I be? that's the injustice we want to do away with.

Agatha. To do whatever work one has a mind to, would need unlimited space as well as power: the world is much too crowded for it. If you are to do all you can and like to do, without let or hindrance, I must give up doing what I like, for your wishes would be always jostling mine and I must be compelled to yield. You might be at liberty but I should not—not even at liberty to complain of you. No one but a despot whose world consisted of himself and his slaves, ever had such a liberty as that.

Mrs. Charlton. You exaggerate our demands: we do not desire impossibilities; we only wish women to have as much freedom in these respects as men have already. And we may justly expect that those who are free themselves, will be reasonably considerate of the equal rights of others.

Agatha. Whatever we expect, the fact remains; every one wants his own way, and every one knows his own is the only reasonable way: and when one person gets it, somebody else generally loses it.

Sara. I am afraid that is true: so now you may tell us, when is a body free?

Agatha (confusedly): I never said—I mean I never knew,—any one ever is free.

Sara. Imagine it then and answer.

Agatha. One hopes you know, when a good man is gone to heaven, he becomes free, at least when he has been long enough there.

Sara. Dear, dear, we shall never get on at this rate.

Professor. We grant there is no such thing as perfect freedom on earth, but there are degrees of freedom. A being absolutely destitute of freedom, whose acts and thoughts are wholly determined by external causes, must if he is conscious at all, have a consciousness different from ours: he may be a plant or an animal perhaps, but he certainly is not a man. On the other hand a being whose course of life, actions, and ideas were solely determined by himself without constraint, direction, or stimulus from any causes not himself; would be more than man. We cannot conceive any created and therefore finite being, possessing such an absolute liberty as this. Still if the limited freedom of a creature is a blessing men may hope to enjoy in heaven, we ought all the more to be aiming at it and striving to obtain it here.

Sara. You know Agatha, we shall be nothing when we are dead which we have not been becoming whilst we are living.

Mrs. Charlton. Whilst we are living in the world surely our chief business is here. Practically liberty is nothing but the absence of constraint; and what we have to do first of all, is to get rid of all those constraints arbitrarily and unnecessarily imposed on women, which have educated them to such an habitual dependence on the guidance and protection of others, that now they are afraid to walk or stand alone.

Mrs. Melcombe. I fear that taking away the guidance and protection we have had, will not fit us to go without it.

Agatha. I am much more afraid that if these social science philanthropists and radicals get their own way, we shall be so beguided and directed that we shall possess neither our bodies nor our souls ourselves.

Mrs. Charlton. We aim at nothing so much, as to free

our sex from that feeble and indolent dependence on others, to which custom and prejudice have bound them down; and to teach them to guide themselves by reason and knowledge.

Agatha. If they are left at liberty, not wanting to be independent they won't be.

Sara. You have nothing but negations to give us. We being according to the indictment most oppressed and injured slaves; the question oh you wise woman is, what will make us free, not what won't?

Agatha. St. John says, "If the Son therefore shall make you free; ye shall be free indeed."

Professor. I think, Sara, Miss Tryanon has answered your question. But this is saying what is needed for becoming free: and you have not yet agreed, what freedom is. Will you help us my dear?

Mrs. Melcombe. If I may take a text too, I should say a people haye liberty enough when every man sits under his own vine and fig tree, and none shall make them afraid. We need not wish for more than that.

Professor. In the way of political liberty. To possess what is one's own and to enjoy it in security without any hindrance or injury from others, is perhaps the perfection of social liberty. But if the owner be not free himself, if he cannot use or enjoy his own, or do the things that he would; it will matter very little to him that no one would be allowed to prevent him if he could. Sara it is your turn now: what is your idea of freedom?

Sara. My most vivid idea at present is, that if we told you what freedom is, we should not want you to tell us how it is to be got. If you will keep to your bargain, which you are shamelessly trying to escape from by persuading us to furnish your premises, we will soon discover the conclusion. Forbear then oh best of men to question us any further, and proceed at once to do your own work.

She seemed to be reciting this out of some book; and her brother asked her curiously what she had got hold of; but getting no spoken answer, he shrugged his shoulders and began his paper.

3. The two words, liberty, and freedom, are not properly identical in force: they denote the same condition, but regard it in two different relations. "Freedom is personal

and private; liberty is social and public; freedom qualifies the action; we speak and think with freedom: liberty applies only to the agent; we have the liberty of speech or action."* Freedom is positive, implying the possession of a power or privilege: liberty is negative; denoting the absence of restraint, or the enjoyment of exemptions from burdens. But though this twofold signification has been preserved the words have unfortunately been used indifferently, to express either or both ideas. Austin for example tells us, they are both negative names, denoting the absence of restraint: that civil, political, or social liberty is the absence of legal restraint: physical liberty—the absence of external obstacles, or causes that operate independently of the will: moral freedom—the absence of motives of the painful sort. Whilst Milton uses liberty in the sense which is more properly assigned to freedom: when Michael has in a vision shown to Adam the tyrannical conduct of Nimrod, he tells him that he may be justly indignant with the son who affects thus to subdue the rational liberty of men; but he adds

> "Yet know withal
> Since thy original lapse, true liberty
> Is lost, which always with right reason dwells."†

And whether we agree with him as to the possibility of men's ever possessing such a freedom or not; it is manifest that no mere absence of restraint or "of motives of the painful sort," can be equivalent to that which he here calls true liberty, "which dwells with reason."

Omitting then physical liberty, which we have sufficiently considered in speaking of physical power and its limitations: we have two kinds of liberty to consider—social or political liberty, and moral or personal freedom. The first I have when no one hinders me from doing what I wish to do, or compels me to do what I do not desire. The second I have, when I have the power to command myself to do, what I most of all desire: it connotes the absence of compulsion on my will: it denotes my positive freedom, through my possession of a moral power, or dominion over my desires and

* Crabbe's *Synonymes*. This distinction is overlooked in Richardson's Dictionary, where by a singular confusion of thought liberty is defined as "the power or ability to act unrestrainedly."

† *Paradise Lost*, book xii.

actions. Now these two kinds of liberty have not any necessary connexion with each other. The first is spoken of in the prophecy of Micah; the second in those words you quoted from St. John's Gospel. He who enjoys the first, is not tyrannised over by other men, or by the State: he who enjoys the second, is free indeed—free in mind and spirit. And it is very possible to have the one without the other: a man may possess this last freedom, who is socially a slave, and many a citizen of a free country lives all his days in bondage. But to him his political liberty is useless: it is good for the community which does not oppress him, but useless to himself since he cannot profit by it,—cannot even keep it. He will either give it up choosing some tyrant to rule him, or he will so use his civil liberty as to make himself tenfold more a slave. And therefore in setting women, or the world free, your first object should be, as it seems to me, to strengthen and increase this individual and personal freedom: and as a secondary thing or a means of doing so—to consider what social conditions or laws will give us the most complete scope for its exercise: or, how to secure the greatest liberty for the exercise of our freedom.

Sara. But why must that unfortunate choose a tyrant; and also, what tyrants are there going about, in a free country, to be chosen?

Professor. You will see when we have considered what this positive freedom consists in, why he who has it not inevitably takes refuge in submitting to some external tyrant, or else becomes the slave of his own passions and self will. As for the tyrants who are going about in a free country, seeking whose freedom they may devour, they are countless in number. "Vous vous croyez libres; non, vous ne l'êtes pas; vous êtes entourés d'oppressions:—oppressions visibles et invisibles, directes et indirectes, extérieures et intérieures: les préoccupations, les désirs, quelquefois les scrupules; la vanité, le pédantisme, la nécessité; l'argent, les tyrannies de l'atmosphère, le temps gris, les mélancholies du ciel, l'hostilité d'un milieu contraire. Il y a l'oppression des idées médiocres qui étendent leur niveau sur tout ce qui les dépasse;—l'oppression de l'ignorance qui écrase en aveugle; l'oppression des natures mal ébauchées qui vont de l'avant, cassant et broyant sans pitié. Et chose étrange, c'est que ce

sont les natures d'élite, les natures les plus délicates, qui sont les plus menacées d'esclavage."*

4. We are personally free, so far as we can determine our own actions and mental states. Our thoughts we can to some extent determine, by voluntary attention to some, and disattention to others: our words, through consideration; our deeds, by energising or restraining the motives or desires which directly determine them; our emotions and affections, by yielding to or resisting the actions on which they would put us, or by giving or refusing the attention they seek to claim from us. In a word our freedom depends on the degree of moral power we exercise over ourselves. That we do possess some degree of this power is the direct testimony of our consciousness, and so far lies beyond proof, since no one can demonstrate his own consciousness to another. In every voluntary act and word, consciousness assures each one of us, I am responsible for it, I did it, I was not compelled to do it. As St. Augustine wrote, "I knew as well that I had a will, as that I lived. When then I did will or nill anything, I was most sure that no other than myself did will or nill:" and he adds "I all but saw, that this was the cause of my sin."† But if positive proof is unattainable, of circumstantial evidence there is surely more than enough; for as we have seen,‡ not only do we impute to each other the possession of this power; but society and law only exist on the assumption that men can exercise it if they will: they are founded on the conviction that "no conceivable motive will certainly determine to compliance; or, no conceivable motive will render obedience inevitable. . . . If they could, commands and duties are simply impossible."§ And therefore it is that nothing but physical compulsion can take away legal responsibility. However overwhelming the motive,—such as love of life, mortal terror, or moral weakness—though it may palliate the crime, yet when any choice is possible, moral responsibility comes in. And however terrible the consequences, where there is no choice there is no responsibility. Thus as Kant taught, "the mere clear exhi-

* "Un Humoriste protestant," *Revue des deux Mondes*, 1 Juillet, 1865, p. 206.

† *Confessions of St. Augustine.*

‡ Lecture iii. p. 64.

§ Austin's *Jurisprudence*, vol. i. p. 7.

bition of duties, in opposition to all claims of impulses, must quite of itself have produced the consciousness of freedom."*

Mrs. Melcombe. Surely that is an extraordinary paradox: no doubt there are some things we are at liberty to do or not as we like; but whatever is our duty, that we are bound to do, we have no choice left us.

Professor. We are under a moral or religious obligation to do it; just because we are not compelled, but actually have a choice about it. If compulsion comes in, there is neither right nor wrong: and so a motive which we could not resist if we would put forth resolution enough, would as effectually destroy the human or moral character of an action, as an irresistible physical compulsion does. For example I attach no character of right or wrong to acts I commit when asleep, or in a state of delirium: why not? because though they were doubtless in some manner determined by my character, yet they were the immediate result of impulses which I could not control. Or again, you have a loaded pistol in your hand, and a strong man seizes your hand, compels you to point the pistol at another and to fire it; he is the murderer not you: you are morally in the same position as the pistol itself. But say that instead of using physical force, he puts the compulsion on your will: he gives you the pistol and bids you shoot the man under penalty of seeing himself kill the Boy whom he has got in his own hands. If you obey you are guilty, because you were free to refuse. By no intensity or amount of painful motive, could he compel you to save the Boy's life, by the unjust sacrifice of another.

Mrs. Melcombe. He could not compel me because in fact I should have no choice about the matter: what he does can't change the law which forbids murder and leaves me no freedom, as you call it.

5. *Professor.* Well let us go on in our examination a little further, and see if any more light can be got on this matter. Though it be true, according to the almost unanimous conviction of mankind, that we possess this freedom or power of choice, is it true in practice? Can we always do that, which no one prevents our doing, which we most desire to do, and which if we willed to do it, were done? Here is the true difficulty: we are conscious we could will; we know we

* *Critick of pure Reason*, p. 35, preface 2nd edit. Translated by F. Heywood.

desire to will; we condemn ourselves for not willing, acts which yet we do not will. We know we could refuse to will, we know we desire to refuse, and we condemn ourselves for not refusing to do, acts which yet we do will. In respect of these actions then, we know we are potentially free, and yet we do not realise our freedom. Why is this?

In the first place, there are several conditions, mostly external to ourselves, which must concur before we can effectually command ourselves to do what we most of all desire. The act of willing involves preference: it is a choice between two or more events; as the doing or abstaining from some action. "Now choice there is none, unless the thing we choose be so in our power, that we might have refused or left it. If fire consumeth the stubble, it chuseth not to do so, because the nature of it is such, that it could do no other."* Our freedom is limited by our power: this is one condition. The next is, that as preference implies a comparison or judgment, we cannot choose without a knowledge or perception of the things compared: so that our freedom is limited by our knowledge. Further, as all actions are means for some end, the desire for which end is the motive of the action, so to will any action implies a further judgment, that the action will effect our end. And therefore whether we are really free to do what we desire, depends on whether our judgment on this point is the true one. So Socrates said, that as no man does anything but for the sake of some good, and because he judges it better, or a means of obtaining what is better than his present condition: so he that does evil, does not what he wishes; for he wishes to benefit himself; but being mistaken in his judgment as to the means of benefiting himself, he injures himself. And Boethius, commenting as it seems on this passage, counsels his scholars, "Only the wise man then is able to do that which he wills to do: the bad man does that which he has a liking for, but his desire is not accomplished; he has not what he wills . . . . . he is frustrated of his aim, either by misunderstanding what it is, or by inclinations which turn him aside from it."† For the end which all men desire is happiness—good; positive if possible, negative in any case. And hence it follows

* Hooker's *Ecclesiastical Polity*, book i. § 7.

† Professor Maurice's *Mediæval Philosophy*, p. 21, 22.

that to be free our judgment of good and evil, of truth and falsehood, of means and subordinate ends, must be a true judgment, in accordance with reality, with our own nature, and with the actual relations of things. In Hooker's words,* "Of one thing we must have especial care, as being a matter of no small moment; and that is how the will properly and strictly taken, as it is of the things which are referred unto the end man desireth, differs greatly from that inferior natural desire which we call appetite. The object of appetite is whatsoever sensible good may be looked for; the object of will is that good which reason doth lead us to seek. Affections, as joy and grief, fear and anger, being as it were the sundry forms and fashions of appetite, can neither rise at things indifferent, nor yet choose but rise at the sight of some things: wherefore it is not altogether in our power whether we be stirred with affections or no. Whereas actions which issue from the disposition of the will, are in the power thereof to be performed or stayed. Finally, appetite is the will's solicitor, and the will is appetite's comptroller: what we covet according to the one, by the other we often reject. Neither is any other desire properly termed will, but that where reason and understanding, or the show of reason prescribeth the thing desired."

I think this is what you mean in saying we are not at liberty to choose what is wrong: for we can choose it, and do if our will succumbs to the importunity of desire: but we cannot alter its character nor change its effects, so that in choosing it we use our liberty to make ourselves unfree. Certainly it is not possible for us to will our own misery, as our end. That we continually do will it, as a means to our greater happiness, is true: it is testified by our common language, whenever we speak of a man "taking great pains;" or "giving himself much trouble." That men do continually go straight towards their own misery, and that not unconsciously nor in ignorance, but because they cannot indulge their appetites without effecting it, is also true: but in this case common language is again right, and they are "the slaves of their passions." They are not free men. Here you must note the distinction between "will," in the sense in which Hooker uses it; and "self-will," which

* *Ecclesiastical Polity*, book i. § 7.

is never used except as a term of reproach. For all men desire happiness: and true happiness consisting in the complete satisfaction of their highest capacity is essentially the same for all; that is the same in kind though not in degree. But what that satisfaction is, and where it is to be found, is a matter of knowledge. And every object of knowledge is what it is, independently of our conceptions of it, unchanged by our mistakes about it, the same to all. Consequently when men's wills are in harmony with right reason, they are really determined to the same object, they all have the same will, and following the same course, work together (whether consciously or not), for the same common end. But when men's choice is determined by their individual appetites, each pursuing his own path is continually in conflict with the rest; and then we say each is governed by his own self-will.

6. The first condition of freedom then, is knowledge and a sound judgment. To be free we must know what is good and what is evil; and we must know the means by which we are to secure the one, and avoid the other. It is so in our material ends: we may attempt what we please, but we can never execute our purpose unless both our end is a possible one, and the means we employ to accomplish it are in accordance with the laws of matter. "Thought," says the proverb, "is free," yet it is certain that we cannot think, what is contrary to the necessary laws of thought; neither can we choose to think that which by reason of the limitation of our minds is to us unthinkable; neither of those things of which we can form a conception, can we command ourselves to think what we choose: we can only think them according to our perceptions; we can only examine them in the forms and modes of our understanding. Neither can we choose, if we do so examine them, what our judgment of them shall be: neither the manner nor the result of our comparison is subject to our will. It is true that men continually hold opinions, merely because they like to hold them: but it is not because they have chosen to judge that true, which appeared to them to be false: but that they have refused to judge at all; listening only to the arguments for it, and refusing to listen to those against it: and even this they can only do with a latent conviction their opinion is questionable, which they will not attend to lest it should so rise into conscious-

ness that they might be forced to judge themselves mistaken. Thought is at liberty, because no one can compel us to think, or prevent our thinking what they would not have us think: it is free only in the sense that of those notions or ideas we have acquired, we can in some degree attend to those we choose. Again our actions are free: but we cannot choose what their consequences shall be: it is only in the moment of volition they are in our power. The moment after, the act is gone beyond our reach, and is numbered among the causes that are working on ourselves, and all things around us: we can resist its effects on our own character, we cannot again be as though it had not been. We are free to do, but not to undo.

And therefore if we mistake the means to our end, we are not free to do what we would. To secure our freedom, to do in any measure what we desire to do, demands a sound practical good sense. Whilst he who cannot control himself pursues not the end he would, and gains what he would not; he who judges wrongly of the means fails to gain what he would. This made Goethe say, "I honour the man who clearly knows what he desires, who knows the means to his end, and how to attain and employ them. How far his end is great or trivial, worthy or blameable, I consider afterwards. Believe me the greatest part of the sin and misery of the world arises merely from this, that men are too negligent truly to determine what their aim is; or if they know that, —to labour earnestly to accomplish it."* These are the purposeless men, who float on through life as circumstances drift them, without considering whither they wish to float; without considering even that they are floating. They scarcely form a distinct judgment as to the tendency of the events that befall them: they either do without one, or they adopt the first opinion they hear; or the one proposed to them by persons they like; or the one that contradicts those they dislike. When driven into the lobby of decision they resign themselves to the impulse that at the moment is uppermost or they ask, "what will people expect me to think?" These are the men who will rather shut their eyes and tumble down Niagara with the stream, than be at the trouble of struggling out of it: these are the slaves of

* Wilhelm Meister.

circumstances; slaves of that public opinion whose dead weight they serve to swell, or of that social party or religious clique to which accident has attached them. And being slaves, they are tolerant of anything, except freedom in others. Though destitute of any real opinion of their own, yet to differ from themselves one iota, in formulas or modes, is to be bigoted, fanatical, intolerant, blind, immoral, irreligious, atheistical. There are no enemies of freedom so implacable as the weak men or women who are themselves without freedom.

7. The second condition of freedom is our having strength of will, or resolution sufficient to pursue our end, and to labour earnestly and perseveringly after it. Here is the main difficulty: to be governed by circumstances or by appetite is so easy, and needs so little either of thought or of effort: to be really free needs so much endurance and so much moral energy, and we have so little.

No man or body of men can deprive us of freedom: but what no other man can do for us, we can do only too easily for ourselves. Each man has it in his power not only to lose his freedom, but to weaken—as it seems to us finally to destroy,—his capacity for being free. As Epictetus, himself a slave, wrote, "What makes thee a slave? Not Nero, for he is a slave as well as thou: Not fate, for thou art not bound to be a slave: Not God, for He would not have thee a slave. It is thyself. Thou fanciest that all these things over which thou hast no power are necessary to thee; therein consists thy slavery. When thou ceasest to desire these things and desirest to be what thou art meant to be, thy freedom begins."* But this is just what it is so very hard to desire thoroughly: yet not only can I make myself a slave, I shall inevitably be a slave if I do not very earnestly desire and strive to be free. For the pleasures our appetites crave, are present with us, and ever in our grasp: but the good we long for is remote, only to be seen by an effort, and only to be won, if at all, by strenuous self-denial. Consider in how manifold a way we live surrounded with passing circumstances; subject to the unceasing influence of other men's opinions, desires, and tempers; ourselves inhabited by so

* Philosophy of the First Six Centuries, by Professor Maurice. *Encyc. Metrop.* p. 10.

many wants, emotions, appetites, contradictory to each other, yet each claiming our attention and clamorous for immediate satisfaction. To be taken up by these present claims requires no exertion. But to resist them all, to subject them to the judgment of reason, and to form and carry out in our lives a distinct resolution according to its dictates: to see our true goal clearly under every change of circumstance, whilst so adapting our measures to those changes as to keep steadily on our way towards it, this indeed requires a good deal of energy—a great exertion of will. We must rouse ourselves to put forth all our strength, and maintain it at that pitch. "The servitude of man consists in his yielding to partial affections and inadequate ideas. The freeman is he, who with great energy and effort, conforms himself to his reason."

8. You all know the burning words in which St. Paul has described this conflict between desire and reason, appetite and will. Plato attempted to show how it arises, and how it is to be won, in a passage well worth your studying: I can only give you part of it. Socrates says: "The lovers of wisdom know that Philosophy receives their souls bound and glued, and compelled to view things through the body as through a prison, and not directly by her self; and sunk in utter ignorance. And they perceive too the strength of this prison; that it arises from desire, so that he that is bound therein as much as possible assists in binding himself. . . . They consider therefore that when any one is exceedingly delighted or alarmed, grieved or moved by desire, he does not merely suffer such evil from these things as one might suppose—such as being sick or wasting his property through indulging his desires; but that which is the greatest evil, and worst of all,—this he suffers and is not conscious of it.

"But what is this evil Socrates? said Cebes.

"That the soul of every man is compelled to be either vehemently delighted or grieved about some particular thing, and at the same time to consider that thing most real and true, though it is not so. But these are chiefly visible objects, are they not?

"*Cebes.* Certainly.

"In this state of affection, then, is not the soul especially shackled by the body?

"*Cebes.* How so?

"Because each pleasure and pain, having a nail as it were, nails the soul to the body, and fastens it to it causing it to become corporeal, and to deem those things true which the body asserts to be so. For in consequence of its forming the same opinions with the body, and of its delighting in the same things, it is I think compelled to possess similar manners, and to be similarly nourished: so that it can never pass into Hades in a pure state, but must ever depart polluted by the body. . . . For these reasons the lovers of wisdom are moderate and resolute—for the soul of a philosopher would not think that philosophy ought to set it free, and that when it is freed it should give itself up again to pleasures and pains, to bind it down again."*

Thus Plato sought the remedy in philosophy: which Augustine having tried found wholly insufficient to free him, or to maintain his freedom. The passage in which he describes his own conflict is so graphic, you must excuse its length. He has been speaking of one who, in the days of Julian, had given up his profession rather than God's word. "He seemed to me," St. Augustine goes on, "not more resolute than blest, in having thus found opportunity to wait on Thee alone. Which thing I was sighing for, bound as I was, not with another's iron, but with my own iron will.† My will the enemy held, and thence had made a chain for me and bound me. For of a froward will was a lust made; and a lust served became custom; and custom not resisted became necessity, by which links as it were joined together, a hard bondage kept me enthralled. But that new will which had begun to be in me, freely to serve Thee and to enjoy Thee,—the only assured pleasantness, was not yet able to overcome my former wilfulness strengthened by age. Thus did my two wills, one new and the other old, one carnal and the other spiritual, struggle within me, and by their discord undid my soul. Myself either way, yet more myself in that which I approved in myself, than in that which in myself I disapproved. For in this last it was now for the more part not myself, because in much I rather endured against my will than acted willingly: and yet it was through me, that custom had obtained this power of warring against me, be-

* *Phædo*, translated by Cary, § 72–75.

† Will is here used for appetite.

cause I had willingly come whither I willed not. . . . For now the truth was altogether ascertained to me, yet I still under service to the earth, refused to fight under Thy Banner, and feared as much to be freed from all encumbrance, as we should fear to be encumbered. Thus with the baggage of this present world, was I held down pleasantly as in a sleep. . . . . And as no one would sleep for ever, and in all men's sober judgment waking is better; yet a man feeling a heavy lethargy in all his limbs, defers to shake off sleep, and though half displeased, with pleasure yields to it even after it is time to rise: so was I assured that much better were it for me to give myself up to Thy charity, than to give myself up to mine own cupidity: and yet though the former course satisfied me and gained the mastery, the latter pleased me and held me mastered. For the law of sin is the violence of custom whereby the mind is drawn and holden even against its will, but deservedly for that it willingly fell into it."* . . . "If I tore my hair and beat my forehead,—I willed, I did it. But I might have willed and not done it, if the power of motion in my limbs had not obeyed. So many things then I did when 'to will' was not 'to be able:' and I did not what both I longed incomparably more to do, and what soon after I should be able to do, because soon after I should will thoroughly. For in these things the ability was one with the will, and to will was to do; and yet it was not done. . . . Whence is this monstrousness, and to what end? The mind commands the body and it obeys instantly: the mind commands itself to will, and would not command unless it willed, and what it commands is not done. But it willeth not entirely, therefore doth it not command entirely: so far forth it commandeth as it willeth: and so far forth the thing commanded is not done, as it willeth not. . . . It is therefore no monstrousness partly to will and partly to nill but a disease of the mind that it doth not wholly rise upborne by truth, borne down by custom." †

Thus it is the presence of these inconsistent and opposing desires within us, which prevents us willing thoroughly: and it is the necessity of constant and strenuous conflict in and against ourselves, which their importunity imposes on us, which makes it impossible for us to be free, unless we do will

* *Confessions*, book viii. § v. 10, 11. † Ibid. book viii. § viii. 20; § ix. 21.

thoroughly. Then only are we free, when we can effectually command ourselves to do that which we chiefly desire to have done. A man is not free, who does that which his reason and conscience direct out of regard to the penalties attached to disobedience. He may be a conscientious and upright man, and he is on the way to become free. But to be really free we must love that which we command ourselves to do, and for its own sake; not merely because it is our duty, but because we find our chief delight in it. This conflict then, which is now our only path to freedom, is itself the effect and the evidence of its limited and imperfect nature. To be wholly free, would be to have every desire in harmony, and unrepressed; to have no inward conflict between one desire and another, and no conflicting results from the satisfaction of all. To be free as a good man is free we must have one ruling desire and aim—one predominating affection, to which all the rest are either conformable or subordinated, both as to the ends they put us on and the means by which we gratify them. And this is only possible, when reason, conscience, and our governing affection coincide, and the object which they put us on pursuing is that which can fully satisfy us: When that course of life and action, which reason affirms to be true and conscience pronounces right, is the object of our ruling desire and predominant affection, the source both of our true and our actual happiness, of our present enjoyment and our future satisfaction.* So that now, to be free at all, a man must bring his lower nature with its appetites into bondage to his higher—to that which is indeed himself—his true personality: for his animal nature lusteth against the Spirit, and the Spirit against the flesh: and these things are contrary the one to the other so that we cannot do the things that we would.

Yet we may hope that this very conflict, which has its origin in our weakness and the incongruity of our nature, may if it be manfully carried on, become the means of increasing our moral power, and that to a degree far beyond what it could have attained, had there been no opposing self to be overcome. What helps can we find, to enable us to contend effectually for freedom—what hindrances can we set aside?

* Liddon's *Bampton Lectures*, lecture vi.

9. Foremost of all, stands the power of custom and habit.* St. Augustine speaks of this as his great foe; but it is a principle of our nature that tells both ways, and with equal power rivets our bondage or confirms our freedom. And one of these two it must do, for it never ceases to act upon us, nor can we ever evade its effects. Let us see how it acts. Some object presents itself to me, which I perceive to be within my reach, and which rouses in me so strong a desire that I cannot rest satisfied without obtaining it. But I see that this new object forms no part of that which I have recognised as best, and to the pursuit of which, in obedience to that judgment of my reason, I have resolved to devote myself. I see also that the pursuit of both ends is inconsistent, either they are contradictory, or my power is not equal to the double attempt. Here there is a strife within me; I am longing for two irreconcileable things: the one approved as best by reason, conscience, and by my will: the other clamorously demanded as pleasantest by my feelings. I choose the former: I say my passing wish shall not master my deliberate resolution; I will not have this pleasure. Then there is no discord between my will and the truth, my actions and judgment: and I retain my power of self-control and therefore of free choice; I retain it not only unimpaired but strengthened by the operation of that law which we call the force of habit. By this law, every action becomes easier to us by repetition; or it requires under the same conditions a less expenditure of energy the second time than the first: and the third time than the second: and at the same time every emotion or desire becomes weaker by being refused indulgence. Indeed although one such act of self-government cannot commonly be expected to produce much conscious difference, yet it has not unfrequently proved to be the turning point in a man's life, by giving him the conviction that resistance is possible and the hope of final success. But whether, or no, it is certain that a uniform succession of such acts of self-government,

* "The frequent repetition of any act forms a custom: the state of mind or body produced thereby is a habit. The custom forms the habit, and the habit, once formed keeps up the custom. The same conduct if occasioned by different motives, will produce different habits."—*Archbishop Whately.* "The test of a habit is, that obedience to it shall cost no effort: or that discontinuance of the custom has become painful."—*Aristotle.*

makes the right choice so easy, and the disturbing desire so much weaker that the conqueror becomes unconscious of any struggle: he says, "I have no choice to make; the alternative is morally impossible."

Or instead of resisting I yield, choosing for this time the immediate indulgence, and postponing the pursuit of my real object till the next; as St. Augustine tells us he did, praying to be made holy, "only not yet." This is equally an exercise of free choice; and the strife is in this case also over for the moment: but the discord continues. I and my reason are no longer at one: nor am I so free to refuse myself the indulgence, the next time it offers itself, as I was. By the law of habit every indulgence of an appetite strengthens it, making it more vehement. So that the next time the object that rouses it presents itself, my desire for it will be stronger; the remembrance of the pleasure it gave me will make the thought of refusing it more painful: the remembrance of the weakness that yielded to it—the very condemnation of my conscience on account of it—weakens my will to resist. I have less desire to resist it than I had, because I have less hope that I shall constantly resist it to the end. The object approved of by my true self, seems further out of my reach, and the thought of it is less prominently before my mind: the pressure put upon me by the worse desire is greater, and my controlling power is weaker.

How this process may go on step by step, until all self-control—all power of choice is practically lost, is most plainly seen in the consequences of physical indulgence, such as indolence; or in the case of drunkards and opium eaters, whose excesses produce a physical condition in which the man has literally no power to refuse the stimulus he craves. And though in the case of mental habits, the effects are less obvious, they are neither less real nor less extensive. No single effort of will can enable us to escape from the associations of thought, nor free us from bondage to the mental habits we have allowed ourselves to form. History records numberless instances of men who have in this way lost all intellectual liberty and all capacity for attending to or seeing any truth they dislike. How constantly do we see men of genuine conscientiousness and great ability, who have so

habituated themselves to refer all things, human and divine, to one special opinion of their own: to look upon that as "*the* truth;" and to judge all other facts and propositions by it; that they not only do not see, and are firmly resolved they never will see any truth but that; they have become incapable of seeing any other: they cannot even wish to be just to their opponents.

In either case the man has lost his freedom: in the one he is the slave of his animal nature, in the other he is a slave to the forms of his own understanding. There may be a stage in this downward progress, when he will not only lose all freedom, but all capacity for being set free. There certainly is a stage, when,—though still conscious through the very discord and dissatisfaction he feels that he is responsible for not resisting,—he has finally lost all power of struggling; "when—

> "Custom lies upon him like a weight
> Heavy as frost and deep, almost, as life."

There comes a time in many men's lives, when the sentence goes forth—

> "He that is unjust, let him be unjust still;
> And he which is filthy, let him be filthy still;
> And he that is righteous, let him be righteous still;
> And he that is holy, let him be holy still."

But even when the path we move in is thus, as far as human nature is concerned, irrevocably fixed, the law of habit is still in operation. Nothing human can stand still: growing or wasting, rising or falling, quickening to a fuller and stronger life or sinking lower in death, we must cease to be before we can cease to change. And so we must either be gaining freedom by its continual exercise, or we shall be losing it by strengthening the power of those lower impulses which we fail to control. If we are not governing ourselves, we are being governed. For moral self-government is of that nature, that unless it is exercised for its true end, *i.e.* the control of the whole man in harmony with what is true and with what is good,—it is lost: the man who no longer masters himself, is mastered by something, other than himself: by a part of his own nature, by something that belongs to himself, but not by himself. Common language teaches us this fact, with even more than its usual accuracy, when

unhesitatingly rejecting half the philosophies it speaks of a man as being the slave of his own temper. He who exercises such moral power over himself, for this true end, and in any considerable degree, is becoming free: and he who, being himself a free man, exercises it over other men, is a giver of freedom, a direct agent of God and of Christ in the world.

To be free then, is not a thing to be attained once for all. Day by day, and hour by hour, it must be striven for afresh; exercised with energetic resolution, mantained with unwavering fortitude and continual self-denial, without fainting or weariness: or rather with the more steadfastness the more weary we are:—

"Let no man think that sudden in a minute
All is accomplished and the work is done;
Though with thy earliest dawn thou didst begin it
Scarce were it ended in thy setting sun.

. . . . . .

"Oh, the regret, the struggle and the failing!
Oh the days desolate and useless years!
Vows in the night so fierce and unavailing,
Stings of my shame and passion of my tears."*

10. And this we shall never do, unless we have some confident hope of finally succeeding. Once a man doubts of this, his efforts slacken; and if he begins to despair, he ceases to struggle. One sees this continually in children: it is equally evident when a man is struggling against his habit of excess in drinking. It is equally true of all of us in our inward conflict; and men are apt to entertain, and even to welcome the thought that resistance must be unsuccessful, because it excuses them to themselves in giving it up. Dr. Channing says, "I find almost universally in men a scepticism as to their moral power. I find almost all disposed to magnify the power of passion and temptation; to think themselves the creatures of circumstances; to look upon great moral progress as an impossibility to shield themselves from remorse under their supposed weakness. I have seldom, perhaps never, met a human being who seemed to me conscious of what was in him: I never saw a man proud of his moral force." † One cannot but suspect, that the man who has a practical knowledge of what moral force is, through

* F. W. Myers's *St. Paul.*
† Channing's *Memoirs*, vol. ii.

exercising it, knows too well he has no reason to be proud of his own share of it.

But one more great hindrance to our obtaining freedom I would name: it is that men do not truly and heartily desire to be free. The animal craving for slavery is stronger in most men, than is the spiritual longing for freedom. From the future consequences of this bondage we would fain escape, but the present motives that urge us to seek freedom, and the course by which we must attain it, are to most of us the painfullest. For one man who cries out with St. Paul, "Oh wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me from this body of death?" how many are there, even of those who are still morally alive, the secret cry of whose hearts is, "Oh wretched man that I am, how long dare I shake off the yoke of this freedom, the burden of this eternal life?"

11. What then do we need in order to become free? It were easy to maintain our freedom, had it once become habitual: the difficulty lies in forming the habit. Hope will do much, but hope demands some solid ground to stand on. A strong desire will do much; but how can we create it in ourselves? And behind and above all these, lies the true difficulty—the want of an adequate moral force. We are not free because we have not moral strength sufficient for freedom. This is the question of questions: "What is the dynamic moral force, that shall enable us to conform to that higher law, and give us the command of our individual desires, private inclinations, and the impulses they put us on?" And whence shall we derive it?*

This at least is certain, we cannot ourselves create any new force: we may by counsels of prudence make the most of what we have; but whatever exceeds that, we must receive. And further, this moral force we need must be a spiritual force, acting on our spirits, in and by our wills and consciences. Nerve forces generated in living organic cells, and accustomed to flow with whatever vigour through nerve channels,—what has that to do with the matter?

The modern creed is, give more knowledge,—sound knowledge and of the right sort *i.e.* knowledge of social science and the laws of health. When one looks over the names of

* See "Moral Theories and Christian Ethics."—*North British Review*, No. 93, from which much of the above is taken.

those who teach that this will supply the motive force of will which is needed for the regeneration of mankind, it seems presumptuous to say, what yet I must say—that this idea appears to me the shallowest of all. If knowing were identical with liking, truly it might answer. If men never erred except through ignorance, it would be intelligible why reasonable men should hold the diffusion of knowledge to be identical with the infusion of moral power. That knowledge is a necessary condition of the right use of moral power we have seen. We must know what the object is which we desire, and the means of securing it. But it is not the motive force we need for freedom: if it were, there must of necessity be a fixed and evident gradation of moral self government, harmony and freedom, corresponding to the gradation from the most enlightened minds, down to the most ignorant. But every one knows that nothing of the kind occurs in real life. "Experience does not justify the anticipation, that scientific demonstration of the physical consequences of social indulgence, is equal to the task of checking the surging impetuosity of passion."* In fine, if we had this moral force, then knowledge would be all we needed to show us how to use it. Our question is, how are we to obtain it?

12. It has been sought for in the power of example. So Aristotle sought for it, when making virtue consist in the due proportion and harmony of men's powers and passions, struck afresh in each case from the consideration of all the circumstances, he bid us guide ourselves in striking that balance, by the consideration of what the "ideally perfect man" would do under like circumstances: creating thus for ourselves an ideal embodiment of the moral law, or order of the universe. And again it has been sought for in the perception and contemplation of the Truth;—that which is,—the cause and centre of all which appears. So Plato sought it: "for" he says "the proper pasture of the soul happens to be in the meadow where Truth is . . . and whatever soul accompanying a deity, succeeds in beholding any portion of it, shall be free from harm till the next revolution: and if it can always accomplish this, it shall be always free from harm." But this none but philosophers can do, and

* Liddon's *Bampton Lectures*, lecture viii.

few even of them: for the mass of mankind he has no hope at all: and of the better sort, most "having undergone much toil depart without having succeeded in getting a glimpse of that which is; and afterwards make use of the food of mere opinion."*

For us both these aids to moral power are combined in their highest measure, in Christ, The perfect Example—not of a merely imaginary ideal, but of the Man, at once ideally perfect and actually living, transcending, whilst including all that Aristotle could conceive: the absolute Truth, to be fed on not by philosophers only, in their highest moments, but made in Christ the food and the life of the world. The "we shall be like Him, for we shall see Him as He Is": of St. Paul, how far does it excel the "we might be true, if we could once and again see but for a moment what Is!" and that—no longer a merely beautiful and just conceivable—myth, has become for us in Christ a sure and certain hope. More than a hope: for even now

> "Who that one moment has the least descried Him
> Dimly and faintly, hidden and afar
> Doth not despise all excellence beside Him
> Pleasures and powers that are not, and that are?
> Aye, amid all men bear himself thereafter,
> Smit with a sudden and a sweet surprise,
> Dumb to their scorn, and turning on their laughter,
> Only the dominance of earnest eyes?"†

Yet even this is not sufficient. Example has an immense determining moral power: that is to say an immense influence in determining the way in which moral power will be exercised. It can rouse the force already existing, but it cannot create force. The sight of perfect Truth and Love may indeed transcend every other desire, in the soul that is true and loving: but it can act on those alone, who have so much capacity for seeing and enjoying it, as to find greater present happiness in its contemplation, than in the things of sense. And whilst it calls out all the strength they have, it cannot give them more. What we need is a new and additional force; a moral power which is not in us: which must be created in us, or imparted to us, and made our own.

We are told we shall find it in faith in Christ. "It is this

* Cary's translation, *Phædrus*, § 54–61. † F. W. Myers's *St. Paul.*

belief in a personal Being, in whom dwells whatever is highest in ourselves: whose will is in sympathy with whatever moral principle is in us, with all that is true and tender in us; which gives a new moral power, a dynamic force." Now faith creates nothing: it perceives what is, and trusts that: it is the hand that receives; it is the capacity for receiving: it is not the power which we must receive, if we are to be made free. Faith cannot give: how can it do more than receive?

13. It is Christ who must give us that spiritual power, which trust in Him enables us consciously to receive from Him. He has sent, He is ever sending His Spirit to be this power in the hearts of all men who do not refuse to receive Him, to work in them to will and to do His will. "He is working in you to make you free from the tempers which set you at war with others"; and with yourselves; "So only is He raising you above the restraints and prohibitions of law: He is doing for you that which restraints and prohibitions cannot do; He is acting on your wills."

The Spirit of God and Christ, dwelling in and working with our spirits—our wills, is the Creator and Giver of that dynamic moral force, which whosoever possesses will be free indeed. But He works only with our wills, imparting to us the power to will that effectually and perseveringly, which we do will really. "Our dependence on His direct influence, is that of a moral being not that of passive matter. It is only by using the power that we can gain new aids from heaven; and these aids will be made effectual only by our own faithful use of them."*

14. Here it is that the exercise of prudence or common sense must come to our aid. Really to govern ourselves to any practical end, we must exercise self control in accordance with the laws of our nature, and the circumstances of our lives: not in contradiction to them. And therefore it is strengthened by moderation in its exercise, rather than by vehemence, or extreme minuteness in respect of particular actions. It concerns us to control the "main course of our lives and the principal designs of our hearts." But far the greater portion of our daily actions have no moral character at all, at the most they only rise to questions of expediency;

* Channing's *Memoirs*, vol. ii.; see also Liddon's *Bampton Lectures*, lecture vi.

and in a healthy state of mind are decided by experience, or by those instincts which are natural to us all, and which are given to guide us, in the absence of complete information, to that which is wholesome for us. But there is a constant tendency in refined and conscientious minds,—whether from having too little of importance to do, or from falling into a morbid self consciousness through over minute religious introspection,—to endeavour to bring all these actions under some law,—a moral one if possible; if not under some self imposed religious rule. Such are questions as to the quantity of food, or sleep, or comforts we are to allow ourselves. Asceticism imposes on all these a moral character, and would supersede common sense and our natural instincts by an artificial code of rules. It says, "these things may be harmless in themselves, but as indulgences they are wrong: if you cannot deny yourself in these trifles, how will you deny yourself in more important matters when self denial becomes your duty? how could you sacrifice yourself? Unless you keep your power of self restraint in constant exercise, when you most need it in the presence of a strong temptation, you will not have it." Now this method of management offends against that law of our nature, by which every action is followed by reaction. If a natural desire is moderately satisfied, the reaction follows in the desire ceasing for a time: if it is absolutely denied, it becomes more vehement: and this sort of moral self tyranny tends to produce a reaction of immoral self indulgence, as certainly in individuals as the same minute moral restraint never fails to produce when exercised over a community. So far from making it easier to withstand the enemy when he comes in with a flood, it makes the flood more tremendous. Then again the habit we desire to form is that of acting uniformly in accordance with what really is, in preference to that we should like to be. But by the ascetical rule in order that I may be able to act in accordance with what is true, when tempted to transgress; I must be continually acting on what is not true:—because it is often wrong to do what is agreeable, and often right to do what is disagreeable; I must make believe the agreeable is wrong and the disagreeable right, when I know that in fact they are equally neutral. Lest I should be unable to give up my comforts if duty demanded it, I must be always a little

uncomfortable when there is no occasion for it. Now such a life cannot tend to form the habit of acting on right reason and sound judgement; because it consists in a course of acting on fictions. And by the principle of reaction, it tends to form a most pernicious habit of constantly thinking about these trivial comforts and wants, and of attaching far too much importance to the pleasure of having them: just as the starving man can dream of nothing but the pleasure of unlimited feasting. It is necessary indeed to have some sort of rule applying generally to these things: but true wisdom bids us enforce it on ourselves with such moderation, as shall avoid frittering away our moral power in efforts of no moment, and shall leave an ample liberty for the exercise of common sense, and instinct. Take for example such a book as Forster's Essay on Time.* All he alleges of its importance is true: it is true too that with our utmost diligence we can never accomplish all there is for us to do. Could we fill up every moment of our time, we should not have done all we might have done. We cannot hope here to attain the standard set before us, we must be ever earnestly pressing—agonizing the word is—towards it. Still the question is: how shall we practically make the best use of our time and strength? Shall we never leave a moment unemployed—never engage in trifles, whilst a higher work is standing still? shall we forbid ourselves to think a thought or speak a word that is trivial, and call it a sin to leave anything undone, which we might be doing and which ought to be done? Literally to live thus we must cease to live at all; and he would be a very feeble worker who sincerely tried to regulate his life on such principles. "Time is only a talent, in respect of the quantity of vital energy, or power to act that each person enjoys."† And power, to rise to its full energy, must be concentrated in definite acts, not spread out over as many minutes as it can be made to cover by lowering its intensity. Thus to govern ourselves in a manner inconsistent with our nature and our circumstances, is to rule by self will, not by right reason. It is not therefore our way to freedom.

15. There is another point that touches on this subject,

* See a review of this work in the *Saturday Review*.

† Archbishop Whately's *Life and Correspondence*.

which has been brought before us again of late years.—I mean the rule of "implicit obedience," to a human superior; which is advocated by some as being the best discipline for a holy life; by others as necessary in order to unite the powers of many under the guidance of one head, for the accomplishment of some definite moral or religious work. As a discipline for religious life, if religious means christian, I will merely say that such a renunciation of personal freedom is about the most self-willed act of which any one can be guilty. For it consists in refusing the guidance God has been pleased to promise us and choosing another by our own judgement. It is a refusal to submit to the condition in which our Maker has placed us, as free—and therefore only—as moral agents. "Whoever thus denies his own will in order to become the will-less organ of another man; he denies the image of God in the dignity of his own free personality; he turns himself from being the servant of God into a servant of men, and gives to the creature the honour due to God alone."* With respect to the second object for which this rule has been introduced, it is no doubt an easy way of getting rid of the difficulty which the many sidedness as well as the weakness of men, opposes to their complete union in action: it is an easy way of accumulating a considerable force, but not properly a moral force: in effecting a purely material work it is applicable; for any spiritual work—any work which is to influence men as men—it is injurious to that very many sidedness which is essential to success in acting on so many sided a subject as a mass of human beings; and which is secured, as we shall see bye and bye, in every real union of men, just in proportion to the oneness of the body plus the freedom of the individual members. The system of union by implicit obedience is altogether founded on a lie, and degrades alike the ruler and the ruled. The agents act as though their ruler could take on himself their responsibility, and as though he were infallible. The ruler acts, as though men were merely engines for accomplishing his effects, and as though the Spirit was given to him for their guidance and strength which is equally false. The Jesuits tried this mode of union, as wisely as any

* Neander's *Memorials of Christian Life*, ch. iii. part ii.

one could; and they have not succeeded: in the long run fictions and falsehoods do not succeed.

That is all I have to say of personal freedom: you have listened so quietly I am afraid you none of you agree with me.

Mrs. Charlton. Oh indeed we do—at least I can answer for myself and I think for all. I am delighted with what you say of the wickedness and folly of implicit obedience; I only wish you had taken as your instance of it, the law which imposes on wives, implicit obedience to their husbands.

Mrs. Melcombe. Nay in Romish sisterhoods they promise implicit obedience in thought and word, and whether right or wrong: it is quite a different thing from the marriage vow.

Agatha. At any rate if the marriage vow is one of implicit obedience, it is purely theoretical, and not getting itself effected, remains a mere formula.

Sara. A proof my little friend how bad the law is that cannot get itself effected,—and it shows how far women are ahead of it.

Mrs. Charlton. And this immoral law, based as you say on a falsehood, and practically intolerable, we are counted unwomanly for denouncing. You must own Professor we want no stronger proof that women must have a share in making laws for women, before they will be just and true laws.

Agatha. But haven't they a share already?

Sara. No we are not in Parliament yet, whatever we may be when we have got our degrees.

Agatha. But Parliament has so very little power in the matter. As long as women choose on the whole to mind their husbands, or husbands choose to make them, it would be remarkably little use Parliament saying they shan't. Why I am told Parliament has at last actually gone the length of saying, it's wrong for husbands to kick their wives to death,—and much they mind!

Sara. I think you are right there; for if the woman really won't, the husband gets very little change out of his legal authority, whatever he may get out of his nailed boots.

Agatha. But does the law require implicit obedience from wives to husbands?

Professor. No; it gives an unjust man some great advantages though for getting obeyed.

Sara. Well, but there is a little ceremony preceding married life—at least in the case of all well disposed young persons who are of course married by the church,—in one part of which the woman promises to obey her man.

Mrs. Melcombe. That is the law of the church, and whatever change your dreadful women's parliament makes, they can never alter that you know.

Mrs. Charlton. The church service was composed long ago, and was no doubt admirably suited to civilize people in those days of darkness and violence, when a special protection was needed for the physically weaker. But in our day it needs to be revised: or better still perhaps, marriage should be treated solely as a civil bond, between equals: and persons would be free to add such religious services as suited their feelings.

Sara. There are rocks ahead there Mrs. Charlton: if you omit the church service you cannot unsay St. Paul's words, and I hope you don't intend to find out a new translation for them: I've a particular aversion to that.

Agatha. But St. Paul says not a syllable about implicit obedience: on the contrary he expressly says "wives submit yourselves to your own husbands, as it is fit in the Lord."

Miss St. John. Then you understand the word "obey" with a mental reservation?

Agatha. I don't think I do: the service is meant to be used only by baptized people: and baptized persons can never promise "implicit" obedience to any other mere human being;—only to obey as "it is fit" in subordination to their vow of obedience to their Lord. But after all it is not the statutes nor the marriage service, that make it necessary, if two people are to live together as one, with one interest, family and property,—one must direct the other: the only possible question is which of the two it shall be.

Mrs. Charlton. No: two right minded and reasonable people respecting each other and united on perfectly equal terms, would act by mutual counsel and agreement.

Sara. So they do now if they are a pleasing couple.

Agatha. But if they are not, and don't agree, which must have the casting vote? laws are only made for unpleasant people you must remember.

Mrs. Charlton. Then the husband should manage his own affairs and the wife hers—as they do I believe in France and in America.

Sara. Oh dear it would be very uncomfortable to have to consider before the least question can be settled—about a dinner party, or the children's lesson, or the horses or the garden—whose affair it is. If you and Tom ever come to that Emily, depend upon it I will be your crow and fly off with the cheese.

Agatha. Then you do not contemplate changing the sentences and making the husband promise to obey? because some of the Americans seem to wish for that.

Mrs. Charlton. Certainly not; we desire liberty, not tyrannical power.

Sara. And I say certainly not too; for if it should be my destiny to be wedded to a clod of wayward marl, it would not lessen my just griefs to find myself sprighted with a—well a muff.

Professor. Well have you any other questions to raise?

Agatha. I don't quite understand about the power of habit: a bad habit diminishes our liberty: but if we form a right habit, does it not equally, in time, make it morally impossible for us to transgress, and don't we so lose our power of choice?

Mrs. Melcombe. And a very good thing too.

Sara. Why you wicked woman who wants to be free to do wrong?

Agatha. I don't; but to be free to do right one must be at liberty to do wrong.

Professor. Our freedom does not consist in being without law: our animal, emotional, and intellectual natures are certainly subject to the action of uniform sequences of cause and effect. My freedom depends on my being the motive or at least the controlling cause of their actions.

If I form as in the case you suppose, the habit of controlling my thoughts and desires, my words and actions, in conformity with my reason and conscience, this is the very self-government which constitutes my freedom; and my

moral power is strengthened by all the force of habit. In the one case, the man chooses as best, what is not best, and wills that which in truth he did not desire: in the other case he commands that which he truly desires, and commanding it effectually, he is strong and free.

16. *Miss St. John.* How you can propose it as our object to have a strong and masterful will, when the whole spirit of the Christian faith enjoins on us to subdue sacrifice and crucify our own will, so that at last it may be annihilated —swallowed up in perfect submission—I cannot understand.

Sara. It is puzzling for no doubt it takes a great deal of resolution, which I take it is will, to get oneself to give up one's own way—which is one's will too. It seems as if we have one will too many for freedom.

Professor. Self will and free will are contradictory. We are free when we govern ourselves from the standing point of truth and of right reason: but self will judges of all things not as they are, but as they seem in relation to self: and self is not exactly the true centre of the universe.

Miss St. John. I cannot acknowledge our poor blind reason is our guide. We have a higher revelation, interpreted to us by the church: and to that we must subdue both our will and our reason.

Agatha. Reason bids us see by the best light we have: having the light of a Divine revelation, it is the most unreasonable thing in the world to shut it out, and try to see by the broken shimmers of light our own understanding can discover.

Miss St. John. So it may be: but we ought to submit to it, not because we count it reasonable, but because we are commanded to receive it and obey it.

Agatha. But you know we are commanded—you are sure of that?

Miss St. John. Certainly: but it would be sinful to doubt it.

Agatha. And that knowledge you received through your understanding; for it could not be through your senses alone you saw it.

Sara. We grant so far: this opinion we did not adopt from the body.

Agatha. Then the knowledge you have received, that the

revelation committed to the church's keeping is of divine authority, is the result of your judgement: comparing these two propositions—"It is divine," and "it is not divine,"—you judge the first to be true.

Miss St John. I do not presume to judge: I receive it implicitly, as given by the church.

Agatha. Having received the whole as divine, it would be most irrational to pretend to question the truth of the parts. And you submit to it because you are convinced it is true; and that without its guidance your own mind would lead you into error. You might think this, and still refuse to submit, and then you would be acting against your reason.

Miss St. John. I cannot answer your sophistical arguments: what I mean is, that the church ought to be our guide, not our reason; and instead of seeking to strengthen our wills, we should study how to lose them in perfect submission. The saints have no will of their own; they yield a perfect absolute unquestioning submission.

Agatha. Yes: but the question is, do they obey willingly, loving to obey because what they are bidden is also what they love; or indifferently neither liking or disliking what they do; or unwillingly, obeying but disliking?

Miss St. John. I believe they have no preference or choice of their own: they obey with equal readiness whatever be the work they are given.

Professor. You do not mean they have actually no preference between doing God's will and not doing it.

Miss St. John. It is shocking to speak so of the Saints who prefer God's will in all things and hate all that is contrary to it. Their delight is to sacrifice their own wills to it.

Agatha. Then they do it willingly and therefore they have a preference and a choice. But surely there is nothing shocking in that. It is a higher moral state to be holy and to delight in what is holy, than to give up the wrong we desire, because it is forbidden.

Miss St. John. Yet you make the obedience of the Saints a kind of refined self-pleasing: not the self-denial and self-mortification of the Catholic Saint.

Mrs. Melcombe. Surely the Psalmist speaks of it so—I delight to do Thy will; Thy law is within my heart.

Professor. The necessity for self-denial comes from im-

perfection and remaining bondage to a lower nature. But there may be as much self-will in it as in self-indulgence, if it be unreasonable.

Sara. Well the way to freedom is now made clear. We need only to get rid of all the false opinions we have taken on board, through our being so unfortunately glued into our bodies; and to replace them with a complete knowledge of what is true, and with a love for that only. The only defect is, a slight degree of impracticability.

Professor. You exaggerate and omit. To gain our true freedom it is not necessary to know all truth; but to be true to what we do know. But it is quite time to stop now.

Sara. Then dear Emily will you for once please to form the same opinion with the body and delight in the same thing?

Mrs. Melcombe. What does the child mean?

Professor. She wants you to order coffee, shall I send it out of doors?

Sara. Yes Tom tell them to bring it: it's all for the nourishment of the soul—brain I mean, and mine is nearly worn out.

LECTURE X.

ON UNION.

"Man is more political than any bee or ant."—*Aristotle.*

"There are principles involved in the constitution of society itself, to which its individual members conform themselves, not because they are content to sacrifice their own distinct personality; but because they have no other way of asserting it."—Maurice's *Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy.*

1. *Professor.* You will remember that we have come to these conclusions:

i. That our well-being consists in our being strong and free: that our freedom depends on our moral power or self-dominion: and that our moral power is partly conditioned by, and so far is dependent on our knowledge and our ability to use that knowledge.

ii. That man's faculties are so incomplete and his energy so limited that even when thoroughly educated and made the most of, they are wholly insufficient for his needs; insufficient for the work he has to do, for the relations in which he is placed, for the satisfaction of his own capacity of happiness. Nay rather, the more of education and culture he has, the less self-sufficing does he become; so far does the growth of his capacities outstrip the growth of his energetic faculties.

iii. And lastly, that this incompleteness of the individual man, can only be ameliorated by the union of men with each other, so that what is wanting in one may be supplied by that which is present in another; and what is deficient in each taken separately may be obtained by what is found in the whole.

The presence of all the social affections, which form a part of our moral nature as essential and as powerful as any of the self-regarding emotions, sufficiently points out the purpose

of our Creator in this respect; and effect that purpose, by making it as natural to us to desire to live together, as to desire to live at all. Practically no one can live his life, or be either strong or free, except he live, in some mode or other, in union with his fellow men. So that Society is a necessary condition of our individual progress, which consists in our becoming stronger and freer; and of our individual happiness which can be secured by that progress alone. It follows from this, that those conditions and circumstances which are essential to the existence, and to the well-being of the society in which we live, are also essential to the individual well-being of each one of us. And what we have now to consider is, what constitutes a society, or union of men, and what are the conditions of its well-being. Johnson's Dictionary tells us that "Society" is "the union of many in one common interest."

2. Now Union is oneness, but such oneness as presupposes complexity, diversity, and relation of parts. There is no union in an elementary atom, because it has no parts to be united: neither is there any union in the addition of two or more such absolutely similar atoms to each other, for there is no relation between them except that of juxtaposition. But union is not the mere joining of several things together, but such a joining as that what were two distinct things become one new whole. For this end, if the union be between persons those only can unite who are of the same kind, but not identical. Beings that have nothing in common never could unite, having no common interest: and those who had nothing but what was common to each and in the same degree, never would unite, for their union would be utterly useless. Human beings each having an individual life, will, and mind, and a personal existence *can* unite, since they are of the same nature, since they can never lose their individuality, since no two of them are ever identically alike. And they *will* unite, because they have one common interest unite so far as that common interest extends: further than that they cannot unite. From this follow two corollaries: First, that no human society is co-extensive with the life and happiness of any one of its members: it is only in some respects, and for some purposes, that he is a member of it: and beyond these it has no right—to speak more truly I

should say, it has no power,—to meddle with or regulate either himself or his interests. And as men's personality transcends their union, as it can therefore never be wholly merged in their union; so any society that attempts to merge the individual in the mass, and to deal with him as though he were nothing more than its member, is acting on a falsehood: in other words, it is acting tyrannically. And secondly; as the actual ground of men's union is their having one common interest; so societies of men exist for the good of their individual members: or, they exist for the purpose of promoting their personal progress in strength and freedom. And if the society fail to promote this common interest, still more if it be positively injurious to it, its "raison d'être" is gone.

The oneness of any society consists in its having one directing will and one common action, in all things that concern itself. It must therefore possess a governing head to determine, and a subject body to execute its determinations. Social union then is rather moral than intellectual: there may exist within it a vast diversity of knowledge and of opinion, but unless the social body is so far agreed as to unite in volition and action, it ceases to exist as a living society. Its outward form of union may indeed continue, long after the real union is dead; and sometimes we see the living union exist, where the outward form has been broken to pieces by external violence: but in neither case is there properly speaking a true society; in the first there is no common will, and in the second, no common action. The one is as a lifeless body; the other as a disembodied spirit.

Then a true society must be a natural, not an arbitrary or artificial union. It must not be the result of the arbitrary will of one man, nor even artificially contrived by all its members. To live and grow, it must be the result of the actual fact, that its individual members are thus related to each by sameness of nature, and fitted for each other by contrast of quality:—of the fact that each constituent unit needs something the rest can supply, and has or is capable of attaining something which the rest need. Without this natural cause of union the society will not last, or only as a sign without the thing signified; and though its members may still be bound together by outward force, they cannot

unite into one body. Even if the object of union be only the effecting of one definite work, and it is not designed to be coextensive with their outward life, yet there can be no united action unless the members agree, and will each take his own share in the work, in combination with and subordination to the rest. A true union may or may not be preceded by a formal and conscious consent between the uniting parties: but their consent is in no case the cause of their union. They unite because, being capable of uniting, their instinctive desire of existing well impels them to do so. People continually consent to unite where union is in reality impossible: just as we all consent to breathe, but do not breathe because we have consented; and certainly we should most consciously consent to breathe, when breathing becomes impossible. Men then never could have voluntarily exchanged a state of nature for life in a social community, as writers on political science used to imagine; for the state natural to man is a social state; and to live in a state of nature, he must be living in a community.

3. And consequently the conditions which are essential for the existence and continuance of any true society, do not derive their force from the voluntary choice of those who compose it: but the same natural law which determines men to unite, determines also the essential conditions and the necessary consequences of their union. It is obvious also that the fact of its continued existence, includes the fact of the presence within it, of whatever is essential to that existence. And as government and subordination are thus essential so there can be no society where there is no actually governing power. The particular form is not essential; is, within certain limits of possibility, a matter of choice: but though no one form is essential, the necessity of having a government in some practicable form is not dependent either on the opinions or wishes of the members, but proceeds from the laws of human nature. It is not necessary for any community that it should adopt this or that precise form of government: but it must either voluntarily adopt some practicable form; or it will be subjected to some form by force; or it must cease to be. a community. Even when a country is in a state of anarchy through the failure of the forms of government it has devised, we find the people who live in it

forming themselves into communities,—bands of robbers, or defence committees,—each of which has a government of its own. So also history teaches us, that when a state has had a constitution, or form of government, which by reason of its violating some principle of human nature, or by its inconsistency with the civilisation of its subjects, fails to govern—fails to secure that is sufficient unity of action, and obedience from the majority of its subjects—then either the nation falls to pieces, or else some other form of government springs up, against the will it may be, or without the design of its subjects; but which governs them because it is able to govern, and therefore to maintain the national existence.

4. I think it follows from this that the union which exists in any community will be more or less intimate and strong, as the members find in each other more or less of what they each need for their own complete satisfaction: and so far as they generally possess the same abilities and the same deficiencies, the same knowledge and ignorance, the same moral strength and weakness, and in the same degree—so much the less closely will they unite. If therefore you claim equality for the members of your union, you must take care not to confound equality with identity. But I should omit the word altogether if I were you, as quite irrelevant. There is indeed in every true and just union, an entire equality of benefit: but we add nothing to the clearness of our notions when we talk of the equality of the members, seeing that the very basis, the cause of their union,—is their mutual inequality, their diversity. It is just because

> "No compound of this earthly ball,
> Is like another, all in all."

that union is necessary, and possible.

Miss St. John. What equality of benefit can there be between parents and children, or between the laity and their priests?

Mrs. Melcombe. I don't know about the last, but if we parents could only manage to secure as much happiness to our children as the little darlings bring to us, we should do very well.

Sara. How do you make out that difference of knowledge

helps us to unite? It seems to me to make us all hold different opinions, and to set us on fighting.

Professor. I do not make out that. The grounds of social union are rather moral than intellectual. But truth is one, and remains quite unaffected by our partial opinions about it. It is the common interest of all men to know what is true, it is our one common misfortune, that we discover only broken fragments. But whilst this is the case, it is surely better that we should see different fragments and those on different sides, than that we should all see the same fragment and in the same relation. It is better for each one of us, for else there would be no chance of our ever knowing our own ignorance: it is better for the community and better for men's progress towards the discovery of what is true. The common mental want which unites us, is our need of the truth: that which makes our union useful is, that of what is known some know one portion and some another. That which separates us, is that each holds his own part with a mixture of error: and commonly that error arises from our great dislike to unite our truth with that of another man; from our proneness to hold that in opposition which really is in antithesis, and to deem that to be the whole, which is a part. The good of this diversity is that many points of truth get attention, and are considered in different aspects; whilst without it all would be left out but one, and that would be falsified. The evil is, that being satisfied with what they do know, and mistaking their form of expressing their own fragment of truth, for the truth itself: men will not unite to discover more, and what others could teach them, they reject beforehand as error. But the good of this diversity of knowledge and of opinion is essential; its evils are accidental and may be diminished. The practical effect is that people do in reality unite and help each other on to wider and less incomplete knowledge, because their knowledge is diverse; and quarrel all the time because their opinions are not uniform.

Or take an example of this principle of union by diversity in respect of our moral wants. Let us go back to that hopeful Frankenstein, our student whom after all the excellent education you had given him we could in no way satisfy, nor make satisfactory, so long as we set him to work alone; we found he must double himself: and this second soul

must be a person also or they cannot unite; and a person having the same common interest, or they will not unite. She must be able to comprehend the nature and enter into the value of his work—you made him essentially a worker you know—or she cannot give him the rest of sympathy and of encouragement, in his failures and successes. But she must not be herself actively engaged in the same, or any similar work,—not in any way entangled in its subtleties and difficulties. If she is to rescue him from the evils we found to be inseparable from a life of energetic labour, she must herself be so far at leisure from the tumult of the world as to be able to watch its course from without, as he sees it from within. As he excels in the use of those active faculties through which mental force is manifested, his other self should rather be marked by the predominance of the receptive capacities; by reason and common sense.

Mrs. Charlton. If men were intended to supply all the active intellect and women only the Morality that society needs, why had women active intellects given them?

Agatha. Surely a creature that was without the lower gift of mind, would be incapable of the higher gift of a moral nature?

Professor. Certainly; but neither could a being without moral perceptions manifest a human intellect. If there are such creatures anywhere, they must be incapable of uniting in the least degree, for neither could give nor receive anything from the other. I utterly repudiate the notion that men may excusably be less moral than women, or women less intelligent or less rational than men. I am speaking of that predominance of one quality over another, which results from habits and circumstances; and when you speak of such predominance, you imply the presence of both. And I wanted to point out this; that the circumstances and necessities of life are such, that men will not, as a rule and in general, rise in moral power without the help of union with women: and that women will not in general rise in intellectual power, without the help of union with men. Thus in every case, absolute uniformity is incompatible with real union.

5. The next condition of union is the mutual receptivity of those who unite; or their capacity for perceiving and valuing those qualities in each other, which are deficient in them-

selves, but not wholly absent. For we cannot feel our want of that of which, having no capacity for receiving it we are unable to conceive. I imagine this is the main reason why some races of men, or even men of the same race in very different stages of civilization, cannot unite together into one nation. Each probably has some qualities in which the other is wanting and for which it would be greatly the better: but they are so deficient in them they are unable to understand their value. Such races may be joined together by external force under one government: but they are so far from amalgamating that their compelled conjunction generally changes mutual indifference or contempt, into active repulsion. So also an uncivilized or uneducated people cannot comprehend the value of intelligence and cannot be civilized by a highly civilized race, and if it forces civilization upon them, they hate and try to destroy it. Just as a few strong and heavy links in a light and weak chain add only to its weakness; or as the new piece of cloth in the thin and worn out garment; so in every community any superiority of intelligence or of morality in a portion of its members, so great and so sudden as to be antagonistic and unintelligible to the rest, will prove a source of disunion, and therefore of weakness to the community.

Sara. I know a sudden glory means laughter: if a sudden superiority is the same thing, I should say it's one of the strongest links of union you can well have.

Professor. Not if it set the inferiority laughing at the superiority, as in the case I have supposed it is almost sure to do. No, if you would have a strong and close union, its members must laugh together, not at each other. Its remotest members—the highest and lowest, the strongest and weakest, the most learned and most ignorant must not be so far separated from each other as that the latter shall be incapable of receiving benefit from and of valuing the former. And as in every large and civilized community, the distance between the two extremes must be very great, it is the more necessary that they should be firmly linked together by such intermediate grades as that both extremes may melt gradually and imperceptibly into each other. In a community which is to live and grow and act as one body, there must be no definite break: there must be no place in the downward

scale where you can put your finger and say; here the intellectual, or here the moral strength of the state ceases: all below is mere physical form: or here our civilized classes end, and our roughs lie beyond. There must be no place in the upward scale where you can say; here our men of business end, and our men of thought and science begin. There must be no such division as that any one class can feel of any other, "we have no part nor lot in you." I alluded to this evil when speaking of that highest education which can only be received by the most able minds amongst us. It has a tendency to isolate them from the rest of the nation, and the rest of the nation from them, and so far as it does this it will make them unintelligible and useless to the nation, and the nation will cease to progress. And this is what we shall come to, unless we can obtain in every grade of society a far more numerous body of citizens, capable of understanding the work of the more educated class above them, and of communicating it to the less educated class below them. What we want in every class below the highest, is not so much increased power for active thought (though we do want that), as an increased capacity for discerning the value of thought and for reverencing it. And unless we can obtain this, the inevitable ignorance and deficient cultivation of the great majority of the nation will remain unleavened by the intelligence of the truly educated minority: and the nation's hands will say to the nation's head, "we have no need of you." And then freedom dies, which can only live when the mind and not the body governs.

Nor is this the only evil: for whilst we have first rate men amongst us, there is always a chance of their compelling the world to understand them. But history shows us, that where this receiving capacity—this intelligent sympathy for the creations and the ideas of genius is greatly deficient in the mass of society, genius itself can never attain its full development. Repelled by the difficulty of imparting its discoveries to others, it falls back on itself in contempt, or in self-isolation. And that spoils it. Unable to introduce the truth it has beheld into the life of its age, it loses that which is the crowning and perfecting discipline of all true seekers after truth—that of teaching. This seems to me to be the reason, that when a general but shallow culture is so

equally diffused through a nation, that every one has some information, we generally find that none, or next to none have much knowledge. Having none more ignorant than themselves to teach, the mass remain profoundly ignorant of their own need of teaching and lose the capacity for being taught: and then all real eminence, all true intellectual superiority represents itself to their minds as an impertinent infringement on their equality. Even the press in America, renouncing its true function of national teacher—not educator mind you—strives only by excess of flattery and sensational excitement to get itself sold. We have not got so low in England yet: our newspaper press seldom forgets that at least it ought to teach. And however low you go in society here, you will find this conviction existing still, they are not the lowest: they may not know much, but they are less ignorant than some. Now it is this conviction more than anything else, that there are those we could teach, could set right on some points; that keeps us alive to that other—for us far more important—conviction, there are those among us who can teach us, and who know how to use their knowledge a good deal better than we use ours. It preserves amongst us still, though all too vaguely and I fear decreasingly, the feeling that intellectual and moral superiority is a thing to be admired and looked up to: that its presence in another does not injure and may be a gain to us. It makes us feel, that though we are too busy to try for such unpaying superiority ourselves; yet that to have men of great mental power amongst us is a thing of which we may all be proud. If we cannot understand the exact good it has done us, to have had such men as Locke, and Coleridge and Bentham; as Sir W. Hamilton or as Mr. Mill: if we cannot quite make out what it was they wanted to teach us, or what good it would have done us had we had leisure to learn it; still we all think a good deal better of ourselves as a community, for having had them. And that because we value ourselves on our also being able to teach something. But we want far more of this capacity for discerning and reverencing what is above us. We need to have this faith in it and reverence for it engrained into our minds and hearts, that it may hold its own firmly and boldly whenever king Nomos and his rabble rise up to roar it down.

Mrs. Charlton. In an age of general intelligence like ours, if these thinkers fail to make themselves understood, it must be because they have failed to comprehend the spirit and the wants of the age; and that of itself would prove they are not fit to be its guides; it is the peculiar distinction of true genius to comprehend its age.

Sara. Ah, but is it necessarily the gift of the age to comprehend its geniuses?

Agatha. I would give a good deal to understand what "the age" and its spirit consists in, and why we are all to fall down and worship it: whether it is a God or a demon, or a resistless fate that makes us all so clever by no fault of our own: or whether it is only a senseless golden image that Nebuchadnezzar our king has set up.

Sara. I rather think it's just a noun, that serves to denote each speaker in turn, with an equal modesty and self assertion.

Mrs. Charlton. Then you say we need more reverence: surely now that the age for aristocracy of mind as of rank is passed away, it is reason and science, not reverence, that must guide us. It is time we put away childish things. If a man can convince my reason, well and good: but if I reverence one man above all others, I shall be led to obey him blindly without using my reason at all.

Sara. I think it's rather hard too, that I should be so excessively free, as not to be allowed to reverence and follow what seems to me more worthy and wiser than myself.

Professor. Our freedom cannot be complete you will remember, if any genuine and healthy human emotion is repressed: certainly not if we repress that sense of admiration for what is beautiful or great in another, and of reverence for that which excels ourselves in goodness, which is the most ennobling emotion we can experience. The fundamental cause of our uniting together, is our insufficiency for ourselves: and it is certainly natural for us, in a healthy state, to desire most those faculties in which we find ourselves too feeble; and to admire most of all those exertions of which we find ourselves incapable. It is a natural and healthy instinct that leads us to look up to, and to reverence that which we see to be good in others, but which we feel to be beyond our reach at present.

Sara. Well I don't know about nations and peoples, but the way in which a happy couple will mutually look up to and admire each other, is so truly incomprehensible to the rational beholder, I take it you are quite right in saying it's a mysterious instinct, and certainly it must be a very convenient one.

Mrs. Melcombe. If one looks up to and reverences the other Sara, I think that is enough.

Agatha. Enough to show the reverencer has need of her, but hardly that the reverenced has need of him: had it not better be mutual?

Sara. Now Agatha don't you perplex Emily's words with your cunningly misplaced pronouns: you know she did not mean that.

Agatha. It's not me. It was Coleridge who said one of the surest criterions of a man's worth is the reverence in which he holds women: surely nobody would assert the converse of women?

Mrs. Charlton. I know he is a great favourite of yours, but is not Coleridge considered out of date now? we have more advanced thinkers than he surely?

Agatha (stammeringly): Oh yes, no doubt, indeed I think he always was out of date.

Professor. After all the main question is not the date, but the truth of the saying; for happily truths do not change with our changing ages. However we must I think say, that for the purpose of cementing a strong union amongst the members of our community, the respect, as well as the receptivity from which it springs, must be mutual.

6. The last conditions I would name are a oneness of material and moral interests, and a division of labour in pursuing these. Indeed no two communities can have really antagonistic or contrary interests: for the laws which govern men's health, wealth, and material prosperity; and those which affect the progress of their moral and intellectual condition, are the same for all; so that to transgress these is injurious, and to obey them is advantageous for the whole world alike. Yet their practical application to the various conditions and races of men is so amazingly varied by circumstances, that exactly opposite means may have to be employed in two different communities to effect the very

same object in each. Thus the fusion of all nations into one, or the government of all nations by one code of laws or one form of government, would not be to unite, but to separate their interests: for whereas they ought to be pursuing the same general end by the use of different means, they would by the use of the same means be effecting opposite results. To constitute one body under one head, the circumstances of every portion of the community must be so far alike, that not only their ultimate end but the means by which they must pursue it, may be the same. Nor will the union be very intimate and cordial, unless the members are persuaded that their interests are the same. Union indeed may subsist without their seeing this: for as union is not for us a matter of choice, so it is not necessarily an object of consciousness. As persons may be pursuing the same end by the same means without knowing it; so also they may be bringing about the same result, when by reason of their disagreement as to measures, they imagine themselves to be pursuing conflicting objects. But as "le lien le plus réel, c'est l'accord absolu entre les deux volontés," so union will be the strongest when this accord is most consciously felt. The special interests of each class must be impartially promoted by the general action of the community, and each class must perceive that it is equally cared for. Or if this is too much to expect of all, yet obviously none are fit to take any share in the guidance of the community who do not fully understand the general principle, that there is one common interest of the whole society, which is equally the interest of every special portion of it; and that no member or class of members can be injured or benefited, degraded or raised, without a corresponding injury or benefit to all the rest. Nor will any union effect its end of advancing this common interest, unless there is a division of labour amongst the members. As they unite because they are not all alike, so they must not, if their union is to be effective, aim at all doing the same kind of work, filling the same place, or possessing the same kind or degree of power in the community. To be complete, each community should be as much as possible independent: and a wise community will therefore aim at developing amongst its members the greatest diversity of gifts and of employments. It is by division not by sameness

of labour and position that the wants of the state must be satisfied and its progress secured: for thus "the whole body being fitly joined together, and compacted by that which every part supplieth, according to the effectual working in the measure of every part, maketh increase of the body into the building up of itself, in love."*

7. Now these four essential conditions, or elements of union, Providence has surely secured to mankind by creating them men and women. Individuals find this great necessity of humanity supplied in that, which as being the closest and most real union, has been made the type of all human unions—Marriage. A free nation obtains it through sameness of race and circumstances, and diversity of character and ability; but permanently and mainly in the natural division and mutual relation of her citizens as men and women.

Sara. And a nation that is not free?

Professor. No where. A number of people bound together by a force external to themselves and against their wills, cannot form a nation, because they do not unite.

Mrs. Charlton. Then you really allow that women ought to take their place among the free citizens of the state.

Professor. I certainly acknowledge they are there, constituting one half of the nation just as truly as of the family and the church. I was going to say that of such societies, such real unions, we know only these three forms;—the family, the nation, and the church. There are countless modes of uniting arbitrarily invented and voluntarily entered into by people; but none but these are necessary for us as men. These three societies men did not create for themselves: they exist by divine appointment, and they prove their divine origin by their necessity: being indispensable for our well-being—our complete happiness. We find ourselves placed in them without our choice, and we cannot exclude ourselves from them, without at the same time cutting ourselves off from everything that makes human life worth living.

But like all things human, these three societies, perfect in idea, are very imperfect as they actually exist amongst us: very deficient in union, in energy, and in right guidance.

* Ephesians, iv. 16.

Human progress may be said practically to consist, in realizing these three modes of union more perfectly. You will have to consider how this can be done, in the case of one of these communities, when we come to speak of social power and liberty. Now I will only add a few words on the connexion in which these three societies stand to each other.

8. The family is the germ whence both the state and the church must grow: and it is in the family that men are educated to take their appointed place, and to fulfil their respective functions in each. "In the family," says a writer I care very little to quote generally, "as forming a permanent relationship, we recognise the great line of demarcation, between the herding together of gregarious animals and the association of human beings." I suppose this means, what is I think indisputable;—that without this primary relationship of the family, any association of men would be, not a true society, but an unorganized herding together of so many individuals. "The true social unit is certainly the family; and this implies far more than the mere physiological fact that families become tribes and tribes nations. . . . Politically also the family presents to us the true germ of the social organism. There would be as many scientific inconveniences in passing it over, as there are practical dangers in pretending to treat of social life without the inevitable preparation of the domestic life. It is by this avenue that man comes forth from his mere personality, and learns whilst obeying his most powerful instincts to live in 'and for' another."*

The true education for citizenship is in the affections, the habits, and the discipline of the family: and what sort of citizens men will prove, whether uniters or dividers, defenders or accusers, just or tyrannical, patriotic or selfish, true or false, indolent or active is pretty well determined by the habits, the feelings, and the aims they have acquired, by the strength of the family bond, and by the moral standard that has moulded them in their own homes. It is in the family that the little self-regarding savage acquires the habit of considering and of respecting the rights, the opinions, and the wills of others—of his elders, his equals, his inferiors in strength. It is in the family he must learn frankly to

* Comte's *Positive Philosophy*, vol. ii. p. 122, 123, English translation.

submit to those inevitable compromises which every society imposes on its members, and to subject his own interests to justice and to law. It is in the family that the child learns to look upon law as his true protector, and to appeal to justice rather than to mere physical strength, as the essential condition of his liberty. Here if anywhere he learns to include his fellows in those self-regarding instincts, which have been given to us for our preservation and our advancement: it is here that he learns to find his own happiness in the affection, the esteem, and the happiness of others; and to value his own powers not so much for the sake of the material advantages they may bring to himself, as for the honour and affection they win him from his family and the advantages they bring to it.

So trained he enters on the life and relations of a citizen ready civilized: he has learned to find his own good in the good of the community. Happiness has become impossible to him without sympathy; impossible so long as he continues to be "I myself I" alone: he must share it with others, be in union with others in order to be happy. And he has learned willingly to subject himself to law; with these moral habits rooted in him, he would be utterly miserable were he forced to live without law and order; the maintenance of both involves for him all that makes life worth having, or even tolerable. His family nature has but to widen and extend itself with his widening relations to the state in which he is a citizen, in order to fit him to discharge the duties and responsibilities which that wider relationship imposes on us all. For surely it is a strange mistake to assume that none but members of the Sovereign Government have national duties and responsibilities. To admit this is to deny the very nature of a true relationship. I must leave you to draw the reverse of this picture—the condition of the men and women who have grown up out of the family, or in what ought to have been a family, but what has been only a disunited ungoverned collection of individuals; and who have learned there every lesson and acquired every habit that can unfit them for citizenship—lessons of mutual distrust and disunion, habits of injustice, contempt for unselfishness, for freedom, and affection; a hatred and dread of law, an admiration of selfishness, of brute force, of tyranny and bondage.

A nation is the union of many families. No number of individuals, however unanimous in their aims and actions, can form a nation. A nation is a living, that is an organized and a growing—a self-renewing body. Indeed in its natural form it has sprung from one family and comprises only one race, or branch of a race. "We have," Mr. Maine tells us, "the clearest indications, that society in primitive times was not, what it is assumed to be at present, a collection of individuals. Both in fact, and in the view of the men who composed it, it was an aggregation of families. The unit of the ancient society was the family; of the modern society, the individual;"* that is, in the eye of the law. In fact, and therefore in the view of science, the true unit of the nation is and ever must be the family. But since the Christian Gospel has raised the individual human being to a dignity, and has set upon him the value of a relationship undreamt of before; and has taught us that families, nations, and churches exist only for individual men, and that not one man exists for them:—since then, law has learnt to deal with individuals alone: and petrifying this truth in its rigid formulas, has excluded the complementary truth, and has done much to break up and tear asunder the family bond. You may note here, as continually, how great a power national legislation has in creating those opinions and states of feeling which it assumes to be true, and on which it acts: for by dealing with each member of the nation as though he were that and nothing more, it has educated men to slight, or even to deem themselves quit of their family relations. Beyond the inevitable relation of parent and child it scarcely recognises any other; even this relation it notices as little, and cuts as short as it can: and its increasing tendency is to encroach upon and regulate it. As though it were wholly unable to deal with any other relation than that of subject and sovereign, it has recognised in a wife little more than the absolute subject of her sovereign husband, his slave or chattel. And now that it would rectify this it seems as if it could imagine no other way than that of severing the relation itself, and "releasing" us from that union which constitutes the germ, the heart and centre of all human society. If a nation bent on rebelling against its primary duty of self-

* Maine's *Ancient Law*.

preservation, were resolved to cut its own throat, it were impossible to hit on a more certain way than this of encouraging the dissolution of marriages; thereby making family life impossible, and effectually preventing us from keeping that commandment, of which we are told, that only the nation that obeys it shall live long in the land which God has given them. So indispensable is a vigorous family life to the well-being and continuance of a nation. When there is little or none of it amongst a people, then truly you will find it hard to detect any national life. Wherever family life does exist with any vigour, there you will find its stamp on the actions of the state, moulding, correcting, and inspiring their course.

But neither the family nor the nation will satisfy that capacity, that craving for union, which they arouse in those whom they have civilized. Unless our national union becomes to us a stepping-stone whereby we can unite ourselves with our contemporary nations, and through them with all races of men; it will represent itself to us, or at least to those of us whom it has most thoroughly educated, as a barrier that separates them from mankind: indeed it becomes this. And so young men who think themselves very advanced strive to weaken its bonds, despising "the old stupid nationality," the "bigotry of patriotism." And this they do because they will not acknowledge themselves members of that wider society, for the higher sympathies of which their family and national training ought to have prepared them. For as the nation is the union of many families into one body; so the church affords the only enduring and real, indeed the only possible, union of nations. It is founded on the only relation that is universal amongst men; it embodies and pursues the only interest, which is equally the interest of every human being. It is founded on that first and supreme relation which subsists between the individual man and his Creator, and which is the cause of all relations that subsist between men. And thus it upholds as no other community can, the distinct personality of the individual man; sustaining his personal freedom all the more, the more closely it draws him into union with his fellow-men. And it demands no compromise, no balancing of various interests; for by reason of the entireness and universality of that pri-

mary relation on which it is founded, it is able to realise that complete harmony, that actual identity of the interests of each one of its members with those of the rest; which family and national union only tends to promote but never actually attains. And thus it becomes the typical union: one body with many members, animated by the same Life, actuated by the same Spirit, governed by the same Head, it is in the completeness of its union the type of the perfect man. It is itself a family—and that in the most perfect form,—but a family embracing our whole race. It is the only ideally perfect kingdom—the kingdom which rules absolutely and entirely, because it governs not the lives only, but also the minds and hearts and wills of its subjects, making them as one with their King, and by so ruling, sets them free. And this union in the truly Catholic Church is secured by diversity, not by uniformity. The visible members of the church on earth are the national churches; all that is alive in each being inspired by the same Spirit and governed by the same King; each living on the same Truth, but seeing it and expressing it in that manifold variety of form and feeling which is naturally demanded by the varying characters of the races of men, and the different educations they receive from their different forms of government and national life. And by that very diversity; they secure to mankind something of its true heritage,—the whole body of the truth that has, as yet, been revealed; and which no one nation or race of men could receive or express in its entireness.

9. You may easily carry out for yourselves the analogy that subsists between these three ascending modes of union. The life of the family is but for one generation; but it dies only as it multiplies itself into many. The life of the nation, unless cut short by internal corruption or external violence, should last as long as the world itself. But the church, whilst using these as its lower and higher schools for the present world or childhood of men, lives onward as long as humanity itself shall endure: the union of the ransomed human race in Christ our great Head, being as immortal as Himself. Again, the family to live and act as one body, must have one common home—the equal right of each member alike; one common head whose protection, whose government and whose good will each has an equal right to claim.

The nation must have some common territory, some country which every citizen alike calls his own, where each has a right to dwell; and one common sovereign whose protection each citizen can claim, and which is in equity bound to protect each citizen whilst living in that country, to the full extent of the power of the whole community. So the church with its many members has one common home and country, and that the only true and abiding home of the whole human race: it has one Sovereign, the King whose protection, good will, and government each enjoys as fully as though it were his alone.

Nor is the analogy less complete in the imperfect realisation of each society as they actually exist amongst us, although as is natural the higher and more perfect the society is in its own nature, the less perfectly is it realised by us. We have no perfect families; yet we can find families which far more closely answer to their ideal than any existing nation does to the typical nation. And in like manner we find the union of the church falls farther below what it ought to be than that of nations does. And as there are both families and nations which are far more marked to our eyes by their disunion than by their union, and which are yet living communities; in which therefore the real union must exceed the visible disunion; so it is with the Catholic Church. Its true life is one; its interests are the common interests of every christian; but the manifestation of its life is so imperfect, and the manner in which it comprehends and pursues that interest is so confused and feeble, that it is for the most part known to the superficially judging world by its divisions—its disunion. And as in speaking of families and nations, we are compelled to speak of them as they ought to be, rather than as they anywhere are; still more in describing the church are we forced to describe what it will be, not what it is. And yet it is a living society, more truly powerful even in its weakest condition than the strongest nation will ever be without it. The union it embodies and nourishes is fundamental; the disunion we witness is accidental, and results not from its action but its inaction, however it may appear to spring from its forms or may call itself by its name.

We are very apt to mistake the government of these three

societies for the societies themselves. But the form is one thing, the life is another: and the particular forms under which they may happen to exist are not the real sources of their strength or their weakness, their union or divisions, their freedom or their bondage. It is a matter of great importance to secure the best form of church government or of national government; the successful growth of the church's or of the nation's life may be greatly promoted or impeded by its government. But if there be no life, it is a matter of no moment at all; and if the life of the community is but feeble, if its real union is but slight, it is a matter of very little importance what sort of government it has. Now we are all apt to think very much of the form of government; we are perpetually labouring to amend it; we attribute every deficiency to its not being amended.* We are very apt to forget the essential thing,—the life—the true union,—and take little heed to maintain and invigorate that. What share I have in the government is a question really of very little moment to myself, or to the body to which I belong: but how much of energetic life and union, or of slothful death and disunion I contribute to my family, my nation, my church,—that is the truly important question; and that we scarcely think of asking.

Miss St. John. No doubt there is a figurative resemblance; but there is this essential difference; the two first societies are purely natural ones, and embrace earthly relations alone. But Holy Church is a supernatural community, of Divine appointment and authority; and all those natural relations must be subjected and give way to her claims on our allegiance.

Professor. If we really believe God to be the Creator of men, we cannot doubt that it is by His appointment men's nature impels them to live in families and nations. And if so, in what respect are these societies less Divine in their origin, or of less authority than the church itself? We cannot admit that the church was an afterthought by which He, with Whom is no variableness neither shadow of turning, superseded a part of His former plan. Had God thus cancelled so much of our obligation to obey His law of family

* *Profcssor*: *i.e.* the legal as well as the political forms.

and national relationships and the duties which result from them, as interfered with His new law of obedience to the church: would He not have ceased to write that first law in the hearts of all men? But the fact is, there is no interference: these three societies, with their respective relationships, are not only not antagonistic, they are inseparable. They are stages of our education for God's kingdom, and such stages, that we can neither fulfil the duties nor enjoy the blessings of any one of them, unless we share the benefits and strive to discharge the responsibilities of the other two.

10. And the reason of this is that all three are the necessary results of one cause. The fundamental human relation, the root and cause of all our other relations, is that which subsists between each individual human being and Him, Who is not only the Creator, but also the "Father of his spirit;" every relation which binds man to his fellow men, results from this; this is the relation involved in the fact of our personal existence; those other relations in which we stand to family, nation, and church, arise from this by God's appointment. This Divine relation is therefore the one that must be satisfied: if it cannot find satisfaction within their forms, those subsequent relations which bind us to our fellow men must give way. The church that hinders it must be forsaken; national bonds snap asunder like gossamer threads; the family is not only renounced—the first-born is sacrificed for the man's transgression; his own life is as nothing: it is little to throw it away,—it shall be cheerfully given up in the fiercest tortures, if only, even in the remotest distance, he can entertain a hope of being thereby reconciled to his Creator, and of entering again into that relation of sonship which his sin seems to have broken. This is the testimony of history. "La religion domine partout la vie humaine: elle la façonne à son image. Avant tout, c'est un instinct impérieux de l'âme; un besoin d'infini, de paix, de pardon, de consolation, qui commence par être un tourment avant de procurer l'apaisement. C'est la tentative passionnée de renouer le lien brisé entre l'humanité et la Divinité: c'est la recherche d'une expiation suffisante, et d'une réconciliation certaine avec le ciel."* Truly this Divine relation is our

* Pressensé's *Jésus-Christ*, livre i. p. 42.

Natural one: our relations to other men, whether in the family, the nation, or the church, are added to it and grow out of this root; to be to us both the outward and visible signs,—the pledges to assure us of its reality; and the means by which we may become capable of realizing it, and of living up to it. Thus though the church was the last developed in the order of time, the relation which it embodies and expresses, and which it aids us to realize, is the first in the nature of man. It is in this sense true that our relations as members of the church transcend those lesser relations of family and country. But they do so only by including, animating, and strengthening them, deepening their hold on our hearts, and so setting us free from the bondage of self. Moreover the church is altogether powerless to accomplish its own work without the aid of the family and the nation. The church is commanded to receive each infant at its birth, to recognise it as a Person—as a being divinely related to, and made in the image of God; and to enrol it amongst her members, because the new-born child of God must be taught to live in fellowship with all His children. But how is it taught thus? the church restores the infant to its parents that he may be educated in and by the family. In case his own parents should die, or fail in this work, she appoints other parents, and so a family for him. She never commits him to her own ministers, because they can only teach, they cannot educate him: family life, family affections trials and blessings, alone can train him rightly for that social and national life with its wider sympathies, duties and difficulties, in which he must take his place as a man. And since Christ has dwelt amongst us, to say "a man" is to say "a christian." And social duties faithfully performed, national relations loyally fulfilled, national laws freely obeyed, are the true earthly discipline for those who are to be fitted here to take their place as free citizens, kings, and priests, in the universal and heavenly kingdom. At least Scripture tells us, this is God's way of educating them.*

The more closely you examine the nature and the effects of these three unions, the more clearly you will see how they lead us up, through the narrowest to the widest. The same principles strengthen each; the same dangers threaten

* Luke xix. 12, 19; Matt. xxv. 21, 23, 34–46.

each. The animal nature which is in us all, is not more antagonistic to our uniting together in the church, than it is destructive of family and of national feeling. The absence of love to our fellow men, is a sure sign of our having no love to God. Nothing serves more effectually to destroy family union than injustice, or inequality of benefit: if once any member of a family is convinced that he is unjustly treated, his interests less considered, himself less loved than the rest: if advantages freely enjoyed by them are refused to him, or an undue share of the family burdens are laid upon him, he will cease to feel himself a member of the family. And if any one member be habitually favoured in these ways above the rest, he also will be separated from the family, and learn to live for himself alone. Just so it is in the nation or the church: a sense in any class that they are less protected, more heavily burdened; sacrificed as instruments for the benefit of the more favoured classes; or arbitrarily excluded from advantages the rest enjoy; or if any class finds itself in these respects more highly favoured than the rest; in either case alike that class will become an element of weakness because of division in the nation and the church. The sense of injustice does more to destroy patriotism or devotion than any amount of suffering endured in the service of the commonwealth.

So again we find that the strongest bond of a man's actual union with his family, lies not so much in the importance of his family to his own happiness, as in the consciousness of his own importance to his family. Just so in a more marked degree we find it is in the nation. The sense of what our country is for us, and of what she does for us; the sense of the state of impotency and degradation into which we should fall did she fail; this has much to do with our patriotism. But much more potent is the sense of what we are, or may hope to be to her,—the consciousness that we also can do something for her welfare. This is the true source of active patriotism; which we consequently find to be more active in small than in very great nations. In a nation so large as our own it is only by accident, or as members of large classes, that we can hope to serve it; yet give any class a fresh opportunity of benefiting their country; and you will find the best and strongest feelings of their nature are

roused for her defence. Nor is any other way of enlisting men's affections in the welfare of their church comparable to this of employing them in some mode or other in her active service. Because God would have us love Him, He gives us work to do for Him: because He would have parents love their children, He has made children wholly dependent on their parents' care. The principle is the same throughout all relations. It is strange that our own church and our government have not been able to make more use of a motive to good order, loyalty and devotion so powerful and so universally felt as this: it is one to which the poorest and least cultivated of our citizens are fully as susceptible as the most educated. The success of the volunteer movement attests the strength, and its effects in rousing the patriotic enthusiasm of the volunteers, and the country generally, shows its value. In our country where no *men* but those of the criminal class have any real sense of injustice, if our magistrates had the courage and the skill to avail themselves of it, it might be safely relied on as sufficient in any populous district and ordinary emergency for the maintenance of order. I have always thought that had the Government had the keenness to be beforehand with Mr. Beales, far the greater part of the mob who pulled down the Hyde Park railings, would have been found there, long before the roughs had a chance, in the character of special constables zealous for their protection.

It is the entire absence of this motive, and the presence of the antagonistic feeling of injustice, which makes the growth of a savage population,—of homeless, family-less youths and girls, men and women,—so ominous of evil to our nation. For the causes that produced them are still at work,—nay fast increasing: and the motives that might counteract those causes are more remote from them than ever; to restore family life to a race who have once lost it, being little less difficult than to restore life to a corpse. Destitute of family training, outlaws from their infancy, these savages in the midst of a civilization which has bestowed on them nothing but a knowledge of its vices, owe nothing to their country but neglect and injustice, and can do nothing to make themselves important to her prosperity.

11. These three societies then are mutually dependent on

each other: so dependent, that they must flourish or decay together. Two practical principles follow from this. The first is, that whatever weakens one, weakens all. The second is; that they who would make one of paramount obligation or importance, and would do so by lowering the obligations of the other two, will in fact destroy the living power of that which they would exalt. The social philosophy which denies our obligation to live together in church union; and which would put out of sight that first Divine relation between God and the individual man, as irrelevant to our actual life in the world; leaves our family and national relations without any adequate cause, and therefore without any morally binding power. For setting aside that first relation, the man belongs to himself in a sense far more real and absolute, than any in which he can be said to belong to his family, or to his country, or to mankind.

He may justly maintain that as it is only as a person, that he can be a member of either, so his personality precedes his membership and all its consequences; and therefore if he is willing to forego the benefits of society, he is justified in renouncing its claims. To the man who thus falling back on his own personality claims his right to live for himself alone, and to regard his fellow men only as he can by force or cunning use them for his own benefit; such philosophy has nothing to say. It cannot even say, that he must take the consequences, for whilst families and nations and churches exist, such a man will not and cannot suffer the true consequences of isolation. This is no imaginary conclusion from that godless teaching: it is openly avowed by not a few, it is practically acted on by a far greater number than those who care to avow it. It is all but openly avowed as the maxim of our Stock Exchange and of our commerce, that society has no claims on a man comparable to the claims he has on himself; that the claims of self-interest are paramount. It is the rational conclusion from a Godless Philosophy: and what proves it to be a false philosophy, is that though logically he may, practically and in fact he cannot separate himself or his interests from his fellows and from their welfare. For thus taking his stand on his own individuality, and cutting himself off from men, he stands face to face with the Author

of his existence. That relationship he can only escape if he can cease to be: or rather if he can cease to have been. But could he free himself from it, he would not any longer belong to himself, he would belong to whatever had the power to take possession of him. He is only a person, because God made him in the image of His own Personality: he is only a free agent, because God sustains him in life, Who has also determined the bounds of his habitation and decreed his union with and his dependence upon his fellow men.

Not less does the church that interferes with, or strives to tyrannise over men's personal freedom,—seeking to interpose itself between God and us, as though it were the cause of that relation of which it is the result,—sap its own foundation, and destroy its only claim to our allegiance. Whilst they who neglect, or actively endeavour to separate men from the fellowship of the church, can only divide and break down the bonds of family and nation. Seeing neither the true origin of nations, nor the end for which they exist, how can they rightly discern the means by which their progress can be promoted?

And again it follows, that they will most effectually strengthen the church and increase the force of its union, who do the most to purify and strengthen the life of the family and of the nation. Whatever artificial communities separate men or women from family life; or teach them to subordinate their family relations and duties, to their self-chosen and (falsely so-called) religious ones;—whatever form of church government enfeebles the patriotism and loosens the national allegiance of the church's servants;—these weaken the church far more than they injure the State, and frustrate all its work of education.

Thus it comes to pass, as Professor Maurice has told us, that "Our home life is confused and darkened by our want of zeal for the well-being of the nation; and our domestic transgressions involve a coldness and deadness to our duty as citizens." Our apathy as citizens blinds us to the necessity of union in the church and to the means by which the church can grow in men's hearts. It is truly strange how family affections and national loyalty have ever been

set aside for ecclesiastical obedience,—professedly I mean —in the presence of those words, "If any man provide not for his own, and especially for them of his own household; he hath denied the faith, *and is worse than an infidel.*"

And he who cares nothing for the nation of which he is a citizen—to which he owes his personal security, his liberty, his family, and his property—how can he care for humanity? If philanthropy is the pure gold of human nature; then like gold it may be so beaten out as to gild the universe. But there is no wear in gold-leaf. The ox-hide that was cut into strips so fine as to enclose a city, could no longer serve as a shield for a single citizen.

None of these, our true relations, are repellant of each other; they will be strong or weak together: properly fulfilled they all draw us closer,

"Day by day, each to the other, all to God."

Self-chosen relations, artificial communities, may offer to bring you to perfection by a shorter road: may try to supersede these natural relations by purer and less earthly bonds; but beginning by attacking individual freedom, they will end by destroying the sanctity of all obligations. It is in the steady and conscientious fulfilment of our threefold relationship, that we must ourselves receive the highest and most christian education of which we are capable. Would you be strong and free; strive to fulfil those natural relations in which God has placed you: nothing else will so surely lead you to that inward harmony which is strength, or habituate you to that self-government which is freedom. Would you strengthen and free others? be to them really what your actual relationship asserts you to be; so you may best help them to perceive and fulfil their own relations to their family, their nation, and their church. Or would you have dominion amongst men? fulfil all those relations which bind you to them, and you will not fail to obtain the full measure of that influence with them and that dominion over them which your ability warrants you to exert, and which their capacity enables them to profit by. Or would you truly serve the church? then seek to realize yourself and to animate and strengthen as much as you can in others

the bonds of union in your family, your parish, your neighbourhood, your nation.

It is not by any self-regarding aim at our own perfection, mental, moral, or spiritual, that we shall make ourselves wiser, or holier, or happier. In this respect also it is true that he who saves his life—makes his own life and its perfection his end—shall lose it: whilst he who loses his life,—regarding his own increase as nothing so that he may do God's will in his appointed post,—he shall find both life and perfection.

LECTURE XI.

OF SOCIAL OR POLITICAL POWER.

"All government and law rest on nothing else than reason and conscience in their ultimate resort: and can have no permanence, except so far as they accord with the moral order of the world."—*Bunsen.*

"To ascertain better and better what the will of the Eternal was and is with us: what the laws of the Eternal are; all parliaments, Ecumenic councils, congresses, and other collective wisdom, have had this for their object. That the laws of this universe, like the laws of constitutional countries, are to be decided by voting, is an idle fancy. Of which laws, if the laws of England are not an exact transcript, they should passionately desire to become such."—*Carlyle.*

Professor. I HAVE been perplexed by the subject you have prescribed to me for this lecture; "Whether it is just that women should be excluded from all share of political power." You appear to call upon me either to prove that women ought to share in the government of the nation, or else to show cause why they are to be excluded. But I have not been able to convince myself that women do not considerably influence the government; nor can I conceive that they could, in a nation so far civilised as ours, be by any possibility prevented from influencing it, if they desire to do so. Instead therefore of discussing who ought to possess direct political power in the State; or—which is the same thing—what is for us the best form of government; I have thought it best,—referring your question to your own decision, to consider only what Sovereign government is; its objects; the extent of its power; and amongst whom it is shared, or who actually do exercise it, directly or indirectly, in such a State as our own.

1. I am afraid I must ask you to attend to a dry enumeration of axioms and definitions; I have endeavoured to make it as brief as I could. I understand you to mean by political power, the power which determines the actions of the State.

It includes the whole power of the nation or political community, acting in its corporate capacity. And whoever habitually wields this power in any nation, is its Sovereign. Before we can come to any clear practical conclusions, all these nouns must be defined: I take the definitions given by Mr. Austin, whose authority I think none will dispute.

1. By an independent political society, or independent sovereign nation, we mean a political society, consisting of a sovereign and subjects.*

2. By subjection we mean, that the bulk of the subjects living in that community, are in a habit of obedience or submission to a determinate and common superior.

3. By sovereignty we mean, that this determinate and common superior—whether it be a certain person, or a determinate body or aggregate of persons—is not in a habit of submission to any determinate human superior.

An independent society not in the habit of obedience to a determinate superior, is not a political society, but is in a state of anarchy. If the obedience be not habitual, the relation of sovereignty and subjection is not established; if it be not paid by the bulk of the society to one and the same superior, either the society is in a state of anarchy, or it is split into two or more independent political societies. Again, if the superior is not determinate it is not sovereign: for an indeterminate body is incapable of corporate action, and cannot therefore command or be obeyed. And if the superior is habitually obedient to a determinate human superior, the society is not independent, not a sovereign nation but a subordinate political society.† I shall use the word "State" as the name of an "independent political society" including sovereign and subjects, and regarding them as one.

Of the origin of such political societies, and therefore of this political or Sovereign power, we need say little. Many different theories have been maintained about it: but it will be sufficient for our purpose to consider that as political or organised society, in some form or other, is essential if men are to rise above the state of savages; that is, if in place of a merely animal they are to live human lives; so its origin is to be sought in human nature; and its essential properties

* "A political society must not fall short of a number which is considerable."

† Austin's *Jurisprudence*, lecture vi. vol. i.

are determined by the constitution of the human mind, the affections of mankind, and the circumstances of human life. In other words, the efficient cause of sovereignty and subjection is the will of our Creator, not the will or consent of man.

"The proper end or object of a Sovereign political Government"—I quote again from Mr. Austin,—"that end for which it ought to exist, is to advance as far as possible the weal or good of mankind generally; and more particularly, to advance as far as possible the weal or good of its own community. The general good of mankind and the particular good of the individual nation, never or very rarely conflict. That which promotes the second, promotes equally the first; and would it accomplish the general object, it must commonly labour directly to accomplish the particular: and it will hardly accomplish the particular object unless it regard the general one. Thoroughly to accomplish this end government must extend its care to all the means by which it may probably promote the common weal."* Thus the sovereign government exists for the sake of the community, not the community for the sake of the sovereign: and this is just as true when the sovereign number is most numerous as when it is one man. And do not forget that the community is nothing but the aggregate of its individual members; that the happiness or good of the community is nothing else than the happiness of its single and individual members.

2. And now as to the limitation of the Sovereign's power. These are of two kinds, the one absolute and positive, and imposed on all Sovereigns alike: the others comparative, often negative, and always variable, depending on the circumstances and the character of the individual State and of its form of government. The first class consist of those regulations and restraints which God has imposed on all human power, in the conditions and circumstances of human life and action. These include the invariable sequences of the phenomena of our own mental, moral, and physical natures; the laws of the material things with which we have to deal; and the laws or settled sequences which result from the combination and mutual reaction of these two classes of phenomena on each other, *e.g.* the laws of political economy.

* Austin's *Jurisprudence*, vol. i. lecture vi. p. 265.

I should call these God's positive laws, in distinction from those moral and spiritual laws which He has set to us as rational persons, and which He has left us free to obey or not as we will. His positive laws, so to speak, fulfil themselves; we cannot disobey them; they carry their own sanction with them; so that "to resist these forces of nature, is to employ them against ourselves."* "The very fabric of our moral being is held together by moral laws; and the State that violates them outlaws itself, and rouses into armed hostility a thousand agencies that might and would otherwise fight on its side."† And again, "Political society and government are not accidental: but the wants, capacities, and feelings of men create certain conditions, with which political institutions *must comply*, and which circumscribe the free choice of the legislator by fixed limits."‡ It is not possible for the most powerful State to set aside these laws, the invariable tendency of which is to promote the general good, the well-being both of men and of all the sentient creation. So long as man acts in conformity with them, they promote this end by blessing him: when he opposes himself to them, either by seeking another end than theirs, or by seeking the same end by means which they proscribe; they promote that end by punishing him and rectifying the wrong he has done. And this they do, not as human justice is obliged to do, but by inflicting an evil or a good answerable to the action that causes it. Thus a breach of the physical laws of health, or of wealth, is followed by a corresponding physical evil: disregard of the laws of mind, by an intellectual loss; disobedience to the dictates of the moral conscience by a corresponding degradation or loss of moral power. Thus men may set these sequences in motion, but can neither change the series nor arrest its consequences. The most powerful Sovereign can only gain its ends by adapting its conduct to them. If it sets itself in opposition to them, by endeavouring to secure advantages which they pronounce incompatible, or by using means which they do not authorise, it does but employ these forces against itself; it is as powerless to resist them as the feeblest infant.

* Say's *Cours complet d'Économie politique*, quoted by Sir G. C. Lewis.

† Dr. Hodgson's *Study of the Economic Sciences.*

‡ *Methods of Reasoning and Observation in Politics*, ch. xviii. § 10.

In relation to its own subjects the power of the Sovereign is incapable of legal limitation: "for all political or civil laws are commands which the Sovereign legislator lays upon the subject community; and the legislator is he, not by whose authority the law was first made, but by whose authority it continues to be a law: if therefore the Sovereign were subject to the civil laws, he were subject to himself; which were not subjection, but freedom." *

3. The second class of limitations of the Sovereign power is a very various one: they arise from such a number of conditions and circumstances, that we can only consider them under very general, and I fear rather vaguely marked, heads. Perhaps it will be most convenient to follow here those three divisions of power of which we have availed ourselves before —physical, mental, and moral.

i. The amount of a Sovereign's power will depend, in the first place, on the physical resources which the State has, or can command. If the State is free, and its Sovereign government therefore absolute, these are equivalent to the whole sum of the physical power and resources of all its citizens. And if this is not sufficient to enable the Sovereign to execute its determinations as regards all its own subjects; and to maintain its independence as against foreign States; then no amount of intellect or of moral strength can make that State a powerful one. But if the Sovereign can command adequate physical power for these two purposes; then its strength will be proportionate to the intelligence, and to the moral energy, resolution, or force of will it possesses. It is in these two last respects that in civilised and free States, disunion negatives power.

ii. The power of the Sovereign to accomplish its intentions is limited by the knowledge it possesses of the ends it desires to attain, and of the means proper for their attainment: and by the intelligence and skill with which it can avail itself of them and adapt them to its purposes. Ignorance of political economy, for example, limits its power; as when it seeks to increase the riches of the State by enactments the effect of which is to impoverish it. Ignorance of human nature limits its power: as when Governments have sought to promote true religion by the persecution of false ones; or to

* Austin's *Jurisprudence*, vol. i. lecture vi., quoted from *Hobbes*.

how can they submit to that which does not exist? If I do exert it, it were no less absurd to say they ought not to be subjected to it. Whatever moral influence I possess must indeed take its own level amongst the other influences to which they are exposed, but so far as it is real no man and no State can prevent my exerting it. This is true also of the second, or intellectual political power, in our own and in all countries where Government abstains from interference by physical force with opinion and its expression. Here the old golden rule is true, and just: that

> "Those may keep, who have the power,
> And those may win, who can."

No State can give this power to those who have it not, and our State debars none from exercising it, who like to try.

Mrs. Charlton. It debars all women by excluding them from Parliament.

Professor. From actually sitting and speaking in Parliament it does: but not from informing and convincing those who do sit there, those who send them there, and the whole mass of thinkers and writers and talkers from whom proceeds that public opinion which so much controls and inspires the action of Parliament. Whilst the press is free nothing whatever prevents women from wielding the whole of *this* power, except the fact they have not got the whole. Nothing hinders them from exercising a far greater share than they actually do exercise, except their own indifference to it, and their indolence in not attaining it. They could well wield a good deal more than they ever have done, but so far they have not been willing to take the necessary trouble.

Mrs. Charlton. But this only gives political power to those who have the power of writing persuasively: there are many inarticulate souls who cannot do that, but who are very capable of forming sound opinions on their own subjects, and might express their opinions by a silent vote, and so share in the nation's self-government.

Sara. I should like these inarticulate voting souls to give some better proof they can govern without damaging me, than the fact of their inarticulateness affords: The others at least exercise no power but what they have had the wits to gain, and I'd rather have it, because it can't be given or taken away by political tinkerers and rogues.

Professor. It may be possessed by them though. The tendency of this intellectual power is rather to form public opinion in its conclusions, as to the immediate ends the State ought to pursue, and as to the measures which ought to be employed to secure them. Moral power is more concerned in creating the motives and moulding the principles whence political action springs: determining as it does the final ends which the nation desires. This is a force which is always acting on the commonwealth whether its possessors intend it or not. And the great evil we have to contend with is the deficiency of an intelligent and upright purpose in its direction. For moral influence does not cease to act because they who—even by the mere fact of contiguity—possess it, do not care to exercise it purposely, or with an intelligent will: the frivolous selfish mother, the worldly or stupid father, mould the moral characters of their children to the full as much as the most intelligent and most Christian parent. The unjust law has as much educating power as the just one. Ignorance, prejudice, and the narrowest self-regarding are as busy in forming public opinion as knowledge, wisdom, and the most devoted patriotism. Men are not the less actuated by moral motives, because the motives that actuate them come from the Devil. Nor can we be simply nescient and passive in those questions which come before us every day, and in which our welfare is so deeply involved as it is in the political action of our country: some notions we must form and diffuse, and if our knowledge is insufficient or our attention too remiss to enable us to form just ones, we shall be teaching false ones. As a cause of social action, the want of political knowledge is quite as great a social force as its possession: and the want of any interest in the conduct of the State has as much effect on political affairs as its presence. So far as the rudder is not held, the ship is driven by blind forces of nature; it does not stand still. "Let no man pacify his conscience with the thought, that he can do no harm, if he takes no part and forms no opinion. Bad men need nothing more to compass their ends, than that good men should look on and do nothing." *

It is true that a resolute will acting in accordance with the moral order of the world, and whether it be inspired by a

* J. S. Mill's *Inaugural Address.*

strong sense of duty or by a keen conception of self interest, is far more powerful than these passive vices,—sloth and ignorance and want of feeling,—can ever be. And it had need be stronger for there is far less of it. But these passive vices are by no means passive in their effects on national conduct: they too often make up by violent clamour, or the dead weight of resistance, for their proper impotence. Thus he who being legally one of the Sovereign number, finds himself unequal to the work of governing can abstain from action, and if he is unable to do good, can at least secure himself from doing harm. But whoever by position or relation exercises, or ought to exercise some influence over the social feelings and principles of any other, cannot abstain from its exercise: and though he may indeed abstain from adding to society's intelligence, yet if he does he can never be sure he is not adding to its ignorance; and he must, if only by the example he gives of neglect and indifference, be guiding those who depend on him for moral guidance, altogether wrongly, and so be adding to society's moral weakness. You cannot by echoing "women have nothing to do with politics" divest yourselves of your social power; you cannot wash your hands of your national responsibility.

This reminds me of another mode, by which a man may increase his political power. Coleridge pointed it out when he remarked that he "often reflected with awe, on the great and disproportionate power, which an individual of no extraordinary talents or attainments may exert, by merely throwing off all restraints of conscience." The counterpart of this evil power has been expressed by a commentator who adds; "it is with something more than awe, that we reflect upon the comparatively small power, which a man of considerable attainments and zeal is permitted to exercise, owing to the want of conscience and the want of earnestness, in others."

11. There is then abundant room for the exercise of all the political wisdom, and goodwill, ample scope for far more governing power over the heads and hearts of our fellow citizens than has as yet been put forth. Every one who can acquire any information on matters bearing on our national and common interests; every one who knows of an injustice to be remedied, or an evil to be exposed and conquered;

every one who has found a new fact, or who wishes to impress an old one on the public attention; can now make it known without any other let or hindrance than the limits of his own capacity: and can say his say to a more numerous public than Pitt or Fox or Burke could ever hope to reach. No doubt if the truth he offers is really weighty as well as new, and remote from the common line of thought, he will not get the public attention at once. But there are numbers amongst us to sift its truth and to act as its interpreters: so that in time it is pretty sure to be understood, familiarized, and finally adopted as a principle of action. The rule of intellectual influence seems to be something of this kind. He who can discover some general law or first principle of human nature; or who can grasp its true relation to human action and express that relation in a new form adapted to the circumstances of his times,—he will exercise the most lasting influence, creating a new epoch, and determining first the course of men's thoughts and then of Sovereign action. But this takes time; so that the truth he taught may not have leavened men's minds so as to come into general practice for some generations. Nevertheless "the principles thus diffused through the majority of the nation, are the true oracles whence statesmen are to learn wisdom." * It is of such a man Carlyle cried, "Oh thou who art able to write a Book which once in the two centuries or oftener there is a man gifted to do, envy not him whom they name city builder. Thou too art a conqueror and victor but of true sort, namely over the Devil: thou too hast built what will outlast all marble and metal, and be a wonder-bringing city to the mind, whereto all kindreds of the earth will pilgrim."†

Second rate men and books partly interpreting such universal principles into well devised maxims of policy, and showing us how we may best apply them to the government of the special circumstances of our own State, act on the public mind more speedily but less profoundly and therefore far less permanently. And of these books there can hardly be too many. "A second rate politician is very useful in his own way; yet very few of these suffice for all that men of their stamp have any power to do. But second rate books—and be it observed this does not mean fifth rate—may be almost

* *The Friend*, § 1, Essay iii. p. 113. † *Sartor Resartus.*

indefinitely multiplied with great general advantage to thought. The second rate thinker may, in spite of being second rate, raise the average of public opinion and knowledge, whether the form in which he embodies his thoughts be that of fiction, history, criticism, or pure speculation."*

Clever superficial writers, seeing only surface things, or teaching specious seeming truths, and clap trap intended to flatter not to teach the public, act at once on current opinion: indeed I am afraid these often succeed better with our Sovereign number than the real labourers do, better at the moment, but not in the long run. At any rate these are powers which may be used in defence of the right as of the wrong. And the power thus exercised through the press, can never be the merely brute force of numbers: none but the very feeblest minds estimate the truth of a fact by counting heads in its favour.

12. Scarcely less extensive is the national influence exercised by those who have to maintain our family life, with all its affections and discipline. These indeed have the nation's heart and habits in their hands in its childhood when both are most easily moulded: when moral habits of feeling, and social habits of acting are for the most part formed. It is perhaps difficult to estimate the extent of the influence exercised on the State, even by its physical and mental educators; but far deeper and more lasting is the influence of that moral education which its young citizens receive, for good or evil, in their several families. Take for instance that element of social health and national prosperity—reverence for women: our laws do a good deal to diminish it. But if they were ten times worse in this respect—were that possible—than they are, what power would they have to injure sons and husbands as against the power a wise and good woman has to benefit them? literally none at all. Hers is a moral force, and no physical nor mental force can neutralize it. Take only one of its more superficial operations. Habituating the young to good manners may seem a thing very remote from political action: yet some of the evils which most grievously threaten our legislation, which are indeed already encroaching on our liberties; would be effectually got rid of could the mothers of the rising generation form in

* *Saturday Review*, March 4, 1865.

them that habit of good breeding, which makes it a man's second nature to shrink from interfering with, or even from unnecessarily expressing any opinion about his neighbour's personal conduct and feelings. It is indeed improbable that the bulk of mankind will ever become so wise, or so certain that the truth is true, as to be thoroughly tolerant and thoroughly just towards those who differ from them. But it is quite possible that family life shall train men in such practical habits of reticence, justice, and self respect, as that they shall be almost incapable of interfering with the purely self regarding conduct of their neighbours; or of using their numerical power, or money to suppress their opponents' opinions, even though they find themselves at once in the right and in the majority. This is only one instance, one might give many. So great a political power do they exercise who mainly determine the character and tendency of our family life. It has been said that they who would foretell the course of our politics for the next twenty years, have only to acquaint themselves with our young men between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five. It is at least as true, that they who knew what our young women are, and how they have been educated, could tell what our nation itself will be. And yet women complain they are not allowed their due share of power in the State, and cry out for more responsibility. Did they realize but a part of that which already lies upon them, they would surely pray for less.

Agatha. Do you think so? As they can't it seems have less, what they should pray for is more power, answerable to it: and surely they may fairly ask, their task shall not be made harder, by their being placed by the law in an arbitrarily lower position, which makes their sons less capable of being influenced by them for good. Our law educates English boys to despise their mothers and sisters, and if that cannot destroy their moral power over them, it must weaken it.

Mrs. Melcombe. But my husband means we have more influence already than we know how to use well, in being the first educators of our children, before the law can hurt them.

Agatha. Unless the influence of family life and of mothers extends over the whole lives of men and women, it seems to me this nursery part of it is pretty well effaced in a couple of years.

Professor. I have no doubt that is true: what I meant by the responsibility of women to the State, is that whatever power family life exercises over individual and national character and principles, is almost wholly in their hands. If men are the heads of our families,—which of far the greater number is truer in theory than in practice, for the daily work of the mass prevents their acting as such,—but if men are the nominal heads women are its life and spirit and the bond of its union, As the women of any family are, that the family generally will be. If its women are womanly and thoughtful, if their aims are pure and their affections strong, its sons can hardly fail to grow up manly. If they are mean, unrefined, selfish, and feeble, it is more than probable that its men will be coarse and ignoble. It is not possible that women's proper influence can be weakened, whether by their own failure or by foolish laws, without a corresponding degradation of the men of the nation. I confess that when I consider how great their influence is, it seems to me that if women had as direct a control over the nation's actions, as they exercise over its moral life, the nation would be too feminine.

Agatha. Well the nation would hardly be a success if it were wholly shaped by women: But the intellectual power is not theirs, so there is no fear.

Professor. No fear, but there may be loss through a wrongly directed aim. At present our nation is too unfeminine, too barbarous and impure, too little strung together, too morally feeble: and that because our women govern our families with too little power; either they do not steer their boat at all but let it beat about in the trough of the world's wild seas; or else they guide it as impulse, or convenience, or Mrs. Grundy, inclines them. "For the States amongst whom the regulations regarding women are bad, enjoy scarcely the half of happiness."* But this subject is beyond my purpose. I have alluded to it as an illustration of the connexion between family life and national prosperity. The true strength of the nation, its effectual union and its life, springs out of the strength and the union of its individual homes; and their union depends mainly on the purity, the unselfishness, the intelligence, and the steadfastness of their

* Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, ch. 5.

women. How far all these depend on the character of their religious convictions and the strength of their religious principles we cannot now enquire. I have already wandered too far, from the possessors of political power amongst ourselves, to the question how they ought to use it.

Sara. And instead of the suffrage, have given us a scolding.

Mrs. Melcombe. It will do you much more good my dear.

Agatha. Us more—yes; but the State more—no.

Mrs. Charlton. If we are fit to exercise this last and highest power in the commonwealth: why should we be arbitrarily deprived of the first and less difficult?

Professor. Perhaps you ought not to have every kind of power. But that is one of the conclusions you have to decide upon. Would not your question be more accurate if put so, "why should not the suffrage be arbitrarily given to women, as well as to men?" It is not a natural, but an artificial power, given by law to certain persons for the supposed good of the whole nation.

Mrs. Charlton. Is there not something arbitrary in giving it to some citizens on the ground of their possessing certain qualifications, and witholding it from others who possess the very same, merely because they are women?

Professor. One of the qualifications now required is that of being a man. You must remember every one of the qualifications required for the suffrage, except possibly that of rate paying,—is an arbitrary one. It has been refused to education, to tax-paying, to economy—to everything which has any natural connexion whatever with the possession of capacity or inclination to use it aright: and that on the ground that anything which could give any sort of security the voter possessed such a capacity, would be a purely fanciful reason for making him one of our Sovereign number. If you claim the suffrage, you had better claim it on the ground of the public good.

Mrs. Charlton. We claim it on every ground. As woman's influence is so important to the State, the State is deeply concerned in her elevation: you have shown us that freedom is essential to elevation of character: and as a nation is not free unless it governs itself, its women do not share in its freedom, unless they share in its self-government.

Professor. This concerns the form of government, and lies

altogether out of my province: you must debate it amongst yourselves; Mrs. Charlton I resign the chair to you.

Agatha. But we don't know—I mean you have not told us yet, what political liberty is, and it's no use our discussing whether we ought to have it, till we know that.

Sara. He was craftily trying to skip his last lecture.

LECTURE XII.

OF POLITICAL LIBERTY: ITS FOES AND ITS FRIENDS.

"To many I shall appear to speak insolently; because the public is at present accustomed to find itself appealed to as an infallible judge, and each reader is complimented with excellencies, which if he really possess, to what purpose is he a reader?"—*The Friend*, Essay i.

1. *Professor.* It is obvious that every such union as those we have been discussing, must demand a perpetual compromise from those who live in it. Out of society we should have little power and no liberty; the exigencies of physical existence would absorb all our efforts; and in society whatever freedom we can attain, we must exercise in subjection to those restraints which the social state imposes upon us. For no society can exist, unless it can so far unite its individual members as that the whole body shall act together as though it had one desire, and one controlling will. And if in a single family this may sometimes be the fact, it never can be so in any numerous community, such as a church or a nation, whilst men are as variously constituted and as differently informed as they now are. That society may act, nay that it may exist, each member must give up something of his own personal freedom of action, and subject himself to the social will and judgment, in all matters which concern the common weal. How far, and in what matters he must do this, must be determined not by himself but by the Sovereign head, and that decision must be enforced upon him by the whole power of the body: in all civilised States it is defined by law, written or unwritten.

This is true in its measure of all these societies: but the government of the family is now so controlled—not to say usurped,—by the State, it would be useless to trace out its effects on the liberty of its members. And the freedom

designed for Christians, and for which they are prepared by means of their union with the church, is not properly the subject of social science as at present understood, but of theology. I will only venture to suggest now, that what is obviously true of the family, is still more true of the church: *i.e.* that both were created, not to limit our liberty, but to make it possible for us to become free. As the great end of the education which family gives, is that we may become self-governing men and women: so in a far deeper sense, it is only through our union in the church with the church's Head and King, that our lost freedom has been redeemed: and only so far as we, individually and for ourselves, realise that union, can we enjoy that freedom.

2. Our present enquiry must be confined to political, civil, or social liberty: the liberty which we enjoy or might enjoy, as members of a Sovereign State. In what does this political or civil liberty consist? what are its limits? how is it to be secured, and on what conditions does its enjoyment depend?

There are two principal answers to these questions, which at the present time divide the world of politicians into two great schools or parties. The one is, in brief, that civil liberty is the possession of a share in the Sovereign power of the State: that its limits are co-extensive with the formal distribution of that Sovereign power; and that it is enjoyed by those alone who are included in the Sovereign number. Those who affirm this, maintain as you will observe that political liberty is a positive thing: they understand by it the actual possession of a certain amount of political power, given to and exercised by a determinate number. It is the opinion maintained by Sir G. C. Lewis,* Mr. Bagehot, and the greater part of our radical politicians.

The other answer is, in the words of Mr. Austin,—that "civil liberty is that liberty from legal obligation, which is left or granted by a Sovereign Government, to any of its own subjects." This liberty is therefore wholly negative; and it can only be secured to the subjects to whom it is granted, by a corresponding legal restraint imposed on all their fellow

* See *Methods of Observation and Reasoning in Politics*, ch. xvi. p. 91, vol. ii. and elsewhere. "Free government," he says, "is equivalent to the supreme power shared by several rulers."

subjects.* Its legal limit is the will of the Sovereign: but its actual enjoyment depends on the power and resolution of the Sovereign to enforce those restraints by which it is secured. Thus civil liberties become practically synonymous with legal rights; for it were useless to grant me liberty from legal restraint in respect of any action, if I am not at the same time protected from obstruction: and this legal protection constitutes my liberty a legal right.

When then we speak of civil or political liberty, you must remember that we are no longer concerned with that spiritual freedom which is the true freedom of man, and which may be indefinitely increased as he rises towards perfect freedom, or totally lost in a brutish slavery. If we take civil liberty in its first sense, as signifying some share in the Sovereign power; then the power of the State being necessarily limited any share we can have in it, must also be limited. And if we take it in the other sense; then the power of the State over its individual subjects is not, and never can be so absolute, as that they have no liberty left them. Even Bonnivard chained to his pillar could not be restrained from thinking and feeling. And however despotic, however tyrannically minute its laws may be, there is much of daily life, of action, and of speech which lies practically out of its control. And beyond these the utmost liberty a Sovereign can grant to its subjects is but small, limited as it is on the one hand by its own necessary condition,—that it can only be secured by imposing a corresponding and efficient restraint on all; and on the other, by the tyranny of inefficient restraint approaching to anarchy.

Now these two answers are in truth antagonistic, and destructive of each other. And yet the confusion of ideas which arises from the two being mixed up with each other, and held together, is perhaps no unimportant source of our political divisions and our legislative blunders. To compare them together we must go a little further back, to the point where they agree.

3. Whatever we mean by political liberty, it is certain that its enjoyment presupposes political society. That is to say, it presupposes the existence of a community consisting of a Sovereign and subjects:—of a community therefore in which

* Austin's *Jurisprudence*, vol. i. p. 241–243.

the bulk of the subjects are in a habit of obedience to the Sovereign, and wherein the Sovereign is not in the habit of obedience to any determinate human superior. Now the Sovereign one or number, is, as Sovereign, absolutely free; being subject to no legal restraint whatever. But though the Sovereign number, considered thus collectively or in its corporate capacity, is independent, and its power incapable of legal restraint: yet considered separately, the individuals and smaller aggregates composing that Sovereign number, are the subjects of the supreme body, of which they are component parts.* Bearing these definitions in mind we shall see at once through one source of this confusion—and find it where usually confusion of ideas is to be found, in a confusion of words. The word nation or State, is used in three wholly distinct senses by political writers. Sometimes it denotes the whole society, composed of the Sovereign and subjects, and regarded as one community, in relation to other political societies similarly constituted. Sometimes we mean by it the Sovereign Government as distinguished from the subject people, and acting in relation to them as individuals: and sometimes we intend by it the whole mass of the subject people, as distinguished from the Sovereign body or Government. That is to say we use it sometimes for the nation; sometimes for the Government, and sometimes for the subjects; and there we predicate of it in one of these senses, what is only true of it in the other. Using the word in the first of these meanings, and intending by it one independent political community, we rightly say, that nation is free which governs itself: which is independent of, or not habitually controlled by any other Sovereign State: which determines its own policy and governs and protects its own subjects without habitual subjection to, or habitual hindrance from, any other society. Using the word nation or State in the second sense, it were little more than an identical proposition: for to say that every Sovereign Government is free which governs itself; is the same as saying every Sovereign Government is Sovereign. But if we use the word nation in the third sense, and then affirm the same proposition, we entirely alter its meaning. Now it becomes equivalent either to the assertion that those subjects only have any civil liberty

* Austin's *Jurisprudence*, vol. i. p. 192.

who are governed by the combined will of the majority of their fellow citizens; or else, that those citizens only have any civil liberty, who themselves form a part of the Sovereign body. The first of these two propositions is not a definition of what civil liberty is; but rather the assertion of a fact which can only be proved, if at all, by history, *i.e.* that no form of government does or ever did secure any civil liberty to its subjects, except this one form of a pure democracy. For it were absurd to say that my civil liberty means nothing more than this that the Sovereign number which governs me absolutely, is a very great number. The degree of liberty the Sovereign leaves to me is a question of fact, and depends on what it decrees, not on the number that decree it. If the question were, what form of government is most likely to grant me the most, and to secure me in the enjoyment of what it grants the most effectually; then we must go to history for an answer. But it is impossible to make all the difference between a free citizen and a subject slave depend, —not on his enjoyment of a certain definite liberty, or his being wholly restrained,—but solely on who it is that secures it to him, or that deprives him of it. Take for example liberty of speech, of religious worship, of emigration: suppose I live under a Sovereign which grants me these, and which effectually and habitually prevents all others from molesting or hindering my enjoyment of them: then in these three respects I am at liberty: and whether that Sovereign be the whole body of my fellow citizens including myself; or an autocratic One, makes no difference. I am not in these respects a slave, because it is an individual autocrat who secures this liberty to me: nor am I free, because it is a democracy that restrains me from exercising it.

The same consideration applies in part to the second assertion, that those only are politically free, who form a part of the Sovereign number. But this will require a little more examination. It is true, as we have seen that in every nation the Sovereign alone is positively free, being subject to no legal restraint but that of his own imposing. The Sovereign body then is not free because of its power over its subjects, but by reason of its unrestrained command of its own actions. The Sovereign body, quasi Sovereign is free; but the individuals included in that number are not free but

subjects; and personally they enjoy only such civil liberty as the one corporate Sovereign leaves or grants to them. When we say, that an Englishman who possesses the suffrage is a free man, what is it we mean? We certainly do not mean that our Sovereign gives to him personally a greater liberty of interference with his fellow subjects, than it grants to those who have not the suffrage: we do not mean that he is less subject than they are to the control of its laws, or less likely to be punished should he disobey them: we do not mean that either his person or his property are less at the disposal of the State than theirs are. As a member of the Sovereign number he has more political power than they have: as a subject of the Sovereign Government, he has as much civil liberty as that government is pleased to grant him, and no more.

4. This theory has been maintained in a more plausible form than I have put it, by Mr. Bagehot, no mean authority in political science I believe. He puts it thus.*

"By definition a nation calling itself free, should have no jealousy of the executive:" *i.e.* of its exercising too much power. In this clause you see, he uses the word nation either in its first, or in its third sense. "For," he goes on, "freedom means that the nation,—the political part of the nation,—wields the executive." It is clear from the context that by "the political part of the nation" he means that part which has a share in the Sovereignty: and this part he puts for the whole: for otherwise this proposition would simply amount to saying that "freedom means that that part of the nation which governs it, does govern it." Here then he glides into the second sense of the word nation, defining the nation as the "wielders of the executive;" in other words, as the Sovereign. And to make this Sovereign co-extensive with the "free nation" of his first clause, he boldly cuts off from the nation, and from all share in its freedom, all who do not share in its Sovereignty,—the unpolitical portion,—the purely subject mass of the community. For he goes on to complain, "we still look on State action not as our own, but as alien action; as an imposed tyranny from without; not as the consummated result of our own organised wishes." And this he said of the British nation when about two million

* *The English Constitution*, p. 316, 1st edition.

voters wielded the executive over the thirty million subjects, whose existence as a portion of the nation he wholly ignored. We have been used to say and think, that Sovereigns exist not for their own sake, but solely for the good of their subjects: it has been reserved for our advanced liberals to affirm the Sovereign to be everything, the subjects nothing in the nation. Thus liberty becomes identified with power, not over ourselves but over others: and especially with that successful accomplishment of the Sovereign's will, which is denoted by "wielding the executive." It is true that in such a State, the possessors of Sovereign power are included as individuals, amongst the subjects for whose benefit the Government exists. But in this assertion of Mr. Bagehot's appears to be involved, the not uncommonly acted on, but peculiarly immoral English doctrine, that the adult men of the community, or the political portion of these, are the only portion of the subjects for whose welfare and interests the Government need take any care. To comprehend the full extent of the immorality of this doctrine, you must consider that this political portion of the nation is, and must under every conceivable arrangement ever remain, a minority, when compared with the unpolitical subjects they govern. Half the population in almost every country is under age: and to this half must be added; 1st all those who are mentally or physically incompetent to exercise any political function: and 2ndly the numerous minority of the remainder whose share in the executive is destroyed by reason of their being outvoted. For in almost every case of government by a large number, the executive though nominally wielded by the whole, is actually wielded by that portion of it which being agreed together are also the most numerous. In determining the numerical ratio of Mr. Bagehot's free nation to the real nation, or of the Sovereign body to the subject community; we must take from the former (in our own case) the outvoted minority, and we must add to the latter all women—more than half the nation,—together with the whole population of our imperial dependencies, India standing first with its 170,000,000. It may be said, all these are incapable of exercising political power, and therefore incapable of enjoying political liberty. Even if the latter is only a synonyme for the former, this is scarcely true: but granting it

true, I should say that of this political power or liberty, we ought all of us in such a case to be very jealous indeed. Here we have an independent political nation consisting of a Sovereign head, the aggregate majority of a body the whole of which may amount to about 3,000,000; and we have the subject mass of about 200,000,000 souls who are absolutely under their sway. Add to these, the interests of succeeding generations which are very much subjected to and disposed of by our present Sovereigns: and then let us ask whether political liberty has actually become synonymous with the utterly irresponsible despotism of an unwieldy body of men, who, exercising a supreme and absolute sovereignty at once legislative and executive over this vast multitude, owe nothing to them, and have no need to be jealous how they themselves wield this power, because—however madly or wickedly they use it, its results are still "only the consummated results of their own organized wishes!" So much the worse for them: so much the more reason why this many-headed Sovereign should be very jealous indeed of its own power: no tyranny imposed from without can be half so fearful as the tyranny of our own mistaken but successful wishes.

But passing this; suppose I am one of Mr. Bagehot's little nation—one of the 3,000,000 Sovereign number. If my wishes are opposed to the wishes of the majority, I do not wield the executive. I oppose the action which they determine, and am compelled to submit to it against my will. Where is my liberty now? The fact that I have been allowed to vote against an unjust law, cannot make that compelled subjection to it a free act on my part, which had I not been allowed to vote against it would have been a slavish one. If I willingly consent to pay the tax the State imposes I am so far free whether I had a vote in the matter or not: if I do not consent, it is taken from me by physical force and I am not free; though I were the only dissident, and though it were the whole body of my fellow citizens who took it. It would not even be more just that I should be compelled to obey in this case, than it would be if the Sovereign were one man, instead of 3,000,000 of men. It is just that I should submit to the State that protects me, as long as its decisions are just, that is, not contrary to the Divine Law; it is just, as long as the evils of submission are less than those of

rebellion; or as long as submission tends more to the general good than rebellion would. But whilst I am forcibly prevented from acting on my own deliberate judgement in matters which concern myself and my own welfare, surely I have a moral (not a legal) right to expect that the State which judges for me shall employ for that purpose the best information, intelligence, moral rectitude, and wisdom it can command, and these can never be secured by counting wishes or heads. Though however the number of actors makes no difference as to the justice or injustice of the acts done, it does practically make a considerable difference in the oppressiveness of the acts if they are unjust; because it makes resistance more hopeless, and redress much less probable. In truth no better definition can be given of a despotism than this which Mr. Bagehot gives us of a free nation. "In almost every case of supreme government by a number, the interests and pretensions of the constituent members antagonize:"* and hence the greater the proportion that number bears to the subject community, the more certain it is to pay little or no deference to the public opinion of its subjects. For besides that its own clamours deafen it to their wishes; the actually ruling majority of the Sovereign body, winning the accomplishment of its own purposes only by the vigorous and incessant struggle it carries on against the wishes of the opposing minority, can seldom afford, and will never be inclined to defer to their opinions: whilst the rest of their subjects are little able to express any general opinion on State matters. As a matter of fact, most politicians are now agreed, that in a representative or constitutional form of government, no interests will be much cared for or understood, except the interests of those who are represented, *i.e.* who form parts of the Sovereign body. And so Kant justly says, that a democracy pure and simple is a despotism.

Then again on Mr. Bagehot's theory it would be impossible that any nation having a democratic form of government, should be overgoverned: for government and liberty being the same thing, the more of government the more of liberty. Though self-government be freedom, it is not even true of the individual man that the more he governs himself, the freer he will be, unless we add—the more wisely he controls

* Austin's *Jurisprudence*, vol. i. p. 213.

make the mass of the people docile by keeping them ignorant; or to educate them to the right use of political power, by entrusting them with a degree of power they were unable to use aright; in other words,—by habituating them to use it wrongly. There is indeed no ignorance that may not, in one way or another, cripple the power of the Sovereign. Thus we see session after session, our own Sovereign failing to effect the object it intends, by reason of its ignorance of the art of exact expression: or to put it bluntly, by its inability to master the English tongue; lawyers telling us no session passes but some law is made which being intended to enact one thing does in fact enact something else, or contradicts itself, and by reason of its incomprehensibility simply effects nothing. Or take the history of our national ship-building for the last twenty years, and consider how great a waste of labour and material, and therefore of power, has been occasioned by our Sovereign's ignorance of the art of ship-building, and by its want of skill and intelligence in applying the knowledge it could have commanded, to the accomplishment of the ends it desired. And this loss of power is greatly owing to the false opinion men entertain of the inexhaustible resources of the Government: they make free to waste it as they waste time, when they throw it away without heed by reason of their inward conviction, they have an immortality to draw on.

Then the Sovereign's power is limited, not only by the amount of its knowledge, but yet more by the degree of wisdom it possesses. The ultimate object of Governments is comparatively clear; but the means by which that object is to be pursued in any given society, are so various, so complex, and so entangled, that the highest human intellect can scarcely grasp them. "Government and civil society are the most complicated of all subjects accessible to the human mind: and he who would deal competently with them, as a thinker and not as a blind follower of a party, requires not only a knowledge of the leading facts of life, both moral and material; but an understanding disciplined and exercised in the principles and rules of sound thinking, up to a point which neither the experience of life, nor any one science or branch of knowledge affords."* "From reason alone can we

* J. S. Mill's *Inaugural Address.*

derive the principles which our understandings are to apply: —but the laws of reason are unable to satisfy the first conditions of human society, and must be applied by the positive and conventional laws, in the formation of which understanding must be our guide, and which become just because they happen to be expedient."* Or take this brief enumeration of what is requisite to constitute an adequate practical sagacity in the Sovereign one, or number: "the observation of times and places, and relative bearings; of history, of national customs and character; the cautious balancing of comparative advantages; the painful calculation of forces and counter forces; the preparation of circumstances; the lynx-eyed watching for opportunities;—all in short which makes the attainment of legislative prudence a work of difficulty and long-continued effort even for the acutest and most comprehensive minds."† And as the Sovereign cannot accomplish its designs without these, it is without these powerless: what it does is not that which it desires.

4. The moral limits of its power are even more important. For the first element of a nation's strength is the degree of union it possesses,—the strength and the breadth of the moral cohesion that binds the community together. The Sovereign one or number actually determines the actions of the State, and legally wields for that purpose the whole power of the collective body; but practically it wields only the power of that portion of the nation which is united in a habit of submission to it. The rest may be compelled to submit by the superior strength of that obedient majority, but they cannot add to that power, a portion of which is neutralised by their resistance. If the national union were perfect; if the minds and wills of the subject mass were one with the mind and will of the Sovereign number, the actual power of this last would be equal to its legal power, *i.e.* to the sum of all the forces of the citizens. But as in every existing community this union is very imperfect, the Sovereign's power may be roughly estimated as equal to the force that remains, when all that has been neutralized by conscious opposition, or by involuntary separation; and all that has been wasted by mistaken direction or left inert by want of direction, has been subtracted.

* *The Friend*, § 1. essay iv. † Ibid. § 1, essay v.

Sara. If "you cut me such a monstrous cantle out," there will be no balance left but what can be expressed by a negative quantity.

Professor. Not so: there are cases no doubt, as where the obedience of the bulk of the people is so frequently suspended that it can barely be called habitual; or where the minority which refuses to obey bears any considerable proportion to the obedient majority; where there is so little power left that it is difficult to say whether there is any Sovereignty at all. This is the case in Mexico: between such a state and our own, or I would rather say Switzerland, where obedience is so habitual and so nearly universal, that the exceptional disobedience of a few criminals scarcely weakens the Sovereign's power in any perceptible measure—between such extremes as these lie countless degrees of moral union and therefore of Sovereign power.

A good deal of the strength of Government depends on the resolution with which the Sovereign carries out its determination; on its possessing that quality which is called in individuals force of character. If the Sovereign sees clearly what it intends, and has no hesitation about the way in which it chooses to effect it; if it is fearless, prompt, and energetic in execution, it will have much power, even though the subject mass obey it with reluctance and dislike. On the other hand, if it is the subject people who push a timid government forward to action, its action will be confused and uncertain: the end desired may be desired passionately by the whole nation, but the measures adopted for accomplishing it will be executed with hesitating feebleness and little crowned with success.* Conscious ignorance, or want of legislative ability, may well produce this vacillation: but the most complete information and the greatest ability will not compensate for deficiency in decision. Moral courage in the Sovereign,—a courage which will not shrink from responsibility, and which does not fear the reproaches of the crowd,—is fully as important an element of the nation's strength as the possession of a powerful intellect and a sound judgement, of vast armies and full arsenals. The moral influence which the Sovereign exercises over the community is another great source of its strength. If it can not only secure their habitual,

* As in the first year of the Crimean War.

but also their hearty obedience; having the full confidence of the bulk of the people, and possessing their affections;—this adds so much to the strength of the State as may go far to compensate for positive physical weakness; whereas a Government most powerful in other respects, may be reduced to extreme weakness if it wins the distrust and dislike of its subjects. For if its power is felt by any considerable portion of the nation to be an evil to which they submit only through fear of the greater evils they might incur by resistance; then its effective force will be diminished not only by their continual evasions of its commands, but also by the whole weight of their passive resistance which it will have to overcome: and its moral power over the whole community will be greatly lessened by that sense of uncertainty as to its continuance, which such a state of things will inevitably produce. Thus for example if in a time of excitement and disturbance a district must be held in subjection to the law by the presence of a military force; this is at once a tax on the Government's physical strength, and a proof of its moral weakness: but if it be held in subjection to the law by the citizens themselves, acting in energetic obedience to the civil magistrates, this will be at once a proof of the Sovereign's moral power and an addition to its physical force. In this respect a long established form of government has a great advantage over a newly fashioned one: for besides its direct or governing power the Sovereign exercises also a very considerable indirect, and educational power, which can only accrue slowly and with time. The moral habits and sentiments of the less educated portion of the nation are mainly created by the laws in subjection to which they have grown up, and by the mode in which those laws are administered: these influence indeed far more than we generally admit, our own moral judgements. "Political institutions and civil laws influence the very texture of society, forming national habits and customs, and national modes of thought and feeling, which may long outlive their causes."* Thus we never find much reverence for human life amongst a people whose Sovereign does not strongly and determinately defend it: we seldom find much sense of justice in a nation when the mode of

* Sir G. C. Lewis's *Methods of Observation and Reasoning in Politics*, vol. ii. ch. xiv. p. 16.

administering justice is bad. Our own popular sentiments about the proper relations of husbands and wives are the creation of our common law. As Professor Newman remarks, men never think of beating their sisters and taking their earnings, as they do with their wives, because the law has not taught them to do so. Crimes which the Sovereign permits, or which is the same thing crimes it does not really punish, such as this brutal treatment of married women, the uneducated mass do not deem criminal.

Now it is this educating power of law which is a main cause of the stability of Governments: evils to which the people are accustomed, they not only endure with patience, they will often strenuously insist on suffering them. And modes of administering the law get so inseparably associated in men's minds with the benefits they obtain from being governed, that a proposal to amend the mode appears to them equivalent to a proposal to deprive them of all those benefits, even when in truth they enjoy them not through the goodness but in spite of the badness of the Government. So great a share has the legislature in creating public opinion.

5. This leads us to that, which is in our day the great social limitation to the Sovereign's power; to the existence of a widely extended, and therefore potent public opinion. "Every government," says Austin, "be it ever so powerful, defers habitually to the opinions and sentiments of its own subjects, or of some portion of them." And the reason of this is, that the permanence of every government depends on the habitual obedience it receives from the bulk of the people. The extent to which Governments are bound by the opinion of their respective subjects, and the efficacy of the moral duties which that opinion imposes upon them, depend mainly on the two following causes.

"First: the number of its subordinate ends (or the number of ends subserving its absolute end), concerning which the mass of its subjects think alike, or uniformly.*

"Secondly: the degree of clearness and precision with which they conceive the ends, in respect of which their

* Uniformity of opinion in the mass of the subjects respecting the paramount end or purpose of government, would hardly influence the conduct of their Sovereign; for it would not ensure uniformity of opinion as to the means by which that ultimate end is to be sought.—Austin's *Jurisprudence*, vol. i. p. 289.

opinions coincide. The greater is that number, and the greater is that degree of clearness, the more extensively and effectually is the Government controlled by the public opinion (or positive morality) of the community."* Or the controlling power of public opinion, will be in proportion to its unanimity, its clearness, and its precision: but it will also depend on the proportion it bears in these respects to the moral and intellectual power of the Sovereign: for a feeble Sovereign may be swayed blindly by a public opinion that is far from unanimity and very far from clearness;—guided in fact by the blind and uncertain impulses of an anxious, ignorant, and terrified crowd.

It is not however,—and this is important to note,—it is not all the subjects whose opinions or sentiments have weight with the Sovereign Government: but only that portion of them whose goodwill it is of importance to the Sovereign to secure. Thus in France it is not the educated and the reflecting whose opinions control the Sovereign, but one class alone,—the labouring men, whose support is essential to its continuance. And amongst ourselves our Sovereign is controlled by the public opinion of those classes of its subjects whose goodwill is of importance to the members of the House of Commons, and by theirs exclusively. From this body must again be deducted, on the one hand, those who thinking for themselves and examining questions of national policy more profoundly than the rest, differ from the majority and are unable to convince them: these men may decide the public opinion of the next generation, but in the present they have little weight. And on the other hand we must deduct those who though included in the influential body, yet fall so much below its average in intelligence and expression, and are so much fewer, that their opinions gain no attention. Influential public opinion represents then naturally the opinions of the mediocrity: it expresses the average intelligence of the numerical majority of the influential portion of the nation: and whether that is much above, much below, or on a level with the intelligence of the nation will be determined by the form of government. Its positive value will depend mainly on the education of the class whence it proceeds: but its weight with the Sovereign tends to become

* Austin's *Jurisprudence*, vol. i. lecture vi. p. 290.

greater as the portion of the community whence it proceeds becomes more numerous, and their means of communication with each other more easy. For thus it becomes more conscious of its own unanimity. Its tendency is to increase in power faster than in intelligence; for most men are open to no argument so readily as this—"every one thinks so." The rapid spread of the art of reading, and the possession of a cheap press, has greatly extended the area and swelled the power of this public opinion: but its real enlightenment has scarcely kept pace with its increasing bulk.

We must also distinguish between the current opinions of the day, which fluctuate hither and thither with the daily successes and failures, the passing needs felt and advantages desired: and that public opinion of which Austin speaks, whose abiding tendency is determined by causes more powerful and more permanent than daily accidents and leading articles. To understand aright what its course will be, we must know it in its causes and its genealogy; and for these we must look far back: it is the growth of ages. The elements of which it consists, and the causes from which it springs we have already enumerated:* the religious convictions of the nation; its moral code; the knowledge diffused and the intellectual opinions current amongst this influential portion of the community: their social and domestic habits and the desires prevalent amongst them are chief amongst the former. The past history of the race, the great men it has produced, the knowledge imparted to it, its political institutions and civil laws, are conspicuous amongst the latter. When we are called upon to submit with reverent amazement to the tendencies of modern thought, it is as well to remember how entirely it is itself the fruit of those former ages which it calls upon us to despise. It is not the present age that shapes its own prevailing opinions. The race and its education, or national character and political institutions, family life and religious faith, have all combined to mould it.

No Government amongst civilised nations can now be secure, which is not supported by this public opinion: nor can any be really strong, when the public opinion that controls it is vacillating and changeable. And this will generally be the case, if the classes which from their numbers and

* See lecture i. § 18.

their political influence have most weight with the Sovereign Government, are in a condition of life so little beforehand with the world, that they live from hand to mouth, quickly and materially affected by the accidents of commerce and the variations of demand and supply: or if they are not sufficiently educated to be susceptible of guidance from the past, or by reasonable expectations of the future. "Such free states as are not mere aggregates of individuals, changing their character and sentiments with every outward impression and momentary impulse; owe their steadiness mainly to the subsistence of houses and corporations in which principles and feelings are transmitted for ages, as an heirloom from generation to generation."* Where this steadiness is absent; and indeed wherever mere current opinion and passion habitually and quickly determine the specific acts of the Government, it in fact becomes the Sovereign; and the ostensible Government is nothing else than its agent or the registrar of its decrees. This form of government has been called an Ochlocracy, or government by a crowd, "out of measure and tune." But Austin would refuse it the rank of a Sovereign Government, because it proceeds from an indeterminate body, and is therefore incapable of corporate action and of issuing any positive or certain commands. He would I imagine relegate it to a state of anarchy, which certainly in its results it closely resembles. Lynch law, and the vigilance committees of the far West are amongst some of these, and are by no means the most tyranical.

6. The moral limitations set to the Sovereign by the laws of God, are pointed out by the end for which political society exists—"the general utility, or the greatest happiness of mankind and of the individual community." These moral limits then are mainly those which are set to its actions by considerations of what it ought to interfere with and regulate, and what matters are beyond its proper sphere, because though they may not be out of its reach, it cannot control them to advantage. The proper limits of government action constitute one of the most difficult problems which the statesman has to solve. It may prove that what Government ought not to attempt is in truth the same with what it cannot successfully accomplish; but this test is not very

* Niebuhr's *History of Rome*, vol. ii. p. 377.

easily applied. The subject-matter of all political government is actions, to the exclusion both of opinions and of feelings: the first it can control, and the others it cannot. And the object of its interference is general utility, which causes another moral limitation, of expediency. For there are, as we have seen, some classes of actions, of great importance for the general good, which naturally tend to bring after them their own sufficient and appropriate reward and punishment: and there are others, of equal importance for good and evil, which do not naturally or necessarily bring any recompense to the doer. Thus without any interference on the part of Government, the irreligious man loses the happiness, the consolation and strength which true religion bestows; and intellectual error involves the loss of all the benefits of truth, and incurs all the inconveniences and disappointments of false opinions. So the man who by intemperance injures his health and shortens his life, is sufficiently punished by the evil he inflicts on himself. But no necessary harm or pain comes on him who takes another man's life; and he who robs another, naturally enriches himself. So indolence, though most injurious to society, needs not to be punished by society: for if society do not interfere it will effectually punish itself: but industry though most beneficial to the community, has no certain reward, and therefore little or no motive, until the Sovereign has created property and secured its enjoyment. Whilst the one class of actions does not need the commands and sanctions of the Sovereign, and to interfere with them would be a waste of power: the other class does need it, and to regulate these by its commands and sanctions, is essential to its securing the public good. This affords us one test. Then there are some actions which cannot be successfully regulated by any human Sovereign: all matters relating to commerce, supply and demand, come I believe under this head: there are others which can only be successfully conducted under the direction of the State; such for instance as actions for redress of wrong whether national or individual. This affords another test: and if we should find that the results of these two independent tests practically coincide with each other we should have gone far to solve the problem. There is a third and higher test: *i.e.* the beneficial

limits of personal liberty and independent action on the one hand, and of social control on the other, as indicated by what is requisite for the full development and perfection of the individual man; which could we determine, the results, coinciding with the former tests, would afford us a certain rule of moral expediency in all matters of government action.

To sum up then: that State is strong whose Sovereign Government clearly apprehends its ultimate objects; understands by what means these are to be attained; has adequate physical force to employ those means, and moral resolution enough to pursue them stedfastly, patiently, and vigorously: and whose subject mass are closely united together in affection and by the conscious possession of one common interest, are intelligent, vigorous, and moral, and habitually unanimous in willing obedience to their Sovereign.

7. Our next question is, who do in fact wield this Sovereign power in such a nation as our own, and in our present stage of civilization? Directly those wield it who are included in the Sovereign number. Indirectly those share in it, who influence and determine the Sovereign number; and so far as they influence them.

The Sovereign number amongst ourselves, must be taken to include both the Parliament, in its three estates, and the electors of the Commons' House of Parliament. Taken collectively these constitute the Sovereign Government: taken severally as individuals, they are subjects of the Sovereign Government just as truly and effectually as the rest of the community.* As individuals they have a certain portion of political power formally distributed amongst them by the Sovereign, which they hold as a trust, to be exercised for the good of the community and which the other subjects do not hold. As to the amount of power thus distributed amongst them, if it were equally distributed it is obvious that, the Sovereign power of the State remaining the same, the amount exercised by each individual of the Sovereign number would

* "In a monarchy or government of one, the Sovereign is purely sovereign: but in an aristocracy, or government of a number, the Sovereign is an aggregate of individuals; and generally, the aggregate of divers smaller aggregates composed by those individuals. Considered collectively, in its corporate capacity, the Sovereign number is sovereign and independent: but considered separately, the individuals, and those smaller aggregates, are subjects."—Austin's *Jurisprudence*, vol. i. lecture vi. p. 192.

vary with the number of those who share it; will be $\frac{1}{10}$ or $\frac{1}{1,000}$ or $\frac{1}{4,000,000}$ as the case may be. But this never really happens; sometimes the Sovereign number is divided into several distinct corporations or smaller aggregates of which each wields a definite portion of the Sovereign power: and then this rule will hold as to the share the individual members possess in determining the action of their own corporation: but it will not hold of the whole body, where the smallest aggregate (numerically) may have greater or equal weight with the largest. Every voter in the same borough has equal power; but the voters in different boroughs have very different weight: each Peer in the Lords and each member in the Commons has an equal voting power in their respective Houses: but the two Houses are not of equal weight in the Sovereignty. But though this be not the legal form of Government, still the Sovereign number if it be at all large, will inevitably be found to be practically though not legally or formally, divided into different classes or parties, each class generally agreeing in interests and in purpose, and more or less opposing themselves to other classes. In this case the most numerous class or classes that agree to act together will wield the Sovereign power; and the less numerous will really lose their share in it, though nominally included in the Sovereign number. This is government by numbers—or by the majority: the government of our colonies, and very much of the United States.

Sara. Counting heads in fact, without any reference to their contents.

Professor. Just so. Also I may observe here; that the more complete the education and the greater the intelligence of any class is, the greater will be the diversity of their opinions, and the wider the interests that sway them; consequently they will vote with less unanimity. Whilst the less the education, and the smaller the information possessed by any governing class, the more unanimous and narrow will be their view of their interests, and the current opinions that they hold: and the less susceptible will the Government thence proceeding be to the influence of the more intelligent of the subject citizens.

The direct mode of exercising political power answers pretty nearly in State matters to the physical force of indi-

vidual men. Like that, its possession is no test at all of the ability of its possessor to use it for effecting his ultimate object: and, like that, it is the only kind of power which has no necessary tendency to make its owner free. Like that also, it has no natural connexion with that effort to obtain power, which in the case of the higher modes of energy really tends to fit those who do attain it, to exercise it with intelligence. For it is given arbitrarily to the possessor of certain accidents: its possession depends on where he lives or on what he has; not on his possessing qualities of head and heart answering to the trust confided to him. And this would be just as true, if this power were distributed equally to every man and woman living in the national territory: the accident of living on a particular portion of the earth's surface has a purely arbitrary connexion with the possession of a certain portion of political power, and has just as little to do with fitness to exercise it as a man's height, name, colour, or his possessing riches enough to buy up the votes of a county. Neither is a strong desire to possess it, any guarantee of fitness. "The desire of benefiting a community does not enable a man to benefit it, without a knowledge of the means requisite for that end. Mere good will without skill—plain common sense unaided by appropriate fitness, are in politics unavailing for their purpose.* Lastly, like the physical power of the individual man—this is the only direct mode of exercising dominion. And should it ever fall, by reason of their overwhelming majority of numbers, into the hands of a class who, from the narrowness of their circumstances and the deficiency of their education and moral training, are influenced mainly by the momentary or selfish interests of their own class, this will prove the only political power in the State; for its possessors will in such a case be inaccessible to the indirect power of an intelligent public opinion.

8. Indirectly they wield the Sovereign power who determine or influence the actions of the Sovereign. These include in the first place, all who are able to convince or inform the Sovereign on any matter which comes under its action, persuading it to follow the course which they desire it to pursue: or who exercise any influence in forming and di-

* Sir G. C. Lewis's *Method of Observation and Reasoning in Politics*, vol. ii. ch. xxvi. § 6.

recting the public opinion of the influential portion of the nation. This answers to the intellectual power of the individual man; it is the power of the statesman, and is now chiefly exercised in two ways, by speeches in Parliament, and through the press, more especially through the newspaper press. It may of course be employed either for good or evil; so all power can; but it has this great advantage over the direct mode, that it can only be exercised by those who have had the ability to acquire it, and who are still at the pains to exercise it: it cannot be given arbitrarily to an irrelevant accident, but its exercise proves the possession of at least some answering ability. It is not a trust from the nation or from the Sovereign, which can neither give it, nor rightly take it away. Religiously it is a trust as all power is. This is the chief source of political power now, and the only way in which—in our own country at least—any man could virtually possess himself of the Sovereignty.

Agatha. This sort of power however must be limited not only by their own ability to convince, but also by the capacity of the Sovereign mass to be convinced by motives of reason and understanding: and generally one finds the more people need this kind of guidance, the less can they be guided by it.

Professor. Which is as much as to say, that no one can persuade a Sovereign State to exercise a higher degree of power than it possesses. No possible form of government—or which is the same thing, no mode of dividing the Sovereign power can increase its amount directly. But they who increase the State's morality and intelligence do eventually increase its political power.

9. No such impediment as you have mentioned limits their political power over the conduct and the destinies of the nation, who form the religions convictions, the moral habits and desires of its individual members; on whom depend their habits of civilization, and who influence their wills by the passions which they excite in them, which they accustom them to control or to indulge. This answers to the moral power of the individual man. Though consciously exercised by few, it belongs in some measure to us all: for there is probably no human being so lonely, that his moral feelings and social habits have literally no determin-

ing power over the conduct of others. But mainly it lies in the hands of those who create our family life. For men's moral and social habits and principles are mostly formed whilst they are still young. The uniform experience of those who have the fullest opportunities of observation goes to show, that by the time we are grown up, these are for the most part too strong, and too much a part of ourselves, to be greatly changed: or at least, if they are then found to be anti-social, the State has little power to amend them. This power bears even more indirectly than the former on the actions of the State, which it influences mainly through the positive morality which it creates in the bulk of the nation; and it is for the most part exercised without any reference to national interests; yet it seems to me to be far more powerful for good or evil, and far more momentous in its effect on national prosperity than either of those others. Like the last, it is a natural, not an arbitrarily given power; its amount depends on the qualities, the capacity, and the earnestness of those who wield it; its moral character depends on theirs. And, unlike the last, no Sovereign can prevent its exercise by those who have it, either in a free or an enslaved country.

10. It appears to me to be equally true of all these three modes of exercising political power, that the only right any one can claim to them, must arise from the fact of his possessing them. It is evidently true of the first; for no man, and no body of men can have a natural right to exercise an artificial mode of power. The suffrage, and the power of members of Parliament is the creation of the Sovereign: its possession is a legal right, not a natural one—that is to say, not one that you or I can claim by the divine law. Those who possess it, hold it by virtue of the legal right which the law assigns to them: those who have it not, have no right to have it: it may or may not be expedient on the ground of the common welfare of the whole nation that they should possess it: but only on the ground of such expediency can they have any claim to it, and if such ground exist, they ought to be charged with it whether they wish for it or not. It is equally true of the last, or moral political power. If I do not exercise any considerable moral influence over any of my countrymen, it were absurd to say it is their fault for not submitting to it:

himself. But the very wisest State government is a very rude and imperfect rule, when compared with that which a good and wise man attains over himself: And it is manifestly untrue that the more entirely the State governs our thoughts and words, our affairs and circumstances, the freer we are. In a more barbarous age liberty was imperilled by deficiency of government: now on the contrary, over government, or the too successful organisation of the Sovereign's wishes is one great danger which threatens our social liberty.

5. The truth is, that though it is very convenient for some purposes to speak of the nation in the third sense of that term, as though the subject mass formed one living and acting body; yet being when separated from the Sovereign Government an unorganised body, it has no real existence distinct from the individual persons of whom it consists; but is merely a general notion—perhaps to most of us a noun of number merely, without any notion behind it. Certainly no moral attribute, such as "free" can be truly ascribed to it, if it does not belong to the bulk of the individual men and women who constitute it. The liberty which we do not enjoy individually, can only be ours fictitiously in our corporate capacity. But freedom and liberty are not fictions: they belong neither to general notions nor nouns of number; they belong, if to anything, solely to living persons. As I said before it is as personal a thing as life itself; and it cannot belong to the subject portion of the nation, unless it belongs to the individual persons, who together compose that portion. A society may be very rich, as some of the mendicant orders have been, whilst each individual in it is absolutely poor; but it can no more be free if its individual members are slaves; than it could be holy whilst individually they were vile. It may make this matter clearer if we bear in mind, that whatever be the form of government, the absolute majority of every nation must of necessity be purely subjects. When then we call one Sovereign and independent community a free nation, and say of another it is not free: we do not mean that the Sovereign Government of the one is free, and that the other is not so. Neither can we mean that the one has no subjects, and the other has. What we do mean is, that the subjects in the first have as much liberty left to them by the Sovereign as tends to the general good of

the community: and in the other case we mean that the subjects have less liberty, or it may be more, than is consistent with the general good. Thus Russia is not free, because Russian subjects are not allowed sufficient liberty: and Ireland is not free, in respect of the too great liberty there allowed by the Sovereign to assassins. We call the citizens of any State free men, when no legal restraints are laid upon them, but such as are necessary to secure the end of all political Government; and we must add—when no restraint needed for that end, is omitted. We mean not that they are free absolutely, but comparatively: we mean, not that they are less subject to their Sovereign than others, but that their Sovereign is more wise, more just, and probably more powerful. You will remember we found that the individual man is free, when his will is in harmony with the truth; and so it is equally true here: that nation is free, whose Sovereign rules wisely and strongly, in accordance with the Divine law; and whose subject mass is willingly and heartily obedient.

I think then we must say that whatever form of government we live under; or whatever share, short of the whole, we have of the Sovereignty; we cannot be free citizens, except so far as the Sovereign is strong enough to govern us efficiently; and wise and just enough to govern us rightly. And the question, how is civil liberty to be secured? merges in the wider one, how is good government to be obtained?

6. A good and just government is one that aiming solely at its true end,—the advancement of the common weal; understands also the subordinate ends, or means by which that end is to be accomplished; and has the power and will to employ these means, and to carry them out effectually.

There are three principal modes in which a government may become unjust, a false government or tyranny. 1st. When either through mistaking or rejecting its true end, the Sovereign body governs for its own advantage or in the interest of one class of its subjects; and neglects or subordinates to this the equal good of the whole community or of any considerable portion of it. 2nd. When being ignorant of the means by which its proper end can be attained, it seeks to accomplish it by mistaken measures. As Pascal

said, "La tyrannie est, de vouloir avoir par une voie, ce qu'on ne peut avoir que par une autre." Or 3rd, when it is too weak, or too timid, to enforce the measures of which it approves on the whole mass of its subjects.

The old error, that it is the too great power of the Sovereign that makes it dangerous to liberty, we may now pass by, as obsolete. I think it is generally seen, that it is not the power but the weakness or ignorance of a government that is likely to make it tyrannical. But another error has taken its place: and that is, that the power of public opinion is the one sufficient security for good government and therefore for political or civil liberty. Perhaps no conclusion shows more want of thought than this. As Austin has told us, "*every* government pays habitual deference to the opinions and sentiments of its own subjects, or of some portion of them," so that if this power of public opinion were of itself a security for good government, it would be impossible for any nation to be badly governed. The power of public opinion is so great that Austin wrote; "The principal cause of tyrannous or bad government, is ignorance on the part of the multitude of sound political science:"* and Hobbes taught;—"Good and stable government is simply or nearly impossible unless the fundamentals of political science be known by the bulk of the people."†

Austin says there are two securities for good government: "The best moral security, yielded by positive morality, *i.e.* by the general opinion of the community, would arise from a wide diffusion, through the mass of the subjects, of the soundest political science which the lights of the age afford. The best religious securities, would arise from worthy opinions held by rulers and subjects, concerning the wishes and purposes of the Good and Wise Monarch, and the nature of the duties He lays upon earthly Sovereigns."

And therefore he tells us, that "to provide for the diffusion of such science throughout the bulk of the people, may be classed with the weightiest of the duties which the Deity lays upon their Sovereign."‡

Sir G. C. Lewis quotes the following from the French

* Austin's *Jurisprudence*, vol. i. lecture vi. p. 252, note.

† Quoted by Austin, same page.

‡ Austin's *Jurisprudence*, vol. i. lecture vi. p. 296.

Economists, but with no special reference. "In order to the being of a good government, two things are needed: 1st. The bulk of the people, both governing and subject; must have somuch knowledge as to conceive correctly—i. the paramount end of government, with—ii. the principal means through which it must accomplish it. And 2nd. There must be a numerous body of citizens versed in political science, and not misled by interests conflicting with the common weal who may shape the political opinions and steer the political conduct of the less profoundly informed, though instructed and rational multitude."

"Without these two elements, if it be a government of a few, it will consult the narrow interests of a portion of the community; not being constrained to the general good by the opinion of an instructed society. And if it be a government of many, being controlled by the general opinion of an uninstructed society; it will often be turned aside by the restive and tyrannous prejudices of an ignorant and asinine multitude."*

So Mr. Herbert Spencer, in his essay on political education, writes: "The essential thing is the establishment of a true theory of government, a true conception of what legislation is for, and what are its proper limits. This question which statesmen deride as speculative will one day be found infinitely more practical than those they wade through Blue books to master, and spend nights in discussing. Before discussing the way in which law should regulate some particular thing; the previous question is, whether law ought to meddle with that thing? And before answering this, comes the more general question, what law should do, and what it should leave undone:—Surely if people *may* misuse political power, it is of supreme importance they should be taught for what purpose political power should be used. Should the masses gain predominant power while their ideas of social arrangements and legislative action remain as crude as at present; there will certainly result disastrous meddling with the relations of capital and labour, and disastrous extension of State administration. These evils can only be prevented, by establishing in the public mind a profound conviction of the certain, and comparatively

* *Method of Observation and Reasoning in Politics*, vol. i.

narrow limits to the functions of the State, which must on no pretext be transgressed. And *having first learned what these limits are*, the upper classes ought energetically to use all means of teaching them to the people."

I have purposely quoted only from writers who are not only liberals, but advanced liberals: and fully adopting their statements, I must still say there is one fact omitted, in these accounts of the political danger we are in, and of the remedy which is to shield us from it. That fact is the selfishness of human nature, and its proneness to self-indulgence. Mr. Austin assumes that if the bulk of any community were sufficiently enlightened to understand that what is, on the whole and in the long run best for all, is also best for each, then the majority would postpone their immediate personal gratification for the sake of this general good. Whilst Mr. Spencer's remedy would be complete, if to know the just limits of our power, and to confine our use of it within those limits, were one and the same thing. Surely experience proves that with the clearest knowledge of what is wise and right, most men do continue to regard their own immediate and private interests, and will postpone the general good to the gratification of their own present desires. Nor can we reasonably expect, that men will exercise that self-control for the sake of the community, which with the fullest conviction of the inevitable consequences, they yet cannot be persuaded to practise in the management of their own lives. "History shows how unsafe it is to assume that nations will always pursue their true political interests, when present temptation, as of vanity, ambition or resentment, intervenes." *

Science may be taught by the upper classes to the lower: and without political science men, though they were saints cannot fail to err: knowledge is a necessary condition of right action, but it is not the cause of it. To teach we must learn, and an adequate knowledge of social science can only be acquired by a personal labour which the upper classes have never yet been persuaded to undergo. But disinterestedness and freedom from the prejudices of self-interest and the power of passion, can only be taught by the moral power of a resolutely and habitually unselfish life, lived in exactly

* Grote.

the same circumstances by the teacher as by the taught: and it can only be learnt by being practised. Nothing but the early discipline of a wholesome family life and healthy and vigorous family affections can really secure them: what is needed is, not that men should comprehend the political value of unselfishness, but that by all the force of association they should have become incapable of finding happiness in any good they cannot share with others. This lesson which comes so easily to happy children can hardly be learnt in later life, and our present social arrangements are such that family life and a happy childhood are practically impossible to a considerable portion of the nation. I think Mrs. Jamieson would have said, these philosophers have omitted the woman from their adequately instructed State. This family life is the necessary link between sound knowledge of political science, and its actual practice; between "worthy religious opinions," and their realisation in a corresponding social practice. The christian church is indeed so closely bound up with family life, that where this is lost to any nation, that cannot long survive.

7. It is not then to the much boasted power of public opinion that we can trust as our security for good government and civil liberty. Its power makes its direction most momentous, but it is its intellectual enlightenment and its moral soundness that must make it beneficial. "When the people speak loudly," Sir Philip Sydney said, "it is from their being strongly possessed by the Godhead,—or by the Demon." Though we have not in this country any asinine multitude to deal with,* we have an ignorant multitude, and one which is unhappily vastly more ignorant than it imagines itself to be: we are far from having obtained that "rational and instructed multitude" as the bulk of our community; and we are almost further from possessing that "numerous body of citizens versed in political science, and not misled by private interests," which is needed to shape the opinions and steer the course of the community: nor can we hope to secure the first until we have obtained the second. "The diffusion of knowledge, unattended by a corresponding deepening of its sources, is likely rather to vulgarize than to raise the thoughts of a nation;—depriving them of another sort of

* At least not in Great Britain.

education through sentiments of reverence, and leading them to fancy themselves capable of judging, what they do but dimly discern."* A powerful, unanimous, and conceited public opinion, is almost certain to be a tyrannical one: nor will there long remain any vestiges of liberty where such an opinion has obtained much political authority.

Neither can we trust to the form of government, for the maintenance of our liberties. I do not deny that forms which give ample opportunities for minorities to make themselves heard and their influence felt, are the most favourable to liberty. But as no organisation however perfect can give life, so no machinery of government, no balance wheels or subtlest checks can secure liberty. Every form has its own merits, and also its own special dangers, which cannot be too jealously watched or too carefully guarded against, by those who know the worth of liberty. Neither does the present course of political events, nor what men delight to call the progress of the age, at all tend to increase or even to maintain our liberties. When the nation was poorer than now, men thought more highly of the blessings of freedom: now riches have increased so enormously, we are more anxious to be safe than to be free. Perhaps it was not altogether an idle dream, that led moralists of old to bracket together poverty, courage, and the love of liberty on the one hand, and riches, timidity, and tyranny on the other. But however this may be it is certain there is, "in the world at large an increasing inclination to stretch unduly the powers of society over the individual . . . and the tendency of all the changes taking place in the world is to strengthen society and to diminish the powers of the individual."†

We can no more maintain our liberties unimpaired by passively yielding to the tendencies of the age, than we can become free without toiling for freedom. They who know the worth of liberty, they who desire to be themselves free citizens and to leave their children free, must keep watch and ward over their social liberties as vigilantly and as vigorously as the sentinel who guards an open camp that is already surrounded by enemies. For their foes are many and powerful, and alike insidious and incessant in their attacks, and the camp we have to defend is very extensive, and its

* *Margaret D'Ossoli.* † *Liberty*, ch. i. introductory.

boundaries are ill marked. Besides our legal liberty which constitutes as it were the citadel; there is also an undefined territory of social liberty—the natural outworks of that citadel, and which it behoves us jealously to defend against encroachments. It can only be secured by a resolute refusal to submit to any needless interference, and by creating a sound and manly tone of public opinion. It is this social liberty which is now most assaulted, but the citadel itself would not long outlast its destruction.

8. The first foe I would mention, is the false persuasion men entertain that they already possess liberty, and are in no danger of losing it. The confusion I have endeavoured to point out between the State in its Sovereign capacity and the nation as an aggregate of individuals, is the chief cause of this ignorance. Men fancy that being members of the nation, they are as individuals all that the nation is collectively: and because the nation as Sovereign is *ipso facto* free; conclude that the nation as subjects is necessarily free also. But no doubt the most dangerous foe against which we have to struggle is that we do not desire liberty. I know that almost all civilized nations say, and possibly really believe they desire liberty. But the truth becomes daily more and more manifest that those amongst us who truly desire liberty, knowing what it is, might be counted by tens. The great mass of mankind do neither. What they do desire is to be so protected by the State from all interference with their own aims, opinions and actions, that they may follow their own way in peace and impose it on everyone else; without being disturbed by those doubts as to whether it is the best way, which must inevitably be forced on the most self-satisfied of us, if we are to see our neighbours pursuing, and pressing us to pursue a hundred different ways. This freedom, this want of uniformity in social matters and opinions is inconvenient and must be got rid of. That uniformity itself would be destructive matters not to the multitude—that may be awaited. Taking another form, this impatience of the inconveniences of the divisions which imperfect knowledge produces, leads men of common sense and little culture to indifference, nay to contempt of truth itself. What is there in truth—mere doctrine they call it—for which it is worth while to stop the world's progress and all

its evident practical needs, whilst you wrangle about it? be silent about that on which you cannot agree, and let us get on. And truly there is very little—neither material prosperity, nor riches, nor convenience, nor information, nor personal political power: only freedom and life are at stake and the liberty to struggle for both. And freedom is highly inconvenient to eminently practical men who know the world, and only ask for smooth and safe thoroughfares; as for truth, no one knows exactly what that is; but it does not make money. And so for one or other of these two reasons, because in England the government is but slow to shackle liberty, we have all set to work to make a tyrant for ourselves, and to exalt its power as much as possible, calling it "the opinion of Society." Our artisans have made a much more vigorous and less hazy tyrant for themselves, in those trade unions which our Society condemns. But the secret charm of both is, that by their means men seem to get a chance of compelling their more immediate neighbours to be and think and do, what they themselves like to have thought and done. For what all men naturally covet, is despotic power: the last thing they naturally care for, is freedom. We can say fine things about never being slaves; but when any man asserts in any practical form that he will not be a slave, but will take his own way in all matters that concern himself, we are disposed to greet him as Yorkshiremen are said to greet strangers—"this is a strange thing—heave a brick at it." And so we put it down; but if the strange thing will not be put down, then indeed the whole populace rise up against it, to make an end of it. And this it always does in the name of liberty. You must all remember an instance of this; when it first became notorious that the worshipping congregations in some of our churches had changed the ceremonial of their services, making it more expressive and more ornamental; how did not the British mob rise up in wrath, and, loudly clamouring, cry "What are these men about? this is not our way: *what is to become of our religious liberties, if these fools are allowed to worship as we don't like?* Ho public press, bishops, Government, 'heave bricks at them' and drive them away." And now they boast of having subscribed 50,000*l.* to defend these precious liberties, by persecuting, ruining, and banishing these strangers.

Mrs. Charlton. I had no idea you were a ritualist.

Professor. I! personally I detest the whole system: but I dread tyranny more.

9. The next foes of social liberty I would name, are the flatterers of the public. Every charlatan and demagogue, who finds it more convenient to silence than to convince his opponents, first asserts the despotic rights of public opinion and then insinuates it agrees with his own. It is even asserted by many who are neither charlatans nor demagogues, and who are by no means ignorant of the hollowness of those pretensions to infallibility which they make in its behalf; but who adopt this argument under the idea it is the one best suited to convince their auditors and carry their own point; and who do not deem it too mean a thing to flatter the crowd they despise, by appealing to its opinion—crude and vague as they know it must be on most political or religious questions,—as the test of truth and falsehood, of right and wrong. They tell their readers they are "that enlightened, generous, and mighty public, which day by day treads on the heels of the best educated in the land"—obviously therefore excluding them—"which day by day asserts its overwhelming power, and summons before the tribunal of its opinion the statesmen who *presume* to act in its name." And which noble public by a curious coincidence, is invariably found to hold exactly the same opinion about everything,—from a reform bill to flowers in a church, from an American war to a parish footpath,—with the writer. We employ statesmen to act for us, because we, who are the political portion of the nation are ignorant how we ought to act. But this fine writing is not a bit worse than that which is written for the more educated classes. I found the "London Review," some time ago assuring some bishop he must hasten to change his opinion on a point of theological doctrine—I forget now what it was—or "public opinion will never sanction him." If a bishop be really a bishop surely the more important question is, does he sanction the public opinion on that point? It is most probable he has considered it more; and it is at least certain he is a bishop because he is supposed able to instruct the public upon it. Or might he not reasonably ask why he should be expected to desire the woe once pronounced on bishops whom public opinion does

sanction? Whether it was not public opinion which some time crucified his Master; which he has been warned will condemn the true servants also? So again I find a Saturday Reviewer deeming it a sufficient proof that three successive ministers were wrong in reprieving respectively three criminals, if he asserts they "outraged public opinion" by not hanging them. Really if we are to be hung by public opinion, we had better go back to anarchy at once, for that would at least allow us to elude or to fight our hangers. It is however a comfort to reflect that if any one was so hung, the public turning round, and justly incensed at its own misguidance, would condemn the minister who so grossly betrayed his trust. Before public opinion took to standing bareheaded before the Duke of Wellington, it execrated him as a tyrant and a foe, and broke his windows because it could not stone himself. It railed against Lord Raglan and the Duke of Newcastle; it condemned Lord Canning's clemency; it thwarted and mistrusted Prince Albert as long as he lived. In short you will find few men now enthroned amongst its heroes, whom it did not begin by hanging. Happily public feeling is more honest and more shrewd than its flatterers would have it believe; else why do we find it so cordially approving of the rule, that its judgement in any case before the courts should be suspended till the verdict has been given and sentence pronounced? If this self-condemned tribunal were flattered by the public press alone, it were bad enough. But what shall we say, when we find a Solicitor General openly assuming in a court of justice, that the opinion of Society is not only the test of what is true, but the measure of what is legal? and urging that a writer cannot have been guilty of a libel, because "he only administered the rebuke which he believed to represent the opinion of Society."* Who I would ask is so great and notorious a libeller as Society?

Surely we must say this: it is high time we all lay to heart and earnestly act on Coleridge's warning: "he who would keep watch and ward for freedom in our day, has to

* "Yelverton *v.* the Saturday Review:" *Times* report. This account appeared to me at the time a very unfair one: I could find nothing in the article indicated to support the charge that it was written to suit the popular opinion: or that the writer gave any other opinion than what he honestly believed to represent the truth.—Note by *Professor*.

guard against the despotism both of the few and of the many: but most of all against the sycophants of the public." * There are no more hateful foes of liberty than these to whichever portion of the public they address their flatteries. Those who honestly love and respect the nation, will rather labour to convince it of the inadequacy of its knowledge, the shallowness of its wisdom and the narrowness of its opinions.

10. Another foe of liberty, is the moral cowardice that submits to this despotism of the many, of Society. We have seen that a great mass of public opinion is dead against liberty. "L'opinion médiocre" of the comfortable classes, would have all things orderly and convenient, not free and growing: and this not in theory or of malice aforethought; but practically whenever the question arises, whether present expediency and "l'opinion médiocre,"—or the rights of individual men to act on their own convictions in their own way,—shall prevail; then liberty goes to the wall, not so much condemned in the abstract, as perpetually postponed to a more convenient season. And the generality of the artisan classes have not yet adopted even the theory, that liberty is a good thing. They then who understand that the social and intellectual liberty a people enjoys is the true measure of their national union and social progress: they who know how certainly without it men will fall down to the level of tyrants and slaves: they who perceive that the vigour and wholesomeness of our moral and religious life as a nation, depend on the freedom of thought and opinion: and that the true riches of any people consist in the free development of many-sided abilities and characters amongst its citizens; they too who have the most faith in the power and the utility of public opinion; must steadily refuse to submit in any measure to its despotism, or for a moment to consent to its claim to control others, even when it coincides entirely with their own most earnest and cherished opinions. And this without any reference to its truth or error. It is highly probable that the deliberate opinion of society will be the true one: nay it is certain, when knowledge is much diffused and discussion is free, to contain some truth. But in our present state of public twilightenment, it is also certain to contain much of

* *The Friend*, essay x. introductory; note, p. 42.

error. And it is only by its subjection to incessant criticism, re-examination, and free opposition on every point and from every side, that it can be either proved right, or set right. So that to assume it is right without its being subjected to this ordeal, is almost to secure its being wrong. And now that such exposure is felt to be both inconvenient and arrogant and to attempt it unsuccessfully is considered a social offence, that which statesmen have held to be the bulwark of liberty is being turned into the most oppressive because the most irresponsible of tyrants. Depend upon it the want of moral courage, the prevalence of moral cowardice which leads us to submit to it, is one of the worst social diseases of the times, and one most fatal to all truth of character: and to resist its claims, for ourselves and others is one of our highest national duties, one of our plainest Christian duties. It is not possible for any one to be neutral in this matter. Be we men or women, be our circle as small as it may, we are all taking sides in the battle, and if we are not boldly refusing a blind submission to the yoke of Society and its opinion, we are adding to its weight. And I must say that of all the warriors on the side of this slavery, few have been more active or more persistent than the women who belong to what calls itself good society, or religious society, and the women who say, "oh we have nothing to do with politics." They force the yoke on their daughters; they teach it to their sons; they press it on all: do as others do; think as our religious set think; praise all society praises; condemn all society condemns; and you are safe; besides you are well bred, and pious: disobey—you are excommunicate. Thus they throw all the weight of their influence into the scale of bondage; and if but a spark of liberty appears in their circle, they rush to extinguish it, and stamp it out as though it were of necessity kindled from beneath.

We cannot all be enlighteners and guides to the public; but we can, and as lovers of the public we are bound to abstain from swelling its torrent, or from availing ourselves of its strength against our opponents. If we cannot form an independent judgement on every question on which we are called to act or to speak; we need not appeal to a false standard, or condemn those who refuse to submit to it. If we are unable to form any distinct opinion on the matter, we

are unable to judge whether the current opinion we hear about it is true or not; but we can refuse to make up for our want of an opinion by adopting the current one and calling it ours. Because we cannot judge, we are not compelled to be false: because we are ignorant, we need not try to silence those who know or think they know. And what can be more false than to have an opinion, and for shame or fear's sake, to appear to acquiesce in another? It seems to me that all, who have the requisite information within their reach and leisure to examine it, are bound if called to action—and expressing an opinion is social action,—to think for themselves. They are bound I mean religiously, by the laws of God. For "only when men begin to think freely, can they renounce the Devil's service and enter God's. Unless we have much more free thinking in our land than we have now, or ever had, I fear we shall sink into Devil worshippers."*

"I very early," wrote Archbishop Whately, "resolved to tie myself to no man or party: but to listen to reason from every quarter; to prove all things; to hold fast that which is right according to the best judgement I am able to form: and that not because I thought myself an eminent man, but because I thought it a Christian duty. I have faults enough of my own to answer for; I cannot afford to answer for other people's: and yet that I must do, if I am to act at the bidding of others, or give my implied sanction to the acts of a party. It is vain for me to throw off my free agency when I cannot throw off my responsibility. And whether the reason which God has given me be strong or weak, He does not authorize me to shut my eyes and act blindfold. It is not so much intellectual as moral greatness which is wanted for this; but it is precisely that moral greatness which is required of every Christian, and which he is enabled to manifest." †

Even to decline expressing any opinion, requires no doubt some moral courage. "It is certain that the man who makes such a confession, that he does *not* know, what not only Sophists but everyone else professes to know well; will be looked upon by his neighbours with suspicion and displeasure, not to speak of yet worse consequences. He is one whom the multifarious agencies employed by King Nomos have

* Professor Maurice's *Conflict of Good and Evil.*

† *Life and Correspondence of Archbishop Whately*, vol. i.

failed to mould into perfect and uninquiring conformity and he is still in process of examination to form a judgement for himself." * And Dean Stanley declares that even the sight of such courage in another, is ennobling. "How refreshing," he exclaims, "to see men, not in wild knight errantry but in simple Christian independence of spirit—dependent on God, independent of man,—stand up against the fury of professional clamour and the stupidity of popular prejudice. How ennobling to see men, whether in the press or out of the press, resist that tyranny of public opinion which will not hear the other side." †

They are speaking you see of those, whose prominent position and greater ability make all they do conspicuous. Those who, being of less note, enjoy like ourselves the liberty of privacy, need less of this courage. Our part is mainly negative and consists rather in refusing to be accomplices in this tyranny; in persisting in hearing the other side; in declining to volunteer any opinion, if we do not happen to have one. But I think that even in the case of public men, it is quite possible to exaggerate the danger, and therefore the courage which such truthfulness demands. For the more we yield to the authority thus falsely claimed by society, or rather in its behalf; the more exacting it becomes; whereas to refuse submission to its claims, is for the most part to silence them. However let the fearful ones bethink themselves whilst there is yet time, that there is no safety in submission: for that this false opinion concerning the truth of public opinion is unquestionably "one of those erroneous political notions, which having become general and a part of the popular creed, have practical consequences and those of the most fearful nature; a truth as certain as historic evidence can make it." And if it is to be checked at all, it must be at once. The first to suffer from such errors are ever the weaker, or "non-political" portion of the nation: and they should from mere prudence take part with the resisters, not with the promoters of it.

Mrs. Melcombe. It is quite right for men of superior minds or high position to oppose the general opinion if they clearly see it to be wrong: but for most women, to set up their own

* Grote's *Plato*, vol. ii. ch. xx.

† A. P. Stanley's *Canterbury Sermons*.

opinions against it, would be the greatest presumption in the world.

Professor. That expression "set up" involves a fallacy. Whoever maintains an opinion to be true because it is the general one, or the one held in her own family or circle, "sets herself up" to decide that these tribunals have competent information, and are best qualified to judge of the conclusions that information warrants. Or if it is presumptuous in a woman not to pretend to know when she does not know; not to say she thinks when she has not thought at all; not to profess ignorance when she believes herself not ignorant; then I am afraid my dear it will be over bold in her to go to Heaven, where we are told the fearful and they that make a lie, have no part.

Mrs. Melcombe. It is the man's part to prove all things and hold fast what is good. The woman is to learn of her husband at home.

Professor. I certainly can't object to such a view of your duties: are you going—may I ask,—to adopt my dreadful radicalism, and abandon the Conservative principles you have so carefully inculcated on Minnie and the boy? You see women are as much bound to be true as men are; and when called on to act—and to maintain an opinion is a social act,—she must do her best to form a right opinion. Probably she does her best when she examines it with her father's or husband's help: but however she learns, learning never means getting off a party opinion by rote, and abusing all who don't hold it.

11. Not only have we to watch against this public tyranny and private cowardice; the very virtues of the public endanger its liberties; and the strong tide of active benevolence which has done so much to raise us, threatens to flood us with despotism. Our anxiety to get rid of the causes of suffering; and the way in which our best efforts to do so are baffled on every side by the presence of weakness and of more active vice; make us impatient of their legal toleration. As individuals we ought never to tolerate them perhaps; for as such we can only use moral weapons against them; and whatever effect these have, it can only be a moral effect. But to use legal measures is a very different thing, and dangerous to liberty because destructive of freedom: it is the very defi-

nition of tyranny thus "to seek to do in one way, what can only be done in another." To make a man sober or virtuous by law, is not to make him more moral; it is "to produce a fictitious moral effect, by the annihilation of the moral creature." To tempt a man by law to profess the true religion, is not to secure his salvation, but to make him a hypocrite. To say that you, that society, that the Sovereign or the church have no right whatever to make a vicious man moral against his will; is to say what is indeed true, but what expresses the fact very inadequately. You and society have no power to do it; you cannot do it: you can only degrade him and yourselves by attempting to do it: and therefore it is a tyrannical and an immoral thing to try to do it. If this seems an inhumane doctrine, is it not the very way in which God deals with us? does He compel us to be moral, to be holy? Does He not leave us liberty to be immoral? And shall we pretend to be more impatient with sinners than He? "Dieu a créé d'un mot un être libre: mais la liberté une fois donnée, ne saurait être violentée, pas même pour l'accomplissement de l'œuvre de restauration: sinon la restauration serait en réalité l'anéantissement de la créature morale. Il s'agit donc d'amener progressivement un nouvel accord entre la volonté humaine et la volonté divine."* May I stop for a moment to point out this as a striking instance of the great evil we inflict on our nation, by our really stupid contempt for metaphysics? The metaphysical law thus laid down by Pressensé, is not only as constant a law of human nature as gravitation is of matter, but it is one which practically governs all human progress: so that unless our efforts to secure that progress are made in conformity with it, they can effect nothing but mischief. Yet because we English are far too sensible and practical a people to attend to anything metaphysical, we refuse to know the law: and so we go on blundering and stumbling with our legislation, hitting out spasmodically at a vice—and now and then succeeding in slaying a virtue. That the ministers of the Christian faith have done so much for the social and moral improvement of mankind; is owing to the fact, that this principle is so inseparably bound up with the faith they have to teach, that no

* Pressensé's *Jésus Christ, sa Vie et son Temps.*

ignorance of it, no fighting against it on their part, could avail to counteract its presence.

How real this danger to liberty is, we may gather from the annually increasing number of measures urged on our legislators for the direct diminution of our liberties. Philanthropists of all sorts; sanitarians, teetotallers, sabbatarians, anti-ritualists, each would have their own antagonistic piece of liberty cut out: each would make us good and moral and devout on his own point, by means which can be effectual only so far as they annihilate our moral nature. Even society in its vaguer sense, may easily exceed the just bounds of moral control, and so produce that inevitable reaction to which I alluded before.* We are told this has been manifested in New England. "Perhaps nowhere in the world can be found more unlovely wickedness; a more malignant bitter tenacious hatred of good, than in New England." And why? because there "good men are so thoroughly intent on public morality, that the private individual has scarcely any choice left. Under such pressure some men act in open wickedness out of spite, and some secretly: and the bottom of society wages clandestine war with the top."†

It is not you see that these good men are too good themselves, but that they are too interfering with their neighbours. And there is in us also the same want of proportion—want of balance in our social virtues. We have not too much benevolence,—we need far more than we have and far more earnestness and self denial in it; but it is that we are too little governed by a sense of justice. Justice is the foundation of society; and must be the controlling principle, the inflexible test of all that is done for society. In our benevolent zeal we are apt to take for granted, that as mercy transcends so it includes justice; and that whilst we pursue the one, there can be no risk of our missing the other. But the truth is just the converse of this: did we rightly estimate the claims that our miserable and criminal classes have on our justice; had we any adequate sense of the long protracted national injustice involved in the neglect, which has created so terrible a mass of ignorance, poverty, and vice, as we have now to contend with; then there would be no fear of mercy failing. But whilst our desire to do good is made

* Lecture 9, § 14 above.

† H. Beecher Stowe's *Norwood*.

our law of action in place of the resolution to do right, there is the greatest danger of its leading us to injustice; and I think too you will generally find that works of supererogation are feebler than works of obligation. "Liberty, liberty!" cried Joubert, "in all things let us have justice; and then we shall have enough of liberty." Now-a-days when men rest in the delusion liberty is secure, we have more need to cry, "in all things let us have justice, and then we shall have enough of philanthropy." For as liberty is the necessary condition of moral regeneration; so justice is the only true safeguard of liberty:—such justice, as makes it as impossible for the just man to encroach on another's liberty, or to attempt to use any compulsion over him, as it would be for an honest man to rob him because he sees him making an ill use of his wealth. But unless we learn to value our own freedom more highly than our social power: in other words, until we desire and strive to obtain full mastery over ourselves, as being incomparably nobler and better than the most unbounded rule over the hearts and minds of other men; until we do this, we shall never heartily respect the liberty of others. And thus it is, that when the love of doing good, and the love of social power meet together, justice goes to the wall; and the social reformer becomes the social tyranniser, undermining the bulwarks of society in the hope of remodelling its tracery. "The disposition of mankind, whether as rulers or as fellow citizens, to impose their own opinions and inclinations as a rule of conduct on others; is so energetically supported by some of the best and by some of the worst feelings incident to human nature; that it is hardly ever kept in restraint by anything but want of power; and as the power is growing, unless a strong barrier of moral conviction can be raised against the mischief, it must increase."*

12. The next foe to liberty against which we must watch, is the increasing tendency to over government. Our civil liberty is at present threatened, not so much by the eagerness of our Sovereign to govern us, as by our own impatient and vehement desire to be governed: but it does not follow this will always be the case. In either case the danger arises from all these influences which we have found at work amongst us: from men's natural dislike to liberty; from the

* J. S. Mill's *On Liberty*, p. 29.

preference of property and its security to human welfare; from our great impatience of present inconveniences; from our strong desire to be proved right to our own satisfaction, by seeing all men like ourselves; from our aversion to the trouble of thinking; from our ignorance of the fallibility and changeableness of public opinion; from our fear of being condemned by it: and from the exercise of active benevolence being so much easier than the exercise of strict justice. Our Jupiter is so strong; and it is so much handier—so much less trouble—to get him to pull our cart wheels out of the quagmire, than to moil and toil all our lives to get them out by ourselves. That it does us much more good to pull them out for ourselves; and that it makes us far more careful not to get them in;—which is a far higher social good than their easy extrication would be;—this may be true; but the benefit is remote, and for the present the truth is inconvenient. We have not practically suffered so much from this busy meddling of our Sovereign as yet; because hitherto parties have been so nearly balanced, and educated men have had so much weight, as to make the Government very slow to do half the public call upon it to do. But if a large admission of the populace to the suffrage should add new vigour and unanimity to the executive, as we all hope it may; the contest against over government will become a very sharp and arduous one: and it is to be feared that the tyrannical interference of Government in matters with which it ought not to meddle, will no longer be a thing merely invoked for the gratification of an impatient temper, but a very formidable evil actively at work amongst us. Of the fearful extent to which such over government may be carried, those who know the temper of the more intelligent artisan class,—the earnestness of their zeal for the public good, and the extent of their ignorance of human nature,—may best judge. But the despotism they voluntarily subject themselves to in their trade unions, gives us all too sure a measure of the tyranny to which they would gladly subject us all: and if any one desires to estimate the amount of civil liberty which will be left to Englishmen, should these citizens in their present state of enlightenment ever succeed in governing us by the consummated results of their own organized wishes, he may readily do so by measuring the liberty left to the man who

has bound himself hand and foot as a member of one of these bodies, in which if anywhere on earth those results are consummated.

And we must be on the watch to resist each of these tyrannical tendencies not only when they seek to manifest themselves in legislative action, but when they first assert themselves in the expression of opinion: or our resistance will probably be too late. For false opinions which fall in as these do with so many of the lower and of the higher tendencies of human nature; and which being repeatedly expressed remain unopposed and unconfuted, are certain to tell ere long in public action. Whereas the mere fact of their being diligently contradicted neutralises much of their power, by preventing the false assumption that they must be true because every one asserts them. And the true limitations of political government ought to be clearly made out, and steadily maintained, and incessantly pressed upon public attention. Every act that is proposed ought to be criticised from this point of view: and every attempt to overstep those limits should be pointed out and denounced, however strongly popular impatience may demand it, and however hopeless resistance may appear.

13. For the last foe of liberty I have to mention, is the growing belief that resistance to the tendencies of society is useless: that its progress is governed for good or for evil, by inevitable laws, against the action of which it were vain to strive. Unquestionably the tendency of our modern material civilisation, is to grind down all to one model, to pour all men into one mould: it is this which makes it so superficial. Neither is there anything in the present course of modern thought that is likely to control and check this evil. Order in uniformity not in union; obedience secured through inexorable sequences, not freely given to force of reason and conscience;—these are the noblest lessons physical science can teach us: and a materialistic philosophy abhors freedom as nature was said to abhor a vacuum. Thus there is, as Pressensé tells us, "a sure and secret intelligence between materialism and despotism." They who see and regret the evil, still most anxiously press upon us that it will and must prevail: they tell us that the monotonous level of sameness, the dead weight of society's despotism, is all that the human

race has to look for, as the final result not only of its own feebly organised wishes, but of all its slow and painful growth through the weary ages; of all its noblest struggles; of all its unspeakable sufferings. What a contrast between the highest hopes held out to us by these philosophers, and that call which is still sounding through the world; bidding all men arise and return to their Father and their Father's Home; bidding them enter into that glorious liberty of the Sons of God, which Christ has won for all.

There is no surer mark of a generally increasing feebleness of character,—no surer sign therefore of the approach of slavery; than the abounding of such an excuse for passive inaction in the presence of political danger, as this that resistance is useless and the danger inevitable. "Such a mode of reasoning not only implies the worthlessness of all safeguards for good government; but renders useless all history which is written for our instruction, and to guide the future by the light of the past." But even on the principles of their own science, the conclusion of these fatalistic politicians is false. If the course of society be governed by fixed and inevitable sequences, then men's minds and wills—human intellect and moral resolution, enlightened and inspired by God, are proved by experience to be the most potent of social causes.

14. "Nor let any one falsely persuade himself, that they who keep watch and ward for liberty, are meddling with things that do not concern them, instead of minding their own business. For all men should know that all blessings are stored and protected in this one, as in a common repository. Here is the tradesmen's security, the soldiers' honour, the agriculturists' profit. In this one good of liberty, the religious will find the permission of their rites and forms of worship; the students their learned leisure; boys the rudiments of their education; the aged their repose; maidens their pure nuptials; matrons their womanly honour and the dignity of their modesty; and fathers of families the dues of natural affection and the sacred privileges of their ancient homes. To this one solicitude therefore let all other cares yield the priority. If you omit this, be occupied as much and sedulously as you may, you are doing nothing: if you apply your heart and strength to this, though you

seem to be doing nothing, you will nevertheless have been fulfilling the duties of citizens and of men, yea in a measure pressed down and running over."*

Our lectures were over and Dr. Melcombe was gone for a fortnight's shooting before his autumn work should begin, when we met for the last time at Holme Manor, to consider the conclusions we ought to draw from the principles laid down for us. As my friends did not very well agree about these; as I entirely declined to act as umpire; and as those who have followed us so far, will be as well able to draw their own conclusions as we were; I do not propose to trouble my readers with any account of our discussion. The practical conclusions which these ladies have arrived at during the last year may be more briefly told, and will perhaps show a greater unanimity.

Miss St. John, after taking counsel with the Bishop, who was always the nominal and is now the real head of St. Mary's sisterhood; has under his direction engaged her sisters in the work of superintending and training a large workhouse infirmary and its schools: she is aiming at changing the latter into two large families. For this more engrossing occupation they have in a great measure,—not entirely,—relinquished their former work,—the strict observances of services, hours, and holy-days, and the embroidery of vestments and altar cloths; seeking in these things their relaxation not their labour.

Mrs. Charlton has lately ceased to lecture on the wrongs of women, being entirely engrossed with carrying on in her own neighbourhood, and with signal success, the work of the committee for promoting the higher education of women, by arranging courses of lectures in the larger towns; by putting herself in connexion with the principal girls' schools near her; and by assisting teachers and others in preparing for, and enabling them to profit by the Cambridge examination for women above eighteen.

Agatha continues her former work, which fully occupies her time: she has, I hear, signed, and undertaken to get signatures for Mrs. Charlton's petitions both for the better

* "Translated from Petrarch," *The Friend*, introductory, essay x.

protection of married women, and for the female franchise: and I fancy some articles I have read this summer on this subject, are from her pen; but she did not trouble any revising barrister at the last election.

Mrs. Melcombe has not only consented to Sara's plans, she is cordially assisting her in preparing to carry them out. And Sara has made up her mind. This last year she has spent in studying English with her brother, in acquiring household arts under Mrs. Melcombe, and in learning Hindustanee on the natural system by herself. After another year so spent she intends,—so far does the logic of facts triumph in her over that of feeling,—to try for a Cambridge certificate in English, Latin, and logic: which Dr. Melcombe assures me she might easily have obtained this year. A third year she hopes to pass as a lady pupil in a London hospital, under the training of the Sisters of St. John's Home. And then she purposes to go out to India, to devote herself to the education and cultivation of the native women; in connexion with a mission of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, of which her uncle is at present the head. Unwilling to lose her for ourselves and for our own people, I remonstrated against this scheme, and spoke of charity at home. But she told me in reply, her father and grandfather had both lived in and for India; what fortune she had was earned in India; that her health warrants her going there; that few other women were as free, or had so much reason to work for India as she had; that she could hope to do more for women there, than here, where so many abler women are at work: and that there seems to her nothing more useful to be done for our own country than assisting—in however slight a degree,—to discharge some of its responsibility to its Indian Empire. Unable to deny the justice of her plea, I can only wish her, and her fellow-workers there and here—as I hope my readers will do—God's speed.

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